LEGISLATION
RELATING TO THE
AAF TRAINING
PROGRAM
1939 to 1943

UNCLASSIFIED

PREPARED BY
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF AIR STAFF
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LEGISLATION RELATING TO THE ARMY AIR FORCES
TRAINING PROGRAM, 1939-1943

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SECRET
FOREWORD

It is the desire of the President, the Secretary of War, and the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, that a solid record of the experiences of the AAF be compiled. This is one of a series of studies prepared as a "first narrative" in the projected overall history of the Army Air Forces.

The decision to make the information contained herein available for staff and operational use without delay has prevented recourse to some primary sources. Readers familiar with this subject matter are invited to contribute additional facts, interpretations, and constructive suggestions.

This study will be handled in strict compliance with AR 380-5.

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Readers are requested to forward comments and criticisms, and to this end perforated sheets, properly addressed, are appended at the back of this study.
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Legislation Relating to the Army Air Forces

Training Program, 1939-1943
Introduction

During the greater part of the "theatrical" from 1918 to 1930, the American people gave little thought to the growth of their military establishment. The neglect to make adequate preparations for national defense is clearly shown in a downward curve in military appropriations after 1925 which was not checked until fiscal year 1936. But even then, though army appropriations started on the upward path again, only 212,000 were allotted for military aviation. The formation of the Air Corps expansion began early in 1937 and the beginning of their operations in the fall of that year brought a sharp increase in appropriations for army aviation. The appropriation for fiscal year 1938 was nearly a quarter of a billion dollars, and for the following year almost four billion. The figure was approximately twenty-two billion for fiscal year 1942, more than ten billion the next year, and reached an all-time high of 20,655,481,000 for the year ending June 30, 1944.

The transformation of these vast sums into planes, engines, and highly trained personnel was a feat to be attained only by prodigious effort. The Air Corps had to procure and train pilots, crewmen, mechanics, and technicians to operate and maintain the vast array of planes to be operated by the national defense program. Before this process could be set in motion, conversions...
sanction was required for many of the steps to be taken. The
inception of this legislative program came with the opening of
the Seventy-sixth Congress in January 1939.

This study recounts the story of the legislative authoriza-
tion for the Army Air Forces training program from 1937 through July
1947, before the whole picture can be filled in, Miller accounts
just in case of legislative authorization for a trivial procurement,
for any kind of allowances of personnel of the Army establishment,
and for organization of the Air Corps. The method of breaking
some broad proposals for enactments into a specific category and
labeling it "training legislation" was started because it was
possible to bring attention upon a closely related group
of legislative bills, whereas treatment of individual bills in
their entirety could result in a series of unrelated and involved
discussions. Certain subjects treated were personal legislation
in the conventional meaning of the term, but such acts as those
creating the grade of aviation cadet, aviation student, and flight
officer are basic to an understanding of the training program
and hence are vital sections, and considered as training legislation,
of the legislative program and enactments treated in the
study were primarily civil aviation measures. They were included
because they have vital bearing on the military training program.

The story of the execution of training programs authorized
by this legislation is another study. Such treatment as is given was
also subsequent to the enactment of any proposal included for
purposes of evaluation of the law or to point out interpretations
that should.
Chapter I

PROVISION FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

The impact of public demands and presidential leadership brought legislative results in the first session of the Seventy-sixth Congress which convened on January 3, 1939. In his annual message to the Congress on January 12, President Roosevelt indicated the awareness of the incoming foreign menace and of the potentials of modern warfare, particularly air power. He called attention to the fact that "there is now range and speed to offense" and asked for an early appropriation of about $550,000,000, of which $10,000,000 should be expended by June 30, 1940. Of this sum he asked that $450,000,000 go to the Army, $55,000,000 to the Navy, and $10,000,000 for civilian pilot training.

With particular reference to military aviation, the President stated that information from abroad indicated that the ultimate air strength of 3,370 planes recommended by the Baker Board Report of 1931 was completely unreasonable. On the other hand, there were no responsible officials who advocated "building our forces up to the total either of planes on hand or of productive capacity equal to the forces of certain other nations." President Roosevelt continued: "We are thinking in terms of necessary..."
defense, and the conclusion is inevitable that our existing forces are so utterly inadequate that they must be immediately strengthened. The concrete recommendation was an appropriation of $300,000,000 for plane purchases, which he expected would provide a minimum increase of 5,000 planes. There was the possibility, however, that a greater number might be procured through reduction of unit cost in placing large-scale orders. It was suggested that $50,000,000 of the proposed $300,000,000 be made immediately available in order to correct the present lag in aircraft production due to 1941 demands.

In addition to procurement of planes, President Roosevelt emphasized the concomitant need for procurement of pilots.

