ALASKAN AIR COMMAND


REPORT OF A MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

INVOLVING CIAYA NO.57-167A

WHICH OCCURRED __ 1015

AT NHITTIER, MAKA






ME-1 1342

	3 -		rep.	ORT O	F AF	AIRC	RAF	T AC	6	NT				
	Use this form	in accordance w	th AF F	teg. 61–14	and AF	Manual 6	2-5, "/	Aircraft	Accid e n	t Investiga	store' Han	dbook."	Fill is	
- spec	ces apparcable.	If someone (NEMAL REF	· .			44.5		2 10320		of F
L Pr	LACE OF ACCIPINT.	State, county, nearest	town-Dis					tet Ameri			og this plane	Distance	and die	
		Cnty) Whit	tier -	- 37 mi	NNE		Bla	endori		- 53 m		<u> </u>	<u></u>	
8.	L. at notident son	OTHER?			_		7. JANE : TOLVE	ro: (IFilip pag	grace For	OTHERN ATRICE In 14 for each	aircreft)	Name		
9. C1	9001	22 How 5	Le Oten	I		n Druc		N/		12	Fras Oo	Norther		
	Major			cCnord		nash		n Rem			D Pas Oc			٠.
		TYR & Other		endorf				NG FLOR			Fras Da			<u> </u>
ı M	oChord AFE	Suce La	ST TARBOA	7	or Form	18 smbol)				9,7	trusent			
30	Somora are		•			m S - NACI		11E A.A.1	<i>70</i>	U. 11.3	DE 122 012 0	, 505 j.		
l Al	CEAPT NO.	2 Tyre Model	, Seeres	S. ORGANI	atiof Re	PORTURE AT	CLAPS O	# AF-110	REPORT					
.	1-107A	C-12		MAIOR CO	44 0	-	1	000 MANO)i vis io	AP WEEG			
4. *		,		1		TTPE BO			Dag .		021	<u> </u>	· · · · · · · ·	· .
54	t complied with at a mod like of these	time of accident. () C. O.'s on accident sh	List nam- est.)	1705			34 A		Mo	Chord :	FB. Wa	sh	ti ti ya	
		7		Section Ç—O		•				100				
	ST NAME OF B			Minner I	1	GRADE			BEMAI.		NATIONALI		Bu	10
	HOMED BAR	MAJOR	COMMAND	James	COMMAND.	Capt	AF WE	READ		42695 Group No. 4	D Tree	SQUADEO	OR USF	
(¥e	Chord AFB	, Wash MATS	3	Cor	o ti ner	ıtal Di	4			1705 AT	rgp	34 4	<u>rsa</u>	.:
	man of the same		<i>#</i>	, l	TRANSPOR		AF WE	ЖG	1	SEGUP No.	<i></i>	SQUADRO	77	T
	Chord AFB	, Wash MATS				ital Di				1705 A		34 A	छित्	
					**** ****	ANAUTREAL R	ATTEG AN	ED DATE R	accervists :	C. PRIMARY	DOTT ARMS	HERE	,	
ρį	lot - 12		- 112/11-1			DWAUTERAL R 12 Apr:			PCETARD.	1044A	Derr Ame	NATRI		
7-7-7	lot - 12			P11		12 Apr	il 19	TER APP	Monat 1	1044A		NATOR		
OP 2. Tvi	ERATOR'S FLYI PROFESSIONERS	April 1943 NG EXPERIENCE CARD Green	(Including	P4 1 Civiline)	n 115	12 Apr. 17. L	il 19 est av T Extens (e.g., B	TIPE APP SPICE IN ST -26, 50 hrs.	Model 1:	1044A				
OP 7. Tvi 1. Tot	ERATOR'S FLYS PR OF INSTRUMENT PAL PROT (101 PROT	April 1943 NG EXPERIENCE CARD Green , Copilet, Command	(Including	P4 1 Civiline)	11A 2559	12 Apr. 17. L	il 19 me av T Expense (a.g., B	THE APP HICK IS ST -28, 50 hm.	MODEL 1:	1044A	Accuration	I EMMEDIA	elt Bes	ж <u>и</u> ?
OP 7. Tvi 8. Tos 8. Tos	ERATOR'S FLYI PROFESSIONERS	April 1943 NG EXPENSIONE CAMP Green L, Copflet, Command	(Including	P4 1 Civiline)	n 115	12 Apr.	il 19 EXPENSE (e.g., B. Vas Open	THE AND LINE IS NOT THE AND LATER ON IN	Morat 19 MILLE AD	1044A	Account of	ires Francia		
OF 7. Tri 8. Tot 8. Tot 8. Let 1. Let	EMATOR'S FLYI FR OF INSTRUMENT FAL PROT (1st Pilot TAL 1st PROT HOU PROT HOUSE LAS PROT HOUSE LAS	April 1943 NG EXPEMIENCE CARD Green , Copilot, Command TES T 90 DATS T 90 DATS	(Buckpding Ex Filot, etc.)	Pill Civiline) (PRATION DA	114 2659 1657	12 Apr. 17. 1. pr. 53	il 19 EXPENSE (e.g., B- VAS OPEN No tore empre	TYPE AND SINCE IN ST36, 50 hoa. LATOR ON IN UNIE wer in "Ye consistions,	Monat 19 MILAR AD MITAUMEN TO SEE IF IN SEE IN IN SEE	1044A	ACCEDENT OF	e enema	213	
OP 7. Typ 8. Top 8. Top 9. Left 1. Left 2. Left 2. Left	EMATOR'S FLYE FR OF INSTRUMENT FAL PROT (1st Pilot FAL 1st PROT HOU PROT HOUSE LAS PROT HOUSE LAS PROT HOUSE TER	April 1943 NG EXPEMIENCE CARD Green , Copilot, Command res T 90 Date T 90 Date Monga (5-25, F-4	(Including Ex Pliot, etc.)	Pill Civilian) SHRATION DA	2659 1657 165 164 290	12 Apr. 17. L	il 19 EXPENSE (e.g., B- VAS OPEN NO	THE AND INC. IN SUCCESSION IN	Mopet, 1st HEAR AD	1044A	PACCEDENT OF WEAT Ted at night House	terment of during	213 142	
OP 7. Typ 8. Top 8. Top 8. Let 1. Let 2. Let 1. Let	EMATOR'S FLYE FR OF INSTRUMENT EAL PROF (1st Pilot TAL 18T PROF HOU PROF HOUSE LAS PROF HOUSE LAS PROF HOUSE TEL ESS PROF HOUSE	April 1943 NG EXPEMIENCE CARD Green , Copilot, Command TES T 90 DATS T 90 DATS	(Including Ex Pilot, etc.)	Pill Civilian) SHRATION DA	114 2659 1657 165 84 290 126	12 Apr. 17. L pr. 53	il 19 int my T EXPENSE (e.g., B- Vas Open] No hove ensembledown of otal let or Prior I	THE AND INC. 18 IN THE AND INC. 18 IN THE AND INC. 18 IN THE CONDITIONS, INC. 18 IN THE INC. 18	Model 19 MILAR AD MILAR A	1044A	FACEDERY OF WEAT THE ST. WE TH	a faring of thirtog	213 142 62	
OP 7. Try 8. Toy 8. Toy 9. Lat 1. Lat	EMATOR'S FLYE FR OF INSTRUMENT FAL PROT (1st Pilot FAL IST PROT HOU PROT HOUSE LAS PROT HOUSE TO LEE PROT HOUSE PROT HOUSE LAS	April 1943 NG EXPENSENCE CARD Green , Copilot, Command ras 1 90 Days 1 30 Days 2 Monga (5-25, F-4 (CF, C, 90) Taxs M	(Racheding E1 Pilot, etc.) 1, etc.) (ODEL	Pill Civilian) SHRATION DA	2659 1657 165 164 290	12 Apr. 17. L. pr. 53	il 19 zer by T Expense (a.g., B- Vas Oppe J No over annual shown a oval let oval let oval let oval let oval let	THE AND INC. 18 IN THE AND INC. 18 IN THE AND INC. 18 IN THE CONDITIONS, INC. 18 IN THE INC. 18	Moder, 1: MILLE AD MILLE	1044A	PACCEDENT OF WEAT Ted at night House	a faring of thirtog	213 142	
OP 7. Tvi 8. Toi 8. Toi 9. Let 1. Let	EMATOR'S FLYE FR OF INSTRUMENT FALL IST PRIOT (1st Pilot FALL IST PRIOT HOUSE FROT HOUSE LAS PRIOT HOUSE TEL FROT HOUSE LAS PRIOT HOUSE LAS PRIOT HOUSE LAS PRIOT HOUSE LAS	April 1943 NG EXPENSIONCE CAM Green , Copies, Command TAS T 90 DATS A MODEL (5-25, F-4 (CP, C, 80) THE MO T 90 DATS THE MO T 20 DATS THE MO AM DURING 24 HE	(Including Experience of the Control	Pill Civiline) INTRATION DA) HOUSE	114 2659 1657 165 84 290 126 185 87	12 Apr. 17. 1. pr. 53. 18. W. W. 19. T. 19. T. 19. T. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19	IN 19 LET BY TEXT EXPENSE (e.g., B. Vas Oppn INO LOTE CONTROL LOT LOT LOT LOT LOT LOT LOT LOT LOT L	Type and seek is 51 and 52 and 53 and 53 and 54 and	Modern 1: Market And Yes If the Market And I have a Table And I have a Tab	1044A	FACEMENT OF ACCEMENT ACCEMENT OF ACCEMENT ACCEMENT OF ACCEMENT ACCEMENT OF ACCEMENT ACCEMENT ACCEMENT ACCEMENT ACCEMENT OF ACCEMENT ACCEPTANT A	a Zamanda par district as district as Scorrass	213 142 62	
OP 7. Tvi 8. Toi 8. Toi 9. Let 1. Let	EMATOR'S FLYE FR OF INSTRUMENT FALL IST PRIOT (1st Pilot FALL IST PRIOT HOUSE FROT HOUSE LAS PRIOT HOUSE TEL FROT HOUSE LAS PRIOT HOUSE LAS PRIOT HOUSE LAS PRIOT HOUSE LAS	April 1943 NG EXPENSIONCE CAM Green , Copies, Command TAS T 90 DATS A MODEL (5-25, F-4 (CP, C, 80) THE MO T 90 DATS THE MO T 20 DATS THE MO AM DURING 24 HE	(Including E1 Pilot, etc.) (ODEL DEL S. PRIOR 2 PERSONNI	Pill Civilian Dirination Da House Dirination Da House	114 2659 1657 165 84 290 126 185 87	12 Apr. 17. 1. pr. 53. 18. W. W. 19. T. 19. T. 19. T. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19	IN 19 LET BY TEXT EXPENSE (e.g., B. Vas Oppn INO LOTE CONTROL LOT LOT LOT LOT LOT LOT LOT LOT LOT L	Type and seek is 51 and 52 and 53 and 53 and 54 and	Modern 1: Market And Yes If the Market And If th	1044A	FACEMENT OF ACCEMENT ACCEMENT OF ACCEMENT ACCEMENT OF ACCEMENT ACCEMENT OF ACCEMENT ACCEMENT ACCEMENT ACCEMENT ACCEMENT OF ACCEMENT ACCEPTANT A	R LESSEDIATIONS OF CHARLES OF CHARLES OF CHARLES OF CONTRACT OF CO	213 142 62 44 51	
OP 7. Tvi 8. Tor 8. Let 1. Let 2. Let 4. Ori 8. Let 6. Tor 9. Let 9. Let	PROT HOUSE LAS PROT HOUSE LAS PROT BOUSE TER PROT HOUSE LAS PROT HOUSE LAS PROT HOUSE LAS	April 1943 NG EXPENSIONE CAMP Green , Copilot, Command 188 19 DATE MODEL (5-25, F-4 (CP, C, 80) Tem Mo 1 20 DATE Tem Mo Am DURING 24 He Sorbes D Name	(Including El Fliot, etc.) L, etc.) Loops. Loops. FERSONN Type Age Catt	Pill Civiline) INTRATION DA) HOUSE DA ACCIDENT EL INVOLVE of	114 2659 1657 165 84 290 126 185 87	12 Apr. 17. 1. 17. 1. 17. 18. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19	il 19 ser sy T Exymis (a.g., B- Yas Oppa) No ovre enpreshnown o ovat ler ovat ler Prior I re Prior or Prior	Type And Secret is St. M., 50 head. And Co. St. W.	MODEL 1: METALE AND SELECTION OF A S	1044A TFROT SCRAFT THE OF SCRAFT THE OF SCRAFT THE OF SCRAFT HOOD TO HOUSE THOSE HOUSE THO	FACCEDENT OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE ACCEPTANCE AND T	a linimplay ments of during b Moorran 80 Days	213 142 62 44 51 149	ther
OPT. Typ. L. Tot. L. Tot. L. Isr L. I	PROT HOUSE LAS PROT HOUSE LAS PROT BOUSE TER PROT HOUSE LAS PROT HOUSE LAS PROT HOUSE LAS	April 1943 NG EXPENSENCE CARD Green , Copilot, Command TAR T 90 DAYS MODEL (5-23, F-4 (CF, C, 90) THE MO T 90 DAYS THE MO T 20 DAYS THE MO AM DURING 24 BB Name first)	(Including E1 Pilot, etc.) (ODEL ODEL BEL S. PRIOR 2 AFFECT (BYR) DOIL	CIVERAPO DA DE PROPERTO DE LA CRIMENTO DEL CRIMENTO DEL CRIMENTO DE LA CRIMENTO DEL CRIMENTO DEL CRIMENTO DE LA CRIMENTO DEL CRIMENTO DEL CRIMENTO DE LA CRIMENTO DEL CRIMENTO DEL CRIMENTO DE LA CRIMENTO DEL CRIMENT	114 2859 1657 185 84 290 126 185 77:47	12 Apr 17. L pr 53 14. W 19. T 20. T 20. T 20. I 19. I	II 19 MF BY T EXPENSE (e.g., B. FAS OPEN IN OF AND OPEN INTO THE PROOF IN THE PROOF	TYPE AND SHOCK IS ST28, 80 hea. A 70A ook 10. Uses were in "Ye conditions." Prior In Prior In Prior In State Institutions. Name Ho Name Ho Con-rossur (See A 7 M 60-6)	MODEL 1: METALE AND SELECTION OF A S	1044A TFROT SCRAFT THE OF SCRAFT THE OF SCRAFT THE OF SCRAFT HOOD TO HOUSE THOSE HOUSE THO	P According to What ted at night ted at nigh	a Luisuplature de district de	213 142 62 44 51 149	in the state of th
OP 7. Tvi 8. Tor 8. Tor 8. Let 1. Let 1. Let 1. Let 1. Let 1. Let 1. Tor 1. Let	EMATOR'S FLYE FR OF INSTRUMENT FAIL PROOF (1st Pilot FAIL IST PRIOT HOUSE LAS PROOF HOUSE LAS FAIL THEN SPEET IN	April 1943 NG EXPENSENCE CARD Green , Copflot, Command 750 Days T 50 Days	(Including El Fliot, etc.) L, etc.) Loops. Loops. FERSONN Type Age Catt	Pill Civiline) ITTRATION DA HOUSE DA ACUMENT EL SIVOLVE of SEAL	114 2859 1657 185 84 290 126 185 87 7:47	12 Apr. 17. 1. 17. 1. 17. 1. 17. 18. 18. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19. 19	II 19 MF BY T EXPENSE (e.g., B. EXPENSE (e.g., B. FAS OPEN IN	E.3. TYPE AND SERVICE	MODEL 1: STLAR AD STRUMENT OF WEST LAST UND THE STRUMENT OF WEST L	1044A T PROFITE OF TIME OF THE OF TIME OF THE OF TH	FACEDERS OF WEAT TOO ST. WEAT TOO ST. WEAT TO DAY SEED OF TO SEED OF TOO SEED	B MOSTERS B MOST	213 142 62 44 51 149	No.
OPT. Typ. L. Tot. L. Tot. L. Isr L. I	EMATOR'S FLYE FR OF INSTRUMENT FAIL PROOF (1st Pilot FAIL IST PRIOT HOUSE LAS PROOF HOUSE LAS FAIL THEN SPEET IN	April 1943 NG EXPENSENCE CARD Green , Copilot, Command TAR T 90 DAYS MODEL (5-23, F-4 (CF, C, 90) THE MO T 90 DAYS THE MO T 20 DAYS THE MO AM DURING 24 BB Name first)	(Imhoding Fr Pilot, etc.) L, etc.) Loon. Loon. Type Awro Ratin (3) P	Pill Civiline) ITTRATION DA HOUSE DA ACUMENT EL HIVOLVE of	114 2859 1657 185 84 290 126 185 77:47	12 Apr. 17. L 17. L 17. L 17. L 18. W 18. W 19. T 19. T 19. 19 20. T 19. 19 21. 19 22. 19 23. 19 24. 19 25. 19 26. 19 27. 26. 19 28. 19	II 19 MF BY T EXPENSE (e.g., B. EXPENSE (e.g., B. FAS OPEN IN	TYPE AND STATES OF THE AND STATES OF THE STA	Modern 1: STAR AD	1044A T PROFITE OF TIME OF THE OF TIME OF THE OF TH	FACCEDENT OF WEAT THE STATE OF	B MOSTERS B MOST	213 142 62 44 51 149	No.
OPT. Typ. L. Tot. L. Tot. L. Isr L. I	EMATOR'S FLYE FR OF INSTRUMENT FALL IST PRIOT HOT HOUSE LAS PROT HOUSE LAS CLES CLES CLES CLES CLES CLES CLES CLE	April 1943 NG EXPENSENCE CARD Green , Copflot, Command res # 90 Days # 30 Da	(Including Fr Plict, etc.) L,	Pill Civiline) HOUSE D. ACUDENT EL HIVOLVE	114 2659 1657 165 84 290 126 185 87 7:47 7:47 7:47	12 Apr. 17. L 17. L 17. L 17. L 18. W 19. T 20. T 21. Is 22. Is 23. Is 24. Is 25. Is 26. Is 27. 24. Is 28. Is 28. Is 29.	II 19 MF BY T EXPENSE (e.g., B FAS OPER INC OPER	TYPE AND SHOCK IS ST28, 80 hea28, 80 hea38, 80 hea470. Os II User Iwe Is "Ye conditions." Prior Is Instruction Ins	Monet 1: MILE AN MILE AN MILE AN MILE OF MARKET WHITE OF MARKET WHITE OF MARKET WHITE OF MARKET MARKET	1044A T PILOT TO AT TIME OF CRAFT TO AT TIME O	FACCEDENT OF WEAT THE STATE OF	B MOSTERS B MOST	213 142 62 44 51 149 149 U	No (se)
OPT. Typ. L. Tot. L. Tot. L. Isr L. I	EMATOR'S FLYE FR OF INSTRUMENT FALL IST PRIOT HOT HOT HOUSE LAS FROT HOUSE THE FROT HOUSE LAS CLESTEY, FROT STEEL, FROT HOUSE LAS FROT HOUSE	April 1943 NG EXPENSIONE CAMP Green , Copilot, Command Hab T 90 DAT9 MODEL (5-25, F-4 (CP, C, 90) THE MO T 30 DATS THE MO AM DURING M HB Sadies D Name t mame first) (2) (cpring fi fillion f	(Imhoding Fr Pilot, etc.) L, etc.) Loon. Loon. Type Awro Ratin (3) P	Pill Civilian) HOUNG DACUMENT EL HIVOLVE of SEAL	114 2859 1657 185 84 290 126 126 7:47 7:47 7:47	12 Apr. 17. L 17. L 17. L 17. L 18. W 19. T 19.	IN 19 LET BY EXPENSE (A. G. B. LET BY IN 19 LET BY IN 19 LET BY PROPE IN PROPERTY IN PROPE IN PROPERTY IN PROPE IN PROPERIES IN PROPE IN P	TYPE AND SHOCK IS ST28, 80 hea28, 80 hea28, 80 hea470	Monet 1: MILE AN MILE AN MILE AN MILE OF MARKET MILE OF M	1044A T PILOT TO AT TIME OF CRAFT TO AT TIME O	FACCEDENT OF WEAT THE STATE OF	B MOSTERS B MOST	213 142 62 44 51 149	No.
OPT. Typ. L. Tot. L. Tot. L. Isr L. I	EMATOR'S FLYE FR OF INSTRUMENT FALL IST PRIOT HOT HOUSE LAS PROT H	April 1943 NG EXPENSENCE CARD Green , Copilot, Command res # 90 Days # 190 Da	(Including Fr Plict, etc.) L,	Pill Civilian) INTRATION DA HOUNE ACCUMENT EL HIVOLVE of 1 2 2 A 5 1 8 2	114 2659 1657 165 84 290 126 185 87 7:47 7:47 7:47	12 Apr. 17. L 17. L 17. L 17. L 18. W 19. T 20. T 21. Is 22. Is 23. Is 24. Is 25. Is 26. Is 27. 24. Is 28. Is 28. Is 29.	IN 19 LET BY EXPENSE (A. E. B. LET BY AND SELECT BY PROTEIN FRONT USAF USAF USAF USAF USAF	TYPE AND SHOCK IS ST28, 80 hea. A 70. 60	Modern 1: MILLE AD MILLE	1044A T PILOT TO AT TIME OF CRAFT TO AT TIME O	FACCEDENT OF WEAT THE STATE OF	B MOSTERS B MOST	213 142 62 44 51 149 75 8 Un	No (18)
OPT. Typ. L. Tot. L. Tot. L. Isr L. I	EMATOR'S FLYE FR OF INSTRUMENT FALL IST PRIOT HOT HOT HOTEL FROT HOTEL LAS FROT H	April 1943 NG EXPENSIONE CAMP Green , Copilot, Command Hab T 90 DAT9 MODEL (5-25, F-4 (CP, C, 90) THE MO T 30 DATS THE MO AM DURING M HB Sadies D Name t mame first) (2) (cpring fi fillion f	(Including Fr Plict, etc.) L,	Pill Civilian) HOUNG D. HOUNG D. ACUMENT EL HIVOLVI	114 2659 1657 165 84 290 126 185 87 7:47 7:47 7:47 60 6251 12344 75585	12 Apr 17. L 17. L 18. T 18. T 18. T 19. T 1	IN 19 LET BY EXPENSE (A. E. B. LET BY AND SELECT BY PROTEIN FRONT USAF USAF USAF USAF USAF	TYPE AND SHOCK IS ST28, 80 hea28, 80 hea28, 80 hea470	ORDAN COMMENT OF CAME AND CAME A	1044A T PILOT TO AT TIME OF CRAFT TO AT TIME O	FACCEDENT OF WEAT THE STATE OF	o Moores o Moores Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male	213 142 62 44 51 149 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75	No k
L Too	Castley, Cas	April 1943 NG EXPENSENCE CAMD Green , Copies, Command Has F 90 DATS MODEL (S-25, F-4 (CF, C, 60) THE MO F 30 DATS THE MO F 30 DATS THE MO AM DURING M Ha Sadies D NAME Hambedfret (C) (C) (C) (C) (C) (C) (C) (C) (C) (C	(Including Fr Plict, etc.) L,	Pill Civilian) HOUNG D. HOUNG D. ACUMENT EL HIVOLVI	114 2659 1657 165 84 290 126 185 87 7:47 164 2595 2595 2595 2595 11722 67412	12 Apr 17. 1 17. 1 18. T 18. T 19. T 1	USAF USAF USAF USAF USAF USAF	TYPE AND STATE OF THE A	ORDANA OR	1044A T PILOT TO AT TIME OF CRAFT TO AT TIME O	FACCEDENT OF WEAT THE STATE OF	Fater Make Market Make Make Make Make Make Make Make Make	213 142 62 44 51 149 149 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15	No.
L Too day	Camey, A	April 1943 NG EXPENSENCE CAMD Green , Copies, Command Has H 50 DATS MODEL (5-15, F-4 (CP, C, 60) Tem M H 50 DATS TEM Mo H AM DURING M Has L mame first) (2) (enneth J liger M Conrad N Engelf W Conrad N Engelf W Conrad N Engelf W Conrad N	(Including Fr Plict, etc.) L,	Pill Civilian) HOUNG D. HOUNG D. ACUMENT EL HIVOLVI	114 2659 1657 165 84 290 126 135 87 7:47 7:47 7:47 60 126 135 87 7:47 7:47 82 135 84 135 87 135 87 135 87 135 87 135 1	12 Apr. 17. 1. 17. 1. 18. T 18. T 18. T 19. T 19	USAF USAF USAF USAF USAF USAF	TYPE AND LINES IN STATE AND LINE	Modern 19 Maria Andrews Andrews Lawrence The Comment of Westher Westhe	1044A T PILOT TO AT TIME OF CRAFT TO AT TIME O	FACCEDENT OF WEAT THE STATE OF	Morran Malays Many Malays Ma Malays Malays Malays Malays Malays Malays Malays Malays Malays M	213 142 62 44 51 149 149 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15	New Akada karangan ka
L Too day	Castley, Cas	April 1943 NG EXPENSENCE CAMP Green , Copies, Command NAS N 90 DATS N 90 DAT	(Including Fr Plict, etc.) L,	Pill Civilian) HOUNG D. HOUNG D. ACUMENT EL HIVOLVI	114 2659 1657 165 84 290 126 185 87 7:47 164 2595 2595 2595 2595 11722 67412	12 Apr 17. 1 17. 1 18. T 18. T 19. T 1	USAF USAF USAF USAF USAF USAF USAF	TYPE AND STATE OF THE STATE OF	ORDANA OR	1044A T PILOT TO AT TIME OF CRAFT TO AT TIME O	FACCEDENT OF WEAT THE STATE OF	Fater Make Make Make Make Make Make Make Make	213 142 62 44 51 149 149 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15	No. (18)

	Tarker E BATTO OF		ET OF DUAL CONTROLS CONTROLS	an Planting State 1		
L. LAST NAME (JR., II, etc.)			RADE COMPOSESTE SAIL	HAL NO. NATION	ALITY AM	D YEAR
Thomas	Alter	deredich	Cent HEAD AO	-746251 US		1920
L ASSUSED BASE	MAJOE COMMAND	STROMMAND	AF WING	GROUP NO. AND THE		COL UNIT
VaChord aff. Weeh	KATS	Continent	21 Div	1705 ATGo	34 A	<i>m</i> 3.7
McChord off, Wash America Base for Furing	MAJOR CORMAND	SUBCOMMAND	AF WING	GROUP NO. AND TYPE		OS CHI
McChord &FB, Wash	MA 15	Continent	61 D	1705 ATG6	34 A	750
L ORIGINAL ARRONAUTICAL HATING						
Pilat - 20 May 19	43	Er Hilat	- 9 July 1952	10444		
	ENCE (Including Civi					
			CL. LIST BY TYPE AND MODEL EXPERIENCE IN STRELAG AN	E had IP lad C-P iable C Bergyy (e. K., B-25, IP, 50 h)	(¥.)	
	**	MATION DATE 7 Jul 5	8:00 C-74			
8. Toral Pilor (int Pilot, Copilor,	emmana ruot, etc.)		0:03 //=/4			
9. Total ist Pilot House	71	2003	Pill in Home below if Instruct	ent and Night Experience of	Operator •	Par Eleted in
8. TOTAL HOURS, TP Z CP	C (Check applier					
1. PROT HOURS LAST 90 DAYS		245	22. TOTAL INT PILOT INSTRUM	BY WEATHER HOURS		287
2. 1et Pilot Rocius Last 90 Data		148	23. TOTAL 1ST PILOT INSTRUME	ит Нось Восы		145
3. Horres Last 90 Days; 🔲 1P 🖟	SICP LIC	97	24. 1st Palot Instrument (Wes	ther and Hood) ilks, last 6	MOXING	51
4. Pilot House Last 30 Date		75	25. let Phot Introducts (We	athw and Hood) Has. Last	O DATE	18
5. TOTAL PILOT HOURS THIS MORE	L (R-25, F-51, etc.)	645	26. Total Pilot Night House	LAST 5 MONTES		96
6. 1st Prior Hours This Moore		36.	27, 197 Prior Night Books L.	LAT & MONTHS		73
7. Horse This Moder, 🔲 IP 🛭	Cr Cc	234	28. NIGHT HOUSE LAST 4 MOR	, Die Koce De		137
8. TOTAL PROT HOURS THIS MODE	L LAST 90 DATA	245	29. TOTAL PILOT NIGHT HOUSE	THE MODEL LAST 80 DAY	rs :	108
9. 1st Pilot Hours This Money, L	AST 10 DAYS	341	30. 1st Palor Night House Ti	IN MODEL LAST 60 DAYS		67
L Hours This Model Last 90 Da	TAL IP K CP]c 97	31. Night Has. This Moone L	AST 60 DATE IP C	P 🗆 с	108
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		Carlina C	DAMAGE			
PLANE OR WERCEAGE WAS I	Resultant to an AF	Page	7. Give below a considered estim	39, 494	Destac	
PLANE OR WESTFAGE WAS I			COST OF DAMAGE TO AU		the ND Fu	
		Yes No		IER GOVERNVENT PROPERT	<u>.</u>	
· In Drawe Dawasen Berner Pro		44 I 150 L. 147		ER OUTERARY I MOTER	3 4	
L IS PLANE DAMAGED BEYOND ECO		Commence Barrers or	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	TARE PROPERTY		
IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED.	GIVE ENGINEERING		COST OF DAMAGE TO PR	VATE PROFESTY		
OF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED. NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUIRE	GIVE ENGINEERING	Man-Bus.	COST OF DAMAGE TO PR	VATE PROPERTY	\$	
IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED. NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUEST. WAS PRIVATE PROPERTY DAMAGE	GIVE ENGINEERING		COST OF DAMAGE TO PA COST OF INVESTED COST—OTHER (Expiniu)		\$	
IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED. NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUIRE	GIVE ENGINEERING	Man-Brs.	COST OF DAMAGE TO PR COST OF INJURIES COST—OTHER (Expisiu) TOTAL RETHINATED CO		\$	
IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED. NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUEST. WAS PRIVATE PROPERTY DAMAGE	GIVE ENGINEERING	Man-Brs.	COST OF DAMAGE TO PA COST OF INVESTED COST—OTHER (Expiniu)		\$	
IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED. NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUEST. WAS PRIVATE PROPERTY DAMAGE	GIVE ENGINEERING ED FOR REPAIR: 107 Y SEPARATE SERET.	Man-Hus. Section B — SPEC	COST OF DAMAGE TO PR COST OF INJURES COST—OTHER (Expisiu) TOTAL RETHATED CO		\$	
IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED, NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUIRE WAS PRIVATE PROPERTY DAMAGE IF "YES," DESCRIBE DAMAGES ON	GIVE ENGINEERING and FOR REPAIR TO Y SEPARATE SERET. Thirth affected the socio	Man-Bus. Section 6 - SPEC	COST OF DAMAGE TO PR COST OF INJURES COST—OTHER (Expisiu) TOTAL RETHATED CO TAL EQUIPMENT DE-ICEAS		\$ \$	on Course
IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED, NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUIRE WAS PRIVATE PROPERTY DAMAGE IF "YES," DESCRIBE DAMAGES OF Check items of special equipment w	GIVE ENGINEERING ED FOR REPAIR: 107 Y SEPARATE SERET.	Man-Hus. Section 6—SPEC lent.	COST OF DAMAGE TO PR COST OF INJURES COST—OTHER (Expisiu) TOTAL RETHATED CO	et of Accepta	\$ \$	on Course
IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED. NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUES. WAS PRIVATE PROFESTY DAMAGES. IF "YES," DESCRIBE DAMAGES OF Check licens of special equipment with the profession of the profession o	GIVE ENGINEERING and for Repair inf? Y SEPARATE SERET. Thich affected the social AREAMENT FREE EVINOUSEED EACHMENT IN FLE	Man-Hrs. Section 2—SPEC lent.	COST OF DAMAGE TO PR COST OF INSURES COST—OTHER (Expiniu) TOTAL ROTHARD CO TAL EQUIPMENT DE-ICEAS ATO	EQUIPMENT FOR CLEAR	\$ \$	ом Состра
IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED. NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUES. WAS PRIVATE PROFESTY DAMAGES. IF "YES," DESCRIBE DAMAGES OF Check licens of special equipment with the profession of the profession o	GIVE ENGINEERING ED FOR REPAIR INTERPOLATE SERET. FIGH ASSETS THE EXTRACOSMED EACHERNT IN FIG. NOTURE, METORE, O.	Man-Bus. Section 8—SPEC lent. IC	COST OF DAMAGE TO PR COST OF INFURENCE COST—OTHER (Expiniu) TOTAL ROTHARD CO TAL EQUIPMENT DE-ICEAS ATO COCHMENT APPECTED THE ACCIDENT	EQUIPMENT FOR CLEAR	S S Vignori Par	
IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED. NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUES. WAS PRIVATE PROFESTY DAMAGES. IF "YES," DESCRIBE DAMAGES OF COMMANDER OF COM	GIVE ENGINEERING ab for Repair In Parameter Super. Thich affected the accident Extraordament Frame Extraordament Engineering Fig. Nowver, Marone, or Static whit	Man-Bus. Section 2—SPEC Lect. Lect. Lect. A AMERICA OF STREAM IN ch is known t	COST OF DAMAGE TO PR COST OF INJURES COST—OTHER (Expisis) TOTAL ESTIMATED CO TAL ESTIMATED THE ACTIONS TO have existed in	Equipment for Class the Whittier a	S S S Vision Pa	
IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED. NUMBER OF MAN-HOUSE REQUES. WAS PRIVATE PROFESTY DAMAGES. IF "YES," DESCRIBE DAMAGES OF Check items of special equipment with the second control of the second control	GIVE ENGINEERING ED FOR REPAIR: INTERPOLATE SERET. Thich affected the accident of the Evineous Engineering Fig. Nowver, Marone, or Static which is be	Man-Bus. Section 2-SPEC Legs. Legs. A AMBRICE of SPECIAL I ch is known t lieved to hav	COST OF DAMAGE TO PR COST OF INJURES COST—OTHER (Expisis) TOTAL ESTIMATED CO TAL ESTIMATED THE ACTIONS TO have existed in	Equipment for Class the Whittier a	S S S Vision Pa	
IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED. NUMBER OF MAN-HOUSE REQUES. WAS PRIVATE PROFESTY DAMAGES. IF "YES," DESCRIBE DAMAGES OF Check items of special equipment with the second of the second o	GIVE ENGINEERING ED FOR REPAIR: INTERPOLATE SERET. Thich affected the accident of the Evineous Engineering Fig. Nowver, Marone, or Static which is be	Man-Bus. Section 2-SPEC Legs. Legs. A AMBRICE of SPECIAL I ch is known t lieved to hav	COST OF DAMAGE TO PR COST OF INJURES COST—OTHER (Expisis) TOTAL ESTIMATED CO TAL ESTIMATED THE ACTIONS TO have existed in	Equipment for Class the Whittier a	S S S Vision Pa	
IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED. NUMBER OF MAN-HOUSE REQUES. WAS PRIVATE PROFESTY DAMAGES. IF "YES," DESCRIBE DAMAGES OF Check items of special equipment with the second control of the second control	GIVE ENGINEERING ED FOR REPAIR: INTERPOLATE SERET. Thich affected the accident of the Evineous Engineering Fig. Nowver, Marone, or Static which is be	Man-Bus. Section 2-SPEC Legs. Legs. A AMBRICE of SPECIAL I ch is known t lieved to hav	COST OF DAMAGE TO PR COST OF INJURES COST—OTHER (Expisis) TOTAL ESTIMATED CO TAL ESTIMATED THE ACTIONS TO have existed in	Equipment for Class the Whittier a	S S S Vision Pa	
IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED. NUMBER OF MAN-HOUSE REQUES. WAS PRIVATE PROFESTY DAMAGES. IF "YES," DESCRIBE DAMAGES OF Check items of special equipment with the second control of the second control	GIVE ENGINEERING ab for Repair por	Man-Bus. Section 2-SPEC Legs. Legs. A AMBRICE of SPECIAL I ch is known t lieved to hav	COST OF DANAGE TO PR COST OF INJURIES COST—OTHER (Expisio) TOTAL ESTHATED CO TAL EGOLPMENT DE-ICEAS ATO COUPMENT APPECIED THE ACTION O have existed in e rendered the rad	Equipment for Class the Whittier a	S S S Vision Pa	
IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED. NUMBER OF MAN-HOUSE REQUES. WAS PRIVATE PROPERTY DAMAGES. IF "YES," DESCRIBE DAMAGES OF Check items of special equipment with the time of this figure that the time of this figure. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY HOW THE USE. Precipitation the time of this figure.	GIVE ENGINEERING ED FOR REPAIR BY BETARATE SERET. Thich affected the social ALEMANENT FIRE EVINACULARIA FORE EXTENDED SERVICE STATE OF THE STATE OF THE COLUMN TO THE BY CHERETION TEMP.	MAN-BES. Section B-SPEC Local Manager or System L Ch is known t Lieved to have	COST OF DANAGE TO PR COST OF INJURIES COST—OTHER (Expisio) TOTAL ESTHATED CO TAL EGOLPMENT DE-ICEAS ATO COUPMENT APPECIED THE ACTION O have existed in e rendered the rad	Equipment for Class the Whittier a	S S S Vision Pa	
IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED. NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUIRED. WAS PRIVATE PROPERTY DAMAGE. IF "YES," DESCRIBE DAMAGES OF Check items of special equipment with the time of this former is the time of this former is the time of the time of the time of the same and the time of the time	GIVE ENGINEERING and FOR REPAIR. TO Y SEPARATE SERET. Thich affected the accidence of the	MAN-BES. Section E - SPEC LOCAL ACCORDANCE OF SPECIAL IN COLOR KNOWN to Lieved to hav ACCORDANCE OF SPECIAL IN COLOR KNOWN to ACCORDANCE OF SPECIAL IN COLOR IN	COST OF DANAGE TO PR COST OF INJURIES COST—OTHER (Expisis) TOTAL ESTMATED CO TAL EQUIPMENT DE-ICEAS ATO COMPRESS AFFECTED THE ACTOS: O have existed in E rendered the rad time and place of scribes) a Weather Conditions	EQUIPMENT FOR CLASS the Whittier a ics ineffective	S S S Vision Pa	
IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED. NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUES. WAS PRIVATE PROFEST DAMAGE IF "YES," DESCRIBE DAMAGES OF Check Rems of special equipment with the time of this females of the time of this females of the time of t	GIVE ENGINEERING ED FOR REPAIR: 107 SEPARATE SERET. THICH Affected the mode ARRAMENT FORE EXTINGUISHED EQUIPMENT IS FINA NOTIVER, MISTOR, O STATIC Whill Light is be is accident	MAN-BES. See No See No See No See No See No See No A AMERICA WEATHER (AS DEW POINT OTES 45 Wet	COST OF DAMAGE TO PR COST OF INJURIES COST—OTHER (Expisis) TOTAL ESTHATES CO TAL ESSHERET DE-ICEAS ATO COST-OTHER TERMINATES CO COST-OTHER TERMINATES CO TOTAL ESTHATES CO TOTAL ESTHATES CO TOTAL ESTHATES TOTAL ES	EQUIPMENT FOR CLEAR the Whittier a ics ineffective	S S S Vision Pa	
IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED. NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUES. WAS PRIVATE PROPERTY DAMAGE IF "YES," DESCRIBE DAMAGES OF Check items of special equipment w RADIOS INSTRUMENTS DESCRIBE BRIEFLY HOW THE USE Precipitation the time of this f contributing to th	GIVE ENGINEERING ED FOR REPAIR: 107 SEPARATE SERET. THICH Affected the mode ARRAMENT FORE EXTINGUISHED EQUIPMENT IS FINA NOTIVER, MISTOR, O STATIC Whill Light is be is accident	MAN-BES. See No See No See No See No See No See No A AMERICA WEATHER (AS DEW POINT OTES 45 Wet	COST OF DANAGE TO PR COST OF INJURIES COST—OTHER (Expisis) TOTAL ESTMATED CO TAL EQUIPMENT DE-ICEAS ATO COMPRESS AFFECTED THE ACTOS: O have existed in E rendered the rad time and place of scribes) a Weather Conditions	EQUIPMENT FOR CLEAR the Whittier a ics ineffective	S S S Vision Pa	
IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED. NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUIRED. WAS PRIVATE PROFESTY DAMAGE. IF "YES," DESCRIBE DAMAGES OF Check Rems of special equipment with the transfer of the process	GIVE ENGINEERING ED FOR REPAIR: 107 SEPARATE SERET. THICH Affected the mode ARRAMENT FORE EXTINGUISHED EQUIPMENT IS FINA NOTIVER, MISTOR, O STATIC Whill Light is be is accident	MAN-BES. See No A AMERICA WEATHER (AS DEW POINT OTES 45 West	COST OF DAMAGE TO PR COST OF INJURIES COST—OTHER (Expisis) TOTAL ESTHATES CO TAL ESSHERET DE-ICEAS ATO COST-OTHER TERMINATES CO COST-OTHER TERMINATES CO TOTAL ESTHATES CO TOTAL ESTHATES CO TOTAL ESTHATES TOTAL ES	EQUIPMENT FOR CLEAR the Whittier a ics ineffective	S S S Vision Pa	
NUMBER OF MAN-HOUSE REPAIRED. NUMBER OF MAN-HOUSE REQUES. WAS PRIVATE PROFESTY DAMAGE. IF "YES," DESCRIBE DAMAGES OF COMMENT OF COMMENT OF COMMENT OF COMMENTS. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY HOW THE USE Precipitation the time of this formatting to the Contributing to the Contribution of Cont	GIVE ENGINEERING ED FOR REPAIR INTERPOLATION SEPARATE SERRY. Chich affected the accidence of the series of the	MAN-BES. See No A AMERICA WEATHER (AS DEW POINT OTES 45 West	COST OF DAMAGE TO PR COST OF INVESTS COST—OTHER (Expisio) TOTAL ESTIMATED CO TAL ESTIMATED TOTAL ESTIMATED TOTA	Equipment for Class the Whittier a ics ineffective	S S S Vision Pa	
NUMBER OF MAN-HOUSE REPAIRED. NUMBER OF MAN-HOUSE REQUES. WAS PRIVATE PROPERTY DAMAGE. IF "YES," DESCRIBE DAMAGES OF COMMENT OF COMMENT OF COMMENT OF COMMENTS. DESCRIBE BRIEFIT HOW THE USE Precipitation the time of this fountributing to the Contributing to Contributing to the Contributing to the Contributing to Contribut	GIVE ENGINEERING LO FOR REPAIR INTERPRETATION SEPARATE SERET. CICHARLEST FURE EXTINGUISHED EQUIPMENT IN FLA NOWINE, MENUM, OR STATIC WHILL LIGHT IS BE IS ACCIDENT DIRECTION TEMP. VELOCITY 2 26 46 wind conditions for Bested to secident.	MAN-BES. Section G-SPEC Legs	COST OF DAMAGE TO PA COST OF INVESTED COST—OTHER (Expisio) TOTAL ESTMATED CO TAL ESTMATED TO TOTAL ESTMATED THE AGENCY TO TOTAL ESTMATED THE AGENCY TO TOTAL ESTMATED TO TO TOTAL ESTMATED TO TOTAL ESTMATED TO TOTAL ESTMATED TO TOTAL ESTMATED TO	EQUIPMENT FOR CLARE the Whittier a ics ineffective	S S S Vision Pa	
IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED. NUMBER OF MAN-HOUSE REQUES. WAS PRIVATE PROFESTY DAMAGE. IF "YES," DESCRIBE DAMAGES OF Check items of special equipment with the same of this formation the time of this formation to the time of this formation that the time of this formation that the time of this formation that the time of the time	GIVE ENGINEERING and FOR REPAIR. TO THE PARTY SHAPE. THICH Affected the accidence of the	MAN-BES. Section G-SPEC Legs	COST OF DAMAGE TO PR COST OF INVESTS COST—OTHER (Expisio) TOTAL ESTIMATED CO TAL ESTIMATED TOTAL ESTIMATED TOTA	Equipment for Class the Whittier a ics ineffective	S S S Vision Pa	

Section 1—ACCIDENT TYPE	PUNCANY	BECOMDARY	그 사람들은 그 살아 가장 하는 것이 되었다. 그 없는 것이 없는 것이 없는데 없었다.			CTD D AMALYSIS A collection option of Table 1977 Collections)
GROOMS ON WATER LOOP	\perp X	\mathbb{X}	1. ERBORS OF AIR CREW	1	1	A MATERIE PARLURE LANDING GE
Wingsto Jakepone	_[Ì	Misused Power Plant on Power Plant			MATERIA GIA
Value Ve LANNING		L	History Brass am/os Frant Controls of			NOSE WHEEL OR TAX WHEEL
COLLARS ON RETRACTION OF LANDING ONLA	ŢĹ.		Intracesa Use de Pisone Commons De Alla			LANDING GRAB POSITION INDICATORS
17-20-20000T	-	-	INATTENTIVE TO FUEL SOPELY OF FUEL	-		Bears
Over 1000	\Box -	+	FAR. 20 TO EXTEND OR RETRACT LANDENG GRAS		Н	Tier
Nome UP ON NOME OVER			PROFESSION UNIVERSITY THREATH OR RUNWAY	1		Designation
COLLAROS WITH OTHER ADVIAGE		X	FALED TO COMPRESSATE FOR WORD COSMODES	∇	∇	MATERIEL PARTURE FOURMENT
COLLEGOR WITH CHOPED OF WATER	$-\mathbb{C}$		Marineso Derasa	\mathcal{V}		
Ornes Contrators		L	FALLED TO LEVEL ON PROPERTY	H	7	RADIO EOUDINET
Page of Groung		1_	FARESTO COMMENTS CHARGE ASSESSMENT OF CRUSTES	-		District Strates
For Aspec Rescondent And	_	-	FAR IN TO MAINTAIN ASSOCATE PLENS SPEED			REPRACES STREET
AMPAGES PARCES IN PAGET	_ -	1	SHAME LOST (Weather ADMINIST OF A PORTS) CONTRICTED VPR FLAGET LISTO UNFATORABLE WEATHER	1	10.7	OFFICE OF PERMUNICATION STREET
ARAPPOWED ADDRAST	_	1	Introoping, Openation on Authorising	1-4	-	SAFAIT ROUMENT
Page Ca Fat Blast Accessor	$ \Box$		OFRACED ADDRESS IN RESIDENT MANUEL	\vdash	-	COCKET, SEAT, GASOFT, FITTINGS, DOG
Oracia (Liet)			MADE INADEQUATE PLIQUE PREPARATIONS ATTEMPTED FLIQUE BETOND ASSLITT OR	H		ADMANUST
	_	L	Expansion For the Community Uses	12.5	٠.	Oness:
Santan IL-PHASE OF OPERATION (Clarch only ONE)	X		Orman (List): Incorrect navi -	X	X	2.46.1018
TARRES DESIGNAT TO PLICAT	4	: .	gation.	H		Low Centre
TARR-ON	$-\nabla$	V	2. ERBORS OF OTHER PERSONNEL			Rate-Too
A ip Floore	- (^)	Μ				SHOW HAIL
Go Around	_		AIRCRAFT INADSOCATELY MAINTAINED AIRCRAFT INFROFERLY CLEARED FOR FLIGHT	Ш	X	CHATCHARLE WIND COMPITIONS FOR LANDIN
ENGINE RUNNING-NOT TAXING		٠. :	WRATER INCOMPRINT PORSCAR	Н	~	TARREG. OR TARROWS
Свосир Орраднока	<u> </u>		IMPROPERTY OPERATED ARTIFARITY FACILITY INTROPRACY SUPERIMED TRAINING (GROUND	H	Ť	THEOLEGIC IN PLOTE White Alort
Гиратаниц о			Personnell Surraymen Tanning (Fight In-	П	-	Tropposite
ti el kan fund beginning til kendel er en <u>en for de</u> skelet til elle. 2011 f. 17 f. 18 kan en de ble forbette var en en en eller forbette ken.		7	Structors and Plinht Leadurs) Orners (List):			Downsias: Crosast
Sealing L—CONSTITIONS AFFECTING ACCOSENT (Classical particular)				X	X	Ornes. L Langelia arza
INDERMATE FORCED LANDISC				ĬĬ		
Processionant Landing	$\exists \forall$	∇	A MATERIEL PARLUES FOWER PLANT			
FUEL EXHAUSTION			Cooling Status	Ц	4	Show
ESGUE STOPPAGE			LUSSICATING STATEM		\dashv	
Loss PERSONNET T.O.'s NOT COMMISS WITH			Post System		7	Rotsit
I ormen (Lim): Off course due to	1-1		BROINE STRUCTURE (Includes Jet Engines)			RUSWAY TOO SHOAT
navigational error.			PROPRIER AND PROPRIER ACCUMONS			Omes Hatard:
			SOFERCHAROUR (Reciprocating Engine only)	XI)	X	2. GROUND EQUIPMENT
			Maters, South	\Box		Ampair Parames
Section 64—VIOLATIONS (Charte off top financia)			Engine Accumouses			AMPAT PACHINE
			Omes:	Ш	_	Акаретна Вичева
IMPROPES TAXING PROCESSES		$\langle \cdot \rangle$	Untergrantism		-	Lapscenzo Divicas
PARLING TO USE CRECELIST UNAUTHORIZED LOW PLYING	-X	Χi	a material pailure air prame	V	J	OTHER:
INSTRUMENT PLYING ON VYR CLEARABLE	П		FLIGHT CONTROL STATEM	\triangle	Δ	
Unicrocation Politation]	4	WINES, ROTORS, AND FLATE	3	4	Sup in Plicar Park
Orman (List):	1	1	COULDE AND FAMILIA PRINTAGE			Smort Over Takogs for Plicky Path Ornes:
		- 4	Ottos:			IL UNDETERMINED
TKANASE MONTO LIESEN VERSIENS		. 1				

	Section ODESCR	PTION OF ACCIDENT		e volta e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e
Tell in narrative form, in as much becked on reverse side are justified by teps taken to extinguish it.	detail as necessary, every this narrative. If fire w	ything that is known as involved in acciden	about the accident, t, explain in detail its	Make certain that items origin and progress and
,				
				•
				•
				.:
	1			
COMMENDATIONS for action to p				
	\mathcal{B}^{ϵ}	L,I		
The same of the first section	P ANTHENTICATION (Each in	ندو بناونه اسا پشهاد	l sign below)	
PERSONNEL RESPONSED LE POR TRUS ACCIDENT E	Ave Been Covered Oppositions	TOF RESUTTAL . NO RE		TAL STATEMBUT (A) ATTACHING
RESOURCE RESOURCE NOT AVAILABLE BECAUS AS SUBSCIENCE REPORT	MEMBER (Norm and Grade	u Duvey; 🗵 Orman (Ru	Market General Column	and Oracle)
merodorf AFB_Alasta_	William J HODE	DALL SAJUSAR	CARLY	Carrel
ANT (Name and One) Inha	American According Office		Recessor (Same and 9	2900
IBS E HOHAMALA COL. USA	NICK JUSACRIOS	.1ST LT. USAF	service!	TION, CHO, USAP




2 December 1952

SIAIBMEAR

I state that I, Thomas S. Sulkivan, let Lieutenant, USAF, or assigned to the 5002nd IG, Special Investigations Squadron, Elmendorf AFB, Alcoha; that F have approximately 200 hours experience as an air crow percer in the Air Ferces of the United States; that I have been a parachatist since 1951; that I have flows at least 2,000 hours in aircraft, either as a crew member, passanger, or parachatist; that I have approximately four and one half years active military service, all of which has been in the Air Force; and that I have been an investigator for the past four years.

On 28 Movember 1952, at approximately 0830 hours, I departed Elecodorf ATB, Alaske, in a Piper Super Cub sircraft flown by Dr. Terris Moore. President of the University of Alaska. We flew directly over the Chugach Range to the Serpentine Glacier, arriving in that area at approximately 0945 hours. A search of the Serpentine Giscier failed to reveal sircraft wreckege as marked on the map supplied us by 10th Air Resous. However, a search of the Surprise Glacier on the slopes of Mount Connect seen revealed what appeared to be the tail section of an aircraft on the floor of the Surprise Clacier, and close to the principal western ridge of Mount Connett. We flew directly on to the glacier, and landed in the soft anow which covered the greater part of the glacier. Our altimater indicated approximately 8,100 feet upon landing, and the temporature of our thermometer. which was fixed on the wing strut of the sircraft, indicated zero degrees Pahrenbeit. This temperature fluctuated plus or pinus 50 during daylight hours. Or. Moore stated that he had not the eltimoter at 100 feet at Elmendorf before our takeoff. We landed at approximately 1000 hours. After londing, we proceeded immediately to the tail section of the wrecked mircreft, which was authorize tely 1,500 feet from our landing position. The snow was dry and approximately six to eight feet in depth over the floor of the glacier, and drifted in many areas to a greater depth. Travel on the floor of the glacier was thus practically impossible without snow shoes, and even with their assistance, extremely difficult.

Having errived at the teil section of the aircraft, we made a visual inspection, and determined from the numerals 1107 appearing on the right aide of the vertical stabilizer of a C-124 type sireraft, that we had positively identified the missing aircraft. The tell section appeared to have been absered completely off from the funelage section of the mircreft; and was tipped forward from its normal position so as to rest shost perpendicular to the level floor of the glaciar. Host of the skin covering the vertical stabilizer and mudder was stripped completely off, but that section on the right side of the vertical stabilizer upon which were painted the moments described above, was intent. The structure of the varticel stabilizer was tilted forward out of alignment, and Dr. Moore remarked to no that "the impact 'O'e' must have been tramendous". (See photograph attached.) a blanket was caught on and hanging from the left elevator of the tail section, and upon exemination showed a slight charring. Or. Foore and I probed for a short time around this tail section, but were unable to discover human remains, or other objects of interest. It will as noted from the photographs that the tail section is demaged on the extraction



of the right and left borisontel stabilizers and vertical stabilizer. There was no evidence of fire basing desaged the tail section. From our position on the glacier at the tail of the sireraft, we noted a large mound in the show approximately 150 feet above and to the right of the tail motion, and following this line with our eyes, we noted a piece of metal approximately three or four square feet in area on the precipios of the western ridge of Hount Gannett above us, and sporoximately 600 feet above the floor of the glacier. Looking down glacier and to the left of our position as we feed the ridge of Hount Cemett, we noted several jamed bits of motal protrading from the most, and also in direct line with the tail and the wreckege higher on the hill. Because of this appearest dispersel of the parts of the siroraft over such a large ures from near the top of the ridge to the floor of the glecier hundreds of feet below, the mecessary conclusion is that no one could possibly have survived the impact of the electraft upon the mountain. From this exemination I concluded that the sirerest had strock the face of the western ridge of Mount Commett below its maddle and above the drifted snow line at an angle of about 20 degrees in esimuth, and thus scattered parts of the eircraft down glaster as described shove. We visually imspected the face of the ridge for further signs of wreckage, and I may three stringers or langerons scattered to the right of the line of wreckage described shove, but below the snow line and protruding vertically from one to two feet above the enew, and spaced about ten to twenty feet apert.

We then climbed to the mound about 150 feet above, and to the east of the tail assumbly, and while probing this mound discovered a blanket which was partly covered with frozen blood, and melting in the sunlight. We noticed the odor of decomposing or burned flesh in this vicinity, and I proceeded to probe the mound for human remains or other objects of interest. Dr. Meere stated that he had to return to the floor of the glacier to propere a rememy for his already, as he was interested in returning to Finander? AFB as seen as possible. Before Dr. Moore returned to the floor of the glacier, however, I saw a dark from below him is the enow, and having excevated the snow for about two or three feet, pulled up a Military parks. This perks bors no serks of identification. It was buttoned up and there were no human remains evident thereon or nearby. The significant thing about this parks was that the front of it was generally cherred through one layer of cloth. While Dr. Hours returned to the floor of the glacier I continued probing this wound for approximately one half hour, but was unable to discover anything of real interest. I uncovered several fragments of cardboard cartons near the site of the blankst. As I began to probe underneath this mound I discovered that it expected to be a buge encyball which had experently rolled down from a higher altitude. It was at least fifteen feet in dismeter, but contained no object within it that I could determine. Dr. Moore then colled me to oppe and sid in the construction of a runway for our sircraft, and I complied with his request.

We spent several hours packing show is an area about 600 feet in length and ten feet in width, running generally cost and west, and because of a preveiling wind down gladier in the necessary direction of our takeoff, we began to construct a new runway to the south at 90 degrees to our cantwest runway. Dr. Moore thought that a cross-wind takeoff would be too



Statement of Commu S. Sulliven (cont'd)

hasordous, and we ebendoused this attempt after a short time. Our construction of the runway was interrupted by several para-drops of survival equipment by loth Air Resons Group sireraft, which occupied us for some two hours in retrieving the equipment and setting up our comp. The wind down standard increased steedily towards sundown, and caused us some screen as to whether or not we would be able to take off on the following day.

On 29 November 1952 we arose at approximately 0700 hours and continued work on our east-west russey, which we lengthened (because of the prevailing tail wind of five to eight miles per hour) some 200 feet. The angine of our aircraft had become frazen during the night, and Dr. House worked with a plumber's make pot and a blow torch for approximately can hour before we could get the engine started. At approximately 0900 hours Dr. Moore made a takeoff down glacier with a tell wind of approximately five miles per hour, and burely succeeded in gotting his sircraft in the air. He circled and returned, lending at the east end of our ranes, and we worked for another hour lengthening of running another 500 feet. Fortunately the prevailing tail wind gradually leasened, and during one of the Tulls we bearded the sircreft and took off, using only 1,000 feet of our runny, having lightened the afrogest of all but Dr. Moore's personal survival equipment. We then flew towards Elmendorf AFB on a direct course, but observing bad wasther ahead, and not being equipped with proper instruments; we turned west and flow to Palmer, where the cailing was approximately 1,000 feet. Our fuel tanks indicated one fourth full at Palmer, but Dr. Moore desided that he would fly on down to Elmendorf. We then turned south and proceeded down the Knik Arm and flav over the water at an altitude of 150 feet, erriving at Elmendorf at enproximately 1200 hours. As we approached Elmendorf, Dr. Moore expressed concern over the fuel level in our tanks, and mode an emergency landing on the taxing near the MATS terminal.

In my opinion, based on the conditions which I observed on the Surprise Choter, any attempt to locate the remains of the passengers abourd the G-124 streets, or to looste the remainder of the areckage of that girareft. will be an extremely difficult operation. As I have indicated above, the show level is expressinately sight fact in depth over the floor of the claster and drifted to higher levels in many parts. There is a large snowdrift along the northern edge of the glacier where it joins Mount Cannett, and I would estimate the snow to be us doop as neveral bundred fact in the area of the wreckage. It is significent that we were unable to locate any of the engines or any of the major parts of the C-124, and this fact gives rise to the conclusion that either the sircraft is completely disintegrated, or that its major parts are buried under meny fact of anow. One fact is obvious from observation, and that is, that the siroreft and its contents are scattered over at least two acres, most of the area having an incline of about 40 degrees from the horizontal, and covered with at least eight feet of fresh fallen powdered mov. Should it be demed desirable to excavete the wreckers and the human remains at the site of the eccident. I would suggest that a party of approximately twelve sen to be flown in by. light sirersft, or perschuted onto the glacier, which party might be evenuated upon completion of their operation by light giroraft or helicoptery

> THOMAS 8. SULLIVAN 1st Lieutenent, USAF

Heedquarters, Aleskan Air Command



HEADQUARTERS, 1705TH AIR TRANSPORT GROUP CONTINENTAL DIVISION MATS McChord AFB, Washington

TCNCO

29 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Record

SUBJECT: Brief on D-39/22, C-124 S/N 1107

Flight D-39/22, G-124 #1107, departed TCM for EDF at 2370Z (1530L) via Military Airways, 22 November 1952.


The flight plan was 7 hours and 03 minutes and there was fuel on board for 11 hours 30 minutes. This amount was computed in accordance with MATS Manual 55-1 plus 2402 lbs for pulling extra power due to forecast icing conditions.

The aircraft gross weight was 174,746 lbs at take-off. Maximum gross weight for this type aircraft is 175,000 lbs. The center of gravity was 31.2% at take-off (within limits) and computed to be 29.1% at time of landing (within limits).

There was 11 crew members and 41 passengers on board; all properly manifested.

The weather for EDF was forecast to be 6/8 5000-7000 ft, 8/8 at 8000-10,000 ft with 10 miles visibility. Ladd AFB was the alternate and was forecast to be 7/8 9000-12000, 8/8 15,000-18,000 with 7 miles visibility. The cross section for the route indicated clear skies to appreximately the half way point with increasing cloudiness to 8/8 coverage from the 3/4 point to EDF. Ising level was 1000 ft at Middleton Island and on the ground at EDF. A stationary front lay between a point west of Sitka and Middleton Island. (Pilot reports from other mircraft in the vicinity indicated moderate to severe icing and turbulence.) The weather cross section forecast 30 knot winds from 180° to 9000 ft between Middleton and EDF. Pilot reports from this area indicated 65 to 80 knot winds; however, this information was not then available to the pilot. A U-47 southbound into EDF at approximately the same time reported a ground speed of 68 knots.


The pilot was considered qualified in all respects and had recently been checked by the CHTLD Chief Pilot (Major Warren) on a trip to Europe. (Pilot's and Co-Pilots Gualifications are attached). There is much conjecture as to how the flight passed through two range legs to hit the mountain and the concensus of opinion is that severe precipitation static was a logical factor. It is considered that this assumption plus the unpredicted high cross wind were major considerations in the flight drifting so far off course.



The flight reported just east of Middleton Island at 9000 feet at 0550 and this was the last contact established.

The sircraft was subsequently sighted at approximately the 8300 ft level on a mountain 45 miles from EDF on a bearing of 74 degrees.

THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526



UNIVERSITY of ALASKA

COLLEGE, ALASKA

December 2, 1952

OFFICE OF THE PHENDENS

CONFERENCE WITH MAJOR DWIGHT H. POTTER AND MR. WILLIAM L. KIEFFER

Experience in Arctic Flying: I have about three thousand hours in total flying time, about equally mixed on skiis and on wheels and approximately half of that time is in Alaska or in the Arctic. For example, I have made six flights between Boston and the Arctic Ocean during the years since 1946, terminating at the Bering Strait, Little Diomede Island, on through to Copper Mine, Coronation Gulf, up under Victoria Island in Canada. Also in 1937 I made a flight in my own plane from Helsinki, Finland, north to the Islands in the Arctic Ocean there, a region taken by the Russians from Finland, and hack to Helsinki and over to Stockholm. I have not had much experience in gazing upon and evaluating causes of other aircraft accidents. However, I have done quite a bit of mountain flying. Specifically in the summer of 1951, I made approximately seventy-five (75) to eighty (30) glacier landings and takeoffs assisting various scientific expeditions here in Alaska. Included in this were landings and takeoffs of 10,0001 on Mt. McKinley in which I removed eight members of one expedition from 10,000* including their equipment.

What Time Did I Leave Anchorage for the Glacier on This Particular Flight?: I departed Anchorage Friday morning, November 28, just before dawn and landed on the glacier just as the sun was rising and its rays were striking the surface of the glacier. Stayed there during the day and over night. I was forced to stay overnight because there was a downslope wind blowing which made landing easy but made takeoff hazardous, if not impossible, thus we decided to stay overnight and wait until the wind moderated.

Approximately What Time Did We Leave the Glacier the Next Day?: We left the glacier sometime between 11:00 and 12:00, I believe most probably around 11:30 in the morning, Nevember 29.

Question as to the Location of the Mountain, Size of the Glacier, and the Relative Position of the Plane Striking the Mountain?: The location is on the south slope of Mount Gannett, almost exactly fifty miles due east of Anchorage. Mount Gannett is just under 10,000° in height according to a World Air Chart and according to my altimeter the altitude approximately 8,000° where the remains of the aircraft are found which is the same level as the spot where we landed the Piper aircraft. It would appear to be the case that the aircraft, having come in from Middleton Island, must have passed over other peaks in the range immediately south of Mount Gannett, namely the outlying fringe peaks of a two to three mile wide snow field extending from the south base of Mt. Gannett immediately southerly. Thus it appears to me that the aircraft pilot must have been unaware of the terrain immediately near him

ME HT

Page Two
Conference re C- crash with MajorDwight H. Feer and Mr. Wm. L. Kieffer


as he was approaching Mt. Gannett because it would appear that he must have barely skimmed over, closely missing the outlying fringe peaks of this snow field. From this I conclude that he was on instrument, flying blind, and probably crashed without any warning whatsoever to him directly into the southerly face of Mt. Gannett.

Do I Think There is Any Possibility the Pilot Might Have Attempted a Forced Landing?: My own opinion is that there is not any evidence whatsoever that he attempted a forced landing for the reason that the aircraft is so completely demolished, only the tail assembly to any degree at all retaining its original shape, that it would seem that he must have struck the face of the Mountain at full flying speed somewhere between 200 and 300 m.p.h. One other point might be noted and that is the fact that it is just barely possible that icing may have brought him into the spot in which the aircraft struck, because the point of impact is so closely in line with the peaks immediately south of the edge of the snow field that the question is raised, just how closely did the pilot miss those peaks and was he perhaps somewhat higher and naturally brought down by icing?

Condition of Snowat the First Spot We Landed?: The temperature ranged between 5 below zero and 5 above zero during the time that we were there. The snow is very loose, deep, soft: and powdery as much so as is ever found in glacier country. Without snowshoes, one went up to one's hips or even deeper--between the hips and shoulders in the snow.

How Deep is the Snow Around the Aircraft Itself?: The aircraft's remains are scattered over an area of several acres in extent ranging from the spot where the glacier definitely terminates and the rock wall begins. There were pieces of the aircraft there, down through some hundreds of yards, perhaps 500, on to the glacier itself. At that lowest spot the glacier is perhaps anywhere from 500 feet to 1,000 feet thick as also typical glaciers in such an area so that the depth of the snow varies from that down to nothing at all over the spot where the aircraft is strewn.

What Did We Do When We First Landed and Saw the Aircraft?: Initially we had a list dentification as to the location of the aircraft, the air chart I had been given indicating the site of the crash to be near the south slope of Mount Gilbert. However, when Lieutenamt Sullivan and I arrived around Mount Gilbert and were not able to find the aircraft we noticed other aircraft circling to the area around Mount Gannett and thus flew over there and spotted the remains. We landed almost immediately within 400 yards of the remains and proceeded on foot toward the aircraft. We only had one pair of snowshoes, my own, in the back of the ship and I wore those, tramping a trail for Lt. Sullivan, who floundered rather slowly without snowshoes. I stayed back with him so as not to praceed him very much. As we approached the aircraft he made it known to me that it was his responsibility to be the first one there at the aircraft. Thus I backed back and kept him closely behind me, tramping a trail for him and when we came to the remains, I definitely lagged back to allow him to be the first one to actually touch the remains and be there initially. However, immediately after we were there together and examined the remains beginning at the tail assembly very carefully. It was obvious at the outset that there were no survivors, thus that question was answered immediately.



THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

The state of the s

Page Three
Conference re C-124 crash with Major Dwight H. Potter and Mr. Wm. L. Kieffer

What Aircraft Was lt?: After some five minutes of careful inspection of the tail assembly we found the numbers "1107" on the vertical tail fin and that established the identity of the aircraft for according to Lt. Sullivan that was the number of the missing C-124 Globemaster. We then speculated as to what we could next do most usefully. Some remains of the aircraft were visible up the slope and we decided to go up and investigate the remains. I preceeded Lt. Sullivan again on snowshoes and we reached the site of the first material projecting out of the snow again at the same time. What we found there was simply bloody blankets and pieces of boards and miscellaneous broken-up material. We left this scene and went back to the aircraft to start tramping a runway for takeoff for my own aircraft while Lt. Sullivan stayed there some time. Lt. Sullivan must have remained at the site of the crash another hour or two while I was back in my own aircraft tramping a runway. I did not, myself, return to the site of the crash except briefly again with Lt. Sullivan to photograph the remains of the tail assembly. We saw pieces of what appeared to be ailerons but we saw no clear shapes of wings or of fuselage. Apparently all was destroyed in this tremendous impact in direct collision into the rock wall.


Was the Wreckage Uphill From the Tail?: The wreckage was about half strewn halfway up the hill from the tail and about half down from the tail. That is judging by the maximum distance that wreckage was visible from the tail. Specifically, wreckage was visible from the tail about, in my judgement, three hundred yards up the slope and three hundred yards down the slope.

Could There Have Been An Avalancheto Move the Stuff Around After the Aircraft Crashed?: I believe that is exactly what did occur. It would appear to me that there has been several feet of downfall of snow on top of the remains after the aircraft in addition to that a certain amount of avalanching from the mountain-wall itself. However the amount of avalanching is moderate.

It is Feasible To Recover Objects There?: My answer would be that anything is feasible if one is willing to spend enough energy, time and money on it, ranging from \$10,000 to a million to ten million to a hundred million to a billion dollars, anything can be done within reason. Thus certainly everything could be recovered if one wished to. It is a question, in my opinion, whether the objectives are worth x number of dollars and energy. It looks to me as if it were a job for about a month's time for eight or ten men being provided with food by aerial supply working full time on the job to reasonably excavate the remains of that wreck. I conferred at some length with Captain Hackett, of 10th Search and Rescue, regarding this. He is an experienced mountaineer in my opinion and I would feel that his opinion regarding this matter is just as good, if not better, than my own as to procedures and making recovery by the ground party.

What Type of Equipment to Recover the Bodies and Material?: I will refer you to Captain Hackett on that. I say standard mountaineering equipment. Standard mountaineering equipment with shovels.

Can Power Equipment Be Used?: Frankly I am not sufficiently familiar with the



THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

Page Four Conference with Major Dwight H. Potter and Mr. Wm. L. Kieffer re C-124 crash.

power equipment available to the Air Force. You may have some special power equipment I don't know about. I would doubt it however. I would think your best procedure would be through the use of hand-digging for the reason that the material is broken -up in small pieces and scattered all over the area. If you use power equipment you haven't got so close a selective control over what you are picking up. You may have to sift these objects out of the snow. And that is undoubtedably done best by hand and hand-shoveling.

What Do I Feel Is the Largest Type Aircraft Freel Can Get In There?: This question was discussed at length with various colonels in 10th Search and Rescue at Elmendorf and General Kepner and I repeat my opinion that since helicopters are not available, and since the SAló aircraft probably would be unsafe to use at the site of the crash, we concluded that the best means would be to use helicopters and perhaps the SAló at the 4,000° level on the glacier floor and westerly from the south face of Mount Gannett and transport the ground party to that spot and the ground party then proceed up the glacier. But again I would be quite willing to modify this opinion if Captain Hackett held other views on the subject.

Tem lu

TM:ar


11

PASSENJES C-124 ST-107A

				Farachute
Duty Bame	Serial	No. Or 3 Br	Comp Organization	
A SILLER, Edward	J AF16385	003 A/20,USEF	PARC C: 031F 3rd Radio Sq Security Serv	Mob Mars Inic
X HOOTON, Marien	E AF24555	SCE A/10,USAF	Elmendorf AFB USAF 39th A/D Wg.	Alas Elmen- Miss Unk
X MCXANN, Dan F	AF16352	208 A/20, USAF	dorf AFE, Ala USAF 2d AACS IAM S Elmendorf AFE	q, Misk Unk
X ANDERSON, Isaas	. '	771 A/B, USAF	USAF 531st ACAW Gp	, El- Miss Unk Mas
X GRACH, Sames di	<i>f</i>	825 Pvt,Arm	239th T Port ABD 987, Sept	co. His date
X HOBLIT, Noel E			dorf AFB, Ala	Kimen- Mise Vnk
X SMITH, Eugene	/ 3259A	Cal, USAF	USAF 5002d IC Sp 1 Elmondorf AFS	oves Sq, Niks Unk
X SEEBOTH, Albert	. 9 142-177	Cmar, Havy	Mavul Petrola No 4, Fairbank	n Kes List Unk
X SINGLETON, Law:	remos 3 7 295776	LtCol,Army	1st Sen Disp, APO 949, Seatt	Ho Usaral
X STEARNS, Earl	9 0-11132	iej, mrine	es MarTne Co rpla 7	chool Miss Unk
X JACKSON, Willia	a 2 / 9167A	Vaj usaf	Cuaptico, Va USAF 7th Nea Gp, E dorf AFS, Alas	men- Hisk Tak
X COOMBS, William	-	04 Oppot, USAF	10th Air Resco	ie Sp. Misk Jak
X DRASKEY, Delber	_		10th Air Resca Elmendorf AFB,	10 Gp, Misk Ink
X GOEBEL, Jerone	_		Elmendorf AF8,	
X PONIKVAR, John	•	•	10th Air Rescu Elmendorf AFS,	
X TRIBBLE, Welter	_	• .	7th Wea Sp. Sl dorf AFB, Alas	
X TURNEULL, Rober	₹ % A0539077	Capt, USAF	Hq Sq Sec, AAC mendorf AFB, A	
X SHEDA, Denald A	A0788266	int_usif	Hg Sq Sec, AAC	. El-Miss Unk
X SERGER, Alan	7 01676195	ālt, irmy	menders APA, A 925th Engir Ava Ft Richardson,	op, kias duk
X BUIN, Reginald	7 019 87263	•		Go. Mids The
I LEAFERD, Jack E	_	•	1930th AACS SA	AFO MIS Unk
X LOSKYLER, Edwin		Elt, Any	731 Seattle, 926th Bagr Ava Elmendorr APS,	do, Mits Cak
X MOON, Robert B		1 ELt, 08AF	10th Air Biv.	Elmon-Nik ar Vois
A SCHNOZE, Edward	3 RA670799	9 3/Sgt, Army	dorf AFB, Alas 667th AAA AW S Ft Richardson,	Alas
Harrier Company			•	

· · · · · · · ·		
PASOENGERS 0-184 51-107	PESTRICIED	
X UNGER, Leonard	AF37051019 T/Sgt, WSAF 5001st Comp Wg, Ladd AFB, Wiss	θ n k
X RAY, James H &	AF33266952 S/Sgt, USAS 39th C/D Wg, Elmendorf Miss	línk
X VAN FOSSEN, Robert D	AF25417504 S/Sgt, USAF 3rd Radio So Mob Security Miss	Unk
I CODY, Delroy	AF13388325 A/10, USAF 50018 t Comp Wg, LAGE AFE, Mass	Unk
X BENSOMB, Sterling S	AF12270861 A/1C, USAF 27 ARCS IAM Sq. Binendorisses	Unk
X BUDAHN, Verne C	AF17345292 A/2C, USAF 3rd Radio Sq Mbb Security Miss	
X BURNS, Bateman ?	Service, Elmendorf AFB, Ales AF18396484 A/20,53AF Same X153	Unk
I COMPON, Thomas	AF16376614 A/2C, USAF Same Wiss	Unk
X DYER, CARROLL R	AF11221975 A/2C, USAF Same %iss	Unk
X LYDES, Thomas S	AF12365760 A/2C, USAF Same Miss	Unk
a aice, Edmond a dr	# AF14401304 A/2C, USAF Same Viss	link
I THICPEN, Thomas C.	- AF14438910 A/2C_USAF Same Wiss	Unk
X WHITE, Bernis F	AF16398936 A/2C, USAF EJOFE Comp Wg, Ladd AFB, Miss	Unk
X MARTIE, Howard E	AF16397317 A/30, USAF 10th Air Rescue Gp, Elmen- Miss	Unk
X MATTHEWS, Lloyd 1	AF14438630 A/20, USAF Fil Radio Sq Mob Security Wiss	
X CARD, Robert D	Service, Elmendorf AFB, Alas US55220886 Pvt2, Army 813th Eng Avn Br, Elmen- Wiss	Unic
X EITHS, Leonard &		lak
	997, Seattle	

ASTERNA



THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION


Mr. 1947, 1927-48 1984: (See) Final Sumbanishes of Streets Anchoral Involving C-1262, 58 Shill? at Jurgeton Charley, -Ingle, on 22 No. 33

Chicago was only deposite to the skill be maded the sking of the sking of the chicago of the chicago of the sking of the s

A Partie of the continues of the excitate including the properties of the continues of the

as time projection because is not rither to be an entire the property of the control of the cont

RESTRICTED ... SECRETATION



SECURITY INFORMATION:

SECTION "O"

On 22 Nov 52, at 1330 AST, MATS Flight D-39/22 C-124A 51-107A departed on a flight plan specifying Instrument Plight Rules, McChord 9000 direct Rolling Bay Blue 32 Dungeness 10,000 Neah Bay 8,500 direct Sandspit 9,000 Middleton Island 9000 Whittier Amber 1 Anchorage Elmendorf Air Porce Base. At 1954 AST MATS 1107 reported to Yakataga Radio that he was over Middleton Island at 1947 9,000 estimating Whittier at 2017 AST. Anchorage Center them attempted, through Yakataga Radio, to issue a clearance to the mircraft, but Yakataga Radio was unable to reestablish centect. The Center them requested that Elmendorf Airways attempt to contact the mircraft. Loweral attempts were made by Elmendorf Airways, but to no avail.

On 25 Nov 52 a search aircraft assigned to the 10th Air Rescue Group reported sighting wreckage on Mt. Sannett, Alaska. Positive identification of the wreckage was not made, however, until 28 Nov 52, when a light sircraft landed at the scene.

It is the opinion of the board that the accident was caused by an unforecasted increase in the winds which the pilot encountered in the Middleton Island area and by poor radio reception from severe precipitation static, which is known to have existed in that area at the time.

RESTRICTED

SECURITY INFORMATION

RESTRUCTED

FINDIN 8:

- 1. The aircraft crashed into the side of Mt. Sannott at approximately the flight altitude of 9,000 feet, at which time it was approximately 30 miles to the right of course.
- 2. There was no indication of malfunction of mechanical or radio equipment.
- 3. The most probable cause of the accident was a navigational error attributed to the pilot.
- 4. A contributing cause of the accident is that the winus were incorrectly forecast.
- 5. A probable contributing cause was precipitation static which made radio reception impossible.
- 6. It is a probable conclusion that the aircraft crashed prior to its BCA at Shittler.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- B 1. That a procedure be established with the CAA to provide north-bound aircraft calling Yakataga with the lates enroute weather to Elmendorf.
- P. Chat an additional radio aid to navigation be installed in the Whittier area.
- 3. That consideration be given to changing the military airways from the Middleton Island-Anchorage direct route to a Middleton Island-Kenai-Anchorage route.
- β 4. That the minimum altitude from Middleton Island to Anchorage, direct reste, be raised to 11,000 feet.
- 5. That continued study be made to devolog radio receivers that
- f. That a Radar Altimeter SCR 716 be installed in the C-124 type aircraft.