Finally, national defense calls for the annual training of additional air pilots. This training should be primarily directed to the qualifications for civilian flying. In cooperation with educational institutions it is believed that the expenditure of $15,000,000 a year will give preliminary training to approximately 20,000 citizens.

The President concludes with an appeal for the early enactment of the legislation he conceived to be essential to expand the United States for a war which might come at any time with a quickness.

1. Congressional Record, 73 Congress, 1 Session, 518 (Jan. 12, 1935).
"Devoid of all hysteria," he asserted, "this program is but the
minimum of requirements."

Despite the importance of the national defense measure, it
created little stir in Congress long since accustomed to pres-
tial stilts requests for huge appropriations. The New York Times
current comment reported: "Judging from the immediate reception
and subsequent comment it received, the program left a feeling of relief that a much larger outlay was not proposed."

There was "little opposition" aroused because of the "conciliatory
nature of the President's language and requests" and because
many legislators "had been led to expect a strongening armament
program." Congress apparently considered the measure a continu-
ation of the administration's program of education of the public
toward more active participation in international affairs. The
 Gallup surveys for the American Institute of Public Opinion,
 however, indicated that the public was probably as far along in
its thinking as Congress, more than eight out of ten voters
favoring strengthening the Army and Navy, "and an ever larger
proportion—nine in every ten—favor[ing] a larger air force."  

2. Ibid., 31 (Jan. 13, 1939). It is interesting to note that on
the same day as President Roosevelt's message to Congress, Lord
Mersey, attending to the new session of the Canadian Dominion
Parliament, also emphasized the necessity, because of "aggressive
policies" abroad, of strengthening defense. He too stressed
the importance of augmenting the strength of military aviation,
and it was anticipated that nearly all of the appropriations
for Canadian defense would go to the air force. New York Times,
Jan. 12, 1939.
4. Ibid.
A newspaper observer stated that such adverse criticism as was expressed by congressmen cut across party lines. Representative Hamilton Fish of New York termed the message "another sumptuous outing done up in a red, white and blue huckaback." In a radio address on January 10, Fish again attacked the defense message, claiming that it aims to deceive the people into supporting a huge armament program in the guise of national defense, which in reality is nothing but a smokescreen to obscure the depression and economic failures of the New Deal. The Chicago Tribune commented similarly: "For the shortcomings in American defenses Mr. Roosevelt's administration is responsible... Congress apparently is in a mood to examine defense rationally and to take the advice of military experts."  

As in the case of the Chicago Tribune, editorial comment on the President's program was almost inclined to reflect accustomed attitudes toward the administration. The San Francisco Chronicle, for example, begrudgingly conceded the need for an armament program, but went on to state that the nation should be reluctant to accept any opinion without most searching analysis. Further,  

It would be foolhardy to minimize the need for defense in a world armed to the teeth, yet we do not for that reason have to prepare on a matching basis.  

It should not be forgotten that the display of an over-militant spirit for the purpose of urging America to necessary preparedness may be good control for would-be settlers who fear their people in subjection by organizing threats from abroad.

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5. Ibid.  
6. Ibid., Jan. 20, 1939.  
The New Orleans Times-Picayune of January 16, 1942, expressed agreement with the President's use of the word "minimum" in describing the requirements which his program was designed to meet, endorsed the procurement of more planes, and contended that "The warning that our present defenses are 'utterly inadequate' is so convincingly supported by the evidence of world conditions that it must be rejoiced at.

Press reaction to the civil defense training program was generally favorable. The New Orleans Tribune, the St. Paul Pioneer Press, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the Indianapolis Star, and the Indianapolis Times all concurred in President Roosevelt's plan for training college students. The St. Louis Globe-Democrat, however, was critical of the prospect of college students enlisting in the air force.

Potential opponents had been warned and jealously forestalled by the temperate tone of the President's program. Arthur Krock, writing in the New York Times, told of the behind-the-scenes planning by the "inertial council" which advised President Roosevelt on the content of his message. Although the "kitchen cabinet" sessions were secret, "it seems established," Krock stated, "that the voice and dominating influence came from the Treasury, and certain civilian and military chiefs of the army and navy. The sober-minded counselors called him "too talkative".

immoderates and "resolutely held the money totals within the limits of sane and efficient expenditure." Although some of the President's advisers spoke in terms of spending billions, of the government building planes and stuffing the plants with mechanics on relief roles, the Wise had convinced the Chief Executive of the impracticability of these schemes and "combined in the view that the government could not efficiently spend in one year more than an additional half billion." A memorandum in early conversation, dated December 2, 1938, of a conversation with one of the experts on the informal council, indicated that at that time the visionaries were in the saddle. But in a little over a month, as the President's message demonstrated, the experts were able to wield the bludgeon of facts and figures so effectively that a sound and workable program resulted. 10