MEDIC	AL REPORT	OF AF	AIRCRA	FT ACCI	DENT	
Use this form in accordance with					_	ndbook." Fill i
spaces applicable. If additional space						
	Section	A GENERAL II	FORMATION			
L. Station Investigating Accident		LATION OF ALECE		3. Affe	PRIMATE ENGLANCE	OF ACCIDENT FROM
Elmendorf AFF	McChor				4 miles	
L PLACE OF ACCEPANT	1	, Moder, Serie	•		OF ACCIDENT	2. DATE OF AQUAL
Mt Gennet, Aleska		#5 1- 107	A	Apor	ox 0617Z	22 Nov 5
This trensport pla	ene veš on e i	romitine (Maht fro	on McChord	APP. Was	fraton on
route to Elmerdorf AFP	. Alaske. Pos	ition re	rort was	riven ove	r Middleto	n Island f
the Gulf of Alaska. Ti	ds was the la	st conte	et with	the plere.	Leter in	vestigatio
revealed that between !	Middleton Isla	and end t	te place	of the cr	ash strong	crocentral
to the east were encour	ntered. They	hed rot 1	beer pred	licted by	the Weethe	er Service.
This fector plus loss of	of redio conte	ot, es, i	for examp	ple, beceu	se of prec	ipitetion
static, could account !	for this plane	e's being	30 miles	s off cour	se st the	time of im
pect.						
	Section 8—EQ1	RPMENT AND A	URCRAFT FACT	ORS		
BRATE: NUMBER, FIXED 102 NUMBER, E.		en Fines ()		ор Равасиство Рв	OATORD ()	Nomen Can-
EQCUIENT.	to No Cord This I		No TY	72 MANEA_] /	Dio Mares Fit	Yas No.
Demand Date 21 1	and Englishment on t	4				
	DV 32 LESSIE W	L	No	HBER 5	<u>i</u>	LNo No.
SAFETT NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED	None	5, ANTI-G	NUMBER AV	ARABLE, CARD	<u>. </u>	
SAFETY NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED	Fone	S. ANTI-G SCHR	Number Av.	ARABLE, USED ARABLE, NOT USE	<u> </u>	NOT AVAILABLE
SAPETT NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED STREET FACTORS WEIGH CONTRIBUTED TO OR P.	Fone	S. ANTI-G SCHR	Number Av.	ARABLE, USED ARABLE, NOT USE	<u> </u>	NOT AVAILABLE
SAFFET HELMAN: NUMBER STANDARD TYPE CARD NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED SPECIAL FACTORS WRICE CONTRIBUTED TO OR P. plane, or any other factors which added or impa	Fone	S. ANTI-G SCHR	Number Av.	ARABLE, USED ARABLE, NOT USE	<u> </u>	NOT AVAILABLE
SAPETT HELMER NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED STREEL PACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR P. pinne, or any other factors which aided or impa Unknown	Fone	S. ANTI-G SCHR	Number Av.	ARABLE, USED ARABLE, NOT USE	<u> </u>	NOT AVAILABLE
SAPETT HELAGES. NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED. STREEL PACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR P. pinne, or any other factors which aided or impa Unichomy	None REVENTED INCERT: (List ded ascape from aircraft.)	S. ANTI-G SCHR	Number Av.	ARABLE, USED ARABLE, NOT USE	<u> </u>	NOT AVAILABLE
SAFETT HELMELS. NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED STRUCK FACTORS WRICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR P. pinne, or any other factors which aided or impa Unkthown	None REVENTED INCERT: (List ded ascape from aircraft.)	5. ANTI-G SCHR. any items of perso	Number Av.	ARABLE, USED ARABLE, NOT USE	<u> </u>	NOT AVAILABLE
SAPETT HELMELY. NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED STRUAL FACTORS WRICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR P pinne, or any other factors which aided or impe	None REVENTED INCERT: (List ded ascape from aircraft.)	5. ANTI-G SCHR. any items of perso	Number Av.	ARABLE, USED ARABLE, NOT USE	<u> </u>	NOT AVAILABLE
SAFETT HELMELS. NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED STREAM FACTORS WRICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR P pinne, or any other factors which aided or impa Unknown Coopera	None REVENTED INCERT: (List ded ascape from aircraft.)	5. ANTI-G SCHR. any items of perso	Number Av.	ARABLE, USED ARABLE, NOT USE	<u> </u>	NOT AVAILABLE
SAFETT HELMELS. NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED STREAM FACTORS WRICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR P pinne, or any other factors which aided or impa Unknown Coopera	None REVENTED INCERT: (List ded ascape from aircraft.)	5. ANTI-G SCHR. any items of perso	Number Av.	ARABLE, USED ARABLE, NOT USE	<u> </u>	NOT AVAILABLE
SAPETT BELAGE: NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED STREEL FACTORS WRICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR P pinne, or any other factors which aided or impa Unknown Courte Defic 1 shed Share, Shoulder Harnese, Sapety Belts	None REVENTED INCERT: (List ded ascape from aircraft.)	5. ANTI-G SCHR. any items of perso	Number Av.	ARABLE, USED ARABLE, NOT USE	<u> </u>	NOT AVAILABLE
SAFETT HELMELS. NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED STREEL FACTORS WRICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR P. pinne, or any other factors which aided or impa Unknown Coopers Octoopers Octoopers Seath, Shoulder Harnese, Safety Belts	None REVENTED INCERT: (List ded ascape from aircraft.)	5. ANTI-G SCHR. any items of perso	Number Av.	ARABLE, USED ARABLE, NOT USE	<u> </u>	NOT AVAILABLE
SAPETT BELAGES NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED STREAM FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR P pinns, or any other factors which aided or impa Unknown Congres Defici 1 shed Share, Shoulder Harrier, Sapett Belts Inknown	None REVENTED INCERT: (List ded ascape from aircraft.)	5. ANTI-G SCHR. any items of perso	Number Av.	ARABLE, USED ARABLE, NOT USE	<u> </u>	NOT AVAILABLE
SAPETT BELAGES. NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED OF BELLE ACTIONS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR P place, or any other factors which aided or impa Unichotom Compare Compare Defici 1 shed Share, Shoulder Habnese, Sapety Belts Dictions) Crew Standard (Other Than Compare)	None REVENTED INCERT: (List ded ascape from aircraft.)	5. ANTI-G SCHR. any items of perso	Number Av.	ARABLE, USED ARABLE, NOT USE	<u> </u>	NOT AVAILABLE
SAPETT BELAGES. NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED OF BELLE ACTIONS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR P place, or any other factors which aided or impa Unichotom Compare Compare Defici 1 shed Share, Shoulder Habnese, Sapety Belts Dictions) Crew Standard (Other Than Compare)	None REVENTED INCERT: (List ded ascape from aircraft.)	5. ANTI-G SCHR. any items of perso	Number Av.	ARABLE, USED ARABLE, NOT USE	<u> </u>	NOT AVAILABLE
SAPET HELES: NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED STREET FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR P. Pinne, or any other factors which aided or impa Unknown Compare Compare Define 1 shed Share, Shoulder Habbers, Sapety Brits Dikthown Crew Standard (Other Than Compare)	None REVENTED INCERT: (List ded ascape from aircraft.)	5. ANTI-G SCHR. any items of perso	Number Av.	ARABLE, USED ARABLE, NOT USE	<u> </u>	NOT AVAILABLE
SAFFET HELICITY. NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED STREET, OR SINGUISE STANDARD TYPE USED USED IN STREET STANDARD TYPE USED USED IN STANDARD TYPE USED USED IMPOUNDED TO STANDARD TYPE USED USED IMPOUNDED TO STANDARD TYPE USED USED IMPOUNDED TO STANDARD TYPE USED USED USED USED USED USED USED USE	None REVENTED INCERT: (List ded ascape from aircraft.)	5. ANTI-G SCHR. any items of perso	Number Av.	ARABLE, USED ARABLE, NOT USE	<u> </u>	NOT AVAILABLE
SAFETT BELIAGES NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED NUMBER LIFEOVISED TYPE USED NUMBER LIFEOVISED TYPE USED STEERAL PACTORS WEIGH CONTRIBUTED TO OR P pinne, or any other factors which aided or impe Unichoam Charte C	None REVENTED INCERT: (List ded ascape from aircraft.)	5. ANTI-G SCHR. any items of perso	Number Av.	ARABLE, USED ARABLE, NOT USE	<u> </u>	NOT AVAILABLE
SAPETT BELAGES NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED NUMBER INFEOURSED TYPE USED STREEL FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR P. pinne, or any other factors which aided or impa Unknown Cocurr Defin 1 shed SEAR, SECULDER HARNES, SAFETT BELTS IRCHOWN CREW STANDARS (OTHER THAN COCEPTS) GENO 11 shed EMERORNET Exits, HARNES ETC. 11 shed	None REVENTED INCERT: (List ded ascape from aircraft.)	5. ANTI-G SCHR. any items of perso	Number Av.	ARABLE, USED ARABLE, NOT USE	<u> </u>	NOT AVAILABLE
SAPETT BELAGES. NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED NUMBER IMPROVISED TYPE USED STREEL FACTORS WINCH CONTRIBUTED TO OR P. pince, or any other factors which aided or impa Unknown Compar Compar Defic 1 shed Share, Shoulder Habrese, Safety Brits Dikthown Crew Standars (Other Than Compar)	None REVENTED INCERT: (List ded ascape from aircraft.)	5. ANTI-G SCHR. any items of perso	Number Av.	ARABLE, USED ARABLE, NOT USE	<u> </u>	NOT AVAILABLE


	Kentry	£	۲٦	5	- 5	*	\$	}	2	5	2	2	5		feet.	æ)
Reg. 69-14.)	RECAPA RATE UARD	() Youignato)	Unk	Ink	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	Unk	ľnk j	Unk	Upk		increased to 11,000 feet.	USAF (MC) (ASE)
M in A P	BELT	Palled	Tag	Tul	Uni	Jul	ğ	Jul	Unk	Unk	No.	, L	Unk		inere	B. R. M. M. M. M. M. M. M. CAPT.
S, as dam	SAVETY BELT		Unk	A P	ם	Turk	Unk	Tak	S.	D C	Unk	Unk	A Unk	füelbg.	, <u>\$</u>	HUSSELL, CA
ar injura	ARKEM	Father	Aun X	Nab A	K Unk	N Tink	R/N	4 / N	Z CD	A/N	A/A	N/N	N/A). ed; (8) N	this crash be	J
il re sun,	SHOULDER BARKEM	17.000.1	d Unx	a Jak	Yes Unk	Turk Ink	N/A	*	Unk	N/A	11/4	N/N	N/A	(4) K(3)	13.5	CARL V
	SHO.	Avnd. able	χ	Yea	\$	Se X	S.	2	Yes	١	2	2	δ.); Facing kmr, ole. g. 12-14);	ئ ئ	O a
K, Birl on kii ni larr jerramne	AT THE OF ANTORNY	Lex tion to Plane	Unk	Unk	Unk	एकह	Unk	Washington and the Market of the Company	Unk	Ünk	Unk	Hujj	Unk	sg (3); Probe (3); Supine (4); Crusched (5) - Fucing laward (F); Becing war (R), cars Flanding Paring Poward; 3-R finalis Cristched Fucing Rent, etc. inor bylary (pur. 18c, Reg, 68-10); (3) Afabre inpur (par. 13b, Reg, 42-10); (4) Kiliel; (5) Missing	SANION D-MEDICAL OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATIONS LE OVET the Ecupitations region	
מולוו ש נולווו	AT TINE	Budy Po- rition (*)	1'nk	ľak	Unk	Nak Unk	Juk	Unk	Ara V	ű n k	l'ny	Tak	Unk	(4); Crus rustd: J- i. 18-14); (3	TOPE BOOM	
Date State Kinds	,	Pitgirt Duty	¥C.	lat P	Мяу	E	248	243	2	6	2	FA	τ. Α	e (3); Supine 13, Pacing Fo par, 13e, Reg	over the	
			Tak	Tak	भवत	Unk	ink Ink	Unk	THAT I	AHO	<u> </u>	An C	Unk	is (2); Prob ens Blandi nor friury (section the or	
	~		FE	걸	भूद्या	Ä	ğ	Talk.	นูน	Ę,	Trik	Unk	เหล	Fected ()); Standit Emmbles: 4- F m No lighty: (2) Mi	r 133p	
		Pylkrot.	PC PC	ρ,	AUN	Bug	Fng	Eng	8	02	7.	F.	F.A.	ody: Regred Erron el: (1) No In	યતે કે	. 5
CATESONE, INCOLLE - (NOT: 100 14 BOURSE OF COMPAND OF STREET OF ST		7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	DHVALI, KENTETH J. Capt (DAR)	CHANGE WORD V. Cont (Die)	THENTER WILLIAM T. I /IL (DAT)	MAGEN, ENGOIF W.T/Sgt (DAF)	SPELITIE, COUTED N. A /2C (DAF)	COSTLEY, FUGENE R.S./Sgt (TMF)	ONEN, ROBERT A. A. CC (DAF)	SOUTH, MARION I. A/30 (DAW)	PREPARE GEORGE W. A AC (DAF)	KINYAII, JANES R. A/30 (DAF)	JACKTON, WAYNE D. A /3C (DAP)	L. Ose feliowing ende manbers and beloes for position of boydy; Sected ()); Standing Emotypie: 4- f mea. I. Ose feliowing code manbers to specify rough to presonnel: (1) No lighty: (9) Minn	That the minder of filtering	. 4 *

_					Ar Thur	AT PINE OF ARTHERT	Notice	SHITT DES BARRAS	2 × 12.04	Herer One	1		E Contract
Note president	Rativo Gramas	Liesdor	WEGUT	Phich	Yorky Par-	Length in Phus	Avada	11 mg	Pality	Tauch Yalled	13		E
HOBITT, HOFT E COI (DAF)	Д. 83 ж	II.	(ink	Ряяз	Unk	Unk	.2	No N/A N/A	-	Unic Unic	ğ	Unk	۲
	Page	Tak	L'IIK	Posts	Juk	Unk	ş	K/M M/N		Unk Unk	a	Unk	4
christing, Alight Comp. (DR) Free	£ 5	Unk	'n'	Pring	(IBX	In the second of the second of the second	Ç.		V/M V/	Unk Unk	音	Unk	4
STUGISTON, IAMPRICE S IX COI PREB	Pess	Unk	Unk	Pass) Yei	Unk	٤	N	8/N	M/A Unk Unk	걸	July	4
STEARES, MAIL I Ned (DA) Pess	Pe 58	Unk	Unk	Pass	THY.	Unk	2	+	*	N/A N/A Unk Unk	¥	Meil	*
JACKSON, WILLIAM C. P. 1 (DAY) PASS	PAEE	Unk	link	Pres	Unk	Unk	No	N/A	N/A	Unk Unk	署	Unk	4
CCONBY, WITTIAM N. Cort (DAW) Pers	74.00	E _a k	Unk	Pres	Jak Jak	Unk	2€		×	N/A N/A Unk Unk	ž	UNK Separate	-
DRASTEY, DEL MEST D. Capt (DAF) Fess Unk	Pess	Unk	Unk	Pess	Unk	Unk	Ş	N/A	X	Unk Unk	Juk	Nak	sr.
CORPEL, JEHON H. Cont (DAF) Pess Unk	Pass	Unk	l'ny	Pens	Unk	Unk	2		N/A	N/A N/A Unk Duk	Sp.k	Unk	d
PONTYPAS 3(4) E. Cart. (DAN) Page Unk	7 22	¥	(fn)	Pease	ž	Unik	٥		N./A	N/A N/A Unk Unk		(lak	4
TRIBELS, WANTER P.Cont (DAP) Pres	D. 10	11mk	Unk	Prese	Unk	nok	, N		N/A	N/A N/A UPK UPK	Unk	Unk	\$
1. The following code or in bers and leaders for position of body: Beaud (1); Standing (3); Standing (4); Observed (4). From forward (5); Fuching form (4); Fuching form (5);	body: Bean Eng nel: (!) No.	d (t); Blank mploe: 9-F injury; (2)	line (2); Pro means Stand Study injury	the (3); Sup- the Facing r (per. 18c, 3	Ine (4); Chou Forward; 5-1 24, 69-14); G	Seasel (1); Standing (2); Proving (3); Stupine (4); Chouchell (4)—Finding forward (§); Fucing rose (R); Examples: 9-F means Standing Facing Forward; 6-R means Couched Facing Roser; etc. No knjury; (2) Minor injury (par. 18c, Reg. 49-14); (3) Major injury (par. 13c, Reg. 60-14); (4) Killes Section 0—MEDICAL OFFICERS RECOMMENDATIONS	7); Fucing tour, etc. 0g. 62-14)	rour (R)	ж Э	•			
							O				Q.		

					Ar Ting	AT TIME OF AGIDENT	Su.	UKUEN F	SHOUKHER HARNESS	RAPET BELT	Date:	Control of the Contro
Name and Baltin	Brieson	HEIOHT	W STOILT	Plicht	Body Po-	Location in Plans	Awaille	l- Used	Falled	Uned Pulled	Palled	(Detignate)
TURN MILL, ROBERT W. Capt (DAF) Pass	F) Page	ип	Unk	Pess	Unk	Dak	Ž	No N/A M/A	X	검	Unk	link
TEDA, TONATD A.1/It (DAE) PRES	Pass	Unk	ž	Pars	Unk	l'ak	ź	No M/A	7	Х	ip C	Jak
Breggin, Alan 2/1t (DA)	Page	Unk	, , , ,	Pass	Unk	Unk	Z	No N/A	N/A	C. K	Unk	Unk
RULE, REGENALD 2/14 (DA)	Q.	Unk	13mk	Pess	Unk	Unk	Ž	No N/A	N/A N/A	ž	D C	Unk
EMPORD, JACK R. 2/Tt (DAP) Pess	Рязв	Unk	Unk	Pese	Unk	Unk	Ž	No N/A	N/N	űn,	Jak	Unk
IOSFFIFF, RDSTW H.2/14 (DA)	Pass Sa	Unk	Unk	Paca	Unk	Unk	<u> </u>	No N/A	- N	Ě	dak	Unk
HOOH, ROBEST E. 2/14 (DAF)	Psss	Unk	Unk	Pess	link	Unk	2	No M/A	N/A	Unk	Unk	Unk
MILLER, EDWARD J.A/20 (DAF) Pose	Pose	Unk	Unk	Po 38	Unk	Unx	2	No M/A	_ X _ X	Qu's	ŭ.	n, Kun
HOTTON, MARION E.A/1C (DAF) Pees	DeeB	Unk	ህግን	9) 6 0	Unk	Unk	F	No M/	N/A N/A UNK	Qu'y	Unk	Unk
MCKANT, DAN F. A/2C (DAF)	Pras	ra Ye	Unk	Poss	Unk	Unk	2	No M/A	1 N/A	N/A GE	Çî.	Unk
ANDERSON. ISAAC W. A/R (DAR) Pese	Pese	Unk	Unk	Pass	Unk	ř		No N/A			ď	Unk
1. Um beliewing sode numbers and latters for position of body: Seated (1); Panadag (3); Proise (3); Sayins (4); Croschod (5)—Freing four forward (7); Tacing from the forward; Falling forward; Felling forward; F	flody: Seate Ess med: (1) No	d (1); Ptarsd mples: 9-F i mjury; (2) A	feg (2); Pro roans Stand (inor injury	ne (3); Sapit ing Facing (par. 13c, R	na (4); Crus Forward; 5- 46, 69-14); (3	(1); Planding (3); Proise (3); Sagistes (4); Croached (5)—Frethe forward (7); Facthe rear (R. 1988; 2-F means Standing Fabing Forward; 5-B means Croached Fabing Rear, etc. (arr.) Winor Injury (par. 13c, Rag. 69-40); (3) Major Injury (par. 13b); Rog. 69-40); (4) Major Injury (par. 13b); Rog. 69-40); (4) Major Injury (par. 13b); Rog. 69-40); (5)	(T); Facit Ross, etc Rog, 63-14	(4) K	(3)			
			3	O-MEDIC	AL OFFICE	Section DMEDICAL OFFICEN'S RECOMMENDATIONS	ã					

Kerder Weider Flight Duty Unk Unk Pegs		OTOSTORE TIREMEN SPECT PERIL		
Unk Unk Pess	ody Po- tion (!) Location in Plane	Avail. Used Failed Used Fa	Failed (Designate)	
	Tok	No N/A Unk Unk	Aul link	•
SOF HORE, FEDMARD J.W/Cet (DA) Pres Unk Unk Press Un	Unk	No N/A N/A Unk Ur	Unk Unk	5
UNCER, LEGNATO G.T/Set (DAF) Pres Unk Unk Pees Un	Unk Unk	No N/A N/A Crok Us	Unk	•
RAI. JAMES H JR. S/Set (DAR), Pres Unk Unk Pess Un	Unk Unk	No N/A N/A Enk II	Ink	· ·
Unk Unk Pass	Unk Unk	No N/A N/A Unk U	Unk Unk	2
Pass Unk Unk Pass	Unk Vnk	No N/A N/A Unk Un	Unix Unix	•
NEW COME, STERLING R.A./10 Pass Unk Unk Pess Un	Unk Unk		Unk Unk	2
BITAHE, TRUER C. A/2C (DAF) PASS UNK UNK PESS UN	Unk Urk	ja,	Unk	¥
PULLS, BATTERN R. A / PC (DAP) PASS URK UNK PASS UR	Unk	No W/R W/A Unk U	Jok Jok	٠,
CONDOW, THERENS J.A./2C (DAR) PASE UNK UNK PASE UN	Unk Unk	Jak	Unk Unk	ď
DYRF, CARROLL R.A/2C (DAF) Pasa Unk Unk Pass Ur	Unk Unk	No N/A N/A Unk U	Unk	· ·
(1); Caudin ples: P-F me lury: (3) Mis	g (2); Franc (2); Supine (4); Crouthed (6)—Facing forward (F); Facin ans Sanding Facing Forward: 5-R means Crouched Facing Rear, etc. sor injury (par. 12c, Reg. 62-14); (3) Major injury (par. 13b), Reg. 62-14)); Pacing race (B). ser, 960. g. 62-16); (4) Etilad; (5) Bilming,		
THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY O	Section DMEDICAL OFFICEN'S RECOMMENDATIONS			

				A. 新原理的	PR1 10	PAROLOG BO FARE PE	HIOUR	Bilonipre Ilerres		BATTET MELT		•
	Bywell			Nation of the last	Body Po-	I seether by Piene	さ	150 130 130	TANKE U	Used Paded		မ
LYONS, THOMAS S. A/CC (DAF)	Pass	Cak	Unk	7. 28.68	Unk	Unk	္မွ	- ₹ ×	N/A	N/A Unk Unk	, trak	
MICH DIVIND W JR A/20 (DAE) Page		Unk	Unk	Pass	Zpķ	Unk	N _O	N/A	N/A N/A UDK	ak Unk	Jak was a same a	¥1
THIRTH THE ACT OF A LOCTOR PRINT	Paus	Trans	Thk	4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	Jak	Ann	No N/A		<u> </u>	N/A Unit Unit	Nat In the second	4
WITTE, PEPRIS F. A/ZC (DAF) Peer	•	Unk Unk	Unk	Pass	Unk	Unk	No N/N	-	17 V X	N/A Unk Unk	yun y	v
MARTIV, HOMERO E. A/3C (DAF) Paus	P. 25.25	ZIA LIA	Unk	Pess	Çnk	Unk	20	3	n 4 /x	N/A N/A Unk Unk	i i	
WATTHEWS, LLOYD L. A/20 (DAT) Pass		Cnk	Unk	Pasa	Unk	Įnk I	Ş	3		N/A N/A Unic Unic	2 <u>2</u>	•
CARD, RUHERT D. Pott-2 (DA) Page Unk Unk	Page	ם		Page	Ų,	Unk	8	No N	<u>।</u> ()	M/A Unk Unk	Xe.I	4
XITTIB. LECOMAND A. Pre (DA)	Pose	Unk	¥E]	Pesa	(Ink	"N	چ	1 / X	1 7 2	Unk Unk	36. 0	.
						entantanta a par i remana kampani a ambana vida apana a			4 m	1		
Die following, gode nambeer und betrare for besitien of body: Seanold (1); Standlug (2) Example: 9-F musas Die following oode nambers (0 moodly result to personnel: (1) No injury: (2) Minor	ody: Busted Erans el: (1) No in	Meter (1); Standing (3 Examples: 2-F means No injury; (2) Minor	ng (2); Prot sens Stand hoer injury	ne (8); Rup ing Pucing (par. 13c, R	los (4); Crou Formand; 5-1 log. 69-14); (3)	1): Frome (9); Equino (4); Crouchod (6)—Factor forward (8); Pacing rear (B). Standing: Pacing Forward: D-R mouna Crouched, Factor Rear, etc. injury (par. 18c, Neg. 62-14); (3). Major injury (par. 13b; Rear, 63-16); (4) Killed); (5). Mineting.	. Vacing r. n., etc.	er (B).	(3) MC1mm)	ı.	9	
			Section	D-MED	CAL OFFICE	Section D. MEDICAL OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATIONS						
								Š		0		
							CARL		SELL	CAPT, 1	CARL M RUSSELL, CAPT, USAF (MC) (AME)	



STATEMENT

3 December 1952

Having been advised of my rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Filitary Justice, 1951 I voluntarily make the following statement:

The entire crew had been on normal duty thirty-six (36) hours prior to departure and was released from all duties twelve (12) hours prior to departure. Transport movement control personnel state that the crew appeared to be normal in every respect during the two hour period prior to take-off. Friends and associates of all crew members were contacted and it was determined that the crew had ample rest and had not participated in any activities out of the ordinary. Captain hency alew a four (4) hour local transition on 21 November 1952 between the hours of 1445 and 1845. The pilot, co pilot and navigator were seen and talked to by the 34th Air Transport Squadron Operations Officer between 1100 and 1200 hours on 22 November 1952 and he stated that they appeared to be in good health, a normal frame of mind and in good spirits.

I have read the above statement and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

> WILLIAM A. McLAUGHLIN Major USAF

Commanding


34th Air Transport Squadron

Sworn and subscribed to this third (3) day of December 1952.

WILLIS L. BALDWIN Cantain USAF

Adjutant

CO



STAIRMENI

The following statement, to the best of my knowledge, is a breakdown of the cargo, passengers, mail, and baggage weight, by compartment, which was loaded on A/C 1107, Prip No. D37/22:

Comp. n∪m	0ergo lit. 2,150	No. Pex end Mt. 4 2 720	Restraint Used 6 A-1 Straps @ 1,250 10 B-1 Cables @ 5,000
uĐu	3,032 (Mail)	2 😩 360	15 a-1 Straps & 1,250
н <u>Ж</u> н	5 ,5 00	5 6 900	10 9-1 Cables & 5,000
upn	5,700	5 & 900	10 B-1 Gables @ 5,000 2 C-1 Chains @ 10,000
nG n		8 2 1,440	ALL PASSENGEN
uHu	3,110 (Fax baggage	15 % 2 ,7 00)	10 4-1 Straps € 1,250
.uIa	2,064 (Fly-away Mi	2 & 360 t)	

[&]quot;D" Compartment was all mail.

"G" Compartment was empty, except for eight (3) passengers and their hand beggage.

"H" Compartment (The Elevator) was loaded with passengers, baggage, and 210 pounds of Courier Mail.

"I" Compartment was emergency equipment and fly-away kit.

The load was very well put together and was not more than 5-1/2 feet high—the tie-down was good, being hooked to 10,000 pound chains, through 10,000 pound floor "D" rings.

HELVIN G. O.E.

1/LT., USAF

AIR PREIGHT OFFICER

SECTION AFORMATION

STATELELI

To the best of my knowledge, the following is a description of the tis-down equipment and restraint utilized in securing the cargo and meil loaded on eircraft No. 1137, Prip No. 039/22.

"C" Compart ant

2,150 pounds general cargo. lie-down equipment utilized.

(A) Six (6) 1,250 pound straps 4-1. (B) Ten (10) 5,000 pound cable B-1.

Total restraint employed approximately 15,000 pounds

"Dr Compartment

3,030 pounds mail.

Tie-down equipment utilized.

(A) Fifteen (15) 1,250 pour straps A-1. Total restraint employed approximately 10,000 pounds.

FEB Compartment

5,500 pounds general corgo. Nie-jown equipment utilized.

(A) Ten (13) 5,000 pound cable 3-1.

Potal restraint employed approximately 30,000 pounds.

TPH Compart ort

5,700 pounds general corgo. Tia-down equipment utilized.

(a) Ten (10) 5,000 cable 5-1. (b) Two (2) 10,000 chains C-1.

Total restraint employed approximately 30,000 powner.


Min Compartment

3,010 pounds baggage, wall, and corgo. Tis-down equipment utilized.

(A) Ten (10) 1,250 pound streps A-1. Total restraint utilized approximately 12,000 pounds.

The preceeding compartments tis-foun equipment were all connected to 10,000 pound chains received to 10,000 pound "De rings. The cargo level did not exceed three (3) feet in height except in "D" compariment where the hall was loaded to approximately five (by feet from the aireraft floor.

Chard C. Caken



My final inspection of the nown of cargo and baggage on C-124, 1107, Trip 339/22 to the best of my knowledge was as follows:

"C" Compartment which had approximately 2,150 pounds corgo was lawhed with approximately five (5) "G's", using cable and straps.

"O" Compartment had approximately 3,000 pounds of mail lashed with about three (3) "G's", using straps.

"E" Compartment had approximately 5,500 pounds and was lashed with approximately five (5) "G's", consisting of chains and cables.

"F" Compartment had approximately 5,700 pounds of cargo lashed with approximately five (5) "G's".


THE Compartment has approximately 3,000 pounds of baggage and sail and was lashed with about three (3) 16187.

all tie-down equipment was recured to 10,000 pound chains connected to ten and 25,000 pound "D" rings.

The cargo, mail, or baggage did not exceed five (5) feet in heighth in any compartment.

Tenly K. Hut

Э.



STATEMBE I

at approximately 1100 on Saturday, 22 Hovember 1752, I boarded WC No. 1107, Trip No. 239/22, for the sole purpose of checking the progress of the cargo loading on this particular aircraft. at this time, about one-half of the load had been put in place and lashed. The balance of the load was on pallets in the immediate vicinity of the eircraft. The entire load was quite compact and not at all difficult to the down properly. I noted in particular that the ten thousand (10,000) pound chains which had been strung through tie-down fittings had been done properly. Howhere on the deck was there any long chain running through numerous tie-down fittings. This is as it should be to prevent loss of restraint on any great amount of cargo if one chain length should break. That portion of the load in place and lashed, at the time of my inspection, was tied down with somewhere between three (3) and four (4) 0's in all directions. I am certain that, from a lashing standpoint, this load was absolutely safe and that the actual safety measures taken far exceeded tie-down requirements as published in pertinent directives.

> Captain, USAF Traffic Officer

SECURITY INFORMATION

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS

39TH AIR DEPOT WING AND ELMENDORF AIR FORCE FASE
Elmendorf Air Force Base
APO 942, U. S. Air Force

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF SOARD OF OFFICERS

Proceedings of a board of officers which convened at Elmandorf Air Force Base, APO 942, U. S. Air Force, pursuant to paragraph S, Special Orders Number 161, Meadquarters, 59th Air Depot Wing and Elmandorf Air Force Base, Elmandorf Air Force Base, APO 942, U. S. Air Force, dated 18 August 1952, as amended.

The board met pursuant to the foregoing order at Hesiquarters, 39th Air Depot Wing, at 0850 hours, 8 December 1952.

Members present:

Lt Col James B. Joham, AO-388608 Lt Col David L. Hopkins, 4540A Maj Charles R. Bates, AO-440968 Maj William J. McDougall, AD-501943 Capt John W. MacManara, AO-684014 Capt Carl M. Russell, 20586A 1st Lt Mick J. Tsacrios, AO-878359 CWO Orville M. Gatton, AW-2118105 Hq 39th A/D Mg
7th Wes Gp (Non-voting)
1705th AT 3p, NcChord AFB
Hq 39th A/D Mg
Hq 1804th A40S 3p (Non-voting)
39th Med &, Sep
Hq 39th A/D Mg
54th Trp Carr 22 (H)

Also present during the meeting of the board were:

Maj Gaorge F. Babits

1st Lt Thomas S. Sullivan, AC-1849397 Mr. H. D. Petersen

Office of The Inspector General, USAF, Horton AFB 5002d IG Sp Inves Sq Douglas Technical Representative

PURPOSE:

To investigate the circumstances and establish the facts pertaining to a major aircraft accident which accurred on Mt Gannett, Alaska, 22 November 1952, involving C-124A -61-107A which was assigned to the 1705th Air Transport Group, 34th Air Transport Shuadron, based at definord Air Force Base, Washington. The pilot was Captain Henneth Pales Duvail, A0-742695. The flight was scheduled by 34th Air Transport Squadron Operations on an airlift of cargo and passengers, departing AcChord AFB at 1830 hours, 22 November 1952.

Recause of the lack of eye witnesses the board entered into a discussion of the facts of the accident.

SECURITY IN STRATION

RESTRICTED

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION SCARD 0-124A #51-107A

LT COL JOHAN: The board will come to order.

LT TSICEICS: Sir, I would like to read this memorandum from the 1705th Air Transport Group. (Reads)

LT COL JOHN: What we should do is to determine what happened and how to prevent similar things from happening again. Has there been any evidence brought out that there was any non-compliance with T.O.'s that might have contributed to this?

LT TSACRIOS: No, sir, we have Major Sabits of the Directorate of Flight Safety Research who has made a therough study of this accident, and he will give us a briefing.

MAJ RABIES: I can't tell you what happened, but what we think happened. The crew was very well qualified, although this was the navigator's first trip to Aleska. However, I feel the trip from McChord to Middleton was pretty restine, as he was over the island within four minutes of his flight plan, which would tend to make the pilot believe, or not give him any warning, of any adverse winds or weather whatsoever, except that which was forecast.

When he got over Middleton at '47 and estimated Whittier at '17, he based it on his flight plan and estimated time. However, along there he got those terrific cross winds, for which he had no warning, although he did have a sarming of winds which would require a six degree correction. We based our estimate on moderate winds of 60. You can very easily consider it 15 degrees because of the winds. The Northwest Airlines pilot said it was one of the roughest trips he had made.

We believe he had a considerable amount of precipitation static and could have had trouble picking up the Anchorage Range. We computed his ground speci from Middleton to Mt. Jennett, which compares favorably. We believe he hadn't run out his ETA when he hit the mountain. We believe the accident was in the neighborhood of '12 or '13 after the hour. We was flying fairly straight and level, because impact was very close to his cruising altitude.

We feel that the unforecasted cross-wind had a direct bearing on the scritcht. Had there been some system for informing the pilot of the increase in his wind velocity alord there would have been no accident. There is no requirement today for the forecast to be transmitted to the point of destination. The forecaster at Elmendorf could feel that a 60 knot wind was not becardous, and if we know what winds the pilot had been given, he could notify him of changes.

SECURITY INFORMATION

RESTRICTED

AIRCRAYT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION SOASD 3-124A #51-107A

We reel there is a requirement for additional aids in this area.

Bither a homing station or a range station. I urge that this board consider recommendations for that. We have a report from the chief pilot of the Airways Inspection Bureau, CAA, that he has lost all navigational aid for 10 minutes while flying in that area. It is conceivable that he picked up precipitation static.

LT COL JOHAM: I see Merrill Radic is again misnomered on this map. Do you feel that would have any bearing on the accident?

MAJ SERIES: I don't feel these is pilots would. We have no way of telling if there was any material failure. The plane hit very hard. The only part visible is the tail, which seems to be sticking up about three feet from the snow. It would be pretty hard to tell, because it is all broken up. However, evidence seems to indicate that he hit at flight altitude. We have concluded that it was pilot error, cause navigation.

We have concluded that the forecast was busted. We had a weather officer on our term, and we concluded that precipitation static and icing has a direct bearing on the accident.

MAJ BATES: You say the navigation was in error?

MAJ BASIN: Navigation was in error, yes. We place the responsibility on that.

MAU BASES: Has there been any indication as to how LORAN is in that area?

MAJ BABIE: LORAN is no good in that area.

LT COL DELL: What is the radic equipment of a 124?

MAJ PABLIE: They have two ADF, and they have LCRAN, and they have ILS. That is the last block off the line.

LT SWLLIVAN: Is there any indication that he was over Middleton Island.

MAJ Bill TS: Just his report.

MAJ MCDOGGALL: Do you believe that the radio installed in the 124 is as good as could be installed?

MAJ Bas T: I think the equipment installed is as good as you can get.

MAN MCDCCALL: Is that from an Air Force-wide, or world-wide view?

3

SESTRICTED



SECURITY NEORMATION

RESTRICTED

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD C-124A #51-107A

WAJ BABITS: We had some better equipment when I was flying for the airlines, but I think the Air Porce has good radios now.

LT TRACRIOS: Colonel Hopkins, do you have anything on weather?

LT COL HOPKINS: A pilot reporting from southwest of Yakutat reported winds from 135 degrees at 90 knots. A commercial pilot reported at 0800 Z that the route from Anchorage was turbulent with downdrafts.

I might point out that with regard to advisories to pilots on dangerous conditions on a basis of moderate icing or moderate turbulence, that condition would exist in winter conditions in the Gulf SO to 90 per cent of the time. These pilot reports were after the accident. Our 750 militar chart indicates that there were 60 knot winds in that area.

LT COL JOHAY: It is like the Lieutenant said, he could have passed or missed Middleton Island.

LT TSAGRICS: I have heard that precipitation static in the 124 appears to be a little greater than it is in other aircraft and that the MATS boys have so much paper work that they couldn't pay so much attention to their flying as they should.

MAJ BATES: I couldn't say about the static. The paper work would interfere with flying, but I don't think so. They can do it on the ground. I think your radio procedure up here is too such. In addition to giving our position reports to the ground stations, we also give them to McChord and Elmendorf Airways, and he has to keep switching frequencies.

MAJ BABITS: He wouldn't be giving the POMAR at this time.

LT COL HOPKINS: The POMAR is a position report.

MAJ BATES: I will say this turbulent air is also a little worse on a 124. What is almost light turbulence in a C-54 is moderate turbulence in the 124.

MR. PETERSEN: That is right. This is an aircraft you have to speed up for turbulence. The manufacturer says to red line the aircraft in turbulence.

MAJ FABITS: There is another factor. The instrument panel leaves something to be desired. The panel you have here are new and have a pretty nice instrument panel, but I point that up that he would have trouble holding a heading.

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD C-124A #51-107A

MAJ MCDOUGALL: Regardless of how rough it seems it is a navigational error. Mould it have had any effect on his hearing the range?

MAJ BABITS: The turbulence was just something more to keep him occupied.

LT TSACRICS: It is not unusual to get a strong wind like that on short notice up here.

MAJ BABIN: You had a pilet report from somebody around Homer that got a wind of 80 knots.

MAJ MCDOULALL: Colonel Hopkins, isn't it possible to fly out of here where it is reported 60 to 80 knots of wind and have 100 to 120 knot winds at altitude?

LT COL HOPKINS: We have had winds in the Gulf that have acted like that when we have had a very deep low in the Gulf.

CWO GATTON: How many trips had the pilot made over this route?

MAJ BASI'S: Two trips; the co-pilot had five; this was the nevigator's first.

LT COL HOPKINS: There is one question I would like to bring up concerning the altitude that was being flown. I have flown the route and noticed a little concern about weather. I think that generally most pilots will get a change in altitude. On this particular flight on the report that the tops of the overeast was variable at 9,000 feet, it is possible that icing conditions and turbulence conditions would be at a maximum.

MAJ MCDOUGALL: He was so close to his terminal that he would only have to climb, then let down.

MAJ BABITS: I think a point Colonel Hopkins is trying to make is that this pilot just stayed there and fought out the weather instead of going to 11,000 feet.

LT COL HOPKINS: Some of the pilots would go to a higher altitude.

LT TSACRIOS: Mr. Gatton, do you have anything to add to this? Do you think the pilot could have had mechanical difficulties?

CWO GATION: He would have given a report of that, unless this weight and balance is not right.

MAJ BATES: He wouldn't have made his flight plan like he did.

5

TEST TES



AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD C-124A #51-170A

LT COL MOHAM: How far cut from Middleton do you fly before you can get the Anchorage Range?

MAJ BATTS: You are up near Whittier. I have rarely gotten it out farther than Whittier.

MAJ MCDOUGALL: How about Hinchinbrook?

LT COL JOHAM: Can you read Hinchinbrook?

MAJ BATES: Yes.

LT TSACRIOS: What were the activities of the crew in the time prior to the flight?

MAJ BATES: They were released 12 hours prior to the flight. This particular crew had no cuties three days prior to the flight, and they were released 12 hours before the flight.

LT COL JOHAM: Anything further? If not the board will be closed for findings and recommendations.

6

H. Sibilit

SEQUENCE ACTIVISTIC

RESTRICTED

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION SOARD C-1244 #51-107A

FINDINGS:

The board having carefully considered the evidence before it, finds:

- 1. The aircraft crashed into the side of Mt. Gennett at approximately its flight altitude of 9,000 feet, at which time it was approximately 30 miles to the right of course.
- 2. There was no indication of malfunction of machanical or radio equipment.
- 3. The most probable cause of the accident was a mavigational error attributed to the pilat.
- 4. A contributing cause of the accident is that the winds were incorrectly forecast.
- 5. A probable contributing cause was precipitation static which made radio reception impossible.
- 6. It is a probable conclusion that the aircraft crashed prior to

RECOMMENDATIONS:

In view of the above findings the board recommends:

- Inat a procedure be established with the CAA to provide north-
- 2. That an additional radio aid to navigation be installed in the
- The Middleton Island-Anchorage direct route to a Middleton Island-Kenai-Anchorage route.
- Pirect raute, be raised to 11,000 feet.
 - 5. That continued study be made to devolop radio receivers that eliminate precipitation static.
- Laircraft.