Foreign events were in themselves enough to produce a favorable reception of such a defense program as that offered by the President. The administration, however, had taken precautions to bring to the attention of the congressional committees on military affairs the imminence of an explosion in world politics. In a joint session of the two committees, Joseph P. Kennedy, Ambassador to Britain, and William C. Bullitt, Ambassador to France, reportedly stated that there would be a European war in the spring, and they

also warned of the power of the German "Heerwaffe," particularly its air force. 11 About the same time the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics issued a report warning that rapid strides in foreign aviation were a serious threat to commercial and military aviation in the United States. 12

Despite the general concurrence in the President's program, a few basic questions were raised with regard to the defense arms. Senator Haldeman, a widely known commentator on national defense, quoted the President's statement that the training of the first 20,000 college students should be in "the essential qualifications for civilian flying." The nation already had more fliers than it needed for civilian purposes, "more . . . than any other nation." But there was a "pressing need for a large increase in the number of our military and naval pilots." 13 A comment made by Captain Ted "B" Tichenor on January 17 was to be

11. Ibid.
12. Ibid. Haldeman also contended that an "operating air force" of 7,000-8,000 planes would be "considerably larger than that maintained by any other nation." First-line planes on hand in Germany, he stated, did not number more than 3,000-4,000, and the number in Russia would not be much greater. Although these nations did have other planes in reserve, "they are not flown in daily operations." This analysis leaves out of account the fact that a total of 7,000-8,000 planes would not seem anything like that number of first-line planes "flown in daily operations." A large part of that total, in fact, would be training planes, and others would necessarily be in reserve. Further, the Air Corps formerly called for only 5,000 planes, though this figure was raised to 6,000 in the legislative process. Of the 6,000 the Air Corps contemplated an operating force of 3,250 and a rotating reserve of 2,750. Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs of the United States Senate ... on H.R. 2791, 76 Cong., 1 Sess., 76.
frequently rooted, both in the press and on the floors of Congress. Although he condemned the President's plan for training fliers, he claimed that it came "just 10 years too late." He declared the fact that the United States was "sandwiched in productive capacity." Certain Senate clerks believe that the United States was 10 years behind Germany in the development of military aviation. 14

Although Congress proceeded with dispatch after the President's call for action, it soon became apparent that the exigencies of military aviation defense involved more than appropriation for plane procurement and civilian pilot training, especially after the 1939-40 war in September 1940, the military's pressing for standardization and training standards became desperately overhauled. It was essential, therefore, that legislation authorizing Air Corps expansion be sufficiently flexible to provide for quick reaction to military shifts in combat plane types and tactics. Problems were not only complex, they were intricately interrelated. The reaction of pilot training, for example, was closely related to the composition of crews, and the whole procurement program became crucially balanced and charged with an "explosive issue with the
criticism of lend-lease authorities. In view of the Allied governments' need for combat planes, especially in the critical period after the fall of France, how could they

immediate requirements be met by the limited American productive capacity, and at the same time how could enough up-to-date training planes for the United States' expanding flying training program be supplied?

There were other problems in addition to material shortages: that should be the proper relation between civilian training, those of the Army and Navy, and how much direction, instructional staff, and equipment should be supplied by the armed services? In connection with training, too, there were numerous allied problems of rank, pay, insurance, and the matter of Negro training. Also, there was the urgent necessity of building up a vast reservoir of trained aircraft mechanics and technicians to service the projected air armada. Most of these problems were dealt with by Congress during the hectic period 1938-1940, and many of them in the course of enactment of the President's proposals of January 12, 1939.

The provision to meet minimum national defense needs as outlined by President Roosevelt came with the enactment of S. 3971, a omnibus bill which located various individual measures passed by several Army and Department treaties. The sections of S. 3971 particular to the Air Corps and their origin in that approach.
In December 14, 1937, a draft letter from the General Staff called attention to enclosed for General Arnold, Chief of the Air Corps, to the Department Chief of Staff. The letter contained the provisions of the second, third, and fourth sections of the measure finally passed, the matters relating specifically to Air Corps training. The wording provided for detail of Air Corps personnel to technical, professional, or other educational institutions and certain additional facilities for training in aeronautics needed for the functioning of the Air Corps; for the sale, rental, or loan of academic, technical, or civilian aviation schools; for a civilian military personnel receiving instruction at accredited civilian flying schools; for students of the Air Corps training center.

Although the essential features of the legislation embodied on December 14, 1937, finally were enacted into law, several changes in the provisions were made. General Arnold, Chief of Staff, made mention of the necessity for a new Air Corps manual for detail of Air Corps personnel to educational institutions for aeronautics training substantially.

15. See appendix for text of the training sections in the public act (Public 10, 10) which at last received congressional and presidential sanction.
changed in language and broadened in scope in the office of the
Air Department Budget Officer. The redraft was worked out "in

collaboration with the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps" and
received "the concurrence of the Chief of Air Corps, and of the
Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1 and G-2."

The revision changed the reference to Air Corps facilities
to those of the Army, "at the same time restricting the facilities
to those pertaining to training in aviation." In general, there
was a tightening up of language and elimination of verbiage. The
section of the Air Corps draft to permit instructors of accredited
civilian flying schools to enroll in the Air Corps Training Center
as students went through only linear organizational changes before
submission to Congress, and these were made in the lines section
of the office of the Chief of Air Corps.10

17. Memo for Deputy Chief of Staff by Col. L. E. Lippert, Chief,
Budget and Legislative Planning Branch, Office of the Chief of
Staff, Jan. 27, 1936, in AAG OII, Revision of National Defense
Act, Major Duncan of Maine Section. COA, participated in the
revision of the Air Corps draft. T. E. B. [Lt. Col. Carl
Spreckel] to Chief of the Air Corps, Jan. 30, 1936, in AAG OII.

18. Memo for Deputy Chief of Staff by Col. Lippert, Jan. 25, 1936,
in AAG OII, Revision of National Defense Act. In addition,
provisions were added for coordination with form on limitation
of expenses and for a fiscal year basis. One of the
provisions also intended to imply legal authorization for detail
of officers as supervisors or inspectors at the schools
[from the training to be carried out] who will have
aircrafts assigned to them for their use. Ibid.

19. Apparently there had been a follow-up by the Air Corps to the
crafts of legislation submitted to the Chief of Staff on
December 14, at the language of the original measure enclosed
with the memorandum of that date did not coincide in every
detail with that stated by Colonel Lippert (in ibid.) to be
the original Air Corps draft. The lines section, COA, stated
that the section authorizing training of civilian flying
Instructors at the Air Corps Training Center was "revised as submitted
by this office." [Lt. Col. Spreckel] to Chief of the Air Corps,
Jan. 30, 1936, in AAG OII.
The remaining section of the omnibus bill submitted in the December 14 memorandum went through one major change in the process of review by the General Staff. This was the elimination of the sole and rental feature present in the Air Corps draft. The Budget and Legislative Planning Branch of the Office of the Chief of Staff, stated "that the submission of the bill might be jeopardized," unless the authorization "to sell and rent as well as to lend aircraft and aeronautical equipment to the civilian schools" were removed. The Air Corps agreed to the change.\(^{20}\)

After review and revision by the Budget and Legislative Planning Branch, the measures desired by the Air Corps were dispatched to the chairman of the House and Senate military affairs committees. The parts dealing with detail of Army personnel for training in aviation specialties and with the training of civilian instructors at the Air Corps Training Center were introduced as identical bills in the two Houses, H. R. 500 and S. 1735. The section providing for the loan of aeronautical equipment to civilian aviation schools was introduced in S. 500 and H. R. 7172.\(^{21}\)

Although formal introduction of these proposals took place on January 27 and 28, the House and Senate Committees on Military Affairs had already begun hearings to expedite the consideration of

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\(^{20}\) See C. S. Coons to Chief of Air Corps, Jan. 28, 1935, in AIR 032.

a general measure which would provide adequate national defense.

On the first day of the House hearings, January 17, General Malin Craig, Chief of Staff, outlined the War Department program. In addition to an increased number of air lanes and increased personnel, he considered the following authorizing legislation necessary for the Air Corps training program: (1) "Provision to authorize the training of Air Corps personnel in civilian schools"; (2) "Authorization for training of the civilian flying instructors of civilian flying schools at Air Corps schools for standardization of instruction"; and (3) "Authority to furnish training planes to civilian schools for training of Air Corps personnel." 62 General Craig stated that $7,000,000 of the president's request for $300,000,000 for Army aviation would be allocated for the purchase of instructional equipment and for way outs to civilian aviation schools. "This sum would enable the Army to meet "the accelerated rate of mechanics' training and primary training of pilots." Also, the appropriation would be used for the enlargement of Air Corps technical school facilities for mechanical training and to pay civilian flying schools for the primary pilot instruction they would give under the program. 63

General Arnold, Chief of the Air Corps, explained at greater length the Air Corps purposes and the reasons for the decision to

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63. Ibid., 6.
utilize civilian institutions in the training work. He told the Joint committee of the War Department decision not to attempt to increase the facilities of the training center at San Antonio to meet the vastly expanded needs for pilot production. "Under production there would be room up, it would also be necessary to "build up a war reserve of productive capacity for pilots"

"...to meet the employment of civilian flying schools. The Air Corps facilities for mechanics' training, however, he considered adequate, provided an appropriation for additional construction were granted."