7

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD C-124A \$51-107A

The board adjourned at 1130 hours on S December 1952.

Lt Colonel, USAL

HILLID J. MCDONGALL

Major, USAF

Flying Safety Officer

Carley Ensure

CAML M. RUSSKLL Captain, USAF Medical Officer

MICE . ASACRIOS

1st it, USAF


Accident Investigation Officer

ORVILLE 1. GATTON

CWO, USAF

Engineering Officer

RESTRICTED



NORTHWEST AIRLINES INC.

Minneapolis-St Paul International Airport

MERCAPOLIS, MARKESOFA
Telephones Descrit 3451

Hovember 2h, 1952

Operations Officer Military Air Transport McChord Field Tacoma, Washington

Gentlemen:

On takeoff we were cleared to climb NN to Susitna Intersection return inbound at 10,000 ft. On crossing the range station at 10,000 we had vertical visibility, no icing, and the air was smooth. From the range station to Whittier Marker, we encountered moderate rough air and moderate downdrafts to the extent that we used Neto power for a short period of time on two occasions to counteract the effects of the downdraft. After leaving Whittier and to the coast line, we hit sharp moderate turbulence, moderate downdrafts, and moderate icing for a short period of time.

At 07502, as we approached the coast line, we heard a lone transmission on 121.5 emergency frequency, as follows:

"As long as we have to land, we might as well land there".

Upon reaching the coast line we broke out on top and were intermittently on instruments in and out of the top. From coast line to Middleton the air was smooth, there was no icing, and we were definitely on top on reaching Middleton. Trip was rectine from there to Seattle.

Very truly yours,

NORTHWEST AIRLIES, DIG.


T. W. Denstermaker.

T. W. Fenstermaker Captain

EXECUTIVE OFFICES 1895 UNIVERSITY AVE ST PAUL T. MINNESOTA

THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

				ECURITY RESTR			
	WWA Plight	F cord	ng Forms	านอยุท -	1012U		
					:		
		150/		210	175	i na na sa	Company of the Company
324/		ini a samananina		510	188		
343		1		21Q	201	i di Fi	. F. F.
	1111	230/2	25	210	210	:	TOTAL
		290/2	25	210	2 32		稿1、編 <u>1、</u>
	<u> </u>	320/	x	510	240		
	1	030/2	25	210	219		
Pone	termer	en de su estimato su		ATE	n spile halanda	enament of the	eners a mention of the contract of the contrac
	NOPH IS	G COFL	0600	/_ 0620	Σ	2	:10 ATC
Province	710	50 E1	Jerrend	2 (0	65	ni.	
	(10)			0645		1,0000	
	18_		0703	0711			MDT Down Drafts MDT Turbs
1		0752	0752	0600		10000	
(28	0820	0833	0831	/11		
	35		0908	0908	/ 13	,	A CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACTOR
	32		0944	1			di come de la mara
		0927	-,	. 0935	/ 12	10000	A section of the
		0958	1001	1003		·	i commente de la compania
	. 54	1052	1053	,			In Clr past Cpl Hrs
<u> </u>		1120				6000	:
tana dia mandria d		1134		i	:	6000	•
·	. :	1227		1229			
	•	1259		•		10000	
		1326		1329	4.3	6000	• · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	10	1336	1338				
	08	1344					
70 4	25	1409	-	:			
N. 17 2 1.	7. – .44	5 .			. : #		
Part Town				. 1. 114.	<u>4</u> 5		



Flying Time of DUVALL, KENTETH J. Capt., A0-742695

- 2659:00 Total illot
- Total Filot Time Last Six Months 312:00
- Total Filot Time Fast Three Norths 224 00
- 4. Total Filot Time Last Honth (OCT.) 67:20
- 5. Total Filot Time Last Month (MOV.) 74:00 6. Vertificate (Green) 21 Aug 52 Expires 11 April 53
- 7. Lest Proficiency Check 12 Aug 52.
- 8. Last Route Check 4 Oct 52.
 9. Total Filot Hours This Medel 418:00 Filot (291:00) CoFilot (127:00)
- Total SCA's Inst Six Months (Actual 8) (Hood 3) 10.
- 11. Two Fries to Alaska, (Finendorf)
 12. Graduated from HTTU 13 Dec 51
- 13. Captain Davall's judgement and Proficiency is considered to be average.
- 14. Total 4 engine Time 1738:00

Flying Time of CHENEY, ALGER M. Capt., A0-746251

- 3492:00 1. Total Filot
- 2. Total Filot Time Lest Six Months 413:00
- 3. Total Filot Time Lest Three Months 245:00
- 4. Total Filot Time Last Month (OCT.) 103:40
- 5. Total Filot Time Last Fonth (NOV.) 73:00
- Certificate (Green) 8 May 52 Expires 7 July 53
- 7. Last Fraficiency Check 19 July 52.
- Last Route Check 14 November 52. Total Filot Hours This Model 645:00 Filot (361:00) CoFilot (284:00) Total CCA's Last Six Months 13 (Actual 6) (Reed 7) 9•
- 10.
- Graduated from HTTU 10 June 52. 11.
- Captain Chemey's evaluation is an average CO Pilot with respect to 12. Judgement and Proficiency.
- Total 4 engine time 2795:00 13.
- 14. Total Trips to Alaska, (Elmendorf) 5.



Graduate Navation in March of 51

1. Total Time 869 Hours

2. Current MATS equal navigation
3. Previously assigned to Search and Rescue at Bluie 8 (Arctic Operation)


during which time be accumulated approximately 100 hours of polar navigation experience.

4. His Training records indicates that his performance of duty was very satisfactory (better than average).
 5. This was the Navigators 1st trip to FOF.

This was the Mavigators 1st trip to Jur.
 Radio fixes are the best means of navigation, when there is cloud cover.
 Loran is good only up to about half way.


	YMR	ED STATES AIR PO	RCE.			T - 229)
		VATS			20.3	
	PAS	SENGER MANII	EST		UNE W	
		COT ES PARTIE GE MS				
		Of Control of Tours			- Agen Grande	
	· setta, £. (4)	Com. 32574	EDF	2. 72	135	1500 110
	PINGETTON, C.S.	Lieoc 0295775	Ľøŕ	1	214	**** ********************************
	STEMMS, E.J.	المس المس	EDF	1 3	135	582 10
	JACKSON, D.C.	we 31574	EDF	2: 59	2221	578 211
	TRIBBLE, W.P.	CAPT ADSOUTE	EDF	2 . 72	1772	
	PONIKVAR, J.E.	CAPT ATEMPTOT	197	2 22	152	383 (61)
# B : -	TURME ILL, B.W.	CAPT A 23332777	. EDF	2 31	233	5564 W11
	GOESEL, J.H.	CAPT NÍZOSTE	EDF	2 . 55	157	5565 411
	DRABKEY, D.D.	CAPT A937/305	EDŘ	1 43	234	5766 (* 1 1
	SHEBA, D.A.	1 LT A)7852200	EDK	1 5	132	264 gli
	LEAFORD, J.R.	2 (11 2 115)2916_	ED#	2 55	169	227.41
Table 1	(100N, E.E.	2 'LT A2223331	EDF	رو د	145 .	5562 gtl
	SERGER, A.	2 (1 71 <u>37</u> 5195	EDF	2 54	222	5765 gell
	DUIE, R.	2 LT 31387233	EDF	1 42	15)	THE WILL
	LOSTFLER, E.H.	2 (1)1392353	(D)	1 4 47	160	5365 (21)
	SCHWORE, E.J.	M SET #40737993	CDF _	2 5)	130	2081
		T SET AF37051719	EDF	1 50	130	0872 gr11 4, us 25
	-	A 2c AF13333330	ED/	1 4		1877 4 11
	COPY, D.			2	215	Ays 3
	50 - 62 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1	A 30 A 16397317		2	135	5630 A/11
The second secon		-1 905 W3 (2003)52				
		A 26 A 1443-210		1. 1.22	237_	
		A 20 AF1635073 A 20 AF11221375	EDF	1 65	150	
	DYCE, G.E.	2 5		52 9 70	7374	94 (1) Harris (4)
					-	
	. see Green	6 594- 1107 639/ 22		- 17 m	40	
	Calculation .	TO SAME STATE OF	**			

THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526




THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526


THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526



THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526




THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526




THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

WANOU	
LEGIT -LIE PRINCE	CONTINUES DIVISION, MATS
1. Company of the com	
	COLUMN CO
SCHOOL OF ESCHAFES	1. Temperature-pry with
), Youther	2. Dev Foirit S
2. Westhor	3, Field Elevation -/ FT.
8. Vesthor 84 Page 164 & 173 T.S. Cl-40NVL-1	c. Specific husidity
1. Teather	5. Wind direction & Velocity
6. Zaova factor	6, BHP Def cloncy/Sng / BHP
9, 20m ()"	7. Actual Gross Wt
8, Face 175 T.C. 01-40NI-1	8, Perfermance Gross Mt
9, Page 707 MATS Remai 55-5	1, TPS1 available tid 38 Not 1 Dry
10, 15 781 ! No "aved1 No. 1	10. TFSI Reject
11. Page 179 T.C. 01-0874-1	11. 3 Traping critical A/8
12. Page 175 \$.0. 01-46874-1	
18, Pers 175 T. O. DI-KNAT	13. Life of Claimace
14. Page 193 to 191 TO 4077341	15. Best Climb apend a Marines //
15. Page 197 to 200 T.C. 61-40W/-1.	16. 7 at 316mb at 4 3 ongines 2/2 Ki
16. Page 201 15 202 7.C. 01-2077-1	
American services of the servi	



THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526



THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

	della la control de la control
MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE	
Division	
INSTRUCTOR ABRIAL ENGINEER'S SIX (6) MONTH LINE CHECK	
Due 10 May 52	
ENGINEER HAGEN ENGIL W. 75t INSTRUCTOR ENGINEER Hall Stanle; D. 7/54t	
그는 물이 많은 사이 집에 집에 살아왔다. 그들은 사람은 사람이 되었다면 하는 것이 없는 것이 없다면 하는 것이다면 하는 것이다.	
AMBCRAFT COMMANDER BREIGLE CANADAS E. // TYPE AMBCRAFT C-124 H	
BOUTE M'Charl - Tokyo And ReTURN	
MECHANICAL DIFFICULTY EXPERIENCED # 2 PROP MORMALING RELAY INSPERATIVE	
try went directly into teather when coming out of neverse	
on landing	
REPAIRS MADE Meplaced Relay.	
<u>Programment i de la companya de la</u>	
(Grading system: S—Satisfactory, U—Unsatisfactory. Each grade of U (unsatisfactory) requires an explanation in remarks.)	
GRADES: 1. Personal requirements :	
[2] : [1] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2] [2	6
GRADES: 1. Personal requirements :	
GRADES: 1. Personal requirements : 2. Exterior inspection of aircraft	
GRADES: 1. Personal requirements : 2. Exterior inspection of aircraft 3. Interior inspection of aircraft 4. Starting and run-up 5. Performance in flight	
GRADES: 1. Personal requirements 2. Exterior inspection of aircraft 3. Interior inspection of aircraft 4. Starting and run-up 5. Performance in flight 6. Knowledge of aircraft	
GRADES: 1. Personal requirements : 2. Exterior inspection of aircraft 3. Interior inspection of aircraft 4. Starting and run-up 5. Performance in flight 6. Knowledge of aircraft 7. Arrival at destination	
GRADES: 1. Personal requirements 2. Exterior inspection of aircraft 8. Interior inspection of aircraft 4. Starting and run-up 5. Performance in flight 6. Knowledge of aircraft 7. Arrival at destination 8. General:	
GRADES: 1. Personal requirements 2. Exterior inspection of sircraft 3. Interior inspection of sircraft 4. Starting and run-up 5. Performance in flight 6. Knowledge of sircraft 7. Arrival at destination 8. General:	
GRADES: 1. Personal requirements 2. Exterior inspection of aircraft 8. Interior inspection of aircraft 4. Starting and run-up 5. Performance in flight 6. Knowledge of aircraft 7. Arrival at destination 8. General:	
GRADES: 1. Personal requirements 2. Exterior inspection of sircraft 3. Interior inspection of sircraft 4. Starting and run-up 5. Performance in flight 6. Knowledge of sircraft 7. Arrival at destination 8. General:	
GRADES: 1. Personal requirements 2. Exterior inspection of sircraft 3. Interior inspection of sircraft 4. Starting and run-up 5. Performance in flight 6. Knowledge of sircraft 7. Arrival at destination 8. General:	
GRADES: 1. Personal requirements 2. Exterior inspection of sircraft 3. Interior inspection of sircraft 4. Starting and run-up 5. Performance in flight 6. Knowledge of sircraft 7. Arrival at destination 8. General:	
GRADES: 1. Personal requirements 2. Exterior inspection of sircraft 3. Interior inspection of sircraft 4. Starting and run-up 5. Performance in flight 6. Knowledge of sircraft 7. Arrival at destination 8. General:	
GRADES: 1. Personal requirements : 2. Exterior inspection of aircraft 3. Interior inspection of aircraft 4. Starting and run-up 5. Performance in flight 6. Knowledge of aircraft 7. Arrival of destination 8. General Final grade of this report SUMMARIZED RECOMMENDATIONS A. SCR. Coccilent Subjects CR. pl. Respects	

	grafie de la companya del companya del companya de la companya de
	ACCESSES.
불통하는 경에는 사람이 맞이 모든 사가 되는 모양이다.	
1. Personal requirements:	GRADE
	F S T U-7
A. Promptness and appearance	
B. Availability of tools and equipment C. Theroughness in checking forms with engineer to be relieved	
D. Attitude toward duties	
D. Attitude toward duties E. Knowledge of ditching procedures	
F. Knowledge of weight and balance data	
	Grade S
후 발표했다고요 그는 얼마를 하셨는 하는 이 아버지는다.	7
REMARKS	
2 Exterior inspection of aircraft	GRADE
	STU
A. Proper inflation and condition of tires B. Condition of landing gear, locks in place	
C. Condition of interior of wheel pacelles	- Horoto, Hor
- A THE PARTY OF THE PERSON WAS CARLED BOTH ACCURATE AND THE PROPERTY OF THE PERSON WAS A PROPERTY OF T	
E. Oil on pacelles F. Fuel leakage under and slong wings	
F. Fuel leakage under and along wings G. Wrinkles and damage on control and stationary surfaces	
11. Condition of de-icer boots	도 그 그 도 그를 가 보는 경기를 모르게 하고 있다. 전하는
J. Quantity of fuel oil abound	
A Decurity of caps on fuel and oil tanks	
22 Decurry of Goors to cargo compartments	
M. Props pulled through	
	Grade
REMARKS	
	or of comments the same to report the same to be a same to
3. Interior inspection of aircraft	GRADE
선생님들 그리고 하는 것이 없는 것이 없는 것이 없는 것이 없는 것이 없는 것이 없다.	SUV
A. Security of cargo B. Condition of fuselage tanks	
C. Position of fuselage fuel selector	
D. Level of hydraulic fluid	
E. Adequate rations and water	
F. Emergency equipment stowed G. Supply of auxiliary oil	
II. Cleanliness of crews' compartment	
I. Position of all switches (OFF)	
化分离 "你们,我我没有意思,我没有这样的意思,只是有一个一样,这个女子,只是这个人的人,	
	Grade
	Grade
	Grada
	Grada

2	
	BEMARKS
	4. Starting and read sep
	A. Promptness in completing preflight inspection . B. Thoroughness of report to pilot (checklist) .
	C. Check on availability of battery cart, fire guard D. Report on ladder, tail support, and gear locks stowed
	E. Handling of RPM and throttles, starting, and taxing. F. Technique with mixture controls
	G. Check for proper temperatures and pressures
	REMARKS Grade
	5. Performance in flight
	S U
	A. Attention to flap position indicator on take-off. B. Repetition of power settings and pilot's instructions on take-off.
s	C. Smoothness with prop controls D. Ability to synchronize props
	E. Knowledge of cruise control data
r.	F. Care and neatness with Forms 1A, 41B, and OP-14. G. Ability to use fuel system controls
•	I. Examination of wings when icing conditions exist
	J. Care in desinding blowers K. Promptness in reporting defects to pilot.
	Committee of the Commit
	REMARKS That Hosen has a very excellent houndary of course control. Keeps all loss and alexander toward univery good evention
	3012 3011 30
<u> </u>	6. Knowledge at alreadt
	A. AUCCRAFT STOCKES:
	(1) Fuel (2) (01)
	(3) Hydraelic
	(4) Electrical (5) Heaving
	(6) Anti-iding and de-iding

THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

		tra et 🎉
	경기되었어요. 150 전 100 기타스 그들은 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	267
	R. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES: GRADE	<u> </u>
	(1) Gear extension	
	(2) Flaps (3) Brakes	
	(4) Fire prevention	
	Grade : 5	_ ·
	REMARKS	
		-
	7. Arrival at destination + GRADE	- 3
	A. Promptness of check on hydraulic fluid level	
	B. Report on fuel supply, fuselage fuel valve (OFF)	***
	D. Handling of prop controls, etc.	
	E. Check on wheel chocks, brakes (077), and gear locks in place F. Completeness of all required forms	
-	G. Analysis of defects with relief engineer H. Cleanliness of aircraft when left	
	GradeS	
	REMARKS T/Set Hagen 15 A Year your engineer in my crimity.	- ·
	REMARKS T/Sof Hagen 15 A reay year engineer in my coincien. T/Sof Hall. 5.D.	-
	REMARKS T/Sof Hayen 15 A reay year engineer in my cylinists. T/Sof Hall, 5.D.	-
	8. General GRADE	
	8. General GRADE S U	
	8. General GRADE A. Attitude and judgment B. Cooperation with crew and with ground engineering personnel	
	8. General A. Attitude and judgment B. Cooperation with crew and with ground engineering personnel C. Ability to determine cause for mechanical difficulty and to correct same	
	8. General GRADE A. Attitude and judgment B. Cooperation with crew and with ground engineering personnel	
	8. General A. Attitude and judgment B. Cooperation with crew and with ground engineering personnel C. Ability to determine cause for mechanical difficulty and to correct same Grade	
	8. General A. Attitude and judgment B. Cooperation with crew and with ground engineering personnel C. Ability to determine cause for mechanical difficulty and to correct same Grade	
	8. General A. Attitude and judgment B. Cooperation with crew and with ground engineering personnel C. Ability to determine cause for mechanical difficulty and to correct same Grade	
	8. General A. Attitude and judgment B. Cooperation with crew and with ground engineering personnel C. Ability to determine cause for mechanical difficulty and to correct same Grade	
	8. General A. Attitude and judgment B. Cooperation with crew and with ground engineering personnel C. Ability to determine cause for mechanical difficulty and to correct same Grade	
	8. General A. Attitude and judgment B. Cooperation with crew and with ground engineering personnel C. Ability to determine cause for mechanical difficulty and to correct same Grade	
	8. General A. Attitude and judgment B. Cooperation with crew and with ground engineering personnel C. Ability to determine cause for mechanical difficulty and to correct same Grade	
	8. General A. Attitude and judgment B. Cooperation with crew and with ground engineering personnel C. Ability to determine cause for mechanical difficulty and to correct same Grade	
	8. General A. Attitude and judgment B. Cooperation with crew and with ground engineering personnel C. Ability to determine cause for mechanical difficulty and to correct same Grade	

	Ground training required? YES No. INSTRUCTION RECOMMENDED
-	
	ACTION TAKEN ON THIS REPORT
	Appropriate bemarks are checked:
	[1886명에 대한 원고대학생님: 1986년 1일 전략 교육 전략 1886년 1987년 1
	Satisfactory check ride—no explanation needed.
	Report discussed with acrial engineer—difficulties settled.
	Instructor, aerial engineer's recommendations followed.
	Aerial engineer assigned necessary training course in accordance with instruction recommended.
	COMPLETED ACTION
*	
13	
77	
	A certified TRUE Gopy Charles & Bates
<	
5 5%	Charles & Baccs
	major de 11
	(5) Ja-152as : 4 2 continuous pounding viets
beautie la	

THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

Dete 17 SET SY Date 17 SET SY ANTONIOS RAYBATOR'S SIE (6) MINES LIM CHECK REPORT Date 17 SET SY ANTONIOS TRUES, WILLIAM I Little provide maybator Sail House (Carling States) Alectrafy commands Keeteeuw Strakey Caffeirs alectry (Carling in All) Alectrafy commands Keeteeuw Strakey Caffeirs alectry (Carling in All) ROUTS TCM—SAYANNAH, UK, RETURN VIA BROOKLEY FLIGHT TIME; DAY 40 NIMES 37 TOTAL 77 (Oreging systems 8—Satisfactory, U—Unastisfactory, Such grade of U (unastisfactory) requires an explanation in remarks.) GRADES: 1. Proflight. \$ Corporation and mentions. \$ Deed recomming. \$ Deed recomming. \$ Deed recomming. \$ S Final grade this report SUMMARISED EROCOMMENTIONS: It Turner has a very good Knewledge of all phase of marigation. Works MINES 100 Constitut of the phase of marigation. Works MINES 100 Constitut of the phase of marigation. Works	
NAVIDATOR TORMER WILLIAM I LIGHTERINGTON SAVERANCE SHIFT HOSER R. (Name in Rel) (Read) AIRCRAFT COMMANDER KOETEEUW STANLEY CAFTYING AIRCRAFT C-124. (Sense in Will) (Read) ROUTE TCM-SAVANNAH, UK. RETURN VIA BROOKLEY PLICENT TIME: AIY 40 STREE 37 TOTAL 77 (Grading systems 8-Satisfactory, U-Unestisfactory, Sech grade of U (unestisfactory) requires an explanation in remarks.) CHADES: 1. Proflight. S. Organization and mentures. S. Dead reckening. 4. Pilotage. S. Radio and consol navigation. S. S	
AIRCRAFT COMMANDER KOETEEUW STANLEY CATTURE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER KOETEEUW STANLEY CATTURE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER KOETEEUW STANLEY CATTURE AIRCRAFT C-124 ROUTE TCM - SAVANNAH, UK., RETURN VIA BROOKLEY PLICET TIME ANY 40 WIMER 37 TOTAL 77 (Orading systems 8-Satisfactory, U-Unsatisfactory, Back grade of U (unsatisfactory) requires an explanation in remarks.) CHARLES 1. Proflight. 2. Organization and resutness. 5. Dead reckming. 5. Radio and consol navigation. 6. Radio and consol navigation. 7. Colestial navigation 8. Post flight. 9. General. 1. TWENT has a New Gard	DESTRUCTOR REVIEWOON'S SIX (6) NORTH LINE OFFICE SECOND
AIRCRAFT COMMANDER KOETEEUW STANLEY CATTURE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER KOETEEUW STANLEY CATTURE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER KOETEEUW STANLEY CATTURE AIRCRAFT C-124 ROUTE TCM - SAVANNAH, UK., RETURN VIA BROOKLEY PLICET TIME ANY 40 WIMER 37 TOTAL 77 (Orading systems 8-Satisfactory, U-Unsatisfactory, Back grade of U (unsatisfactory) requires an explanation in remarks.) CHARLES 1. Proflight. 2. Organization and resutness. 5. Dead reckming. 5. Radio and consol navigation. 6. Radio and consol navigation. 7. Colestial navigation 8. Post flight. 9. General. 1. TWENT has a New Gard	14 SECT 52
AIRCRAFT COMMANDER KOETEEUW STRAILEY CASTEER AIRCRAFT C-124 (Ross in Part) (Ross) (Ross) (Ross) (Ross) (Ross) (Ross) (Oracing systems 8-Satisfactory, U-Unsatisfactory, Rash grade of U (unsatisfactory) requires an explanation in remarks.) (Grading systems 8-Satisfactory, U-Unsatisfactory, Rash grade of U (unsatisfactory) requires an explanation in remarks.) (GRADES: 1. Proflight. S. Organisation and pastness. S. Dead reckening. 4. Pilotage 5. Radio and consol navigation. S. S. Loran navigation. 7. Gelestial navigation. S. Post flight. S. S. General. S. S	는 사람들은 사용하다는 전쟁 항공기 가는 사람들은 사용이 있는데 중에 하는데 중에 대한 경우 기업 기업 기
ROUTS TCM—SAVANNAH, UK, RETURN VIA BROOKLEY PLICENT TIME; DAY 40 WIMER 37 TOTAL 77 (Orading systems 8—Satisfactory, U—Unsatisfactory, Rach grade of U (unsatisfactory) requires an explanation in remarks.) CHADES: 1. Proflight. S. Organization and meatness. S. Dand reckeming. S. Plotage 6. Pilotage 7. Gelastial navigation. 9. General. S. General. S. Simulation this report Simulation modementations: 4t. Turner has a very good.	그는 경기가 되면 하는 사람이 가장 가장 하는 점심이 하는데 이번 가장 없는 것 같아. 그는 가장 하는데 하고 있다고 있다면 하는데 되었다. 그는 사람이 되었다면 하는데
PLICENT THE: DAY 40 SINCE 37 TOTAL 77 (Grading systems S-Satisfactory, U-Unsatisfactory, Such grade of U (unsatisfactory) requires an explanation in remarks.) CHADES: 1. Proflight. S. Organization and meatross. S. Deal reckening 4. Pilotage 5. Radio and consol navigation. S. Radio and consol navigation. S. Colestial navigation. S. Poet flight. S. Poet flight. S. Conservat. S. Cons	
PLICENT THE: DAY 40 SINCE 37 TOTAL 77 (Grading systems S-Satisfactory, U-Unsatisfactory, Such grade of U (unsatisfactory) requires an explanation in remarks.) CHADES: 1. Proflight. S. Organization and meatross. S. Deal reckening 4. Pilotage 5. Radio and consol navigation. S. Radio and consol navigation. S. Colestial navigation. S. Poet flight. S. Poet flight. S. Conservat. S. Cons	CM-SAVANNAH, UK. RETURN VIA BROOKLEY
(Grading systems S-Satisfactory, U-Unsatisfactory. Reals grade of U (unsatisfactory) requires an explanation in remarks.) (MADES: 1. Proflight. S. S. Organisation and menturess. S. Dead reckming. S. Dead reckming. S. S. Dead reckming. S. S. Pilotage. S. Radio and consol navigation. S. S. Radio and consol navigation. S. S. General S. Poet flight. S. S. General S. General S. General S. S. S. General S. S. General S. S. General S. S.	
### Commission and results of States	DAY 40 MINES 37 TOTAL 77
### Commission and results of States	
8. Deed recioning 8. Deed recioning 4. Pilotage 5. Radio and consol navigation. 5. Loran navigation 7. Colestial navigation 9. Post flight. 5. General: Final grade this report SUBJURITED RECORDSHIPLY 1088: Lt. Turner has a New Good	wquires an explanation in remarks.)
8. Dead reclaming 4. Pilotage 5. Radio and consol navigation. 6. Loran navigation 7. Colestial navigation 9. Poet flight. 5. S.	DES: 1. Proflight.
6. Pilotage 5. Radio and consol navigation. 6. Loran navigation 7. Gelastial navigation 9. Post flight. 5 Final grade this report SUBSARTIED RECORDERDATIONS: At Turner has a very good	2: Organization and meatmose
5. Radio and consol navigation. 5. Loran navigation 7. Gelestial navigation 8. Post flight. 5. S 9. General. Final grade this report SUMMARIESD ESCORMENDATIONS: Lt. Turner has a wing good	5. Dead reckening
7. Gelestial navigation	4. Pilotage
7. Gelestial navigation S 9. Post flight. S 9. General. Final grade this report SUMMARISED ESCORMENDATIONS: Lt. Turner has a very good	5. Radio and consol navigation
Pinal grade this report SUMMARIESD ESCONSSIBLATIONS: Lt. Turker has a very good	6. Loran martication
Final grade this report SUMMARIESD RECOMMENDATIONS: Lt. Turker has a very good	7. Golastial navigation
Final grade this report SUMMARISED RECOMMENDATIONS: Lt. Turker has a very good	6. Poet flight.
BUTHURIED RECOMMENDATIONS. It. Turner has a very good	
with the in confident and medicen and	
THE ARTICLE LANGE AND LEVEL ALLEGE AND	verge of are present of navigation, works
The state of the s	tase is confiaint, and produces good
- results.	
HATS FORM AGA (1 Dog 50) Q CENTRE THE CONSTRUCTOR NEVIGATOR	(And () Day ()
(reproduced 1706 ATG, 2 Sep 52) Charter Strat Berg //cT	THE TWO ALV, & SED DE)

		egan.	
	1. PREFLICAT	CHARGE	
	A. Promptoess and appearance.	. X	
-	B. Attentiveness to briefing	cht plan	
	D. Coordination of oruine control inf E. Accuracy and completeness of fligh	ormation and flight plan	
	P. Equipment check (time tick, ectant drift meter, navigation books, et	check, maps, astro compass,	
•			
÷	REMARIS		
	2. ORGANIZATION AND WARRESS		<u> </u>
	A. Accessibility of materials before	talss-off	
	B. Condition of charts, arrangement of C. Care of classified material	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	D. Neutrees and accuracy of log, how- E. Periodic posting of position report	po-sit, and weather felder.	
		Grede	
	REMARKS		
-	ADDAM 25		
		<u> </u>	
	3. DRAD RECKONING	GRADS	
	A. Use of drift meter		
-	B. Preparation of maps in advance C. Use of radio altimeter drift	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
		and the state of t	
	REMARKS		
	<u></u>		*saltesadamin ·
_		2	
	A PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF		
		Section of the state of the section	
	the second secon		SESSEE

THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

 		
4		Ū
,	A. despressy and how of group applies fixes and visual bearing	
Section 1		
6.	PADE CORREL BAVIOLTICE	ʊ -
**************************************	A. Accuracy in was of radio fixes and fore	
	E. Morriedge and use of Demoel	
	Grade 5	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
	LORAN AND RADAR MAYIGATION GRADE	
	A. Calibratian and reception check	
	D. Use of rader equipment (if applicable)	
	Table 1	
	CELESTIAL MAVIGATION GRADE	
	C. Selection of celestial bedies	
. !	Grade S.	
	REVARIS:	

		the transfer of the contract o	(1) (1) (1) (2) (2) (2) (2) (3) (3) (3) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4	THE RESERVE AND ADDRESS OF THE PARTY.			
		•		3 4 3 5 8 7 7 7			
-							
A. PÓ	T PLICET					CRATE	
	eral montrecy (e hadines as	d STA		$\overline{S}^{\frac{\overline{s}}{s}}$		-
B. Pag	ort to mather	effice			3		
D. Ce	riofing report.	ater is compar	tmat.		· · · <u>- \$</u> -		
					<u> </u>		
PHWAR K	le .		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	3 ,_ <u></u>	*		
							_
9. G&1	FRAL		e de la companya de La companya de la co	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	<u></u>	<u> </u>	-
	lity to coordin						
	wledge of divide						_
D. Att	itude and jedge peration with o	set			· · · <u> </u>		_
	DOLLECTION STREET	1 4- 1					
. F. Gen	oral impression				∷ <u>-3-</u>		-
. P. Gen							-
	oral impression	ereated by m	avigator	G G	· · · · <u>- 3</u>		-
Coopers	oral impression	dreated by E	avigator	G G	· · · · <u>- 3</u>		-
Coopers	oral impression	dreated by E	avigator	G G	· · · · <u>- 3</u>		- - ·
Coopers	oral impression	dreated by E	avigator	G G	· · · · <u>- 3</u>		- · · - · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Cooper a	oral impression	th mavigator	avigator	G G	· · · · <u>- 3</u>		
REMARKS	tion of orew wi	th mavigator repenated	evigator (outer in remainder fully	G G	· · · · <u>- 3</u>		
REMARKS 1. Gro	tion of crow wi	th mavigator Toperate Quired? Tas Sommery Tas	(outer in remaining fully	G G	· · · · <u>- 3</u>		
REMARKS 1. Gro	tion of crow wi : Crew Co	th mavigator repetated quired? Iss	(outer in remaining fully	(ke)	· · · · <u>- 3</u>		
REMARKS 1. Gro	tion of crow wi : Crew Co	th mavigator repetated quired? Iss	(outer in remaining fully	(ke)	· · · · <u>- 3</u>		
REMARKS 1. Gro 2. FIL	tion of crow wi : Crew Co cond training re- cond training re- cond training ne- condition reconstruction	th mavigator Toperated Quired? Iss Semanyf Iss ACTION TAI	fully NO V.	(Res)	· · · · <u>- 3</u>		
REMARKS 1. Gro 2. FIL	tion of crew wi : CREW Co. : Crew wi : Crew S.	th mavigator repetated quired? Iss NONE ACTION TAIL checked; shock ride—no	fully NO V. NO V. EN ON THIS RES	ORT	rada S		
REMARKS 1. Gro 2. FIL	tion of crow wi : CALLY CA and training re- ght training her TION RECOLORIBE	th mavigator Toperated Quired? Iss SHEARY! THE ACTION TAI checked: shock ride—no	wigator (outer in remaining fully HO U. H	CRT meded. tles settled.	rada S		
REMARKS 1. Gro 2. FIL	tion of orew wi : CALLY CALLY CALLY CALLY CALLY CALLY CALLY CALL and training re- pht training ne- pht tra	th mavigator Toperated Quired? Iss MONE ACTION TAI checked; shock ride—no	wigator (outer in remaining fully fully 100 / 100 /	ORT meded. tles settled.	rada S	struction	
Coepera REMARIS 1. Gro 2. FIL INSTRUC	tion of crew wi : CREW Color wi : Crew Color wi	th mavigator Toperated Quired? Iss Sensory? Iss ACTION TAN checked: shock ride—no sed with navig	wigator (outer in remaining fully HO U. H	ORT meded. tles settled.	rada S	struction	
Coepera REMARIS 1. Gro 2. FIL INSTRUC	tion of crew wi : CREW Color wi : Crew Color wi	th mavigator Toperated Quired? Iss MONE ACTION TAI checked; shock ride—no	wigator (outer in remaining fully fully 100 / 100 /	ORT meded. tles settled.	rada S	struction ent	
Coepera REMARIS 1. Gro 2. FIL INSTRUC	tion of crew wi : CREW Color wi : Crew Color wi	th mavigator Toperated Quired? Iss Sensory? Iss ACTION TAN checked: shock ride—no sed with navig	wigator (outer in remaining fully fully 100 / 100 /	ORT meded. tles settled.	rada S	etriction ent	
Coepera REMARIS 1. Gro 2. FIL INSTRUC	tion of crew wi : CREW Color wi : Crew Color wi	th mavigator Toperated Quired? Iss Sensory? Iss ACTION TAN checked: shock ride—no sed with navig	wigator (outer in remaining fully fully 100 / 100 /	ORT meded. tles settled.	rada S	etriction ent_	
Coepera REMARIS 1. Gro 2. FIL INSTRUC	tion of crew wi : CREW Color wi : Crew Color wi	th mavigator Toperated Quired? Iss Sensory? Iss ACTION TAN checked: shock ride—no sed with navig	wigator (outer in remaining fully fully 100 / 100 /	ORT meded. tles settled.	rada S	struction ent_	

34TH AIR TRANSFORT SWADSON 1705th Air Transport Group Continental Division, HATS Rechard AFB, Washington

3 December 1952

STEJECT: Technical Orders Not-Complied-With on Aircraft C-124A, Serial Number 51-107

TO: Whom It May Concern

Reference aircraft C-1244, Serial Number 51-107, a thorough check of the aircraft records on this aircraft reveals that the following technical Orders are being carried as not-complied-with:

Ol-40NV-118
Restriction on use of wing fillet life raft compartments.
(No life rafts installed in fillets.)

Ol-ZONVA-ZIA

Inspection and replacement of main landing gear retracting cylinder rod end bearings.

(Tools necessary for accomplishment are on order.)

01-40NVA-57

Redification of Curtiss propeller synchronizer and synchronizer rack assembly.

(Rit not available.)

O2A-10H-22
Oil leakage at front end of propeller shaft.
Number 2 Engine
Number 3 Engine
Number 4 Engine
(Not applicable except when leak is encountered.)

Interim T.C. Cl-1583

Engine driven generator and alternator replacement.

(Not-complied with due to confusion existing on pending change to original Interim Technical Order.)

Centain USAF

RESTRICTED

34TH AIR TRANSPORT SQUADRON 1705th Air Transport Group Continents! Division, MATS McChord AFS, Washington

3 December 1952

SUBJECT: Aircraft Forms, Aircraft C-124A, Serial Humber 51-107


TO:

Whom It May Concern

1. Forwarded as inclosures to this lotter are the AF Form 1's, Port II, for sircraft C-124A, serial number 51-107, for the period 14 November 1952 to 21 November 1952.

2. To the best of my knowledge and belief the current AF Forms 1, Parts I, II, III, IV, and V were on board the aircraft when it departed this station.

1 Incl AF Fm 1, Part II's Optain USAF



THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526





DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE-CIVE ACROMALITIES ADMINISTRATION

DATE OF INCIDENT

INCIDENT NO.

INCIDENT REPORT 22 November 1962

ANC-ARTC-188

To:

Inspector General United States Air Porce Washington 25, D. C. FROM:

Airways Operations Specialist (Center Chief) Air Boute Anchorage, Alaska

The following is a report of an incident which adversely affected the control of air traffic. This report is forwarded for your information and any action you deem necessary. No reply is required. If desired, the chief controller will be glad to discuss this report at your convenience. Any action which you may take to saint the Air Traffic Control Service to provide efficient and safe control of air traffic will be appreciated.

AGENCY/AINCRAFT IDENTIFICATION

MATS 1107 C-124

MAMERIC OF PERSONNEL OR PILOT

TYPE OF INCIDENT

Primary - Academt

SEJIMMARY OF INCIDENT (USE REVERSE SIDE IF HECEMONY)

MATS 1107 C-124 operating on a flight plan specifying Instrument Flight Bules McChord 9,000 direct Rolling Bay Blue \$2 Dungeness 10,000 Neah Bay 8,500 direct Sandspit 9,000 Middleton Island 9,000 Whittier Amber 1 Anchorage Elmendorf Air Force Base.

At 05542 MATS 1107 reported to Yakataga Radio that he was over Middleton Island at 05472 9,000 estimating Whittier at 06172.

The Center attempted thru Yakataga Radio to issue a clearance to the aircraft, but Takataga Radio unable to resatablish contact with the aircraft. The Center them requested Elmendorf Airways attempt contact with the aircraft, but they were unsuccessful in their attempt to establish radio contact.

The Center's Whittier estimate was 05277 and Anchorage Range estimate 06402. When WATS 1107 failed to report his position over Whittier, Anchorage Radio, Anchorage Appearsh Control, Elmendorf Tower, Elmendorf Airways, Renai Radio and Kodiak Airways attempted contact with the aircraft. As all agencies were unsuccessful in establishing radio contact, the Center insectately instigated two way radio failure procedures.

At 07052, Electron Base Operations was advised of the overdue aircraft including all information the Center had at this time.

Radio contacts between MATS 1107 and CAA Stations while enroute on the Whittier-Sandspit Air Route were received and transmitted on 5105 and range frequencies.

Weather: Middleton Island 2505287 - Indefinite six hundred, obscured, two miles fog, temperature 46, des point 45.

Anchorage 2508287 - Measured eight thousand overcast, over fifteen miles, temperature 54, dew point 52.