"Before the Senate committee on January 30, 1924, Mr. Brown asked on the Air Corps plan for building an pilot production capacity:

... it is proposed to utilize private schools accredited by the Department of Commerce and authorized to give commercial licenses to pilots. It will be necessary, however, for us to do two or three things before we can do even that. We will have to train their instructors to Army standards at our training center. We will have to loan equipment to these schools. We will have to examine all the pilots who go there, the same as we do now, so as to be sure they measure up to our educational and physical standards; then, when they are ready to solo, or after a few hours' solo, our instructors will check each one of them to be sure they can rate up to our flying standards. Then we will send them to our training center at San Antonio."
By this procedure, he believed that the output of the training center could be doubled or tripled without an increase in facilities. General Arnold related that the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) had talked over with the War Department its program to train 20,000 pilots a year. "We worked with them because we believed it was a sound program. Any program that will give us that reserve, something to fall back on, something that will cut down the time required by us to get the finished product out, we are for it." 26

Additional reasons for the enactment of the Air Corps proposals were set forth in a draft letter to be sent to Senator Morris Sheppard, chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. This letter, prepared by Major Warren K. Carter of the Plans section, Office of the Chief of Air Corps, explained the intent of the proposed legislation which became Section 5 of the final enactment (Public Law 18). It was pointed out that existing law regarding the detail of regular Army personnel for aviation training by civilian agencies was amended except that the limitation upon the number of Air Corps personnel who could be detailed by the Secretary of War was removed. This latitude

26. Ibid., 57.
constituted the "only an agent objection to the bill," but it would be "even more by "available approximations." The bill contemplated a three-year period of flying training in civilian schools and also authorized training in "specialties incident to aviation, if so desired, in civilian institutions."

The section of the Air Corps bill authorizing the training of civilian instructors in the Air Corps Training Center, the letter stated, would "enable the Air Department to keep the instructional staffs of civilian flying schools . . . in close touch with the curriculum and methods of the . . . Training Center," and would "serve to coordinate the instruction given to Army personnel in both classes of schools." It was felt that the measure would involve little additional outlay over the cost of training in Army schools alone. Tuition and related expenses would largely be offset by a saving in additional airfields, material, personnel, and equipment which "would be necessary to train" wholly in Army schools. Indeed, some of these facilities might turn out to be surplus at the end of the expansion period. For these reasons, enactment of 3, 899 was recommended.27

The Air Corps felt that since Army facilities for primary flight training were insufficient for the expansion program, it was necessary not only to enlist civilian schools, but also to

27. Draft letter, Secretary of War to Assistant Secretary of War, in AAF OCS 4.
lend them equipment. A memorandum of February 3, 1920, explaining $2,000, pointed out that the civilian schools did not have enough space and aeronautical equipment to carry out the training. The War Department, however, did not view "to cause any undue expansion in existing facilities and equipment of civilian aviation schools because of the temporary character of the program in consolidation." It was felt that the proposed bill properly endowed the Secretary of War with "wide discretion" in the issuance of rules and regulations on loan transactions.28

The draft letter for the signature of the Secretary of War to be sent to Senator Edmondson explained the change from existing law embodied in § 200 and its reasons. The War Department favored its enactment. It was pointed out that the Secretary of War (under the provisions of the act of May 28, 1920) already had authority to transfer or lend aeronautical equipment to museums or schools. § 200 "limits the transaction to loans only and is broad enough to cover all classes of aircraft and aeronautical equipment, whether new, obsolete, or stored, which may be considered by the Secretary of War as suitable and necessary for training.

29. 50 U.S. Stat. § 201.
purposes." Again, the only likely point of objection to the bill would be the great increase in the Secretary's lending authority. But there would be no reason to loan any equipment other than training aircraft and such other aeronautical equipment as is necessary for purposes of instruction and training of Army personnel, and now loans were necessary in the interest of the expansion program.

By February 9, 1929, house hearings were completed, and on February 7 Andrew J. Hay, chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, introduced H.R. 3791, containing the Air Corps measures. The bill was referred to Hay's committee and on the following day was reported out without amendment. 31

The greater part of the congressional discussion of H.R. 3791 was devoted to its plane procurement features, with training assets being treated incidentally. It was impossible, however,
completely to dissemble the two. On February 14 Representative James V. Hendrith of New York submitted a statement by a minority group of the Committee on Military Affairs, which agreed that the authorization of 5,500 planes was vital to defense, but contended that procurement should be stepped up over a period of three or four years. The minority members argued that this procedure would simplify the problem of training new "front" and tactical units and would also eliminate to a large extent the danger of obsolescence in the planes procured.\(^32\) This proposal had been defeated in committee, but Representative Lester C. Andrews of New York offered it to the House in the form of an amendment. The amendment provided for the purchase of only 1,000 planes a year. Andrews based his reasoning primarily on "the ever-present problem of obsolescence," but also stressed that the stepped-up program would give the Air Corps an opportunity to train additional personnel necessary to man the planes.\(^33\) Proponents of the amendment argued that it would ensure more time for training, would lessen financial strain, and would give time to carry out increased research and experimentation necessary to avoid obsolescence in the planes delivered.\(^34\)

The proposed amendment, however, was defeated by a vote of 173

\(^32\) Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 1 sess., 1773-75 (Feb. 14, 1939).
\(^33\) Ibid., 1938 (Feb. 14, 1939).
\(^34\) Ibid., 1938-39 (Feb. 14, 1939), 1470-71, 1470-71 (Feb. 15, 1939).
Another amendment was offered on the floor of the House by Representative William J. Miller of Connecticut. It proposed that civilian instructors selected for Air Corps training be provided the same medical care, compensation, and pensions as those provided for flying cadets. Opposition was offered, however, on the grounds that these civilian instructors would undertake such service voluntarily; that their salaries and welfare would be provided for by the civilian flying schools which employed them; and that the Air Corps courses would be to their own profit. The latter view prevailed and the amendment was rejected. On the same day, February 16, H.R. 3771 was passed in the House by a vote of 357 to 15.

The Senate, whose Committee on Military Affairs had begun to hold hearings on January 17, by February 22 had completed its hearings, made certain amendments to the House measure, and reported the bill favorably.

On the floor, Senator Bennett C. Clark of Missouri raised a question which was to be a recurring one in other discussions of

35. Ibid., 1474 (Feb. 16, 1933).
36. Ibid., 1474-75 (Feb. 15, 1933).
37. Ibid., 1440 (Feb. 15, 1933).
38. Ibid., 1757 (Feb. 17, 1933); S. Rept. No. 20, 76 Cong., 1 sess. The major amendment increased the authorization for planes to 6,800 instead of 6,500.
training legislation. He stated that the only provision the bill made to increase the number of pilots for aviation service was to train certain college students. He decried the fact that this training was limited to those able to go to college and cited a letter from an aviation expert to the effect that there was a large potential supply of pilot material among the youth of the nation who were unable to attend college. He did not embody his objection in the form of an amendment, however, and no action was taken on the matter.39

Another issue which was to recur frequently in later congressional action was brought to the fore by Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire. He presented amendments "to permit the training of Negro aviators in certain Negro colleges approved by the Secretary of War, and to do other acts to that end, in order that the Negroes of the country may have the advantages in certain institutions of the same training for aviation that is offered to white boys."40 Several days later Senator H. H. Schwartz of Wyoming offered an amendment to add to Section 4 the words "including at least one Negro school for the training of Negro air pilots." Bridges thereupon offered his proposal as an amendment to the Schwartz amendment. The Bridges amendment was

40. Ibid., 7215 (March 1, 1930).
rejected, but the Schwartz change was accepted by the Senate. The Air Corps opposed the adoption of this amendment, "not only because it is superfluous but, also, because it attracts attention to the authorization and might result in political pressure being directed against the Secretary of War." Apparently, however, the objection was not pressed, for the letter of consent on amendments from the Secretary of War to the chairman of the two military affairs committees contained no reference to the amendment.

After consideration of action on committee amendments and certain minor changes in wording, H.R. 3791 passed the Senate on March 7, 1939, by a vote of 77 to 3. Since the House disagreed with the Senate amendments, a conference committee was appointed. The conference voted to retain the Senate increase in plane authorization to 6,000 and the provision for crew-pilot training.

Both houses accepted the conference report, and on April 7, 1939, President Roosevelt affixed his signature to the bill, which became Public Law Number 18.

This enactment may be considered the primary legislative authorization for the Air Corps expansion program. It laid the

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41. Ibid., 2357-58 (March 7, 1939).
42. Ibid., 2358 (March 7, 1939).
44. Harry L. Noldeney, Secretary of War, to Harris Sheppard and Andrew J. Hay, March 10, 1939, in ibid.
46. Ibid., 2449, 2453 (March 8, 1939); 2824-25 (March 15, 1939).
47. Ibid., 3105-106 (March 22, 1939); 4235 (April 12, 1939).
bases for the first large-scale procurement of aircraft and other material, for the increase in allotment of personnel to the Air Corps, and for a flying training program, to be carried out in part by civilian agencies. Although certain modifications had crept in during the congressional phases, Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Public Number 18 were substantially the same as the legislation proposed by Air Corps personnel some time before.