ATTACHMENTS

PORWARDED

Chief

A. C. WITHOUGHT PERSONS MITTEE M-\$1462-1

FORM ACA-884-A (7-49)



Report No. 34 Da								
Identification 412	and the second				light			
Published Bearings, Range Transmitter:		256 Type T	No.	4		True an	No. 2	10000
Courses Found (Irus)	258	352	76	172.]				
Arrow, Degrees	Ves	Yes	Yes	Ves .			3	-
loy (elich person) Teles/Rego litus	• No	Yes-	No	Yes-		Not	cked	
Deable Range Dist. Usable Voice Dist.			iles		9,24			
Votice Quality								
Brosdonst Sarning Come of Silence		sctory? econds atl		000 ft.	Satisfac Sec			£t.
"Z" MARKER Type		Mai	., 🗸			Stand	7	
let Check 2nd Check 90 fm let		de et			Second			
FAY MARKERS	Secon		ft.		Second	s at		mot.
		secked with		Receiv				. K.
				OL TITLE IN			Axis M	<u>am</u>
location		Type.		les at	st.	=13	e at	£t.
lo: Location				les at	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1		e at	£ŧ,
lo: Location				les at les at			a at a at a at	It It
				les at	(); (); ();		e at 	
				les at les at			a at a at a at	It It
				les at les at			a at a at a at	It It
				les at les at			a at a at a at	It It
				les at les at			a at a at a at	It It
			REMARKS:	les at les at			a at a at a at	It It
			REMARKS:	les at le			a at a at a at	It It
			REMARKS Cartico Leon L.	les at le	Cinc			It It

Form ACA 496		•		en de la companya de La companya de la co	Addition of the Control of the Contr	2 1	•		
Rev. 9-18-44		*					••		
		ivil Aero	casor of	Commerce Administrat	ion	. :			<i>y</i> -
*		PARTO PA	CTITTE I	LIGHT REPOR			v = v, = v,		
Report No. 1/2 Da	te Chd.	av 12, 19	52 Stat			<u> </u>	les SBR	AZ-P-DT	XV.
Identification AND	Frequency	338 kc.	Power L	Omatts Sm	gnt E.Chart N	<u>o. 6</u>	Dated_M	<u>bvezber</u>	19
Published Bearings,	Degrées:	-206	398	38	1/12	Tenuet ar	ad . Trans re	1 01 -11	
	to the state of	100	Y	1			No.	2	
Range Transmitter:	esta de la compansión de La compansión de la compa	Type TS(7. /pe_	TSG	3 exte	park "	• •
Courses Found (True)	207	308	37	1412					-
Error, Degrees Multiples	√l Yes	- 0# 'es-/	Yes-	Yes-		Same	-		_
Key Clicks	Yes-	Хo	Yes-	No		7 2 10	as		
Voice/Hange Ratio Usable Range Dist.	- 01		mal miles				No.	4	
Usable Voice Dist.			miles			24		 	-
Voice Quality Broadcast Jarning	6-62-6		y good						_
Come of Silence		conda at]	Yes 20 mph.l	.000 ft.	Satisfact Seco				
"Z" MARKER: Type 172 lst Check 2430 2nd Check 90°fm lst	I 26 Secon 25 Secon		ft. 12 ft. 12	0 such 2 0 night 2	3 Second	Stand	lby	120 mpt 120 mrt	
"Z" MARKER: Type 172 lst Check 243° 2nd Check 90°fm lst	26 Second 25 Second Ch	is at 1000 is at 1000 ecked with	ft. 12 ft. 12	0 mph 2 0 mph 2 N53B Receive	3 Second	Stand at 10 at 10	1by 60 ft.	120 mil	L.
"Z" MARKER: Type TZ lst Check 243° 2nd Check 90°fm lst PAN MARKERS	26 Second 25 Second Ch	is at 1000 is at 1000	ft. 12 ft. 12	0 mph 2 0 mph 2 N53B Receive	3 Second	Stand at 10 at 10	lby	120 mil	_
"Z" MARKER: Type 172 lst Check 243° 2nd Check 90"fm lst FAN MARKERS (c. Locatio	26 Second 25 Second Ch	is at 1000 is at 1000 ecked with	ft. 12 ft. 12 Type M	0 mph 2 0 mph 2 N53BReceive or Axis Mid les at	3 Second	Stand at 10 at 10 Mino mil	os at	120 mit	
"Z" MARKER: Type TZ lst Check 243° 2nd Check 90°fm lst PAN MARKERS	26 Second 25 Second Ch	is at 1000 is at 1000 ecked with	ft. 12 ft. 12 ft. 12 Type H	0 mph 2 0 mph 2 N53BReceive or Axis Wid les at les at	3 Second	Stands at 10 s at 10 wino mil	oo ft.	120 mit	
"Z" MARKER: Type 172 lst Check 243° 2nd Check 90"fm lst FAN MARKERS (c. Locatio	26 Second 25 Second Ch	is at 1000 is at 1000 ecked with	ft. 12 ft. 12 ft. 12 Type H	0 mph 2 0 mph 2 N53B Receive or Axis Wid les at	3 Second	Stands at 10 s	os at	120 mit	
"Z" MARKER: Type 172 lst Check 243° 2nd Check 90"fm lst FAN MARKERS (c. Locatio	26 Second 25 Second Ch	is at 1000 is at 1000 school with	ft. 12 ft. 12 ft. 12 Type H	0 mph 2 0 mph 2 N53BReceive or Axis Wid les at les at	3 Second	Stands at 10 s	os at	idth	
"Z" MARKER: Type 172 lst Check 243° 2nd Check 90"fm lst FAN MARKERS (c. Locatio	26 Second 25 Second Cha	is at 1000 is at 1000 closed with	ft. 12 ft. 12 ft. 12 itype	0 mph 2 0 mph 2 0 mph 2 N53BReceive or Axis Wid les at les at les at	33 Second	Stands at 10 s	OO St.	idth	
"Z" MARKER: Type IZ lst Check 243° 2nd Check 90°fm lst FAN MARKERS [c. Location] [c. Location]	26 Second 25 Second Chara	is at 1000 is at 1000 coked with Type	ft. 12 ft. 12 ft. 12 it yes Maj Maj Maj REMARKS retune.	O mph 2 O mph 2 O mph 2 N53BReceive or Axis Wid les at les at les at les at les at	33 Second 3 Second 53 Second 54 ft. 55 ft.	Stands at 10 s	OO ft. OO ft. F Axis Nos at the sat th	idth	
"Z" MARKER: Type IZ lst Check 2430 2nd Check 90 fm lst FAN MARKERS (c. Location The southeast course	26 Second 25 Second Characteristics	is at 1000 is at 1000 closed with Type hance*and	ft. 12 ft. 12 ft. 12 it ype in the interest of	0 mph 2 0 mph	3 Second	Stands at 10 s	OO ft. OO ft. F Axis Nos at the sat th	idth	
"Z" MARKER: Type 172 lst Check 20;30 2nd Check 90 fm lst FAN MARKERS to. Location it it it it it it it it it i	26 Second 25 Second Chains mainte	at 1000 is at 1000 cked with Type hance*and cked over ate align o course!	ft. 12 ft. 12 ft. 12 i Type	O mph 2 O mph 2 O mph 2 O mph 2 N53BReceive or Axis Mid les at	AR 600 y Un NW	Stand at 10 Mino mil mil mil mil mil mil mil mi	TAXLS II	idth	
"Z" MARKER: Type 17 lst Check 243° 2nd Check 90°fm lst FAN MARKERS to. Location to. Flight check follow The southeast cours Circlesod at 5000 fe	26 Second 25 Second Chains mainte	at 1000 is at 1000 cked with Type hance*and cked over ate align o course!	ft. 12 ft. 12 ft. 12 i Type	O mph 2 O mph	AR 600 y Un NW	Mino mil	TAXLS II	idth	
"Z" MARKER: Type 172 lst Check 20;30 2nd Check 90 fm lst FAN MARKERS to. Location it it it it it it it it it i	26 Second 25 Second Chains mainte	at 1000 is at 1000 cked with Type hance*and cked over ate align o course!	ft. 12 ft. 12 ft. 12 it yes it	O mph 2 O mph	AR	Stand at 10 Mino mil mil mil mil mil mil mil mi	TAXLS II	idth	
"Z" MARKER: Type 172 lst Check 20;30 2nd Check 90 fm lst FAN MARKERS to. Location it it it it it it it it it i	26 Second 25 Second Chains mainte	at 1000 is at 1000 cked with Type hance*and cked over ate align o course!	ft. 12 ft. 12 ft. 12 it yes it	O mph 2 O mph 2 O mph 2 O mph 2 N53BReceive or Axis Mid les at	AR	Stand at 10 Mino mil mil mil mil mil mil mil mi	TAXLS II	idth	
"Z" MARKER: Type 172 lst Check 20;30 2nd Check 90 fm lst FAN MARKERS to. Location it it it it it it it it it i	26 Second 25 Second Chains mainte	at 1000 is at 1000 cked with Type hance*and cked over ate align o course!	ft. 12 ft	O mph 2 O mph 2 O mph 2 N53BReceive or Axis Wid les at	AR	Stands at 10 Mino mil	T Ards Nos at Seat Seat Seat Seat Seat Seat Seat S	idth	
"Z" MARKER: Type 172 lst Check 20;30 2nd Check 90 fm lst FAN MARKERS to. Location it it it it it it it it it i	26 Second 25 Second Chains mainte	at 1000 is at 1000 cked with Type hance*and cked over ate align o course!	ft. 12 ft	O mph 2 O mph	AR	Stand at 10 at 10 Mino at 1 at	T Axis Nos at State of the control o	idth	
"Z" MARKER: Type 172 lst Check 20;30 2nd Check 90 fm lst FAN MARKERS to. Location it it it it it it it it it i	26 Second 25 Second Chains mainte	at 1000 is at 1000 cked with Type hance*and cked over ate align o course!	ft. 12 ft	O mph 2 O mph 2 O mph 2 N53BReceive or Axis Wid les at	AR	Stand at 10 at 10 Mino at 1 at	T Axis Nos at State of the control o	idth	
"Z" MARKER: Type 172 lst Check 20;30 2nd Check 90 fm lst FAN MARKERS to. Location it it it it it it it it it i	26 Second 25 Second Character and the second and the second and th	is at 1000 is at 1000 closed with Type nance *and cked over ate align o course to d altitude	ft. 12 ft	O mph 2 O mph	AR	Stand at 10 at 10 Mino at 1 at	T Axis Nos at State of the control o	idth	

Form ACA 496 Rev. 9-18-44 Department of Commerce Civil Assonautics Administration RADIO FACILITY-PLICHT REPORT Report No. 47 Date Ckd. Nov.24, 1952 Station Anchorage, Alaska Class SHRAZ-P-DTAV Flight Identification ARC Frequency 338 kg. Power 400 matte 1956, Chart No. 3 Dated May 1952 Published Bearings, Degrees: 206 308 True and Toward Station No. Type TSG Type TSG SCHARL. Rango Pranamitter: Courses Found True 308 Error, Degrees Multiples Key Clicks _-0 Yes Yes Same Yes Tes, No Yes Yes No No. 1 Voice/Range Ratio Norma Usable Range Dist. 75 miles Usable Voice Dist. 75 miles Very good Voice Quality Satisfactory? Broadcast Warning Satisfactory? Yes Seconds at 120 mph. 1000ft. Come of Silence Kain Standby 1 "Z" MARKER: Type 1st Check 270° 34 Seconds at 1000 ft. Seconds at 21 Seconds at 1000 ft. 2nd Check 90 fm lst apa Seconds at <u>mbh</u> Checked with Type-MN53B Receiver FAR MARKERS Major Axis Width Kinor Axis Width Location Type No. miles at ſt. miles at ſŧ. miles at miles at ſt. Δ. miles at ſŧ. miles at <u>. 12.</u> miles at miles at £t. <u>ft,</u> miles at ft. milos at ft. REMARKS Flight check following disappearance Receiver ARB Ceiling 6000 overcast AF 707 C-121 . Visibility. Unrestricted Temperature 10° F Southeast course checked at 9000 feet (same 製造物 altitude as AF 747) 55 miles out over WING. 55E 25; gusts 38 10:45 a.m. Willard Island. This was closest VFR check; Course and fan marker normal over Whittier at 9000 feet. Certified a True Copy and A. Rivers, Actg. Chief Elect. Whitne. Br., N 94 J. C. Pifeffer aircraft_ Region: C. Pfeffer 25647 Harry Control of the State of t

Rev. 9-18-44	Name					
	CIATI YOU	rtunet of Co comutics Admi	inistratio	*		
		CILTI-FIIG			gina de la companya d	
Report No. 28.1 n.s.						
Report Ho. 28.1 Date Cl	M. NOV. 10,	DOK Station	Summit, A	leska	Class SBRA	Z-P-DTV
dentification had Frequ	sency 326 ko.	Power 100	tte See	ht Chart Na	6 'natad w	
ublished Bearings, Degr	187	266	22	776		
	7 To 12 To 1	No. 1		TIO I		
ange Transmitter:	Type	SJ Machen		Dype	TSJ Street	
ourses Found (True)		214				****
rror, Degrees		-1/2			214	•
ey Clicks		Yes/			Yes/	
oice/Range Ratio		Normal '		7.7	Yes/	
Sable Range Dist.		75 miles			Normal 75 miles	
sable Voice Dist.		75 miles			75 miles	
	lafactory?	Good			Good F	
	Seconds at	Yes	Se	tiefecto	LAS.	
			. St.	Secon	de at	ft_
" MARKER: Type	<u>Hai</u>	D &		-	Standby	
t Check S	econde at	ft.	arch .	g		
d Check 90 fm let S	econds at					
7	SCORETS AL.	ſţ.	aph \	Second a	at ft.	<u>-aph_</u> _
			are	Seconds	at ft.	with
N MARKERS	Checked with	Туре	Receiver	Seconds		
N MARKERS		Major A	Receiver	Seconds	Minor Axis Mi	ent.
N MARKERS Location	Checked with	Major A	Receiver	Seconds	Minor Axis Wi	ent.
N MARKERS Location	Checked with	Major A miles	Receiver	ft.	Minor Axis Windles at miles at	dth
N MARKERS	Checked with	Major A miles miles miles miles	Receiver ris Midth at at at at	Seconds	Minor Axis Wimiles at miles at miles at	dth
N MARKERS Location	Checked with	Major A miles miles miles	Receiver ris Midth at at at at	ft.	Minor Axis Windles at miles at	dth
N MARKERS Location	Checked with	Major A miles miles miles miles	Receiver ris Midth at at at at	ft. ft. ft.	Minor Axis Windles at miles at miles at miles at miles at miles at	dth ft. ft.
MARKERS Location	Checked with	Major A miles miles miles miles miles miles	Receiver ris Midth at at at at	ft.	Minor Axis Windles at miles at miles at miles at miles at miles at	dth ft. ft.
MARKERS Location ight check following reprint splacement of this con	Checked with	Major A miles miles miles miles miles miles miles	Receiver ris Midth at at at at	ft. ft. ft.	Minor Axis Minis at miles at	dth ft. ft.
MARKERS Location ight check following reprint splacement of this con	Checked with	Major A siles siles miles miles miles miles miles celes cele	Receiver wis Midth at at at at at initial	ft. ft. ft. ft.	Minor Axis Windles at miles at	dth ft. ft.
ight check following reddisplacement of this courash of Air Force 2560,	Checked with	Major A Major A miles miles miles miles miles Miles Vis	Receiver ris Midth at at at at	ft. ft. ft.	Minor Axis Windles at miles at	dth ft. ft.
ight check following redisplacement of this courash of Air Force 2550,	Checked with	Major A Major A miles miles miles miles Miles Miles Ten Vis	Receiver ixis Midth at	ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft.	Minor Axis Windles at miles at	dth ft. ft.
ight check following redisplacement of this courant of Air Force 2550, rst check made at 5000 foold Graek. The course	Checked with Type Ourt of 20 urse plus , C-119.	Major A Major A miles miles miles miles miles vis REMARKS	Receiver ixis Midth at	ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. 28° F	Minor Axis Windles at miles at	dth ft. ft.
ight check following redisplacement of this concrash of Air Force 2560, rst check made at 5000 foold Grack. The course is just a series of change in the course of the course is just a series of change in the course of the course is just a series of change in the course of the cours	Checked with Type Dort of 2° urse plus C-119. Teet, vicinity at this point iging signals.	Major A siles sile	Receiver ixis Midth at	ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft.	Minor Axis Windles at miles at	dth ft. ft.
ight check following redisplacement of this course crash of Air Force 2560, rst check made at 5000 fold Craek. The course is just a series of chanche second check at 7000	checked with Type port of 2° urse plus , C-119. feet, vicinity at this point uging signals.) feet over 7s	Major A siles sile	Receiver ixis Midth at	ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft.	Minor Axis Windles at miles at	dth ft. ft.
ight check following redisplacement of this course crash of Air Force 2560, ast check made at 5000 foold Graek. The course is just a series of chanche second check at 7000 showed a fairly normal company of the second check at 7000 showed a fairly normal control of the fairly no	checked with Type Don't of 2° urse plus, C-119. Feet, vicinity at this point uring signals. Feet over Talent ourse except.	Major A siles sile	Receiver wis Midth at at at at at at at at at an ceiver iling sibility aperature ad ae	ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft.	Minor Axis Windles at miles at	dth ft. ft.
ight check following redisplacement of this course crash of Air Force 2560, ast check made at 5000 foold Graek. The course is just a series of chanche second check at 7000 showed a fairly normal company of the second check at 7000 showed a fairly normal control of the fairly no	checked with Type Don't of 2° urse plus, C-119. Feet, vicinity at this point uring signals. Feet over Talent ourse except.	Major A siles sile	Receiver ixis Midth at	ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft.	Minor Axis Windles at miles at	dth ft. ft.
ight check following redisplacement of this concrash of Air Force 2560, rst check made at 5000 foold Grack. The course is just a series of change in the course of the course is just a series of change in the course of the course is just a series of change in the course of the cours	checked with Type Don't of 2° urse plus, C-119. Feet, vicinity at this point uring signals. Feet over Talent ourse except.	Major A siles sile	Receiver wis Midth at at at at at at at at at an ceiver iling sibility aperature ad ae	ft.	Minor Axis Minis at miles at	dth ft. ft.
ight check following redisplacement of this course crash of Air Force 2560, ast check made at 5000 foold Graek. The course is just a series of chanche second check at 7000 showed a fairly normal company of the second check at 7000 showed a fairly normal control of the fairly no	checked with Type Don't of 2° urse plus, C-119. Feet, vicinity at this point uring signals. Feet over Talent ourse except.	Major A siles sile	Receiver ris Midth at	### ARB 8000 -b 15 mil 280 F WSW 8 1515 true cop	Minor Axis Windles at miles at	deh ft.

Form ACA 496 Rev. 9-18-44		Civil Aer	onautica	f Commo Administ FLIGHT RE	ration		
Report No. 27 D							
Published Bearings, Range Granusitter:	Degrees		296 No	22	116		rd Station
Courses Found(True)	187	204	22	1112	· ·		
STEET DOSTOGS	101	296	0	116	_		
Miltiples	Yes	Yes	-Yes	Yes		ame	
Key Clicks	No	Yes	No	Yes	1	ane as	
Voice/Range Ratio		OK			1	1	
Usable Range Dist.		75 1	iles				
Usable Voice List.		75 M	les				
Voice Quality	D A A A	Good					
Broadcast Warning Come of Silence	Satisf	ctory? Y	68	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	Satisfact	ory?	
"Z" MARKER: Type TZ	0 16 Secon	Mai Mai ds at 100	6000 Ln	ft. 120h	Serv	Standby	<u> </u>
lst Check 2960 2nd Check 90°fm lst	16 Secon	Nas	6000 in 0 ft.	120 amh 120 aigh	Second Second	Standby Standby	nyh.
let Check 2960 2nd Check 90°fm let FAN MARKERS	16 Secon 14 Secon	Mai ds at 1000 ds at 1000	o ft.	120 mph 120 mph N53B Recei	Second Second	Standby S at ft. S at ft.	don.
lst Check 2960 2nd Check 90°fm Ist FAN MARKERS No. Location	16 Secon 14 Secon	Mai ds at 1000 de at 1000 ecked wit	6000 in 0 ft. h Type 2	120 mph 120 mph 153B Recei	Second Second	Standby S at ft. S at ft. Minor Axis miles at	don.
lat Check 2960 2nd Check 90°fm lat FAN MARKERS No. Location	16 Secon 14 Secon	Mai ds at 1000 de at 1000 ecked wit	6000 in 0 ft. 0 ft.	120 ash 120 ash 153B Receiver or Axis I	Second Second Iver Idth, ft,	Standby S At ft. S at ft. Minor Axis miles at miles at	mph
lst Check 2960 2nd Check 90°fm Ist FAN MARKERS No. Location	16 Secon 14 Secon	Mai ds at 1000 ds at 1000 ecked wit	6000 in 0 ft. 0 ft.	120 ash 120 ash 153B Receiver Aries or Aries les at les at	Second Second iver fidth, ft, ft,	Standby S At ft. S at ft. Minor Axis miles at miles at	mph
lst Check 2960 2nd Check 90°fm Ist PAN MARKERS 10. Location	16 Secon 14 Secon	Mai ds at 1000 ds at 1000 ecked wit	6000 in 0 ft. 0 ft.	120 ash 120 ash 153B Receiver Aries or Aries les at les at	Second Second iver fidth, ft, ft, ft,	Standby S At ft. S at ft. Minor Axis miles at miles at miles at miles at	mph. midth ft. ft. ft.
lst Check 2960 2nd Check 90°fm Ist FAM MARKERS No. Location	16 Secon 14 Secon Ch	ds at 1000 ds at 1000 ecked wit	o ft. o ft. h Type 12	120 suh 120 siph 153B Recei lor Axie I los at los at los at	Second Second iver fidth, ft, ft,	Standby S At ft. S at ft. Minor Axis miles at miles at	mph
lst Check 2960 2nd Check 90°fm Ist PAN MARKERS 10. Location	16 Secon 14 Secon Ch	ds at 1000 ds at 1000 ecked wit	o ft. o ft. h Type 12	120 min 120 min 153B Receiver lor Axis I las at les at les at	Second Second Iver Fidth, ft, ft, ft, ft,	Standby Standby S at ft. S at ft. Minor Axie miles at	mph. midth ft. ft. ft.
lst Check 2960 2nd Check 90°fm Ist FAN MARKERS No. Location	16 Secon 14 Secon Ch	ds at 1000 ds at 1000 ecked wit	o ft. o ft. h Type 12	120 min 120 min 153B Receiver lor Axis I las at les at les at	Second Second Iver Edth, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft	Standby Standby S at ft. S at ft. Minor Axie miles at	mph. midth ft. ft. ft.
lst Check 2960 2nd Check 90°fm Ist FAM MARKERS No. Location	16 Secon 14 Secon Ch	ds at 1000 ds at 1000 ecked wit	o ft. o ft. h Type 12	120 min 120 min 153B Receiver lor Axis I las at les at les at	Second Second Second Iver Midth, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft	Standby Standby S at ft. S at ft. Minor Axie miles at	mph. midth ft. ft. ft.
lat Check 2960 2nd Check 90°fm Ist FAN MARKER'S No. Location Check after return	16 Secon 14 Secon Ch	ds at 1000 ds at 1000 ecked wit	o ft. o ft. h Type 12	120 suh 120 siph 153B Recei lor Axle I les at les at les at	Second Second Second Iver Fidth, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft	Standby Standby S at ft. S at ft. Minor Axie miles at	mph. midth ft. ft. ft.
lst Check 2960 2nd Check 90°fm Ist FAN MARKERS No. Location	16 Secon 14 Secon Ch	ds at 1000 ds at 1000 ecked wit	o ft. o ft. h Type 12	120 suh 120 siph 153B Recei lor Axle I les at les at les at	Second Second Second Iver Edth, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft	Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Minor Axis miles at miles at miles at miles at miles at miles at	mph. midth ft. ft. ft.
lst Check 2960 2nd Check 90°fm Ist FAN MARKERS No. Location Check after return	16 Secon 14 Secon Ch	ds at 1000 ds at 1000 ecked wit	o ft. o ft. h Type 12	120 suh 120 siph 153B Recei lor Axle I les at les at les at	Second Second Second Iver Fidth, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft	Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Minor Axis miles at miles at miles at miles at miles at miles at	mph. midth ft. ft. ft.
let Check 2960 2nd Check 90°fm let FAN MARKERS No. Location L. 2. 3. Check after return	16 Secon 14 Secon Ch	ds at 1000 ds at 1000 ecked wit	oft. oft. hType 12	120 mph 120 mph 153B Recei or Aris B Les at Les at Les at	Second Se	Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Minor Axis miles at miles at miles at miles at miles at miles at	mph. midth ft. ft. ft.
lst Check 2960 2nd Check 90°fm Ist FAN MARKERS No. Location L. Check after return	16 Secon 14 Secon Ch	ds at 1000 ds at 1000 ecked wit	oft. oft. hType 12	120 mph 120 mph 153B Recei or Aris B Les at Les at Les at	Second Second Second Iver Edth, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft, ft	Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Minor Axis miles at miles at miles at miles at miles at miles at	mph. midth ft. ft. ft.
lst Check 2960 2nd Check 90°fm Ist FAN MARKERS No. Location L. Check after return	16 Secon 14 Secon Ch	ds at 1000 ds at 1000 ecked wit	oft. oft. hType 12	120 mph 120 mph 153B Recei or Aris B Les at Les at Les at	Second Se	Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Standby Minor Axis miles at miles at miles at miles at miles at miles at	mph. midth ft. ft. ft.
lst Check 2960 2nd Check 90°fm Ist FAN MARKERS No. Location Check after return	16 Secon 14 Secon Ch	ds at 1000 ds at 1000 ecked wit	o ft. o ft. h Type 12 h Type 12 h ad ad ad ad check	120 such 120 sigh 153B Received at the at	Second Second Second Iver Edth, ft.	Standby Standby Sat St. Sat St. Minor Axie miles at miles at miles at miles at miles at	Midth St. St. St.
let Check 2960 2nd Check 90°fm let FAN MARKERS No. Location L. 2. 3. Check after return	16 Secon 14 Secon Ch	ds at 1000 ds at 1000 ecked wit	o ft. o ft. h Type 12 h Type 12 h ad ad ad ad check	120 such 120 sigh 153B Received at the at	Second Second Second Iver Edth, ft.	Standby Standby Sat St. Sat St. Minor Axis miles at miles at miles at miles at miles at miles at	Midth St. St. St.
lat Check 2960 2nd Check 90°fm Ist FAM MARKETS No. Location Check after return	16 Second li Second Character of	ds at 1000 ds at 1000 ecked wit	oft. oft. oft. oft. oft. oft. oft. oft.	120 such 120 sigh 153B Received 188 at 188 at	Second Second Second Iver Edth. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. f	Standby Standby Sat St. Sat St. Minor Axie miles at miles at miles at miles at miles at	Midth St. St. St.

or and the second FORM ACA 496 Rev. 9-18-44 Department of Commerce ivil Agronautics Administration RADIO FACILITI-FLICHT ERPORT Report No. 28.2 Date Cled. Nov. 28, 1952 Station Summit, Alaska Class SBRAZ-P-DTV Identification Frequency 326 ke. Power 100 metts 800. Chart No. 6 Dated November 1951 296 Published Bearings, Degrees: 187 116 True and Toward Station No. I Range Transmitter: Type_TSJ TSJ March . Courses Found (True) 187 Error, Degrees Multiples Tes 7 Yes Yes ≠ Tes ¥ Samo Key Clicks Tes Yes Yes Voice/Range Ratio Norz Usable Range Dist, Usable Voice Dist. Voice quality Good Broadcast Marning Satisfactory? Seconds at 120 mph, 1000 ft. Satisfactory? Come of Silence Seconds at "Z" MARKER: Type T30 Me1n Standby lst Check 180° ft. 120 18 Seconds at 1000 Seconds at 2nd Check 90 fm lst 13 Seconds at 1000 ft. 120 Seconds at ĸDb PAN MARKERS Checked with Type MN53B Receiver No. Major Axis Midth Minor Axis Width miles at ſŧ. miles at miles at £t. <u>miles at</u> ſŧ. miles at ſt. miles at ft. miles at miles at ٤t. miles at miles at REMARKS light check following report of -320 Receiver ARB displacement of northwest course (220) Ceiling 3000 scattered: Province check, also following maintenance 5500 overcast this date. Visibility 10 miles Temperature 150 F isolacements shown as to on north and Wind Calm south courses actually may be ; to 10. Time 1530 Due to poor quality of on course signal accorate alignment is difficult to determine. Check at 0500 feet over Talkeeting shows course broken to through 60 or approximately 7.5 miles wide at this point. Apparently realignment of north-south courses has caused increase in multiples Yey clicks are too hery Region: Airgraft N 90 good A. Rivers, Acte /8/ J.C.Pfeffer mer Alect. Miche. Br.,

	1 4				1. 4		•	
Porm ACA 496	 -	*						
Rev. 9-18-44		D		Commerce	and the second	•		
	C	ooper 1911.aero	mentice.	Maintetra	tl.co	: **=-		
	•						* * * * * *	en e
				LICHT REPO	and the same of th	:		
Report No. 29 Da	te Cled. Au	igust 18,	1952 stat	ion Skwent	na Alas∠a	cı	SBRA2	P DTV.
Identification MA								
Published Bearings,	Degrees	237	291		106	Drue an	d Toward	Station
		Type_TS	√ Ko d				llo 2 Stroni)	
Range Transmitter:		V/P			- 4p-			* · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Courses Found (True)	237	290	32	106			-	•
Error, Degrees	0	<u>-1</u>	Yes _	γes	Same	\$	<u> </u>	
Multiples Key Clicks	Yes Yes	Yes No	Yes	No		s		
Voice/Range Ratio		OK				No 1		eur
Usable Range Dist.		1 1	iles			*		
Usable Voice Dist.	 _		Hiles) 		- :	
Voice Quality Broadcast Sarning	Sabtat		Yes		Satisfac	tory?		
		econds at		-		onds at		
Come of Silence "Z" WARKER: Type T Let Check 0800 2nd Check 90 fm let	21 Seco 19 Seco	inds at 10 mds at 10	in 000 ft. 000 ft.	120 mph	Secon Secon	Stand ds at ds at	iby 	
"Z" MARKER: Type T	21 Seco 19 Seco	inds at 10 mds at 10	in 000 ft. 000 ft.	120 mm	Secon Secon	Stand	ſt.	_
"Z" MARKER: Type _T Lst Check 080° 2nd Check 90° Im lat	21 Seco 19 Seco	inds at 10 mds at 10	in 000 ft. 000 ft.	120 such 120 siph R53B Received	Secon Secon Iver	Sterring Ste	ft. ft.	anh.
Ist Check 080° 2nd Check 90° fm lst FAN MARKERS No. Locati 1.	21 Seco 19 Seco	inds at 10 thecked wi	in 000 ft. 000 ft. th Type ¹⁶	120 mph 120 mph N53B Received	Second Se	Sterning Ste	ft. ft. or Axla N	anh
Ist Check 080° 2nd Check 90° fm lat PAN MARKERS No. Locati 1.	21 Seco 19 Seco	inds at 10 thecked wi	in 000 ft. 100 ft. th Type ^M	120 mph 120 mph N53B Received	Secon Secon iver	Stand ds at ds at "Mino	ft. ft. or Axis N los at	10th
Ist Check 080° 2nd Check 90° fm lst FAN MARKERS No. Locati 1.	21 Seco 19 Seco	inds at 10 thecked wi	in 000 ft. 000 ft. th Type ¹⁶	120 mph 120 mp	Second Se	Stern ds at ds at "Minx md." md." md."	ft. ft. ft. or Axis # los at los at los at	anh
Ist Check 080° 2nd Check 90° fm lat PAN MARKERS No. Locati 1.	21 Seco 19 Seco	inds at 10 thecked wi	in 000 ft. 000 ft. th Type ¹⁶	120 mph 120 mph N53B Received	Secon Secon iver tidth ft. ft.	Stand ds at ds at "Mino mill sei sei	ft. ft. ft. or Axis N los at los at	10th It. It.
Ist Check 080° 2nd Check 90° fm Ist PAN MARKERS No. Locati 1. 2. 3.	21 Seco 19 Seco	inds at 10 thecked wi	in 000 ft. 000 ft. th Type ¹⁶	120 mph 120 mp	Second Se	Stand ds at ds at "Mino mill sei sei	ft. ft. ft. or Axis # los at los at los at	10th ft. ft. ft.
Ist Check 080° 2nd Check 90° fm Ist PAN MARKERS No. Locati 1. 2. 3.	21 Seco 19 Seco	inds at 10 thecked wi	in 000 ft. 100 ft. th Type	120 mph 120 mp	Second Se	Stand ds at ds at "Mino mill sei sei	ft. ft. ft. or Axis # los at los at los at	10th ft. ft. ft.
Ist Check 080° 2nd Check 90° fm Ist PAN MARKERS No. Locati 1. 2. 3.	21 Seco 19 Seco	inds at 10 inds at 10 lheclord wi	in 000 ft. 100 ft. th Type	120 mph 120 mp	Second Se	Stand ds at ds at "Mino mill sei sei	ft. ft. ft. or Axis # los at los at los at	10th ft. ft. ft.
Ist Check 080° Zrid Check 90° im late PAN MARKERS No. Locati 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.	21 Seco 19 Seco	inds at 10 inds at 10 lheclord wi	in 000 ft. 100 ft. th Type	120 mph 120 mp	Second Se	Stard ds at ds at "Minor mi) stard	ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft.	10th ft. ft. ft.
Ist Check 080° Zrid Check 90° im late PAN MARKERS No. Locati 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.	21 Seco 19 Seco	inds at 10 inds at 10 lheclord wi	in 000 ft. 100 ft. th Type	120 mph 120 mph 120 mph 138 Received at the set of the	Second Se	Stand ds at ds at mill mill mill mill mill mill mill mil	ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft.	10th ft. ft. ft.
Ist Check 080° Zrid Check 90° im late PAN MARKERS No. Locati 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.	21 Seco 19 Seco	inds at 10 inds at 10 lheclord wi	in 000 ft. 100 ft. th Type	120 mph 120 mph 120 mph 138 Received at the set of the	Second Se	Stand ds at ds at "Mine mt." at. at. at. at. 12000 Br	ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft.	10th ft. ft. ft.
Ist Check 080° Zrid Check 90° im late PAN MARKERS No. Locati 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.	21 Seco 19 Seco	inds at 10 inds at 10 lheclord wi	in 000 ft. 100 ft. th Type	120 mph 120 mph 120 mph 138 Received at the set of the	Second Se	Stand ds at ds at "Mine at at at 12000 Br	ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft.	arb. It. It. It. It.
Ist Check 080° Zrid Check 90° im late PAN MARKERS No. Locati 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.	21 Seco 19 Seco	inds at 10 inds at 10 lheclord wi	in 000 ft. 100 ft. th Type	120 mph 120 mph 120 mph 138 Received at the set of the	Second Se	Stard ds at ds at "Mink mt." stard	ft. ft. ft. ft. or Axis Wiles at less at le	arb. It. It. It. It.
Ist Check 080° Zrid Check 90° im late PAN MARKERS No. Locati 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.	21 Seco 19 Seco	inds at 10 inds at 10 lheclord wi	in OOO ft. OOO ft. th Type M REMARK	120 mph 120 mph 120 mph 138 Rece ajor Axis miles at miles at miles at miles at	Second Sec	Stard ds at ds at "Mine stard at stard st	ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. f	arb. It. It. It. It.
Ist Check 080° Zrid Check 90° im late PAN MARKERS No. Locati 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.	21 Seco 19 Seco	inds at 10 inds at 10 lheclord wi	in OOO ft. OOO ft. th Type M REMARK	120 mph 120 mph 120 mph 138 Received at the set of the	Second Sec	Stard ds at ds at "Mine stard at stard st	ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. ft. f	arb. Idth It. It. It. It.
Ist Check 080° Zrid Check 90° im late PAN MARKERS No. Locati 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.	21 Seco 19 Seco	inds at 10 inds at 10 lheclord wi	in OOO ft. OOO ft. th Type M REMARK	120 mph 120 mp	Second Sec	Stand ds at ds at "Mine ad ad ad ad ad stand F	ft. St. Or Aris Miles at less at les	arb.
Ist Check 080° Zrid Check 90° im late PAN MARKERS No. Locati 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.	21 Seco 19 Seco	inds at 10 inds at 10 lheclord wi	In OOO ft. OOO ft. th Type H REMARK	120 mph 120 mp	Second Se	Stand ds at ds at "Mine ad ad ad ad ad stand F	ft. St. Or Aris Miles at less at les	arb.
Ist Check 0800 Zid Check 90 fm late PAN MARKERS No. Locati 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Checked after b	21 Seco 19 Seco	inds at 10 inds at 10 lheclord wi	In OOO ft. OOO ft. th Type H REMARK	120 mph 120 mp	Second Se	Stand ds at ds at "Mine ad ad ad ad ad stand F	ft. St. Or Aris Miles at less at les	arb.