The training program provided for by Public Number 18 was primarily designed for the expansion of a reserve supply of pilots. Because of the inadequacy of Air Corps facilities, it was determined to utilize civilian training agencies, with appropriate steps being taken to insure the uniformity of primary instruction to be given in the civilian schools and to provide the equipment necessary for proper instruction. Although the legislation provided that personnel of the Regular Army establishment might be detail "as students at any technical, professional, or other educational institution, or as students, observers, or investigators at a plant, plant or other places as shall be best suited to enable such personnel to acquire a knowledge of or experience in the specialties incidental to aviation," the principal of was the utilization of civilian flying schools for primary pilot training. But at least partialization was provided for training Regular Army personnel in other aviation specialties,
technical as well as flying. With the rapid expansion of the military establishment, however, it later became necessary to broaden the base to include components other than the Regular Army. 47

The preparation of draft measures, their subsequent criticism and revision, their compilation into omnibus bills, their airing before congressional committees, and their eventual enactment, furnish an excellent example of the legislative process. Despite the significance of the Air Corps training features, little opposition was expressed on the part of any of the agencies responsible for initiating the legislation or bringing it to enactment either as to the objectives or the means proposed to achieve them. Certain newspapers, however, for the most part representing an isolationist segment of public opinion, endorsed the measures only with qualifications. Within the War Department itself substantial modifications were made in the Air Corps draft by the General Staff. These appropriate changes, made with Air Corps concurrence, broadened the scope of one training provision, tightened phrasing, and eliminated a feature which it was feared might jeopardize enactment.

With the passage of R. P. 87, a significant stride had been taken preparatory to putting the nation in a position to defend

47. See part III, ch. III.
itself. But it soon became apparent that the passage of the act was only a prologue. Much more drastic measures and huge appropriations which were to dwarf Public Number 18 almost into insignificance were necessary when it became obvious that the President's estimate of "minimum" defense needs was considerably underdrawn.

In this connection, however, it should be emphasized that the major objective of those responsible for the legislation authorizing the expansion had been a well-rounded program capable of achievement. The measure was designed to implement and speed up productive capacity of planes and pilots. Its enactment was made possible, as General Arnold stated before the House of Representatives Committee on Military Affairs, "by the sympathetic attitude of the public, the change in world conditions, and the message of the President to Congress."48

Chapter II

LEGISLATION FOR TRAINING CIVILIAN PILOTS, M CHANLIS, AND TECHNICIANS

1. The Civilian Pilot Training Act (1939)

The President's message of January 12, 1939 had stated in general terms his aims for the building up of a backlog of civilian pilots who could be quickly adapted to the specialized techniques of military aviation. That the Air Corps chiefs were looking toward the same end is evidenced by their comments on proposed legislation which received congressional and presidential sanction in the enactment of H.R. 3791. Just a few days after the President's message, Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson, in an address before the National Aeronautic Association, expressed the War Department's gratitude for the emphasis placed upon the training and development of civilian pilots by the AAA in its experimental program. Of this program Johnson said:

"In time we hope it will produce 20,000 pilots a year. Out of this coterie of intelligent, enthusiastic, air-minded young pilots will come a preponderant number of fliers in any emergency."

The enabling legislation to authorize this accelerated program of training civilian pilots came with the enactment of H.R. 5619, a bill to provide for the training of civil aircraft pilots, introduced in the House of Representatives by Clarence F. Lea of California on

April 6, 1939. In the course of the hearings on the measure, Robert H. Hinckley, chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board of the CAA, testified that the reserve pilot bill would provide for the training of an emergency force which would be a "formidable and salutary deterrent" to any air attack in this hemisphere. When Representative Alfred L. Barklow of North Carolina suggested that the proposed reserve pilots should be made to pass the same physical tests as Army and Navy candidates, Hinckley considered that this would be undesirable and stated that the Army and Navy "would like for us to try out some of these physically sub-standard boys and see how they turn out as pilots." He contended that they might be "valuable adjuncts to the defense forces" in time of war.

On April 10, H.R. 5619 was reported from committee without amendment. The committee report cited the potential military value of the program as well as its beneficial effect upon the civilian aviation industry. It asserted that world developments had revealed the American "backlog of aerial manpower" to be inadequate in the event of a national emergency. It further reported that the Army, Navy, and the CAA were all in favor of the bill, and it stated the committee's opinion that the proposed program would be "in accord with the traditional American way of providing for its military needs, not by

2. The bill was referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. *Cong. Rec.* 75 Cong., 1 Sess., 3942 (April 6, 1939).
extensive militarization, but by enhancing the strength and efficiency of the men and machines of civil life."