Rev. 9-18-44		Denar	tment of	Commerce		ere produced a second		
	C	Hard Aero	mauti os	Maintetr	ation .		•	
		RADIO FA	CILTIT-1	LICHT REP	RT	· · · · ·		
Report No. 32 Da	rte Clot. A	ug 12 195	2 Stat	ion Hinch		laska	Class 8B	RAE P DTV
Identification HOK	Frequency	362 kg.	Power 4	OOmstie S	Flight	Yo. 10	Dated	Oot 1951
Published Bearings,		· .						rd Statio
		1.5		0 1			To I	2
Range Transmitter:		ТуреТ	50 <u>w</u>	_	ŢŢ	• <u>780</u>		
Courses Found (True) Error, Degrees	206	286	26	106				
Multiples	Yes	Yes	To	Yes	Same	 	-	
Key Clicks	Yes	To	Yes	To		4.5		
Voice/Range Ratio		Goo					1	
Usable Range Dist.			1101	1		<u> </u>		
Usable Voice Dist.			(110=			ļ	 	
Broadcast Marning	Sattat	ctory?		1 33.5	0-44-0	ectory?		
Come of Silence		econds at		ſŧ.		sconda a	+	ft
"Z" MARKER: Type _T lst Check 358° 2nd Check 90°fm lst	14 Secon		00 ft.		Seco	Star nds at	odby ft	
lst Check 358° 2nd Check 90°fm lst FAM MARKERS	1h Secon 15 Secon Ch	ds at 100 ds at 100 medied wit	00 ft. 1 00 ft. 1	20 migh Massage	Seco Lyer	nds at	, (1 (1	ent)
lst Check 358° 2nd Check 90°fm 1st	1h Secon 15 Secon Ch	ds at 100 ds at 100	o ft. 1	20 mph WESTERecoi	Seco Lyer Lidth	nde at mis at	ft ft exte	ech Midth
lst Check 358° 2nd Check 90°fm lst FAM MARKERS	11. Secon 15 Secon Ch	ds at 100 ds at 100 medied wit	oo ft.	20 aph MW53/Repei jor Axie M	Seco Lver Edth	mis at	or Axis	midthft
lst Check 358° 2nd Check 90°fm 1st FAM MARKERS No. Location 1. 2.	11. Secon 15 Secon Ch	ds at 100 ds at 100 medied wit	oo ft.	20 mph WE53 Repei	Secolver Edth ft	nds at	fi fi nor Axie les at	ech Midth
lst Check 358° 2nd Check 90°fm 1st PAN MARKERS No. Location 1. 2. 3.	11. Secon 15 Secon Ch	ds at 100 ds at 100 medied wit	oo ft.	20 mph ME53 Recei for Axie M les at les at les at	Secondary States Secondary	nds at	or Aris les at les at les at	Midth
lst Check 358° 2nd Check 90°fm 1st FAM MARKERS No. Location 1. 2.	11. Secon 15 Secon Ch	ds at 100 ds at 100 medied wit	oo ft.	20 mph WE53 Repei	Secondaria	nds at	ft f	Midth ft
lst Check 358° 2nd Check 90°fm 1st PAN MARKERS No. Location 1. 2. 3.	11. Secon 15 Secon Ch	ds at 100 ds at 100 mecked wit	oo ft.	ym53 Recei jor Axie ! les at les at les at les at les at	Secondary Second	nds at	or Aris les at les at les at	Midth ft
lst Check 358° 2nd Check 90° fm 1st FAM MARKERS No. Location 1. 2. 3.	11 Second 15 Second Ch	ds at 100 ds at 100 mecked wit	oo ft.	20 mph Washington Washingto	Jeco Lver fidth ft ft ft	nds at	or Aris les at les at les at	Midth ft
lst Check 358° 2nd Check 90°fm 1st PAN MARKERS No. Location 1. 2. 3.	11 Second 15 Second Ch	ds at 100 ds at 100 mecked wit	oo ft.	ym55;Recei	Secondaria	Min	or Aris les at les at les at	Midth ft
lst Check 358° 2nd Check 90° fm 1st FAM MARKERS No. Location 1. 2. 3.	11 Second 15 Second Ch	ds at 100 ds at 100 necked wit	oo ft.	20 min WEST Received at less	Secondary Second	Min	or Aris les at les at les at	Midth ft
lst Check 358° 2nd Check 90° fm 1st FAM MARKERS No. Location 1. 2. 3.	11 Second 15 Second Ch	ds at 100 ds at 100 necked wit	oo ft.	20 min WEST Received at less	Secondaria	Min	or Aris les at les at les at	Midth ft
lst Check 358° 2nd Check 90° fm 1st FAM MARKERS No. Location 1. 2. 3.	11 Second 15 Second Ch	ds at 100 ds at 100 necked wit	oo ft.	20 min WEST Received at less	Secondary Second	Min	or Aris les at les at les at	Midth ft
lst Check 358° 2nd Check 90° fm 1st FAM MARKERS No. Location 1. 2. 3.	11 Second 15 Second Ch	ds at 100 ds at 100 necked wit	oo ft.	20 min Ma55;Recol Jor Axis Miles at Les at Les at Les at Me Me Me Me Me Me Me M	Secondary Second	Min at Mi	or Aris les at les at les at	Midth ft
lst Check 358° 2nd Check 90°fm 1st PAN MARKERS No. Location 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Routine Check	11 Second 15 Second Ch	ds at 100 ds at 100 necked wit	oo ft.	20 min Washington Washingto	Secondary Second	Wight at Wight at which a second at which at whi	fi fi les at les at	Midth ft
lst Check 358° 2nd Check 90°fm 1st PAN MARKERS No. Location 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Routine Check	11 Second 15 Second Ch	ds at 100 ds at 100 necked wit	oo ft.	20 min Wassi Report Part	Secondary Right State of the St	Wight at Minds at Min	or Aris les at les at les at	Midth ft
lst Check 358° 2nd Check 90°fm 1st PAN MARKERS No. Location 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Routine Check	11 Second 15 Second Ch	ds at 100 ds at 100 necked wit	oo ft.	20 min WE55 Record Sept	Secondary CA Find RW Line PM	Wight at Wight at which a state of the state	fi fi les at les at les at	
lst Check 358° 2nd Check 90°fm 1st PAN MARKERS No. Location 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Routine Check	11. Second 15 Second Chem	ds at 100 ds at 100 necked wit	OD ft.	20 min WE55 Record Sept	Secondary Second	Wight at Wight at which a state of the state	fi fi les at les at les at	Midth ft

				Gommeroe Administra	ti on		
		RADIO FA	CILITI-P	LIGHT REPO	RT_		
Report No. 37 De	to Chi.Au	28, 19	2 Stat			Class	SHAE-P-DT
Identification HOM	Frequency	<u>320</u> μα.	Power L	00matts A	light m.Chart	ic. 3 Date	1 May 1952
Published Bearings,	Degreest	200	265	20	85		mard Station
Range Transmitter:		Type_T	II E	ii .	Cype.	181	and the same
Courses Found (True)	199	264	21	84			
Error, Degrees	1	1	Λ	-1,			
Key Clicks	Tes-	Yes Yes-	Yes	Yes-		Seme	
Voice/Range Ratio		Hora	<u> </u>	1		To	. 1
Usable Range Dist.			1100		1.		
Cable Votos Dist.			1100				
Votes Quality		Good		1			
Prosdonat Warming Come of Silence		ctory		700004	Satisfac		
CODE OF STREETS	T 30	conds at	EO EDA.	TOOLET I	Sec	onde at	
"Z" MARKER: Type II	<u> </u>	Mai	n	· · · · ·		Standby	
Let Check	Second	is at	£t.	azh.	Secon	is at	Ct. uph
and Check 90 fm Lat	Second	le at	ft.	mpt1			t. anh
O. Locatio	عنا الجاد المستحد	Type	· ·	or Aris M	dth	Kinor Ax	
	The second second			les at	ÎÈ,	miles at	
•				lee at	ft.	miles at	<u> </u>
•				les at	ft.	miles at	ſŧ.
•			æ	les at	ſŧ.	miles at	Įt.
			REMARKS				
light check followi	ng retune.			Receive Coiling		RR 2000 oversest	
esults of first add	ustment of	eok:	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	Visibil		O wiles: lie	
	2 3	h		Wind		alm	
	1 2	-1		Time		000	
			 	Cortifia	d a true	CODY	
		ī	-	$-$]_ ι	(7. 1)	and :	
·····				John P	Jefford.	711 - C A 4	ye Plight
					tion Divi		
oglan: 8 Airer	rkr <u> </u>	Hlot		V.J. C. P	Caf Car	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	•	•	, .	J. C. P	of for		• • •
				•	•		

FORE ACA			3				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	<u></u> <u></u> <u></u> -	
Rev. 9-1	3-44		3	,		(<u>1</u> 1) - 12 (11)			41
•					Commerce				. · •.
			ivil Aeros	mutacs)	deinietr.	ation			
			RADIO PAC	T 1 T 100 . D'1	TOUT DED	00 T			•
		eren arananan	BAULU PAL	11111	TON'T HOLD	LIK I			
Report No	28 Da	ta Cled.	Nov. 16. 1	952 State	on Kenal	Alaska		Class BMR)	2-P
are Per o Me						light		7	
Identific	ation ENA	Frequency	379 kg.	Power 13	3 matte 1	Sec.Chart	No: 3	Dated 1	av
• -	•							_	
Published	Bearings,	Degrees:	209.	299	29	119	_ Drue i	and Toward	i st
	•			No	1		- 	No. 2	
Range Tra	namitter:		Type Till		ln'	₽.	TLI	No. 2	
						ş			معدد
	ound (True)	209.	299	29	119			_	1
Error, De		0	0	<u> </u>	0			-	+-
Miliples		Yes-	⊻es	No	Yes	-	Same		+
Kéy Click		No	ies-	No	Yes-			85	-
Voice/Ran				e sligh	TA TOM			No. 1	1
Usable Ra				niles				+	1
Usable Vo				iTes _				 	
Voice Qua Broadcast		8-41-6	ctory? No	z good	1	Satisfa		_	Щ.
Come of S			conds at]		10004		conds a		
T 7 W . MADEST	: Type TZ	n	Mair				9+	adby	
Z AATRO		-		•	· .		3 644	шоу	
lat Check	9ft ₀	30 Secon	ds at1000	ft.]	20 mm	Seco	vie et	£+	-
let Check 2nd Check AN MARKER	90°fm lat S	33 Secon	ds at1000 ds, at1000 necked with	ft. Type M		Jecon Ver	ds at		
2nd Check Pan Marker To.	90°fm lat	33 Secon	ds, at 1000	ft. Type MA	20 mph 53B Recei or Axia N	Jecon Iver Idth	de at	ior Axis	dat
Znd Check Pan Marker Io.	90°fm lat S	33 Secon	ds.at1000 necked with	Type MA	20 mph 53B Recei or Aria H	Jecon Iver Idth ft.	de at	or Axis)	dat
2nd Check Pan Marker To.	90°fm lat S	33 Secon	ds.at1000 necked with	Type MA	20 mph 53B Recei or Aria N les at	Secondary Second	Mir Mir mi	or Axis ; les at	Adt
Znd Check Pan Marker Io.	90 fm lst	33 Secon	ds.at1000 secked with Type	Type YA	20 mph 53B Recei or Aria W les at les at	Secondary Second	Mir Mir Mi	or Axis) les at les at	Adt
Znd Check Pan Marker Io.	90°fm lat S	33 Secon	ds.at1000 necked with	Type Ma	20 mph 53B Receiver aris Notes at less at les	Secondary Second	Mir Mir Mi Mi Mi Mi	or Axis ; les at les at les at	ddt
Znd Check Pan Marker Io.	90 fm lst	33 Secon	ds.at1000 secked with Type	Type Ma	20 mph 53B Recei or Aria W les at les at	Secondary Second	Mir Mir Mi Mi Mi Mi	or Axis) les at les at	dat
Znd Check Pan Marker Io.	90 fm lst	33 Secon	ds, at 1000 secked with Type	Type Ma	20 mph 53B Receiver aris Notes at less at les	Secondary Second	Mir Mir Mi Mi Mi Mi	or Axis ; les at les at les at	dat
ZM Check AN MARKER Io.	90 fm lst	33 Second	ds.at1000 necked with	Type MA	20 mph 53B Recei or Axis N les at les at les at les at	Secondary Second	Mir mi mi	or Axis ; les at les at les at	dat
Zmd Check ZAN MARKER Io	90 fm lst S Location	Ch	ds.at1000 necked with	Type MA	20 mph 53B Receive	Secondary Second	Mir mi mi mi	or Axis ; les at les at les at les at	dat
ZM Check AN MARKER Io.	90 fm lst S Location	Ch	ds.at1000 necked with	Type MA	20 mph 53B Recei or Axis N les at les at les at les at	Secondary Second	Mir mi	or Axis ; les at	dat
Zmd Check ZAN MARKER Io	90°fm lst S Location eck follow	Gh	ds.at1000 necked with	Type MA	20 mph 53B Receive cr Aris les at	Secondary Second	Mir md	or Axis ; les at les at les at les at	dat
Zmd Check ZAN MARKER Io	90°fm lst S Location eck follow	Ch	ds.at1000 necked with	Type MA	20 mph 53B Receiver 10s at 10s at	Secondary Second	Mir md	or Axis ; les at	uat
Zmd Check ZAN MARKER Io	90°fm lst S Location eck follow	Gh	ds.at1000 necked with	Type MA	20 mph 53B Receive 16s at 16s at	Secondary Second	ARB 3000 so	or Axis ; les at	dat
Zmd Check ZAN MARKER Io	90°fm lst S Location eck follow	Gh	ds.at1000 necked with	Type MA	20 mph 53B Receiver 10s at 10s at	Secondary Second	Mir md	or Axis ; les at	dat
Zmd Check ZAN MARKER Io	90°fm lst S Location eck follow	Gh	ds.at1000 necked with	Type MA	20 mph 53B Receive craxis W les at les at les at Receive Ceiling Tempera Wind Time	Secondary Second	ARB 3000 so 9000 so 11.115	or Axis ; les at	dat
Zmd Check ZAN MARKER Io	90°fm lst S Location eck follow	Gh	ds.at1000 necked with	Type MA	20 mph 53B Receive craxis W les at les at les at Receive Ceiling Tempera Wind Time	Secondary Second	ARB 3000 so 9000 so 11.115	or Axis ; les at	dat
Zmd Check ZAN MARKER Io	90°fm lst S Location eck follow	Gh	ds.at1000 necked with	Type MA	20 mph 53B Receive craxis W les at les at les at Receive Ceiling Tempera Wind Time	Secondary Second	ARB 3000 so 9000 so 11.115	or Axis ; les at	dat
Zmd Check ZAN MARKER Io	90°fm lst S Location eck follow	Gh	ds.at1000 necked with	Type MA	20 mph 53B Receive 10s at 10s at	Secondary Light St. St. St. St. St. St. St. St. St. St	ARB 3000 so 9000 so 11.115	or Axis ; les at	dat
Zmd Check ZAN MARKER Io	90°fm lst S Location eck follow	Gh	ds.at1000 necked with	Type MA MA Bil Bil Bil Bil Certi	20 mph 53B Receive or Aris M les at les at les at les at Receive Celling Tempera Wind Time	Secondary Second	ARB 3000 so 9000 so 11.115	or Axis ; les at	dat
Zmd Check ZAN MARKER Io	90°fm lst S Location eck follow	Gh	ds.at1000 necked with	Type MA MA Bil Bil Bil Bil Certi	20 mph 53B Receive 10s at 10s at	Secondary Second	ARB 3000 so 9000 so 11.115	or Axis ; les at les at les at les at	dat
Zmd Check ZAN MARKER Io	90°fm lst S Location eck follow	Gh	ds.at1000 necked with	Type MA MA Bil Bil Bil Bil Certi	20 mph 53B Receive 10s at 10s at	Secondary Second	ARB 3000 so 9000 so 11.115	or Axis ; les at	dat
PAN MARKER Jo. L. L. L. L. L. L. L. L. L.	90°fm lst	Gh	ds.at1000 pecked with Type	Type MA	20 mph 53B Receive 10s at 10s at	ture Secondary Late of the secondary control	ARB 3000 so 9000 so 11.115	or Axis ; les at les at les at les at	dat
PAN MARKER Jo. L. L. L. L. L. L. L. L. L.	90°fm lst S Location eck follow	Gh	ds.at1000 pecked with Type	Type MA Type MA MA Si Si Si Si Certi Coon Electi /s/ J. C	20 mph 53B Receive 10s at 10s at	Secondary Lit. It. It. It. It. It. It. It.	ARB 3000 so 9000 so 11.115	or Axis ; les at les at les at les at	dat
AN MARKER [o.].]. [c.]. [c	90°fm lst	Gh	ds.at1000 pecked with Type	Type MA Type MA MA Si Si Si Si Certi Coon Electi /s/ J. C	20 mph 53B Receive 10s at 10s at	Secondary Lit. It. It. It. It. It. It. It.	ARB 3000 so 9000 so 11.115	or Axis ; les at les at les at les at	dat

•		575
DATE		FILM PLATE
INC.	picitity decree	200 2018
November	16. 1952	Pilot J. C. Pfeffer Plane # 90
1/20	Anchorage NRL	Alightment southwest ldg normal.
זוויק	Rens i	Range flight checked OK.
1525 1705	Romer Romer	Southwest course checked normal vicinity Anchor Point. North leg checked OK at Tustumera Lake.
Movember	10, 1952	Pilot J. C. Pfeffer Plane N 90
11/30	Anchorage MRL	North leg flight checked plus 10 with light key aliaks.
1500	Skwentna	HE leg checked on course over Talkeetna with light key clicks and multiples.
1530	Branit	SW leg flight checked normal (Report 28.1)
		No Selectivit Marie de la companya del companya de la companya del companya de la

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION

viri in turkhami gN

622/C119 2560
622/C124
IN RELY ADDRESS
REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATOR

P. O. Box 440 Anchorage, Alaska December 5,1952

Commanding General 39th Air Depot Wing Elmendorf AFB, Alaska

Sir:

Enclosed herewith are copies of Aircraft Flight Contact Records from Yakataga and Yakutat, Alaska, showing record of contacts with MATS C-124 51107 on November 22, 1952.

This completes all information available from our facilities in response to your message 250006Z November, which requested the following:

- Who, when and where C-119 2560 was cleared from ten thousand to twelve thousand on November 7, 1952.
- Pilot and aircraft number of aircraft flying route three hours before to three hours after C-12h 51107 passed Middleton Island.
- Transcript of all radio conversations between C-124 51107 and INSAC Stations from and including Yakutat to last transmission.

Item No. 1 was answered by our message 020157Z. It has been determined that the aircraft was not cleared to twelve thousand by either Anchorage or Fairbanks Centers.

Item No. 2. A list of these aircraft as determined from Anchorage ARTC Center records was delivered to your Headquarters by Mr. T. L. Walker, Air Defense Limison Officer, on December 2.

Item No. 3 was partially answered by our 020157Z. The only contacts with 51107 from Yakutat were: Southwest Yakutat (reported to Yakutat); Abeam Yakutaga, and over Middleton (reported to Yakutaga). Copies of these contacts are enclosed with this letter.

Sincerely yours,

F. T. Unruh, Acting Chief Airways Operations Division

Enclosed: (3)

	DEPARTMENT OF	DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE—CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION AIRCRAFT FLIGHT CONTACT RECORD	TACT REC	ORD		Takutat Alaska 11/25/62	ri S	
And LEP 7	HOYLISON ROSITION	TIME	ALTOTUSA.	FRUM ROUN TO				
TOD 306 0508/FM	PER DLVRD TO ARTC CW 2	08022 90 2423272, TIMB OF CTC	90 F CTC DLY	FOR DEVEN TO ARTC ON 2423272, TIME OF CTC DEVED TO ARTC ON 2428352, (ARTC REQUEST)	OSSIZ (ARTC REQUES	06071.	6	o _k
None	PEMAHES							
	The above is a tracking at the of contact Takutat local time		matry ma	0 0	INSACS Baber 22, 1953			:
- 4	PLIAMUES .			Joseph L. Maudi H8468, Station Chief				,
	ILMARKS							
	HE WARKS.	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1			.:			
	FINARKS			17300	-			
10-44 (10- 11						*or	Form ACA-406A (4-41)	(h-41)

IN REPLY ADDRESS
REGIONAL MANAGER
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
CARL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION

IN PEPLY REFER TO

Air Route Traffic Control Center

Box 4

Seattle-Tecoma Airport
Seattle 38, Washington

November 28, 1952

The following is a transcription of the Seattle Air Route Traffic Control Lenter interphone recordings of the conversation pertaining to Military Air Transport 1107 Letwesh McChord Air Force Base and Elmeniorf Field, Alaska on November 22, 1952:

icairí Fl	11/22/52	Эe	1324PST	1450PST	
sasari #2	11/22/52	೨5	1441PST	1845PST	
.e::::3 43	11/22/52	عد	1624PST	2125PST	
ไว้ไรสอร	koChord Air A	forca Rea	s Control Io	wer	
Sia Jenter	Seattle Air :	Gune ira	ffic Control	Center	
2.1 1 (3.4)	Bellingham lo	terstate	Airways Com	munication Sta	ation
San 19840	Seattle Inter	state Ai	гльув Сописын	ication Static	DΩ
Wa leaser	Vancouver Air	noute I	raffic Contr	ol Center	
کاتیجنا <u>ن</u>	Military Air	Pranspor	t Servic e		

I hereby certify that the following is a true transcription of the recorded conversation pertaining to the subject incident.

Name Anne Whitmore

Title Inief, Seattle ARTC Center



Itam = 38

 q_{ij}

..... WATION

06 132LPST - 1150PST

SEA Center WATS

Seattle Control.

I have an IFR flight plan, northbound.

SEA Center Go ahead.

MATS MAT one of

MAT one one zero seven, charlie one twenty-four, pilot Duvall (delta, union, victor, alcha, lima, lima) McChord IFA climbing to nine thousand direct Rolling Say nine thousand Blue thirty-two Dungeness nine thousand Neah Bay, eight five hundred direct Cape St. James, eight five hundred direct Sandspit nine thousand direct hiddle ton Island nine thousand direct Whittier nine thousand Amber one Anchorage landing SDF, true air speed one nine five knots, transmitting normal plus VHF, proposed fifteen hundred pacific, estimates seven plus zero three, eleven plus thirty fuel, pilot rating

three-one, alternate FBR and code eight. Sugar Now MATS

SEA Center

Coca Coca 57 (1357P)

47

..**i**/ . <u>Y</u> :

is thatest - talepst

SEA Center See Control

TCM Tower Tripple nickel six airborne at one zero and one one zero

seven is standing by for ATC clearance.

SEA Center Just a moment, I'll call you right back, McChord WL, one

two (1512F)

SEA Center McChord Tower, Seattle Control clearance.

TCH Tower Tower on

SEA Center ATC clears MAT one one zero seven to the Elmendorf Airport

via direct Rolling Bay Blue thirty-two Dungeness direct Neah Bay direct Cape St. James, direct Sandspit direct Middleton Island direct Whittier, Amber One to Elmendorf maintein at least five hundred on top while in control area, request further altitude changes enroute and climb VFR to five hundred on top, report reaching, just leave that, just climb VFR to

five hundred on top. WL

TCM Tower Tower (initials not readable)

SEA Center One one (1511P)

SEA Center McChord Tower from Seattle Control.

TCM Tower Towers on.

SEA Center LATS one one zero seven ever get off?

Tower Negative, he's still down warming up at the end of the runway.

SEA Center WL two one (1521F)

SEA Center Seattle Control.

TCM Tower One one zero seven sirborne at three zero.

SEA Center Three zero, WL, three zero (1530F)

SEA Center Sellingham Radio, Seattle Control, connect Vancouver.

VR Center Vancouver.

SEA Center Seattle, with Dungeness estimate.

VR Center Go ahead.

SEA Center MAT one one zero seven C one two four estimated Dungeness one

five five six Pacific (1956F) at least five hundred on top, true air speed filed one nine five mautical, McChord direct kolling bay Blue thirty-two Dungeness direct Neak Bay direct Cape St. James direct Sandspit direct Middleton Island direct

Whittier Amber one Elmendorf. WL

YR Center Will you a - is he cleared at five hundred on top?

SEA Center Right.

VR Center Have him maintain at least one thousand on top.

SEA Center WL, three one (1531F) Bellingham Radio release Vancouver.

SEA Center Sellingham hadio, Sesutle Control, connect Vancouver.

VR Center Vancouver.

SEA Center This is Scattle, MAT one one zero seven has now been cleared to

maintain one thousand on top. WL

VR Center M

Win Olly

74

- 2	MENTAL	
	· 医乳腺 · 医乳腺 · 医乳腺素 · 医乳腺	

SEA Center Bellingham Radio this is Seattle Control, crelease Vancouver.

SEA Center Seattle Control.

SEA INSAC This is Seattle Radio with a position on MAT one one zero

seven.

SEA Center Go ahead.

SEA INSAC He's over Dungeness at five five, one thousand on top, es-

timating Neah Bay at twelve, one two. LB (1612F)

SEA Center WL, five eight (1558P)

SEA Center Seattle Control.

BLI INSAC This is Bellingham Radio, MATS one one sero seven Beah Bay one

five (1615P) one thousand on top, southwest leg Comox at three

seven. (1637P) WG. WL, one eight (1618P)

SEA Center WL, one eight (1618F)
WENCenter AR, two zero (1620F)

LSTRUTED

DE 162LPST - 2125PST - DAUGRITY INFORMATION

SEA Center Sea Control.

Reference to this MAT one one zero seven from McChord to

Simendorf, have you had any position on him?

SEA Conter One one zero seven?

MATS Yeah, from McChord to Elmendorf, he departed at two eight

(1528P)

634 Center Wasn't nine four zero seven was it?

MATS Ho, one one zero seven.

SEA Center When did he depart?

WATS He departed McChord at fifteen thirty (1530P), we haven't had

any position on him since.

SEA Center Just a moment, he checked Dungeness about figuren minutes ago,

do younneed the time?

MATS He reported Dungeness at -

SEA Center Yes, he reported Dungeness ten or fifteen minutes ago, some-

thing like that.

About fifty five, huh? (1555F)

SEA Center Just a minute, I can give you the time.

MAYS Oxay.

SEA Center We don't have that information available at the moment.

You don't have the time huh?

SEA Center No, not just now.

HATS He did report there though?

SEA Center Roger.

I'll make it about fifty-five (1555P)

SEA Center RM ten (1610P


MESICICIED



THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526




THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526



THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526




THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526



THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526



THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526



THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526



Recommend

HEADQUARTERS 39TH AIR DEPOT WING OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL APO, 942 C/O PM. SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

360.33

2.4.037.1952

SUBJECT: Transmittal of AF Form 14

TO:

Office of the Inspector General, USAF Norton Air Force Base California

- 1. Transmitted herewith is Air Force Form 14 concerning major airpraft accident to C-124A #51-107A, which occurred 37 miles North-Northeast of Whittier, Alaska on 22 November 1952. Pilot was Captain James Kenneth Duvall, AO 742695.
- 2. I concur with the Findings and Recommendations of the Accident Investigation Board.
- 3. Action taken by this Headquarters to mid in the prevention of accordents of a similar nature is as follows:
- a. The minimum enroute altitude for all military aircraft on a rway Amber 1 from Hichinbrook Range to Anchorage Range has been changed to 11,000 feet. The Anchorage-Sandspit route from Middleton Island radio beacon to Whittier Fan Marker has been changed to an enroute cititude of ID.000 feet.
- b. All pilots of this Command have been informed of the danger of precipitation static and been instructed in ways to reduce or eliminate this hazard. Pilots have also been instructed in the importance of tracking-in and tracking-out from a station to keep abreast of changes in wind direction and relocities.

1436 1

1 Encl & Form 14 John W. Pinsons
Brigadier Jonoral, USAR
Commandian

HEADQUARTEPS
1705TH A IR TRANSPORT GROUP
CONTINENTAL DIVISION, MATS
McChord AFE, Weshington

TCNCO 360.33

4 Jul 1953

SUBJECT: (Restricted) Final Evaluation of Aircraft Accident Involving C-124A, SN 51-107 at Surprise Glacier, Alaska, on 22 Nov 52

TO:

Commender

Continental Division, MATS Kelly Air Force Base, Texas 5.2 - 11-22 - 1

- 1. Reference is made to letter, subject as above, file AFCFS-1E, Office of the Inspector General, USAF, dated 7 May 1953. This letter, with indersements, has been forwarded in accordance with paragraph 18f, AFR 62-14.
- 2. In compliance with paragraph 8 of subject letter, the following action has been taken by this headquarters to prevent recurrence of similar incidents:
- a. Use of 11,000 feet MSL as minimum enroute altitude between Middleton Island and Anchorage was directed for all aircraft under operational control of this headquarters immediately after the facts of the accident were disclosed.
- b. Restrictions were imposed upon our C-124 eircraft prohibiting flight above the 59th parallel unless the aircraft was equipped with either two (2) ADF receivers or one (1) ADF and an APS-42 in operating condition, (reference letter, Subject: Restrictions on Late Model C-124 Aircraft, file OP 360.1, Headquarters, 1705th Air Transport Group, dated 22 December 1952.
- c. All pilots and aircrew members were reminded of difficult terrain, unusual weather and navigational aid deficiencies on the McChord-Elmendorf route. Pilots were advised to climb to emergency altitude whenever poor radio reception, unusual weather or inadequate navigation facilities created a doubtful position in mountainous terrain.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl Cy of ltr fr Hq Ube?

dto 7 hay 53

JAMES P. PERMELL it Col, USAF Jeouty Commander

"我是事主持9世生产"

Hq. 1705th Air Trans Gp. TCNCO 360.33. Subj: (Restr) Final Evaluation of Acft Accident Involving C-124A. SN 51-107 at Surprise Glacier. Alaska. on 22 Nov 52

CDOFS 360.33 (4 Jun 53)

1st Ind

HQ, CONTINENTAL DIVISION, MATS, Kelly Air Force Base, Toxas

. 3


- TO: Commander, Military Air Transport Service, Andrews Air Force Base, Washington 25, D. C.
 - 1. Forwarded in compliance with Par 3 of Inclosure 1.
- 2. With reference to Par 6 of Inclosure 1, the route qualifications for aircraft commanders and navigators as set forth in MATS Manual 55-1 "Transport Operations," are:

a. Aircraft Commander:

- (1) Successfully complete a flight proficiency check (MATS Form 4) administered by a qualified Instructor Aircraft Commander.
- (2) Complete written examination on all data relative to minimum safe altitudes, navigation aids, communication facilities, terrain features and traffic control procedures for main and alternate routes.
- (3) Successfully complete an initial route flight check (MATS Form 48) administered by a qualified Instructor Aircraft Commander.

b. Navigator:

- (1) Each navigator meeting basic requirements and completing ground and flight training (in order named) will be required to undergo a proficiency check administered by an Instructor Navigator.
- (2) Navigators who successfully complete such a proficiency check will be designated "Transport Navigator" and will be eligible for assignment to transport crew duties. Each navigator who does not successfully complete a proficiency check will be required to undergo additional ground and/or flight training and proficiency check as prescribed by the Instructor Navigator. Transport havigators qualified in one division will be considered qualified throughout the Tommand. In cases where Transport Navigators are transferred from one division to mother, unit commandary lirect route familiarization flights as required.



RESTRICTER

Hq, 1705th Air Trans Gp. TCNCO 360.33, Subj: (Restr) Final Evaluation of Acft Accident Involving C-12μA, SN 51-107 at Surprise Glacier, Alaska, on 22 Nov 52

- 3. The aircraft commander had successfully accomplished the above requirements which are deemed adequate in transport operations. The navigator had completed a transport navigator qualification check on 17 September 1952 on a trip from McChord AFB, Washington, to England and return. His duties as navigator were performed under the close scrutiny of an Instructor Navigator for a period of seventy-seven (77) flying hours in addition to the necessary time for ground preparation. This check-out was made with the notation: *Lt Turner has a very good knowledge of all phases of navigation. Works with ease, is confident, and produces good results." No additional training was recommended. He had 100 hours in arctic operations while assigned to the Air Rescue Service. In addition, he was qualified in accordance with Section 2, MATS Manual 55-1, which does not require that he be route-checked over each route flown. It is realized that the Navigator's Transport Qualification Check during September did not unequivocally qualify him to navigate the Alaskan route under winter weather conditions experienced in November. However, the navigator was assigned to this flight in accordance with policies and directives then in existence.
- 4. The additional precautionary measures now in effect, which are indicated in Par 2 of the basic letter, and the emphasis placed on briefing all rated crew members on the winter weather conditions and phenomena experienced on this route, are considered adequate to preclude the recurrence of this type of accident. Close supervision is continuously being accomplished by this headquarters. The Office of Chief Pilot has reported on three (3) recent field trips to the 1705th Air Transport Group. These field trips concerned the requirements, procedures, and techniques employed relating to check-out and performance of the aircraft commanders and navigators. The standards maintained have been found to be satisfactory. Improvements have been noted in the navigational training and route briefing facilities. Close supervision will be continued by this headquarters.

1 Incl:

Bricadie: General, USAF

Deputs Commander

3

CECURITY INTORMATION

FIFE TRICTES

g-1751 1930

B/L fr Hq 1705th ATG, Subject: (Restricted) Final Evaluation of Acft Acdt Involving C-124A, 51-107 at Surprise Glacier, Alaska on 22 Nov 52, dtd 4 Jun 53

MACFS 360.33

2d Ind

H. MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE, Andrews AF Base, Washington A5, 19 C.

TO: Directorate of Flight Safety Research, Norton Air Force Base, California

- 1. Forwarded in accordance with paragraph 41, Air Force Regulation 62-14.
- 1. As requested in paragraph 8, basic letter, this headquarters believes that the action taken by this command as indicated in the 1st indorsement is adequate and should prevent recurrence of similar type accidents.

FOR THE COLLADER:

l Incl n/c ROBERT L. DUNHAM
Lt Colonel USAR

Lt Colonel, USAF

Deputy Chief, Office of Flying Safety

30 347 Westernia

ROTE OF E

COPY

SECURITY INFORMATION

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WASHINGTON

> Office of the Inspector General, USAF Norton Air Force Base San Bernardino, California

52-11-22-8 APCFS-18 7 May 1953

SUBJECT: (Restricted) Final Evaluation of Aircraft Accident Involving C-124A, SN 51-107 at Surprise Glacier

Alaska, on 22 November 1952

TO: Commander

MilitaryAir Transport Service Andrews Air Force Base Washington 25, D. C.

- 1. Reference is made to the following major aircraft accident:
 - a. Aircraft: C-124A, SN 51-107.
 - t. Location and Date: Surprise Glacier, Alaska, 22 November 1952.
 - c. Operator: Kenneth James Duval, Capt, A0-742695.
- 2. The report of this accident and the comments of commanders have been reviewed by this office. The findings and recommendations of the investigation board are concurred in as the most probable cause. The comments and exceptions by responsible commanders have been considered in the final evaluation of the accident report.
- 3. The report of the special investigation prepared by this office 20 January 1953 concludes that navigational error is the most probable cause. A contributing cause was the inaccurate forecast of the winds aloft.
- 4. From the evidence available, it is the opinion of this office that an error in navigation occurred as outlined in paragraph 9 of the special report. The flight plan called for a six degree left correction after passing hiddleton Island. This would correct for the forecast 30 knot wind. The 60 knot wind that existed would not be sufficient to drift the aircraft to the point of crash if the aircraft was actually over Middleton Island as reported and the six degree correction was applied. The pilot's error was induced by inadequate navigational aids, airborne radio equipment, and incorrect forecast of winds aloft.

---- Inches

COPY

Hq USAF, AFURS-1E, Subj: (Res) Final Evaluation of Aircraft Accident Involving C-1144, 5N 51-107 at Surprise Glecier, Alaska, on 22 Nov 52

5. Air navigation begins and ends on the ground. The safety of the flight not only depends on the skill in which the aircraft is directed from one place to another, but also in supervision and pre-flight planning. Atmospheric hazards such as unpredictable winds and precipitation static have long been known in the Alaskan area. The lack of adequate radio equipment in the aircraft, as well as radio navigational aids on the ground, must be taken into consideration at all times in pre-flight planning and supervision. Emergency procedures, such as climbing to higher altitudes when a definite fix is in doubt, must be strictly adhered to and must be considered in successful safe air navigation.

The section of the se

- 6. Parther analysis of the accident indicates that supervision is a factor which must be considered. The commander of this aircraft had made only two previous trips over this route. The co-pilot who was better qualified had made six previous trips. It was the navigator's first flight on this route. On a flight of this kind, with a large number of passengers aboard, it is the opinion of this office that the crew should have had a much higher standard of route familiarization. The requirement for vigorous check out procedures for pilots on weather flying, various navigational techniques and preflight planning by operators, with closer supervision by commanding officers is mandatory as an accident prevention measure. Many pilots and navigators are found who exhibit weakness in navigational skills.
- 7. A report entitled, "Survey of Radio Navigational Aids and Communications Facilities Enroute to and Within the Alaskan Theater," prepared by this office, based upon a survey conducted during the period 1 December through 20 December 1952, contains recommendations to responsible USAF agencies with the objective of improving the effectiveness and safety of flight operations in the Alaskan area. A report prepared by this office "Survey of Transport Operations of the USAF", dated 15 March 1953, copies of which were forwarded to your Headquarters, discusses the problems and makes recommendations concerning cargo type aircraft operations, which are applicable to accidents of this type. It is believed that the addition of adequate asyigational aids in this area would minimize the possibility of a repetition of this error. Action has already been taken to raise the minimum flight altitude from nine to eleven thousand feet. Air Weather Service has taken steps to establish a procedure with CAA to provide aircraft calling Yakataga radio with the latest enroute weather to Elmendorf.

grand and a 2 march of the grand

COPY

Hq USAF, AFCFS-18 Subj: (Res) Final Evaluation of Aircraft Accident Involving C-124A, S/N 51-107 at Surprise Medier, Alaska, on 22 Nov 52

8. It is the primary purpose of accident investigations to disclose deficiencies affecting air operations in order that responsible commanders may take appropriate action to prevent re-occurrence of similar accidents. Paragraph 415, AFR 62-14, 14 January 1953, has not been complied with by the Commanding Officer, 1705th Air Transport Group. It is requested that this office be advised of any action taken or contemplated by that command and that action on this correspondence be taken in accordance with paragraph 181, AFR 62-14, 14 January 1953.

ET COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/t RICHARD J. O'KEEFE Brigadier General, USAF Director, FlightSafety Research The Inspector General



RESTRICTED

1 2 MAR 1953

ANS DO 320.33

SUBJECT: (UNCLASSIFIED) Aircraft Accident

Tüt.


ANS Liaison Officer
USAF Inspector General
Director of Flight Safety Research
Norton Air Force Base
San Bernadino, California

- 1. The inclosed evaluation of the wasther factor and weather service in Aircraft Accident, G-12hA, SH 51-107A, on Surprise Glacier, Alaska, Oc17E, 22 November 1952, is forwarded for the cognizance of the USAF IO, Director of Flight Eafety Ecsearch.
 - 2. When inclosure is withdrawn or not attached, the classification RESTRICTED on this correspondence is canceled in accordance with par 25a, AFR 205-1.

FOR THE COMMANDIES GROERAL:

I Incl Evaluation J. EMARKETE 1st Lt. USAY 400t AB

The state of the s



CONTENTS

- I. Data on which evaluation is based.
- II. Sequence of events.
- III. Evaluation of the weather factor in this accident.
- IV. Adequacy of weather service furnished.

Acres 800

Balling I am a com-

- V. Negligence on the part of weather personnel.
- VI. Conclusions.
- VII. Recommendations.

Prepared by:

Directorate of Operations Operational Analysis Division Headquarters, Air Weather Service Andrews Air Force Base, Washington 25, D. C.



- I. Data on which this evaluation is based:
 - .A. A weather analysis summary from the station of departure, as required by AWSL 62-3, has not been received.
 - B. The data submitted by the AWS Liaison Officer, inclosed as tabs, contains adequate data for an evaluation of the weather factor in this accident. Of the data submitted, the following is pertinent to this evaluation:
 - Tab A Report of Aircraft Accident, AF Form 14.
 - Tab A2 Report of Proceedings of Board of Officers (Aircraft Accident Investigating Board)
 - TabA4 Northwest Airlines Flight Forecast Log
 - Tab B Letter from Base Weather Officer, Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, with inclosures. This includes a cross section for the flight prepared by the forecaster at McChord AFB, point of departure.
- Sequence of Events.

Date of accident: 22 November 1952

2330Z - Time of departure from McChord Air Force Base

0547Z - Reported just east of Middleton Island 0554Z - Aircraft reports to Yakataga Radio (142 28' W, 60 02'N). Arrival at Whittier (approximately 50 miles SE of Anchorage) is estimated at 06172.

> Accident is estimated to have occurred about 06172 at Mt. Gannett which is 9620 ft. above MSL. Elevation above MSL at the accident scene is stated as 8900' on AF Form 14, Tab A.

- III. Evaluation of the weather factor in this accident.
 - 1. The weather factor associated with this accident is:

"The forecast of wind speed from Middleton Island (146019'W, 59°28'N) to Elmendorf AFB, Anchorage, Alaska, is incorrect."

a. The forecast of winds aloft by the weather forecaster at Mc-Chord AFB for the zones of interest at the proposed flight altitude (9000') is: (Ref inclosure to Tab B, Atmospheric cross section).

لجورت والمورد والمراز المورية الكالم وموات سالتات



Wind direction: 180-210° Wind speed: 30-20 knots.

195 25k

- b. Reference Tab A 4, Plight Forecast to Northwest Airlines flight departing Anchorage at 06002, 22 November 1952, approximately 6 minutes after the C-124 reported in over Middleton Island. The forecast of winds at 10,000 ft. for the general area is 150 degrees 35 knots.
- c. Reference Tab B, Statement of Lt Col David L. Hopkins, USAF, Base Weather Officer, Elmendorf AFB, Anchorage, Alaska, non-voting member of Aircraft Accident Investigating Board. According to a post-analysis by cited officer, winds over Anchorage at 10,000 ft should have been forecasted as:

200°60 knots as indicated by the contour gradient over Northern Alaska.

- 2. Operational aspects pertaining to this evaluation.
 - a. The aircraft lost all radio contact after the initial report to Yakataga. Reference Tab C. Attempts were made by Yakataga, Elmendorf Airways, Kenai Radio and Kodiak Airways to contact this aircraft to no avail.
 - b. Reference Section G, AF Form 14, Tab A. Precipitation static was known to exist in the Whittier area and is believed to have rendered the radios ineffective.
- 3. On the basis that the aircraft's radio was useless and the discrepancies between forecasted and observed winds at flight altitude for the zones of interest, a weather factor is considered to have been associated with this accident as specified in par VI, Conclusions, below.
- IV. Adequacy of Weather Service Furnished.
 - 1. On the basis that two independent forecasters, the forecaster for North-west Airlines at Anchorage and the forecaster at McChord AFB, approximated the same wind velocities for the zones, altitudes and time relating to this accident, the weather incorrectly forecast is considered to be within the limits of accuracy of data available and modern forecasting techniques.
 - 2. The discrepancy in the forecasted and observed winds illustrates that forecasted weather obtained at point of departure cannot serve as the sole planning weather data for a flight. Excellent facilities are available to pilots for obtaining latest current and forecast weather information as cited in paragraph VII, Recomme dations, below.



V. Negligence on the Part of Weather Personnel.

No negligence is evident on the part of weather personnel.

VI. Conclusions.

- l. Due to the failure of radios, the pilot was required to rely on such information as was already available. For the purpose of navigation for the remainder of the flight, the information available to the pilot appears to have been the position fixed at Middleton Island and the forecasted winds aloft prepared by the weather forecaster at McChord Air Force Base.
 - The discrepancy in the actual winds from that forecasted was a contributing cause to this accident.

VII. Recommendations.

- Reference is made to recommendation #1, by the Aircraft Accident Investigating Board, which states:
 - * - the board recommends:
 - That a procedure be established with the CAA to provide northbound aircraft calling Yakataga with the latest en route weather to Elmendorf."


Established international and USAF flight procedures are adequate in this respect. The aircraft commander can apprise himself of the latest information affecting his flight by requesting such information from any facility capable of furnishing same. Under normal conditions, most aircraft have radio equipment adequate for contacting a facility which can obtain and furnish to the aircraft any weather information desired. Generally, the communications center of any Flight Information Region, any CAA and AACS station can meet requests for weather data.

2. It is recommended that pilots be impressed with the need to request additional weather information, both current and forecast, while in flight. This should be done even in good weather as a means of familiarizing pilots with methods and procedures for obtaining such information.


5. Recommend that whenever "weather incorrectly forecast" is considered to be a cause factor involved in an air-craft accident, action be taken to permit weather personnel to file a rebuttal in accordance with par 47, AFR 62-14.

accomplished

5



THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WASHINGTON

Office of The Inspector General, USAF Norton Air Force Base San Bernstriino, California

AFCFS-2D

3 Merch 1953

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Opportunity for Rebuttal

TO:

Commanding General McChord Air Force Base Washington

1. Reference is made to the report of sircraft accident involving C-124A SN 51-107A at Surprise Glacier, Alaska, on 22 November 1952.

- 2. The aircraft accident investigating board found that a contributing cause of the accident was an inaccurate weather forecast by weather personnel of Detachment 4, 4th Weather Squadron, McChord Air Force Base, Washington.
- 3. Request the affected personnel be given the opportunity for rebuttal in accordance with persgraph 47, AFR 62-14, dated 14 January 1953. Further, request submission of rebuttal information in accordance with paragraph 42 of the same regulation.

BY COMMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Henry C. Huches

Lt Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Executive

Directorate of Flight Safety Research

The Inspector General

360-38-3

Restricted

SECURITY INDEPULTION

DAF, Hq USAF, Washington D.C., AFGFS-2D, Subject: (Unclassified) Opportunity for Rebuttal

CO 360.33 (3 Mar 53)

1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS 557TH AIR DEFENSE GROUP, McChord Air Force Base, Washington 11 MAR 1953

TO: Commanding Officer, Detachment 4, 4th Weather Squadron, McChord Air Force Base, Washington

- Forwarded for necessary action.
- 2. Request correspondence be returned through this headquarters.

Colonel, USAF

Commanding

360.33 (3 Har 53)

2nd Ind

DETACHMENT 4, 4TH WEATHER SQDN, McChord AF Base, Washington, 17 March 1953

TO: Commanding Officer, 567th Air Defense Group, McChord Air Force Base, Washington

- I concur in the findings expressed in par 2, basic.
- It is the concensus of the forecasters at this detachment that the occurrence of the narrow band of high winds in the Middleton Island-Elmendorf AF Base area could not have been forecast utilizing the data available to this station. This detachment is undertaking an objective study to determine, if possible, what are the parameters preceding the occurrence of such a high band of winds; the results to date are inconclusive.
- 3. It is recommended that a Radar or RDF winds-aloft reporting station, utilizing equipment of the SCR-658, AN/GMD-1A or SCR-584B-type, be established at Middleton Island to provide winds aloft data in an area almost devoid of upper air information. Reports from this station would enable preparation of more accurate upper air wind forecasts for this area.

WILLIAM A

Major, USAF

Detachment Commander

Restricted

SECUPITY INTERPRETARY

RESTRICIZ

Off of The Inspector General, USAF, Norton AFB, San Bernardino, Calif, AFCFS-2D, Subj: (Unclassified) Opportunity for Rebuttal

EI 360.33 (3 Mar 53)

3d Ind

HEADQUARTERS 567TH AIR DEFENSE GROUP, McChord AFB, Weshington 2 0 MAR 1953

TO: Chief of Staff, Department of the Air Force, ATTM: Inspector General, Morton Air Force Base, San Bernardino, California

In compliance with paragraph 3, basic letter, attached information is forwarded.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:


RICHARD E. HOLCOMBE

Lt Colonel, USAF

Executive Officer

STAN STAN

COME CONTRACT VERY NOW



RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

PT

SUBJECT: (RESTRICTED) Report of Special Investigation of Africant Accident Involving C-1248 88 51-107 at Surprise Glacier, Alaska, on 22 November 1952

er: The Trespector General, USAP

DATE 18 Peb 1953

Directorate of Operations, DCS/O

COMMENT NO 2 Maj Cummiff/ge/55648 APROP-00-8

The inclosed report has been reviewed. This Directorate concurs with the re-

I. Tour recombinistion that action be taken to provide a directional radio facility in the Middleton-Mittier are is, in effect, included in your report, (Unilessified) Survey of Serigational Aids and Communications Facilities EnBoute to and Within the Alsakan Theater, dated TO January 1953. This survey is being processed by this Directorate in gooddination with the Directorate of Communications. Communication on the installation of a Righ power, low frequency radio homer at Mittier; and an SRA radio range at Middleton, will be provided as requested in RAR, comment No. 1, your office, subject: (Unclassified) Survey of Madio Mavigational Aids and Communications Facilities En Route to and Within the Alaskan Theater, dated 30 January 1953.

3. It is noted that paragraph ? of the inclosed report states that the representation contained in paragraph A has been referred to the Commanding General,
Alaskan Air Command, for action and reply to your office. In view of this, it is
considered that duplication would result if the CO AAC were required to slat reply on
this recommendation to this office. Upon receipt of the reply by OC AAC on this
matter, it is requested that a copy be provided this office.


I Incl

R. E. KOON Gelonel, USAF Deputy Director of Operations Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

C OPY

22-11-22-8

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION



THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

13 13 17

SECRETY INFORMATION

HEADQUALTEG SAUT ATR LEPOT WIND AND BLOST LO ATR TOACE HASE Elmendonf Air Force Java Pr. 942. c/e Peswasper, Sessoin, Washington

3980T-F 58..33

SUBJECC: Transmittal of AF Form 14

TO:

Commanding Officer

34th Air Transport Squadron LaBord Air Force Base, Wookington

1. Fransmitted herewith is AF Form 14 concerning major mircraft ancident to 3-124A 51-107A which occurred at 35. January, Alaska, on 22 Hereby to 1952. Pilot was Captain Septembrane James (1981), AO-743695, 24th Air praceport Squadron.

2. Apart of accident is to be throughly in antoristed with parames, 4 h, Amb 68-14.

TO THE REPORT AND IN FOR MERCAL:

1114347

1 Incl: AF For 14 (dup)

360.33 (23 Dec 52)

1st Ind

30 Dec 1952

34TH AIR TRANSPORT SQ., 1705th ATG, McChord AFB, Washington

TO: Commanding Officer, 1705th Air Transport Group, McChord AFB, Washington

1. In compliance with paragraph two (2) basic communication and paragraph 48b Air Porce Regulation 62-14, AF Form 14, in duplicate, (reference major aircraft accident to C-124A 51-107A on 22 November 1952, at Et. Gannett, Alaska Pilot Captain Kenneth James Duvall) is forwarded herewith.

2. Concar in fundings and recommendations.

1.1.00

HESTER IS SECURITY INJURNATION

B/Ltr fr: Hq 39th Air Depot Wing and Elmenborf AFB, Elmendorf AFB, Alaska file 39 SOT-F 360.33, Subject: Transmittal of AF Form 14, dtd 23 Dec 1952

- 3. Action taken by this headquarters in an effort to prevent recurrence of similar accidents is as follows:
- a. Continuing emphasis has been placed on the obtaining and wtilizing of all enroute flight advisory facilities.
- b. Terrain hazards, weather hazards, and navigational aids and deficiencies on McChord-Elmendorf route have been re-emphasized to all pilots and aircrew members of this organization.

l Incl:
 AF Form la (dup)

MILLIAM A. MCLAUCHLIN Major, USAF Commanding

PROTEIN COUNTY INCOMETING

SECURITY INTERMATION RESTRICTED

B/Ltr fr: Eq 39th Air Depot Ng, Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, AFC 942, c/o FE, Seattle, Wash., file BOT-F 360.33, Subj: Transmittal of AF Form 14

OP 380.43 (23 Dec 52)

2nd ind

8 JAN 1953

HEADTLETERS, 1705TH AIR TRANSPORT MOVE, OUTLD, MATS, McChord AFB, Wash.

TO: Commander, Continental Division, MATS, Helly Mir Force Base, Texas

- 1. Joneur in recommendations and findings except as listed in paragraph 2 below.
- 2. Exception is taken to the finding that "the most probable cause of the accident was due to navigational error." The term "error" implies that a mistake was made by the pilot when conceivably such action was avoidable. This is not considered quite accurate for the following reasons:
 - a. The pilot had no visual references for navigational purposes.
- b. His ATA at Middleton Island was only 4 minutes off his ATA, giving a positive indication that his forecast winds were quite accurate to that point and therefore were assumed to be accurate from this fix to the Whittier Fan which is only 50 minutes flying time on practically the same heading. The fact that the wind in actuality was, as reported by other aircraft in the area, 60 kts higher than forecast from Middleton Island to Whittier Fan, coupled with the reported severe precipitation static produced a situation in which it was impossible for the pilot to navigate other than by dead reckning and flying out his ATA to Whittier Fan prior to turning in to Shmendorf. Under such circumstances as described above the safest procedure would have been to climb to emergency altitude, however failure to do this encompasses error in technique rather than error in navigation and possibly should be indicated as the accident cause.
- 3. It is further noted that, although mavigational error attributed to the pilot was considered as the most probable cause, the recommendations of the Board are for corrective action covering ground facilities, change of routing, new equipment, and change of altitude. There are so recommendations for change in pilot procedures nor are there any recommendations covering improved navigation methods for pilots under the above descrited hazardous conditions of weather and radio static.
- 4. If the board considered that an error was made, then the recommonactions should include desired corrective action in an effort to pre-lude the recommond of such an error. If, under the conditions exist-

74925

SECURITY INTERMATION

SECURITY INFORMATION RESTRICTED

B/Ltr fr: Eq 39th Air Depot Ng., almendorf AFB, Alaska, AFO 942, c/o PN, Seattle, Wash., file BOT-F 350.33, Subj: Transmittal of AF Fgrm 14

OP 360.33 (23 Dec 52)

2nd Ind (Cont'd)

ing at the time, a logical technique for preventing the accident was not available, then the cause of the accident should be attributed to inadequate equipment rather than pilot error.

l Inol: ·

Jack h. Stovall Colonel, USAF Commanding

RESTRICTED SECURITY IN CHMATION

•RESTRICTED

Hq, 39th Air Depot Wg 3980T-F 360.33, Subj: Transmittal of AF Form 14 (Uncl)

CDOFS 360.33 (23 Dec 52)

3rd Ind

HQ, CONTINENTAL DIVISION, MATS, Kelly AFB, Texas

21 J. 13

TO: Commander, Military Air Transport Service, Andrews AFB, Washington 25, D. C.

- 1. Forwarded in accordance with Air Force Regulation 62-14 is the report of major aircraft accident pertaining to C-124A #51-107A, assigned to 1705th Air Transport Group, McChord AF9, Washington, which occurred on 22 November 1952.
- 2. This headquarters concurs with the findings and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Investigating Board, with the exception of facts outlined in the 2nd Indorsement. In addition to the installation of radar altimeter SCR 718, it is recommended that the installation of airborne radar in C-124 type aircraft and the installation of Omni-ranges on Alaskan routes be given top priority by Headquarters, USAF. Had this equipment been installed, it is very possible this accident would not have happened.
- 3. The following action has been taken by this headquarters to prevent recurrence of this type accident:
- a. All MATS flights are required to maintain minimum enroute altitude of 11,000 feet Middleton Island to Anchorage and Hinchinbrook to Anchorage.
- b. Continental Division C-124 type aircraft will not be operated into areas of forecasted moderate icing.

1 Incl: / / n/c (1 cy w/d)

GEORGE S. CASSADY Brigadier General, USAF Deputy Commander

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION

B/L or Ho 39th ADW, Subject: Transmittal of AF Form 14 (Unclassified) dtd 03 Dec 52

MACCP 350.33

Ath Ind

HQ MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE, Andrews AFF, Washington 25, D. C.

TO: Directorate of Flight Safety Research, Norton Air Force Pase, San Bernardino, California


- 1. Concur with the findings and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board with the following exceptions:
- a. The Board found "There was no indication of mechanical or radio malfunction". Conversely, there was no indication of the radios functioning after leaving Middleton Island beacon; therefore, it appears that malfunction of radios or inadequate radio equipment must have existed, or pilot would have detected the northerly drift and made the necessary corrections.
- the Aircraft Accident Foard found "the most probable cause of the accident was navigational error attributed to pilot." This statement is incongruous with other statements by the Board in their findings. Navigational errors are normally associated with definite obvious mistakes in navigation when they were avoidable. Pilot was on course to within 150 miles of his destination and his ETA at this point was only four (4) minutes off, therefore it appears justifiable for the pilot to assume wind direction and velocity to be as forecast, and continue on his predetermined course.
- 2. Concur with the preceding indorsements and in particular with paragraph 4 of the 2d indorsement.
- j. It is the opinion of this headquarters that the primary cause of this artitlet should be attributed to improperly forecast winds, with secondary cause attributed to lack of adequate navigational radio aids in the area, or suitable radio receivers in the directf itself. Lack of radar altituder and Airborne Search Radar were contributing factors.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


l Irel

to the second of the second of

DESCRIPTY I'S RECTION



THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526



NESTA:CIED SEDURE TEMPOS

> Major Babits/bjg/7211-6291 AFGF8-2D

ATCTS-20

20 Jenuary 1953

SUBJECT: (Restricted) Report of Special Investigation of Aircraft Accident Involving G-1244 EF 51-107 at Surprise Glaciers Alasks, an 22 November 1952


70:

GG, APS; GG ARBS; GG FEAF (12); Comdr., MATS; GG, SAC; CO. 140; 39, 44;

- 1. Inclosed is the report of a special investigation conducted by this office involving a 0-1244 siruraft socident which occurred et Surprise Glacier, Alsake, on 22 November 1952.
 - 2. This report is forwarded for your information. BI COSMAND OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF!

l Inel Rept of subjinves

RICHARD J. O'REFE Brigadier General, U.S. Air Force Director, Flight Sefety Hesearch The Inspector General



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WASHINGTON

Office of The Inspector General USAF Norton Air Force Base San Bernardino, California

20 January 1953

(Restricted) Report of Special Investigation of Aircraft Accident Involving C-124A SN 51-107 at Surprise Glacier, Alaska, on 22 November 1952

THE ACCIDENT

1. C-124A SN 51-107, assigned to the 1704th Air Transport Group, McChord AFB, Washington, departed its home station on 22 November 1952 as Military Air Transport Service scheduled flight D 39/22 to transport personnel and air freight to Elmendorf AFB, Alsska. After passing over the Middleton Island Radio Pescon, the sircraft did not maintain the required course and crashed on Surprise Glacier, Alaska. The sircraft was destroyed by impact. The eleven crewmembers and 41 passengers were fatally injured.

CONCLUSIONS

をおける。 1000mmのでは、1000mmので

- 2. It is concluded that:
- a. The most probable cause of the accident was the failure of the pilot to navigate the correct course (see paragraphs 8, 11. and 12).
- b. A contributing cause was an ineccurate forecast of the winds aloft (see paragraph II).
- c. A probable contributing cause was the inability of the pilot to receive adequate radio range signals due to precipitation status and icing (see paragraph 12).
- d. The minimum sirway altitude from the Middleton Island Radio Beacon to the Anchorage Radio Range Station does not essure safe flight under the rapidly changing and severe weather conditions existent in the area (see paragraph 1),.
- e. This scrider's might have been prevented had the pilot been informed of changes in the forecasted winds shoft (see paragraph 15)

SLIUTT, M.TORMATION

SMAMA Nov 52 SOM

AESTRICTED

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 3. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS, HEADQUARTERS, USAF:
- a. Initiate action to provide a directional radio facility in the Middleton-Whittier area (see paragraph 14).
 - 4. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ALASKAN AIR COMMAND:
- s. Establish flight following procedures which will require commanders of USAF bases in Alaska to monitor the progress of all inbound and outbound flights and issue advisories concerning en route, destination, and alternate weather changes and other information necessary to insure safety of flight (see paragraphs 11 and 15).

ACTION TAKEN

- 5. NOTAM issued on 26 November 1952 by Base Operations, Elmendorf AFB, by order of the Commanding General, Alaskan Air Command, raising to 11,000 feet the minimum safe airway altitude between Anchorage and Middleton Island for military pilots.
- 6. The recommendation contained in paragraph 3 has been referred to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, for action and reply.
- 7. The recommendation contained in paragraph 4 has been referred by letter to the Commanding General, Alsakan Air Command, for action and reply.


HISTORY OF FLIGHT

8. C-124A SN 51-107 departed McChord AFB, Washington, at 1530 PST 22 November 1952 as Military Air Transport Service flight D 39/22. The aircraft was cleared via Blue Airway 32 to Dungeness at 9000 feet; to Neah Bay, direct at 10,000 feet; then via the military airway to Whittier at 9000 feet. The flight progressed in a routine manner until arrival over the Middleton Island Radio Beacon at 1947 Alaskan Standard Time (AST). The pilot estimated the time over the Whittier fan marker at 2017 AST. This position report was the last radio contact with the aircraft. At 0100 ASI 23 November 1952, the aircraft was declared missing and soarch procedures were started. On 28 November 1952, the wreckage of the aircraft was located on Surprise Glacier approximately 40 miles east of Elmendom? AFB.


CORICTED

INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS

- 9. Aerial reconnaissance of the crash scene indicated that the aircraft struck a ridge at approximately 8,900 feet elevation, disintegrated as a result of the impact, and fell down the mountain slope to a point approximately 8,300 feet above see level. Because of heavy snow coverage of the wreckage and the difficulty of reaching the crash area, no examination of the wreckage was possible.
- 10. An examination of the flight records of the pilot and copilot fereeled that the pilot had a total of 2659 flying hours of which 1657 were as first pilot. He graduated from the MATS Heavy Transport Training. Whit (HTTU) as a C-124 sircraft commander on 13 December 1951 and had been respected on 12 August 1952. He had a total of 427 pilot hours in the C-124 of which 290 were as first pilot. The pilot had a total of 213 hours first pilet weather and instrument time, 27 hours of which were accrued in the pest 30 days. He held a green instrument card with expiration date of 11 April 1953. The copilot had a total of 3492 pilot hours of which 2003 hours were as first pilot. He had a total of 645 hours of flying time in C-124 sircraft with 361 hours as first pilot. The copilot completed the HIT training course in C-124 sircraft on 10 June 1952 and was assigned copilot duties on the aircraft. He possessed a green instrument card with expiration date of 7 July 1953. The copilot had a total of 287 hours imatrument weather time, of which nine hours were flown in the past 30 days. This was the third trip to Alaska for the pilot and the sixth for the copilot. Both pilots were considered to be exceptionally well qualified and had passed their flight checks with little or no difficulty.
- 11. An analysis of the weether forecast given the pilot revealed that the winds forecast for that part of the flight from Middleton Island to Anchorage were from 180 degrees at 30 knots. Postflight analysis of weather data indicated actual winds at flight altitude in the Middleton Island-Elegadorf area would have been approximately 60 knots from the south. The flight plan, computed by the newlector and approved by the pilot prior to deperture from McChord AFB, was computed on the basis of the forecast winds. A correction of six degrees left was necessary to maintain the required ocurse; however, with the actual wind velocity of 60 knote, a left correction of 13 degrees would be required and a ground speed of approximately 233 knots would result. It appears that the pilot based his estimated errival time over Whittier on a ground speed of 217 knote which would be obtained if the forecast winds were utilized. This indicates that the pilot had no warning that wind velocities had increased markedly and that he was unprepared for the increase in drift correction that would be required, However, the failure to apply the added drift correction in itself would not sause the sircraft to drift approximately 30 miles off course in 30 SATEGIZA



- 12. A scheduled sirline pilot, who flew southbound over the route two hours after C-1244 SN 51-107 passed Middleton Island, encountered moderate icing and turbulence from Anchbrage to Middleton Island at a cruising altitude of 10,000 feet. The headwind component computed for this flight indicates that the winds were very close to velocities of 60 knots. It is logical to assume that the pilot of C-1244 SN 51-107 also encountered the turbulence and icing at his cruising altitude of 9000 feet. It is also possible that in encountering the icing, static made it difficult for the pilot to accurately identify the signals of the Anchorage Radio Range. This difficulty along with the obvious effort needed to maintain the correct course in turbulent conditions and the added wind drift could account for the sircraft being approximately 30 miles from course.
- 13. At the time of the accident the minimum safe altitude for that part of the sirway from Anchorage to Middleton Island was 9000 feet. A number of the smaller sirling operators in the area utilize a minimum altitude of 11,000 feet during the winter months due to altimeter corrections necessary to compensate for the colder sir of the winter season. This procedure provides an added safety factor. On 26 November 1952, Elmendorf AFB issued a MOTAM reising the minimum safe altitude for military pilots to 11,000 feet between Anchorage and Middleton Island. Had a minimum altitude of 11,000 feet been in effect prior to the accident it is probable that the sizeraft would have safely cleared the high terrain north of the intended course.
- 14. After passing the Middleton Island Radio Beacon inbound to Elmendorf AFB, pilots must report over the Whittier Fan Marker. This sid is surrounded by high terrain which restricts the normal output of the fan marker and thus limits reception. Pilots who have flown this route many times, stated that they had difficulty receiving the fan marker and always held a course well to the left of the inbound heading to sweid the high terrain east. In addition, the southeast leg of the Anchorage Radio Renge is not eligned with the eirway from Middleton Island to Whittier. Cas flight check reports indicate the usable range distances on the Anchorage Radio Range is 75 miles. A flight chack conducted in May 1952 reported that the southeast leg was split and, in addition, this report, and one of 24 November 1952, reported multiples on the southeast leg. It is evident that precise radio navigation while on instruments ie not always possible over this part of the route. A radio range installed at Middleton Island with one leg sligned with the sirway or a homing facility in the Whittier area would sid greatly in maintaining the correct course from Middleton Island to Anchorage. A requirement exists therefore for an additional radio navigational aid on the Whittier-Middleton route of a directional capability to insure safe navigation in this area.
- 15. As the aircraft approached the Anchorage area, six hours after takeoff, a more accurate forecast of the winds could have been given the




SES RICTED

pilot had the forecaster at Elmendorf AFB known the content of the forecast given the pilot at McChord AFB. To do this, in addition to receiving the forecasted weather, base operations, weather, and communication personnel at Elmendorf AFB would have had to be closely monitoring the flight's progress. Enowing the sircraft position, estimated progress, and existing route weather, an advisory could have been issued to elert the pilot and navigator to the stronger winds and might have prevented the accident. To accomplish this expeditiously would require constant flight following by experienced and conscientious clearance, weather, and communication personnel in close contect with one another. The possible saving of life and equipment of this single accident far overshadows the cost and effort required to establish such a procedure. It appears, therefore, that a requirement exists for the establishment of an effective flight following system in each base operations to memiter the progress of all inbound and outbound flights and to issue any advisories necessary. The requirement that bese operations perform this service would require the monitoring of a relatively small number of sircraft by each base operations and would result in a more accurate and reliable flight following system.

SUBSTANTIATING DATA ON FILE IN DIRECTORATE OF FLIGHT SAFETY RESEARCH

- 16. The following data pertaining to siroraft accident investigation of C-1244 SN 51-107 are on file in the Directorate of Flight Safety Research and can be obtained on request.
 - A. Special orders directing the investigation
 - B. Statistics
 - C. Statements of McChord AFB weather forecasters
 - D. Statement of T. W. Fenstermaker, Captain, NWA Flight 324/22
 - E. Aircreft Inspection and Maintenance Records, Part II, 14-21 November 1952
 - F. Briefing Clearance Form
 - G. Aircraft Clearance Form
 - H. MATS Flight Flen
 - I. Plight Orders
 - J. ARS flight forecast cross section
 - K. Brief on D39/22, C-1244 8% 51-107



RESTRICTED

- L. Cargo and passenger manifests
- M. Technical orders not complied with
- N. Instructor Mavigator and Instructor Aeriel Engineer Line Check Reports
- 0. Statements of cargo loading on sircraft 1107
- P. Weight and Belance Clearance, Form F
- Q. Statements of Lt Sullivan and Dr. Terris Moore
- R. Cas Incident Report
- S. NOTAM of safe altitude for flights arriving or departing Anchorage
- T. Letter from CAA with redio facilities chart reports and en route flight check report
- U. Letter forwarding aircraft flight contact record from Yakatega and Yakutet, Aleska
- V. Map of accident area
- W. Route from McGhord to Anchorage
- I. Photographs

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

REPORT DISTRIBUTION LIST

(Restricted) Report of Special Investigation of Aircraft Accident Involving C-124A SN 51-107 at Surprise Glacier, Alaska, on 22 November 1952

Acesary	Action Conies	Information Copies
DCS/O, E; USAF, Wash, D.C.	2	
CG, ASC, Elmendorf AFB, Alaska	2 1	
CG, APG, Eglin AFB, Florida		1 -
CG, ARDC, Attm: RDDNO Baltimore, Maryland		1
CG, FEAF, Tokyo, Japan		12 (
Comdr, MATS, Andrews AFB, Wash, D.C.		1 ~
CG, SAC, Offutt AFB, Mebraska		1
CG, TAC, Langley AFB, Virginia		1:
Directorate of Inspection Services, TIG Washington, D.C.		2
Chief, Lieison Office, TIG, Hq AMC W-P AFB, Ohio		6 (5 - MCM I
Liaison Officer, ARDC D/FSR, Norton AFB, California		1

RESTRICTED

VALUE OF

RESTRICTED BECTRITY WEST ATTOM

ABBREVIATIONS USED ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AFR 12-12

MESD TARTORS

1002D INSPECTOR GROERAL GROUP

MORTOM AIR FORCE BASE

California

SPECIAL ORDERS

14 November 1952

- 1. UP Sec III, par 10. AFL 39-7 as ammed, A/B CHARLES T. MALICKI AF38382210 is promed to A/3C (Temp) off this dt.
- 2, LT COL MEARIE L. BERRY J? 9833A USAF CCA3 WP Hq USAF, Wash.25, DC on TDY o/a 15 Nov 52 for aprx five (5) days for the purpose of Caerdination of Attache-Mission-MAAG Insp Program & upon compl of TDY ret to proper sta. Off cirl for pat up to & inc TOP SECRET while complying w/this par. DPUO. Off visiting the Insp Gen, USAF w/sign in & ly copy of orders at the Management Div, TIG USAF, Tv1 by Mil acft, Com 1 acft & Bus authd. CIPAF. TD" 5735400 P 481-02 03 D7 343-5590 S 04-607. Auth: AFR 35-52.
- 3. The folg named Offs USAF CGAZ WP Yuma County Aprt, Yuma, Arlz on TDY o/a 14 Nov 52 for aprx ten (10) days for the purpose of Participating in special inves of F-86 acft acdt & ucon compl of TDY rot to proper sta. Offs olrd for mat up to & inc SECRET while complying w/this par. DFUO. TPA. CIPAP. TDN 5733400 P 481-02 03 07 343-5530 S 04-667. Auth: AFR 35-52.

MAJ BRUCE C. JENNEY, AD578058 MAJ CL.UDE E. TABOR, AC431988

- 4. CAPT SHITH W. ARTS A0922750 USAF CCA2 WP Los Angeles. Calif on TDY o/t 17 Nov 52 for aprx three (3) days for the purpose of Coordinating Plt Saf Offs Crse at USC & upon compl of TDY ret to proper sta. Off old for mat up to & inc SECRET while complying w/this par. DFUO. TPA dird, it has been adm det that this method of tvl is more advantageous to the Govt. CIFAF. TDN 5733400 P 481-02 03 07 343-5590 S C4-607. Auth: AFR 35-52.
- 5. LLT HUGH A. COVER A01911554 USAF CCA2 WT Williams AFB, Ariz on TDY o/t 17 Nov 52 for aprx two (2) days for the purpose of Ferrying E1 Pers & upon compl of TDY ret to proper sta. DEUD. TEMM dird. CIPAP. TDN 5733400 P 481-02 O 07 343-5590 S 04-607. Auth: AFR 35-52.
- 6. MAJ RENNETH W. SIMTSON A0745958 USAF CCA2 WP Goodfellow AFB, Tex on TDY o/a 17 Nov 52 for aprx fifteen (15) days for the purpose of Familiarization in T-6G noft & upon compl of TDY ret to proper sta. Off clrd for mut up to & in SECHET while complying w/this par. DEUD. Twl by Mil soft, Car'l acft & Bus autho. CIPAP. TDN 5783400 P 481-02 03 07 343-5590 S 04-607. Auth: AFR 35-52.
- 7. The folg named Amn WP sta o/a dt indicated on TDV for aprx no of days indicated for the purpose of Crewing Ell Aeft & upon compl of TDV ret to proper stac Govt ers w/b occupied if aval. LAW sub par 5, par 4205, JTP, Amn are not required to pay for meals furn by Govt Mess a/o Box Lunches issued while compling w/this pare DEUO. TBMA dird. CIPAP. TDN 5733400 r -81-02 -13 07 E43 5500 8 04-607. Auth: AFR 35-52. •No Per Diem authd.

LAE

TC

BFF C/A DAYS CC

●H SGT EDMUND A. DERNBACH AF65€4348 MoChord APP, Wash

17 Nov 52 3

RESITTIGETHER

PROTEIN AND AFIOR

(Par 7 So 246, 14 November 1952, Hq, 1000d Insp Gon, Norton AFE, Calif, Cont'd)

N2B	<u>70</u>	EFF O/A	DAYS	<u>co</u>
T SGT EUGENE SANDERS AF14130172	Fort Worth, Tex	17 Nov 52	4	ΑZ
S SOT BOUND J. HAMINSKI	McChord aFB, Wash	17 Nov 52	3	75

8. The folg named Offs USAF CCA2 TF Elmondorf AFB, Alaska on TDY o/a 18 Nov 52 for agra twenty-one (21) days for the purpose of Participating in invos of C-119 acft acdt & upon compl of TDY ret to proper sta. Offs clrd for mat up to & inc SECTRY while complying w/this par. DPUO. Tvl by Mil acft, Com'l acft, Rail & Bus suthd. CIPAP. TDN 5733400 P 481-02 03 07 343-5590 S 04-607. Auth: AFR 35-52.

MAJ CECTGE F. BARITS, AC429342 MAJ MARION G. COTAN, 5873A CAFT WILLIAM R. DAUTH, A0725335

9. LT COL WALTER P. TALIAFTERRO 9792A USAF CCA2 TH Convair Acft Co, Fort Worth, Tex on TDV o/a 17 Nov 52 for acrx five (5) days for the purpose of attending Mock-up Insp & upon compl of TDV ret to proper sta. Off cird for mat up to a inc TD. SECRET while complying withis para DEUO. Tvi by till acft, Com*1 acft & Fus autho. CHAF. TDM 5733400 P 431-02 03 07 342-5590 S 01-607. Auth: AFR 35-52.

10. M SGT HORERT T. STOVER AFCEDESSS this Hq w/b disch fr the Mil Sv eff 20 Nov 52 NF AFR 39-10 (BTS) (Disch 6 rt m/n/b tendered until after re-enlmt is accomplished). Ann ent to MOP. FD this sta w/pay Ann tvl alws IAT prescribed Regis fr this sta to paloe of enlate Scott AFF, III. Cash Sottlement for thirty-seven (37) days unused acc lv is authd. Home Address: 915 Sycamore St. Relleville, St Clair County, III. Arm w/b furn Hon Disch Cert DD Fm 256AF. TDN 5733500 348-401 F 534.1 02 03 07 S 99-999.

11. The folg named Offs USAF CCA2 Tr Los Angeles, Calif on TDY c/a 13 Nov 52 for aprx two (2) days for the purpose of Obtaining photographic material at USC & Atlantic Productions Studio & upon compl of TDY ret to proper sta. DPUO. TTA, VOCG 13 Tov 52, such orders having been issued under exigencies which prevented the issuance of orders in his are cfmd & made of rec. CITAF. TDN 5733400 T 481-02 03 07 343-5590 S 54-307. Auth: AFR 35-52.

14.J BTY H. NETTY, A01854121

1LT JOHN H. MOORE JR, A0800024

12. For 5 SO 243 this Hq es as pertains to TDV of MAJ KENYSTH W. SEMPSON A0749958 USLY CGA2 is revod.

BY COTTAIND OF MAJOR GENERAL FERTRIFFIAG:

OPFICE.

LIMS F. GATOTHING Lt Colonel, USAF Adj tast

L. Tokan V. S.ahmun Gojer, USAF

KESTALL TEL

assistant adjutant

I & S E DIVISION

INFORMATION CHECK SHEET AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

	SPANIS MISS
1.	DATE OF ACCIDENT: 22 November 1952
	TIME OF ACCIDENT: 1947 LCL (Last Pos report)
	LOCATION OF ACCIDENT:
2.	AIRCRAFT TYPE: C-124
	MODEL: A
	SERIES:
	SERIAL NO.: 51-1074
3.	AIRGRAFT HOME STATION AND ORGANIZATION:
	COMMAND: NATS
	DIVISION: Continental
	AIR FORCE:
	AING:
	GROUP: 1705th ATG
	SQUADRON: 34 ATS
	AIR FORCE BASE; McChord
	LOCATION: Tacoma, Washington
4.	RESULTS TO AIRCRAFT (Include estimate of damage if repairable)
	DESTROYKO

HISTORY OF AIRCRAFT AND ENGI	nes:					
AIRCRAFT:						
(a) Date of Manufacture:						
(b) Date of Acceptance by A	r: 23 Apri	1 1952				
(c) Total Houre: 500:15 p	lus					
(d) Date of Last Overhaul: New						
(a) Overhauling Depot:						
(f) Time since Overhaul:						
(g) Last Periodic Inspection						
(h) Date of last Periodic I						
(i) Last Periodic Inspection			_			
(j) Time Since Last Periodic	nspecti	on;	7-19			
Pegines:	1	2	3	4	5	6
(a) Model	R4360-20W	Same	Same	SAme		
(b) Humber	P-4784	P-8176	P-8249	P-8175	L	
(c) Total Hours	800 199 p	ne				
(d) Hre since Last Maj Owhl		New	New	New	۸,	
(s) Overhauling Depot	SBAWA					
PROPELLERS:						
(a) Model	C-6342	C=402 C=6345	Same	Same		
(b) Dt last Maj Owhl						
(c) Hrs since Last Maj Owhl						
(d) Last Owhl by						
(e) Total Hours	1129:10	866:35	1099:20			
(f) Dt Installed in A/C	8 Jul 52	3 Jul 52	5 Aug 52	4 Apr 5		
(a) Time since [matelled on				700 3.5		
this A/C	315:40	401:10	272:05	500:15		

6.	PII	OT:
	a.	Same: <u>Duvall</u> Kenneth James
	b.	Rank: Captain
	¢.	Service Number: AC 742695
	d.	Home Station: McChord
	•.	Organization: 1705th ATG 34th ATS
7.	PII	OT HISTORY:
	8.	Age: 37
	b.	Date Entered Service: 27 October 1941
	c.	Date Separated from Service: 26 April 1946
	d.	Date Reentered Active Military Service: 20 December 1948 - 9 July 1951
	٠.	Date of Original Checkout This Type Aircraft: 13 December 1951
	f.	Date of Last Checkout This Type Aircraft. 12 August 1952
	g.	Original Aeronautical Rating and Date Received: 12 APRIL 1943
	h.	Present Aeronautical Rating and Date Received: 12 APRIL 1943
	i.	Primary Duty Assignment:)D44 A
	j .	Thying Time:
		(1) Type of Instrument Card: Green Expiration Date: 11 Apr 1953
		(2) Total Pilot (1st Plt, Copilot, Comd Plt, etc) Hrs: 2659
		(3) Total 1st Filot Hours: 1657
		(4) let Pilot Hours Last 90 Days: 185
		(5) lat Pilot Hours Last 30 Days: 87
		(6) lst Pilot Hours This Model (B-25, F-51, etc):
		(7) Other Pilot Hours (CP, C, SC) This Model: 137:20
		(8) 1st Pilot Hours Last 90 Days This Model: 185:00
		(9) let Pilot Hours Last 30 Days This Model: 87:00
	((10) Total Time Spent in Air During 24 Hrs Prior to Acdt: 8:00

		(11)	List by Type Hodel lat Plt Experience in Selar Acft (e.g., B-25, 50 hrs):
		(12)	Was Operator on Instruments at Time of Acut or Immediately Before?
			HoUnk _X_YesHoodWeather
			If above answer is "Yes" or if accident occurred at night or during IFR weather or unknown conditions, fill in items below.
		(13)	Total 1st Pilot Instrument Weather Hours: 213:00
		(14)	Total let Pilot Instrument Hood Hours: 142:00
		(15)	let Pilot Instrument (Weather & Hood) Hours Last 6 Mos: 62:00
		(16)	let Pilot Instrument (Weather & Hood) Hours Last 60 Days: 44:00
		(17)	1st Pilot Bight Hours Last 6 Nonthe: 91:00
		(18)	lat Pilot Bight Hours THIS MODEL Last 60 Days: 81:00
	k.	Jet 1	Bomber Experience:
		(1)	Total lat Pilot Time: None
			Total Copilet Time: None
	1.		at Hours (Pilot and Copilot): 180
3.		PILOT	
	٨.		Cheney, Alger Meredith
	b.		Captain
	G.		ce Number: A0 746251
			Station: McChord
	•.		isation: 1705th ATC, 34 ATS
١.	OOF		ISTORY:
	۵,	Age:_	32
			Intered Service: 26 September 1940
	g.		Separated from Service: 20 Feb 1950
	۵.		Resistered Active Hilitary Service: 24 May 1951
	9 .		of Original Chackous This Type Aircraft: 12 Sept 1951
	1.	Date	of Last Cheskout This Type Aircraft: 19 July 1952

THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

g.	Oria	ginal Aeronautical Rating and Date Received: 20 MAY 1943
Þ.	Pre	sent Aeronautical Rating and Date Received: 9 July 1952
1.		mary Duty Assignment: 10448
١.		ing Time:
•	(1)	Type of Instrument Card: Green Expiration Date: 7 July 1953
	(2)	Total Pilot (1st Plt. Copilot, Cond Plt, etc) Hrs: 3492
	(3)	Total 1st Pilot Hours: 2003
	(4)	Total Hours,IP _x CPC (Check applicable one): 1239
	(5)	Pilot Hours Last 90 Days: 245
	(6)	let Pilot Hours Last 90 Days: 148
	(7)	Hours Last 90 Days, IP CP C: 97
	(8)	Pilot Hours Last 30 Days: 41:05
	(9)	Total Pilot Hours This Model (B-25, F-51, etc): 645
	(10)	ist Filot Hours This Model: 361
	(11)	Hours This Model,IP _XCFC:Z84
	(12)	Total Pilot Hours This Model Last 90 Days: 245
	(13)	1st Pilot Hours This Model Last 90 Days: 148
	(14)	Hours This Model Last 90 Days,IP _X CPC:97
	(15)	List by Type & Model Experience in Similar Acft (IP, CP, C) (e.g., B-26, IP, 50 hrs.) C -74 8:00
	(16)	Fotal 1st Pilot Instrument Weather Hours: 287
	(17)	Total 1st Pilot Instrument Hood Hours: 145
	(18)	lst Pilot Instrument (Weather & Hood) Hrs. Last 6 Mos: 51
	(19)	1st Pilot Instrument (Weather & Hood) Ers. Last 60 Days: 18
	(20)	Total Pilot Night Hours Last 6 Months:
	(21)	let Pilot Might Hours Last 6 Months: 102
	(22)	Night Hours Last 6 Nos., IP CP C:
	(23)	Total Pilot Night Hours This Model Last 50 Days: 66
	(24)	let Pilot Sight Hours This Model Last & Days:
	(25)	Night Ers. This Model Last 60 Days,IPCPC:

h. Jet Bomber Experience:	•		
(1) Total 1st Pilot time: None.	,		
(2) Total Copilot time: None	·		
i. Combas Hours (Pilot and Copilot):	250		
O. LIST OF ALL PERSONNEL ABOARD THE AIRC	aft:		
Name, Rank, and Service Number	Position in aircraft at time of accident	Injuries Sustained	Use of Paracont
S i			Yes No
DUVALL KENNETH'S CAPT ACTAZES	ACET COM.	FATAL	×
CHENRY ALGER M CAPT. AD 9462 51		84	
TURNER 1 T. 1/LT 40 19 12 344	[и	
HAGEN ENGULF W T/SAT AF 1627558	1	,,	
SPRAGUE, BONRAD N. A/20 AF 19354551		^	
COSTLEY EUGENER S/SUT. AF 12111724		٠.	
CURN. ROBERT A ME AF ADBYAR			
SCOTT MARION L MSC AF 163 77386	_	٠.	
INGRAM (-60. M. Mie AF 16285738		٠.	٠,
KIMBALL JAMES X 4/30 AF 19495496		٠.	
JACKSON, WAYNED MISC AT 17548604		··	
SEE THE L FOR COMPLETE PA	SHUGER MANICE	ST - A	
WERE FATALLY INJURED.			
LOCAL TO THE TOTAL TO THE TAX TO			
		. 1	

11. FLIGHT PLA	T;			
a. Time o	f Takeoff: 1530 PST			
b. Total	Pine Airborne:			
c. Time of	f Accident: 1947 LeL			
d. Betima	ted fime en route: 7 pl	ns 03		
	SCHEOULED FA			
	reight at takeoff: 174,	_		
		, i.e		
g. U.G. at	takeoff: 31.2			
h. Route:				
FROM	70	VIA AWY OR DIRECT	ALTITUDE	IFE OR VE
McChord	Roll Bey	Direct	9000	IFR
Roll Bay	Dunganess	B-32	9000	
Dungaress	Nesh Bay Cape St James	Dir Dir	10000 8500	
Book Dee	I CADA DE SEMAS	·	8500	
Cape St James		Dir	1 0000	
Meah Bay Cape St James Sandapit	Sandapit Niddletown	Dir	9000	•
Cape St James Sandapit Middletown	Sendspit Middletown Whittier	Dir Dir	9000 9000	
Cape St James Sandspit Middletown Whittier	Sendspit Middletown Whittier Anchorage	Dir	9000 9000 9000	
Cape St James Sendapit Middletown Ehittier 2. Total Fuel 3. Total Fuel 4. Exhibits Ch	Sandspit Middletown Whittier Anchorage (gallons) aboard Aircra (gallons) aboard Aircra	Dir A-1 aft at Time of Takeoff: aft at Time of Accident:_	9000 9000 9000 5290	#
Cape St James Sendapit Middletown Ehittier 2. Total Fuel 3. Total Fuel 4. Exhibits Ch	Sandspit Middletown Whittier Anchorage (gallons) aboard Aircre (gallons) aboard Aircre ecklist:	Dir A-1 aft at Time of Takeoff: aft at Time of Accident:_	9000 9000 9000 5290	#
Cape St James Sendapit Middletown Ehittier 2. Total Fuel 3. Total Fuel 4. Exhibits Ch	Sandspit Middletown Whittier Anchorage (gallons) aboard Aircre (gallons) aboard Aircre ecklist:	Dir A-1 aft at Time of Takeoff: aft at Time of Accident:_	9000 9000 9000 5290	# #
Cape St James Sendapit Middletown Thittier 2. Total Fuel 3. Total Fuel 4. Exhibits Ch a. Testino	Sandspit Middletown Whittier Anchorage (gallons) aboard Aircre (gallons) aboard Aircre ecklist:	Dir Dir A-1 aft at Time of Takeoff: aft at Time of Accident:_	9000 9000 9000 5290	# #
Cape St James Sendapit Middletown Thittier 2. Total Fuel 3. Total Fuel 4. Exhibits Ch a. Testino	Sandspit Middletown Whittier Anchorage (gallons) aboard Aircra (gallons) aboard Aircra ecklist:	Dir Dir A-1 aft at Time of Takeoff: aft at Time of Accident:_	9000 9000 9000 5290	# #
Cape St James Sendapit Middletown Thittier 2. Total Fuel 3. Total Fuel 4. Exhibits Ch a. Testino	Sandspit Middletown Whittier Anchorage (gallons) aboard Aircra (gallons) aboard Aircra ecklist:	Dir Dir A-1 aft at Time of Takeoff: aft at Time of Accident:_	9000 9000 9000 5290	# #


THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526


	. Form 175 and Loading List:
	2012 177 2011 20201126 21771
	·
. 4	. Form F:
	
	. Operations orders:
	. Operations orders:
	. Map showing Location of Accident:
	
4 .	. Sketch of wreckage distribution:
h.	
AGMETICAL	Station nearest to Location of Accident:

THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

1.	AF Form 1, Part I;
-	
. 3-	AF Form 1, Part II:
k.	Technical orders not complied with:
1.	Form 54 (UR):
n.	List of Personnel Participating in Investigation:

2





DETACEMENT A. ATH VEATER SQUADRON
Notherd Air Purce Buse
Teacus, Markington


26 Hovember 1952

PIALIBEET

I came to work on the moor air charte at the MATS Weather Station at 12009, 22 November 1952, and hearned from Sergeent Holosop, the other forecaster on duty, that three trips were going out: an HGAF North Star at 1400F to Elimederf, a 6-124 at 1800F to Elimederf, and a 6-54 to Mediak at 1415F. Surgeant Bolomb had already made the Flight level wind forecasts for these flights. Surgeant Holomb was sking up the flight folder for the Sorth Ster flight and when he Pinished he briefed me on the weather for that flight and then departed for lauch at approximately 12307. The MAF ares case in a short time later and was tripfed by me. Later as Ale Perso pilet the did not identify kimpair except to may that he was going to Riunder! came in and asked about the route weather. Value the sape and sequences I briefed him regarding weather along Military hisvays and along Amber One Lirvey and also on typical wintertime weather omditions. In regards to the weether along Military Airways, I told the pilot that he would have instrument conditions and ising on the latter third of the route due to a lew in the delf of Alaska I told the pilot that he would have instru that was saving northward. I also told him that in the event that the winds at flight level in the Middleton-Elecator's sector were stronger than forecept, turbulence vould probably be descentered in that area. At an resimutely IXOP a pilot came in with a slearance for the G-124 to Elementers. I told him that his prose-position and not been mule up and he stated that he had the proposed eaction and had been briefed. I then filled out his electrics with the latest terminel and elternate weather, discussed terminal weather with the pilot, and signed the electrons. At the pilot was leaving, Sergment Molecule come in. I maked him if he had given the -124 pilot his cross-eaction and he said it had not been made up and that the pilet would have to come bank for it when he tried to slear through MATS Operations. Surgeout Boloomb them went to work on the 1830% surface there and the C-124 stress-bestion. I returned to work on the upper-mir charts.

Robert W EVARS
N/Set, IBAF
Porecaster

Lyce Took



26 Movember 1952

SIATEMENT

I began work at the MATS Weather Station at 0500P, 22 November 1952. After episating symif on local weather, the symostic situation, etc., I hopen manalysing the 12305 surface chart. This was completed etc., I hopen malysing the 12305 surface chart. This was complete at approximately 09309. I then studied the local situation again and also the Alaskan and suroute weather. Three (3) flight folders were to be prepared for the following flighte: AGAF North Star to Einsulers at 1400P; 6-54 to Endisk at 1415P; 6-124 to Einspiers at 1500P. At approximately 1000P to cross-section for the ROLF Star was legan (lagend, etc.). At approximately 1959 I be-metching the 1908 700th chart in order to forecast winds for legarteries. At approximately 11259 I had completed the fore-Borth Blaz total b b chart in order to forward winds for at winds for the two routes. I then continued with the MAF North to-section completing it at 1200P when M/Set Evens came on duty. After giving him a brief on the local forebast, I began paring the G-54 errors-section to Kodisk inspends as I would not have time to see plate it after lunch in time for their elhecular departure. This made the skaleton form for the G-124 or section was completed at approximately etc) so that it could be completed in a minis I returned from lands. I then briefed Surgeont Event on the terminal and appeared position for Military Aircays for the Billy Borth Star flight. This briefing was as follows: from the forement position of the low center and the frontal system as indicated on the 12302 surface shorts will instrument conditions would be successfored from 1400 H to Simustarf. I expected icing conditions agrees the system as indicated on the cross-section for the same portion of the route. The terminal weather at Elmentorf was expected to be ceiling & to 5 thousand feet, visibility good with so presipitation. At ladd (the alternate) conditions to be 12 thousand fact broken sky, visibility 10 miles or better with very little possibility of feg. I told Sergreat Frame that that was probably the only one he would have to contend with and that I would be back in time to brief the others. I then went to lunch at 1245P. I returned from lunch at 1340P. As I some in the back door Sergeant Evens was signing a electronce form and by the time I had hung up my hat and coat, the officer whom he had briefed had gone into MATS Operations. When I got over to the map table to start work, Sergeant Evens maked me if I had given the G-124 crew their dross-section. I stated that I had not because it had not been made up. He then said that the officer told him that he had already gotten his cross-section and briefing. I them said that he would be back when he tried to elear through MATS Operations. I then proceeded to sketch the 18302 shart for the Gulf of Aleska

Style 12



area and completed the C-124 cross-section at 1400P. I then under the Fort Worden forecast and participated in the terminal forecast conference. I then continued work analyzing the 18302 surface chart. At scootine between 1430P and 1450P Mr. Suith, Operations Bispatcher, came is and asked me if I still had the deplicate copy of the flight folder for the C-124. I told him that they had not picked up either copy and that I had not brisfed them. He then told me that the pilot had some kind of cross-section. He took both copies of the proper folder and rushed cut. I assumed that he was trying to eatch the pilot to correct the server. I then continued with my regular work of the chart I was drawing and the clearance of the Kedisk flight which cleared ten to fifteen minutes later. This Statement congists of two (2) pages.

> JAMES HOLDOWN T Sgt., USAJ Porcoster

BIL 113 EDFO


KEDFFC

BERRY/COPY HAS BEEN SENT HELM SEA/PLZ FWCD FOLLOWING MSG TO OPERATIONS OFFICER MATS MCCHORD FIELD ASAP STOP THIS WAS FENSTERMAKER'S LAST TRIP FROM KEDF SEA AND DESIRE YOU INSERT FLT NBR IN LAST SENTENCE.

QUOTE ON TAKEOFF WE WERE CLRD TO COXXX CLIMB NV TO SUSITNA INTERSECTION RETURN INBOUND AT 10000 FT. ON CROSSING RANGE STATION AT 10000 WE HAD VERTICAL VISIBILITY NO ICING AND AIR WAS SMOOTH. FROM RANGE STATION TO WHITTIER MARKER WE INCOUNTERED MODERATE ROUGH AIR AND MODERATE DOWN-DRAFTS TO THE EXTENT THAT WE USED METO POWER FOR SHORT PERIOD OF TIME ON TWO OCCASIONS TO CONERACT THE EFFECT OF THE DOWNDRAFT STOP AFTER LEAVING WHITTIER AND TO THE COAST LINE WE HIT SHARP MODERATE TURBULENCE MODERATE DOWNDRAFT AND MODERATE ICING FOR SHORT PERIOD OF TIME STOP AT 0750 GREENWICH AS WE APPROACHED THE COAST LINE WE HEARD A LINE TRANSMISSION ON 121.5 EMERGENCY FREQ AS FOLLOWS "AS LONG AS WE HAVE TO LAND WE MIGHT AS WELL LAND THER" UPON REACHING THE COAST LINE WE BROKE OUT ON TOP AND WERE INTERMITTENTLY ON INSTRUMENTS IN AND OUT OF THE TOP STOP FROM COAST LINE TO MIDDLETON THE AIR WAS SMOOTH THERE WAS NO ICING AND WE WERE DEFINATELY ON TOP ON REACHING MIDDLETON STOP TRIP WAS ROUTINE FROM THERE TO SEA T W FENSTERMAKER CAPT NWA FLIGHT NYXXX NUMBER BLANK END QUOTE A F OLSON CHF PILOT MSPFO

E1L R 113


EDFC




THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526



THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526



THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526



THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

-A-THE LOCAL PROPERTY OF

7000

25 January 1952

MARKET PORT BANK

MATRIX Select on Augusta Care and year

M. Aller, Marie St. Com. (Species St. dor and at some Const.)

THE RESERVE THE PARTY OF THE PA

green water to the Water State of the State

made to be a set of the property and the parameters of basely all property

The pilet was considered qualified in all respects and had recently been shocked by the SELE Saint Milet (Major Morrow) on a triy to Serope. Pliet's and Se-Filets Smiliflentians are attached). There is much conjecture as to her the flight passed through two range lags to hit the mountain and the communes of epinion is that severe produktation static was a logical factor. It is considered that this assumption plus the upproducted high cross wind were rejer considerations in the flight drifting as for off course.

34TH AIR TRANSPORT SQUADRON 1705th Air Transport Group Continental Division, MATS McChord AFB, Mashington

3 December 1952

SUBJECT: Technical Orders Not-Complied-With on Aircraft C-124A, Serial Number 51-107

TO: Whom It May Concern

Reference aircraft C-124A, Serial Number 51-107, a thorough check of the aircraft records on this aircraft reveals that the following technical Orders are being carried as not-complied-with:

O1-40NV-118

Restriction on use of wing fillet life raft compartments.

(No life rafts installed in fillets.)

Ol-40NVA-41A 16 October 1952 Inspection and replacement of main landing gear retracting cylinder rod end bearings. (Tools necessary for accomplishment are on order.)

01-40#V4-57

Modification of Curtiss propeller synchronizer and synchronizer rack assembly.

(Kit not available.)

02A-10E-22
Oil leakage at front end of propeller shaft.
Number 2 Engine
Number 3 Engine
Number 4 Engine
(Not applicable except when leak is encountered.)

Interim T.O. 01-1583

Engine driven generator and alternator replacement. November 1952

(Not-complied with due to confusion existing on pending change to original Interim Technical Order.)

JOE C. HILEY Captain USAF Paint Officer

MILITARY ALL CHANSPORT SERVICE Continental Division, MATS

INSTRUCTOR NAVIGATOR'S SIX (6) MONTH LINE CHECK REPORT

Date 17 SEPT 52
NAVIGATOR TURNER, WILLIAM I. 2/47INSTRUCTOR NAVIGATOR SMITH, HUBERT R. I/L
(Name in full) (Rank) (Name in full) (Rank)
AIRCRAFT COMMANDER KOETEEUW STANLEY CAPTTYPE AIRCRAFT C-124 (Name in Fufi) (Rank)
ROUTE TCM-SAVANNAH, U.K., RETURN VIA BROOKLEY
FLIGHT TEAR:
DAY 40 NIGHT 37 TOTAL 77
(Grading system: SSatisfactory, UUnsatisfactory. Each grade of U (unsatisfactory) requires an explanation in remarks.)
GRADES: 1. Preflight
2. Organization and meathess
3. Dead reckoning
4. Pilotage
5. Radio and consol navigation
6. Loren navigation
7. Colestial mavigation
8. Post flight
9. General
Final grade this report
SUMMARIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: Lt. Turker has a very good
Knowledge of all phases of navigation. Works
with ease is confident, and produces good
issults.
LATS PORM 464 (1 Dec 50) reproduced 1705 ATJ, 2 Sep 52) 2 Restified True. Confidence of the contractor
reproduced 1706 ATJ, 2 Sep 52) I Kertified True. Cotte
Stuart Dera 1/17

THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

A. B.	Prompthess and appearance.	• >		4
C. D.	Meather analysis, influence on fill of plant,			
£.	Accuracy and completeness of Claude New	. 3		
F.	Ligui; ment oners (time tick; ortent ore; maps, astro compass, drift meter cavigation books, ato			***
	Grade		. ,	24
		.		
Res	ARKS			197
				**
			-	À
2.	ORGANIZATION AND MEATHERS		A Tompson	# . .;
	Accessibility of materials before tage off	5		
Б. С.	Condition of charts, arrangem of of the trials during flight Care of classified material	ا کے ا		5.43.4
D.	Neathors and accuracy of logs how-ground, and weather folders seriodin posting of coathly seems.	 		3
E.				
	Grade	5		
To 254				:.
RSM	ARKS			:.
RBM			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1.
RSM		gar and a second	······································	:
REM	ARKS	gar and a second		2. 2.
	ARKS	gar and a second	Alas	
		gar and a second		
3. A. B.	DEAD SECRETION of maps in advance.	gar and a second		
3. A. B.	DEAD SECRIFICA	gar and a second	Also	
3. A. B.	DEAD SECRETION of maps in advance.		A de la companya de l	
3. A. B.	DEAD Smckettles Was of drift meters		Also	
3. A. B.	DEAD Smckovica Use of rai: Altimeter drift.		A Section 1	
3. A. B.	DEAD Smckettles Was of drift meters		Alas	
3. A. B.	DEAD Smckettles Was of drift meters		A. 18.	
3. A. B.	DEAD Smckettles Was of drift meters		Alaba	The second secon
3. A. B.	DEAD Received Use of drift meter		A. A.	The second secon
3. A. B.	DEAD Received Use of drift meter		Alaba	The second secon
3. A. B.	DEAD Received Use of drift meter		A. A.	
3. A. B.	DEAD Received Use of drift meter		Alaba	
3. A. B.	DEAD Received Use of drift meter			
3. A. B.	DEAD Received Use of drift meter		Alaba and a second	

PILCTAGE				
A. Aprickij krijekt of ekonogric it B. Mag resolt writing	ser			
rankis o		ರೀತದರ		
	tue training the produce persons of the companies of the			
RADIT AND SECTION SAVIDATION				,
A. A. Ore of the offer of the ore	SMT () () () () () () () () () (\$ VN \$ \$	
REMARKS.				
The state of the s	and the second of the second o	B. 1971 1971 1971 1971 1971 1971 1971 197		
	e men andre de la companie de la com	Substituted within the court of the year.		
And an artificial section of the second section of the second second section of the second section of the second section section sections and the second section sections are sections as the second section section section sections as the second section se	and the second of the second o	Substituted within the court of the year.		
				47
A. veloti moles and reversion end. b. Anorther entries on typoportruct c. Anorther entries of temperature.				·-
A. veloti moles and reversion end. b. Anorther entries on typoportruct c. Anorther entries of temperature.			S	
A. Delote which and reversion for a back delote which and reversion for a call back and reversion for a call back and respect to the same terms of the same terms.		Grade	S	
A. Pelopianies and receits on a		Grade	S	
A. Deliberation and respections of a laboration and respections of a laboration and respections of a laboration and respective and a laboration and a laboratio		Grade	S	

8.	PGST FLIGHT	Jan 2- 6- 6- 6
À.	General accuracy of headings ex (Thus out a contract of a	. 5
В.	Report to weather eliface a	· <u>5</u>
_	Debriefing report.	•
D.	Condition of navigator a compertment of the contract of the co	·
	पंत बंद ।	, <u>S</u>
Rela	LRX3:	
		egen ag vag vag vag vag vag vag vag vag vag
	Company of the control of the contro	Marketin Co
	GLEERAL	and the second s
ð.	Garanni.	Samuel Sa
A .	Ability to coordinate use of ranko, priorage, de eckoning.	. يورين المستورين
	Macwiedge of arching procedures	
C. D.	Knowledge of stergency procedures and location of emerg equipartitude and judgment, and are the same of the contractions and procedures are the same of the contractions of the contraction of the contract	
E.	Cooperation altocrew,	
F.	General impression greated by managator	
		5
	OTACE	
ì.	Ground training required? Yas 80 V.	
2.	Flight training necessary? You hh	
dast	ROSCION RESOURCES NONE	
		grand Market gag and space and an array of the space and array of the space array of the space and array of the space a
	ACTION TERMS ON THIS REPORT	
	opriete remarka are checked.	
	————————————————————————————————————	
	Forort fistures while near the months of the estimate	
1	inaco com marijacor a re o mono como dibliomed.	
	ARMANATOR RESTORED DECEMBERS (*** * *) 158 IN ACCORDANCE	n vita nikonin
	Tall Authority of the second o	
1.5	havegator worrided to	liqueport
N	avigator HRIL	7
	avigato Histor upmaded to	
-	the second secon	
	the state of the first section of the section of th	
	§	

2 December 1992

BELER BEE

I state that I, Thomas S. Schliven, let Mentement, USAF, as assigned to the 5002nd IG, Special Investigations Squadron, Elmondorf AFB, Alexan; that I have approximately 200 hours experience as an air crew member in the Air Ferces of the United States; that I have been a parachutist since 1951; that I have flown at least 2,000 hours in aircraft, either as a crew member, passenger, or parachutist; that I have approximately four and one half years active military service, all of which has been in the Air Force; and that I have been an investigator for the past four years.

On 28 November 1952, at approximately 0850 hours, I departed Elmondorf AFB, Alaska, in a Piper Super Cub siroraft flown by Dr. Terris Moore, Fresident of the University of Alcoke. We flow directly over the Chugach Renge to the Serpentine Glacier, arriving in that erea at approximately 0945 hours. A search of the Serpentine Glacier failed to reveal sircraft wreckege as marked on the map supplied us by 10th Air Roscus. However, a search of the Surprise Clapier on the slopes of Mount Connett soon revosled what appeared to be the tail section of an aircraft on the floor of the Surprise Glacier, and close to the principal western ridge of Mount Cannett. We flow directly on to the glesies, and landed in the soft snow which covered the greater part of the glacier. Our altimeter indicated approxiuately 6,100 feet upon landing, and the temperature of our thermometer. which was fixed on the wing atout of the carcraft, indicated zero degrees Fabrenheit. This temperature fluctuated plus or minus 50 during daylight hours. Dr. Moore stated that he had set the eltimeter at 100 feet at Shrendorf before our takeoff. We landed at approximately 1000 hours. After landing, we proceeded immediately to the tail section of the wrocked aircraft, which was approximately 1,500 feet from our landing position. The snow was dry and approximately six to eight feet in depth over the floor of the glacier, and drifted is many arose to a greater depth. Travel on the floor of the glacier was thus practically impossible without snow those, and even with their assistance, extremely difficult.

Having arrived at the tail scation of the sircraft, we made a visual inspection, and determined from the numerals 1107 appearing on the right side of the vertical stabilizar of a G-124 type sireraft, that we had positively identified the missing pircreft. The tail section appeared to have been sheared completely of from the fuselings section of the aircreft, and was tipped forward from its name) position so as to rest almost perpondicular to the level floor of the glector. Most of the skin covering he vertical stabilizar and raide was stripped completely off, but that soction on the right side of the sertical stabilizor upon which were peinted be macarala described above, was intent. The administrate of the variation medilizer was tilted forward out of olignment, and Dr. Moore ron rhed to that "the impact 'd'a' and a hard been treme identa". (See photograps itsched.) A blanker was as with to sed backing from the left alterator of the tall section, and upon electronic showed a slight charming. Or. Foors at I proposi for a short time around this toll matter, but were mable to disperse human remains, or other conjects of interest. It will be noted Over the photographs that the tell section is issued to the extremities

Statement of H sa S. Sullivan [contid]

of the right and left heriseatel stabilizers and vertical stabilizer. There was no evidence of fire baying damaged the tail section. From our position on the glacier at the tail of the circust, we noted a large ment in the snow approximately 150 feet above and to the right of the tail section, and following this lime with our eyes, we noted a piece of metal approximately three or four square feet in area on the precipies of the western ridge of Mount Garnett above us, and approximately 500 feet store the floor of the glader. Looking down glader and to the left of our position es we faced the ridge of Houst Gamett, we noted several jagged bits of netal protrading from the snow, and also in direct line with the tail and the wreckage higher on the hill. Because of this appearest dispersal of the parts of the circuit over such a large area from near the top of the ridge to the floor of the glacier hundreds of feet below, the necessary conclusion is that no one could possibly have survived the impact of the sirerest upon the mountain. From this executation I completed that the sirerest had struck the face of the waters ridge of Mount Cammett below its saddle and above the drifted snow line at an angle of about 20 degrees in azimuth, and thus scattered parts of the sircreft down glacier as described above. We visually inspected the face of the ridge for further signs of weekage, and I say three stringers or langerous scattered to the right of the line of wreakage described above, but below the snow line and protruding vertically from one to two feet above the snow, and spaced about ten to twenty feet spart.

We then olimbed to the mound about 150 feet above, and to the east of the tail assembly, and while probing this mound discovered a blanket which was partly covered with frozen blood, and melting in the sunlight. We noticed the odor of decemposing or burned flesh in this vicinity, and I proceeded to probe the mound for human remains or other objects of interest. Dr. Moore stated that he had to return to the floor of the glander to prepare a runney for his aircraft, as he was interested in returning to Finendorf AFD as soon as possible. Before Dr. Moore returned to the floor of the clasier, however, I say a dark form below him in the snow, and having excevated the snow for about two or three feet, pulled up a Military perks. This parks here no marks of identification. It was buttoned up and there were no homen remains evident thereon or nearby. The significant thing about this parks was that the front of it was generally charred through one layer of cloth. While Dr. Meers returned to the floor of the glacier I continued probing this sound for approximately one helf hour, but was unable to discover anything of real interest. I uncovered several fragments of cardboard cartons mear the site of the blanket. As I began to proba underseath this mound I discovered that it appeared to be a buge emoball which had superently rolled down from a higher altitude. It was at least fifteen feet in dispeter, but contained no object within it that I could determine. Dr. Moore then called me to come and aid in the construction of a runway for our sircraft, and I complied with his request.

We spent several hours packing snow in an eres about 800 feet in length and ten feet in width, running generally east and west, and because of a prevailing wind down slecter in the necessary direction of our takeoff, we began to construct a new runney to the south et 90 degrees to our eastwest runney. Or. Moore thought that a cross-wind takeoff would be too

Statement of Themis S. Sullivan (cont'd)

heserdous, and we ebundoned this attempt after a short time. Our construction of the runway was interrupted by several para-drope of survival equipment by 10th Air Resons Group sircreft, which occupied us for some two hours in retrieving the equipment and setting up our comp. The wind down glacier increased steadily towards sundown, and caused us some concern as to whether or not us would be able to take off on the following day.

On 29 November 1952 we arose at approximately 0700 hours and costinued work on our east-west runway, which we langthened (because of the preveiling tail wind of five to sight siles per hour) some 200 feet. The engine of our straigh had become frozen during the night, and Pr. Moore worked with a plumber's smoke put and a blow torch for approximately one hour before we could get the engine started. At approximately 0900 hours Dr. Moore made a takeoff down glaniar with a tail wind of approximately five miles per boar, and berely escended in getting his sirureft in the air. He circled and returned, landing at the cast and of our runway, and we worked for another hour lengthering of runney enother 500 feet. Fortunitely the prevailing tail wind gradually leasened, and during one of the Rulls we boarded the sirerest and took off, using only 1,000 feet of our runney, having lightened the siroreft of all but Dr. Moore's personal survivel equipment. We them flev towards Elmendorf AFB on a direct course, but observing had weather shead, and not being equipped with proper instruments, we turned west and flew to Palmer, where the ceiling was approximately 1,000 feet. Our fuel tanks indicated one fourth full at Palmer, but Dr. Moore decided that he would fly on down to Elmandorf. We then turned south and proceeded down the Knik Arm and flav over the vater at an eltitude of 150 feat, erriving at Elmendorf at approximately 1200 hours. As we approached Elmendorf, Dr. Moore expressed concern over the fuel level in our tanks. and made an emergency landing on the texting meer the MATS terminal.

In my opinion, besed on the conditions which I observed on the Surprise Claster, any attempt to locate the remains of the passengers should the 0-124 sirefeft, or to losete the remainder of the wracked of that sironeft. will be an extremely difficult operation. As I have indicated above, the snow level is suprocisetely eight feet in depth over the floor of the glacier and drifted to higher levels in many parts. There is a huge enoudrift along the northern edge of the glacier where it joins Mount Gamest, and I would estimate the snow to be as deep as several hundred fort in the area of the wreckage. It is significant that we were unable to locate any of the engines or any of the major parts of the C-124, and this fact gives rice to the complusion that either the circuaft is completely disintegrated, or that its major parts are buried under many feet of snow. One fact is obvious from observation, and that is, that the sircraft and its contents are mosttered over at least two acres, most of the area having an incline of shout 40 degrees from the horizontal, and covered with at least eight feet of fresh fallen powdered snov. Should it be desired desirable to excavate the wreckage and the human remains at the site of the accident, I would suggest that a party of approximately twelve men to be flown in by light sirersft, or perschuted onto the glacier, which party might be execusted upon completion of their operation by light extra eft or helicopter.

THOMAS S. SULLIVAN
Let Lieutement, USAP

A0-1849397

Beedquarters, Alegken Air Command

3-1-67

NTAC35 XMAR 50 JWPDM43 OPOP JEPC JUPNT JEPFF JUFMB JEDWP JKDC JEDEN 777 /2500 DE JWPDM 13M OP 231130Z FM CO 1726TH SPT SQ MCCHORD AFB WASH TO JEPC/INSPECTOR GENERAL USAF HQ USAF WASH DC JWPNT/DIRECTORATE OF FLIGHT SAFETY RESEARCH OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TECH INSPECTION AND FLIGHT SAFETY RESEARCH NORTON AFB CALIF JEPFF/CO GENERAL MATS ADREWS AFB MD JWFMB/CMDR CNTLDIV MATS KELLY AFB TEX JKDC/COMMANDING GENERAL ALASKAN AIR COMMAND ELMENDORF AFR ALASKA JEDWP/COMMANDING GENERAL AIR MATERIEL COMMAND WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB DAYTON OHIO JEDEN/CG ADC ENT AFR COLO /RESTRICTED/ PLIMARY REPORT OF MISSING AIRCRAFT: A. 23/1100Z OVERDUE ELMENDORF AFR ALASKA B. C-124A 51-107 34TH AT GP 1705TH AIR TRANS GRP MCCHORD AFR CNTLD MATS MCCHORD AFR CNA UNKNOWN C. OPERATOR AIRCRAFT COMPANDER DUVAIL KENNETH J. CAPT A0-742695 34TH AT SQ 1765TH AT GP (UTLD MATS MCCHORD AFR UNKNOWN UNKNOWN PD D. SAME AS ABOVE C. CREW 11 PAXS 41 LIST TO FOLLOW

PAGE TWO JWPDM 13M

F. A/C OVERDUE ON 1FR FILIGHT PLAN TCM-EDF PD LAST POSITION REPORT PD MIDDLETON ISLAND PD TIME 2305472 NO TROUBLE REPORTED AT THIS POSITION PAGE TWO

G. UNKNOWN

H. NNKNOAN

I. IFR TCM TO EDF

J. TRANSPORTATION FREIGHT AND PAXS PD 039/22

K* NNKNOMN

L. UNKNOWN

23/1145Z NOV JWPD%

RH TH 128

sen ling

729

```
4.5 - ...
NTAC 41
XMA@55
JWPDM48
OPOP JEPC JUPNI JEPFF JUFMB JEDUP JEDC JEDEN 777
DE JWPDM 15M
OP
   2312172
FM CU 1726TH SPT SQ MCCHORD AFR HASH
TO JEPC/INSPECTOR GENERAL USAF HQ USAF WASH DC
JWPNT/DIRECTORATE OF FLIGHT SAFETY RESEARCH OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TECH INSPECTION AND FLIGHT SAFETY RESEARCH
NORTON AFB CALIF
JEPFF/CO GENERAL MATS ADREWS AFS MD
JWFMB/CMDR CNTLDIV MATS KELLY AFB TEX
JKDC/COMMANDING GENERAL ALASKAN AIR COMMAND ELMENDORF AFR ALASKA
JEDWP/COMMANDING GENERAL AIR MATERIEL COMMAND WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB
DAYTON OHIO
JEDEN/CG ADC ENT AFB COLO
/R E S T R I C T E D/
REFERENCE OUR MESSAGE NO 13M DTG 2311307 PRIMARY REPORT OF MISSING
AIRCRAFT C-124 PN 51-107 PD
                                               CREW POSITION
                         RANK
                                AFSN
NAME
                                                AC (IN COMD OF A/C)
DUVALL KENNETH J
                         CAPT
                                 A0-742695
                                               1ST P
                        CAPT
                                A0-746251
CHENEY ALGER M
                                              NAV
                        1/LT
                               AO-1912344
TURNER WILLIAM I
                                AF-16275585
                                               ΙE
                        TSGT
HAGEN ENGOLF W
                                              2ND E
                                AF-19354551
                        A/20
SPRAGUE CONRAD N
                                               2ND E
COSTLEY EUGENE R
                                AF-12111722
                        53 G T
                                               RO
                                AF-14087412
OWEN ROBERT A
                        A/20
                                               RO
                                AF-16377386
                        A/3C
SCOTT MARION L
                                               LM
                                AF-16235738
INGRAM GEORGE M
                        A/10
                                               FA
                                AF-19445476
KIMPALL JAMES R
                        A/3C
                                                                  728
PAGE TWO JWPDM 15M
```

AF-17348602

FΑ

A/30

JACKSON WAYNE D

CLIFFORMER

٠,٠

•		
NAMES	RANK	AFSN
SMITH E (N)	COL	3259A
SINGLETON L S	LT COL	0295776
STEARNS E J	MAJ	011132
JACKSON W C	MAJ	9167A
TRIBBLE W P	CAPT	A0838894
PONIKVAR J E	CAPT	A02090619
TURNBULL R W	CAPT	A0539077
GOEBEL J H	CAPT	A0786012
DRASKEY D D	CAPT	A0857385
SHEDA D A	1/LT	A0788268
LEAFORD J R	2/LT	A01 85291 6
MOON R E	2/LT	A02223881
BERGER	2/17	01876195
	2/LT	01 887253
BUIE R	2/17	01 892859
LOEFFLER E H	MSGT	RA6707999
SCHNORE E J	TSGT	AF37051919
UNGER L G	A/2C	AF1 83 98936
WHITE B F	·	1AF13388325
CODY D	A/1 C	1111100000

PAGE THREE JUPOM 15M

MARTIN H E	A/3C	AF16397317
RAY J H	SSGT	AF33266952
THIGPEN T C	A/2C	AF1 4438910
MILLER E J	A/2C	AF1 635993
DYER C R	A/2C	AF11221975
BUDAHN V C	A/2C	AF17345292
LYONS T S	A/2C	AF12365762
MATTHERS LL	A/3C	AF1 4438630
BURNS B R	A/2C	AF1 83 96 484
MIZE E W	A/2C	AF1 4401 30 4
HOOTON M E	A/1C	AF2455378
VAN FOSSEN R D	SSGT	AF25417604
MC CMANN D F	A/2C	AF1 652228
NEWSOME S E	A/1C	AF1 227Ø881
CONDON T J	A/20	AF16376614
KITTLE L A	PVT	US55222166
COOMBS W N	CAPT	A01998894
ANDERSON I W	A/S	AF1 441771
CARD R D	PVT	US 55220886
GREEN J J	PVT	US1149825
HOBLIT N E	COL	18845A
SEEPOTH A J	CDR	1 421 77
23/12202 NOV JW	PDM	

13:03

NTAØ38 XMA@53 JWPDM45 OPOP JEPC JUPNT JUFMB JEPFF 444 DE JWPDM 14M OP 2311557 CO 1726TH SPT SQ MCCHORD AFR WASH TO JEPC/DIRECTOR OF PLANS AND OPERATIONS HO USAF ATTENTION OPERATIONS JWPNT/FLYING SAFETY DIVISION OFFICE OF THE AIR INSPECTOR C/O INSPECTOR DIVISION WASH DC GENERAL USAF NORTON AFR CALIF JWFMB/CMDR CNTLD DIV MATS KELLY AFB TEX JEPFF/CMDR MATS ANDREWS AFR MD /RESTRICTED/ UP PAR AN (1) AFR 60-6 THE FOLLOWING IS SURMITTED: C-124 NO 51-107 HOME BASE OF A/C AND CREW 1705TH AT GP GRP MCCHORD AFB WASH POINT OF DEPARTURE MCCHORD AFB TIME OF DEPARTURE 2330Z/22 PD DESTINATION CMA ELMENDORF AFB CMA ROUTE CMA MILITARY AIRWAYS MISSION CMA MATS SCHEDULED TRANSPORT PD ESTIMATED TIME EN ROUTE CMA 7403PD POSITION LAST REPORTED CMA OVER MIDDLETON ISLAND AT 85472/23 PD WEATHER OVER ROUTE CMA FORECAST VFR TO SO WEST LEG YAKUTAT RANGE 1 FR REMAINDER OF ROUTE PD (PILOT REPORT OVER MIDDLETON 28272/23 WEATHER FROM ANCHORAGE TO WHITTIER MODERATE TURBULANCE AND DOWN DRAFTS PD WHITTIER TO MIDDLETON AIR SMOOTH WITH OCCASIONAL MODERATE TURBULENCE OF SHORT DURATION PD

PAGE TWO JWPDM 14M

20 MIN N. W. OF MIDDLETON TO OVER MIDDLETON AIR SMOOTH CMA TOP OF CVERCAT VARIABLE AT 10,000 OCCASIONAL MODERATE ICING IN CLOUDS PD) AFSN RANK AC (IN COMD OF A/C) NAME A0-742695 CAPT DUVALL KENNETH J : CAPT A0~746251 CHENEY ALGER M NAV A0-1912344 1/LT TURNER WILLIAM I AF-16275585 IE TSGT HAGEN ENGOLF W SND E AF-19354551 A/20 SPRAGUE CONRAD N 2ND E AF-12111722 SSGT COSTLEY EUGENE R RO AF-14887412 A/20 OWEN ROPERT A RO AF-16377386 A/3C SCOTT MARION L L.M AF-16285758 A/1C INGRAM GEORGE M FA AF-19445476 A/3C VIMBALL JAMES R FΑ AF-17348692 A/30 JACKSON WAYNE D

NAMES SMITH E (N) SINGLETON L S STEARNS E J JACKSON W C TRIPPLE W P	RANK COL LT COL MAJ MAJ CAPT	AFSN 3259A 8295776 011132 9167A A0838004
---	---	---

727

MAGE THREE JUFCH

PONIKVAR J Z	CAPT
TERNBULL R Y	CAPT
GOEPEL J H	CAPT
DRASKEY D D	CAPT
SHEDA D A	1/LT
LEAFORD J R	2/LT
MOON R E	2/ L T
BERGER	2/LT
BUIE R	2/LT
LCEFFLER E H	2/1/1
SCHNORE E J	MSGT
UNGER L G	TSGT
WHITE B F	A/20
CODY D	A/10
MARTIN H E	A/3C
RAY J H	SSGT
THIGPEN T C	A/2C
MILLER E J	A/2C
DYER C R	A/20
BUDAHN V C	A/2C
LYONS TS	A/2C
F1000 4 0	, _ •

A02093619 AC539877 A0786012 A0857385 A078\$268 A01852916 A02223881 01876195 01887253 01892859 RA6707990 AF37051019 AF18398936 IAF13388325 AF16397317 AF33266952 AF1443891@ AF1635003 AF11221975 AF17345292 AF12365760

PAGE FOUR WEED 14M

MATTHERS IL	A/3C
BURNS B R	3/2C
MIZE E W	K/20
HOOTON ! E	A/1C
VAN FOSSEN R D	SSGT
MC CMANN D F	A/30
NEWSONE S E	AZIC
CONDON T J	A/20
KITTLE L A	PVT
COOMIS W N	CAPT
ANDERSON I W	A/S
CARS R D	PVT
	PVT
GREEN J J	• =
HOSLIT N E	COL
SEEBOTH A J	CDR
25/12002 NOV JWE	DM

AF1 4438630 AF1 8596484 AF1 4401304 AF2455308 AF25417604 AF1652208 AF1 6270881 AF16376614 US 55222166 A01998894 AF1 441771 US 55220886 US 1149825 18545A 142177

127