Lea, the sponsor of the bill, further explained its intent to the members of the House on April 19. He stated that the plan called for the training of 15,000 pilots by July 1, 1940, and that these would have the qualifications required of private flyers. They would receive from thirty-five to fifty hours of piloting and about three hundred hours of ground school work. Physical qualifications under the terms of the bill would be virtually the same as those required by the Army for flying cadets. It would be obligatory for the trainees to carry insurance, each one contributing a fee of not over $40, from which insurance and other minor charges would be paid.

The appropriation called for by the bill was $5,755,000. Of this amount, $4,375,000 were earmarked for the training expenses of the 15,000 civilian pilots, $300,000 for ground schools, mainly for those which did not meet all the requirements for training schools, $200,000 for supervision, and another $50,000 for research work. The duration of the program was to be five years.

In explaining the beneficial features of the bill, Lea stated his belief that it would provide a method by which "the fullest resources of the United States now available for primary training

5. H. Rept. No. 363, 76 Cong., 1 sess.
purposes can be utilized immediately. He further felt that among its most valuable contributions to the country's air strength would be the "widespread diffusion of knowledge concerning the requirements of aircraft operation" and the development of air-mindedness.\(^6\)

The committee which studied the bill had decided against including the training of civilian mechanics—a feature incorporated three years later.\(^7\) This decision was reached because an inter-departmental committee studying that question had not yet determined upon a policy. With reference to the controverson subject of the college requirement for pilot training, Lea stated that it was not contemplated that a candidate be a college graduate, but that he should "have the mental equipment substantially equal to 3 years of a college course when he finally qualifies." Several representatives, however, in the usual debate following the explanation of the scope and purpose of the measure, objected that the bill would lead to elimination of non-college men from the benefits of the training program. Lea reiterated that the bill did not require college education, but merely proper mental and physical abilities.\(^8\)

Nevertheless, an amendment from the floor regarding the debated college education qualification was successfully passed. Representative

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7. See section 2, of this chapter.
James E. Van Zandt of Pennsylvania asked the addition of a provision that at least 10 per cent of the selected students should be from applicants who did not present two years of college education as a recommendation. He apprehended, despite assurances to the contrary, that there would be such a flood of applicants that selection would be limited to those with a degree, or at least two years' college education, and the less fortunate but otherwise well-suited applicants would be passed over unless some safeguard were written into the law. Lea again argued that the opportunity would be open to all on an equal basis and that such a restriction would be undesirable as well as unnecessary. Representative Wadsworth added that the program called for the use of non-collegiate institutions, as well as colleges, and in the former the students would not be on the higher academic level. A substitute amendment reduced the non-college quota to no less than 5 per cent, and this was accepted. 9

In view of national defense needs, there was also evidence of some concern over the import of the bill for military and naval aviation. Lea pointed out that the training provided would not automatically qualify the graduated student for the armed services. The Army and Navy would have to decide on his qualifications. In response to a question as to whether the committee or the CAA had considered the

9. Ibid., 4487-90 (April 19, 1939).
likelihood of the civilian pilots being available for military training and service, Representative Charles A. Holleck of Indiana realized that the committee had considered that point and that he had suggested enlisting the graduates in the Organized Reserve so that they would be subject to call. This suggestion was abandoned when the committee was assured "that the character of these boys is such that in the event of necessity ... they will come forward almost to a man," as Representative countered with the pertinent query: "If that is correct, why should any hesitate to assume the obligation that would be entailed in enlisting they would make themselves available?" Holleck realized that the committee had been informed that the training would be insufficient to qualify the graduates for Reserve commission. In answer to the suggestion made by some that the Army and Navy should carry out the program, rather than the CAA, he cited statements of Army and Navy representatives at the hearings which indicated that the services were not in a position to execute the training program. The expansion program already provided for placed a heavy enough burden on the armed services. 10

10. Ibid., 4478-79 (April 10, 1933). Regarding on Lea's explanation of the general program to be executed under the provisions of the bill, Holleck remarked that the CAA wanted to decentralize the training as much as possible, in two or three-hundred schools, "in order to bring about the highest safety factor," the number of trainers in each school could be limited, and the schools themselves would be scattered all over the country. In addition to flight training courses in navigation and meteorology, could be taught concurrently. Ibid., 4481 (April 10, 1933).
Sadsworth, conceding the "very important" military potentialities of the bill, hoped nevertheless that no amendment would be adopted which would "in any sense tend to militarize the project." Although the officers would not have a high enough degree of proficiency to qualify them for Reserve commissions, they would provide a pool for the services to draw upon in an emergency. In the event of national emergency, those who had completed primary training could be invited to volunteer or be subject to draft. He said that during the hearings Rear Admiral Arthur E. Cook, Chief of the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics, and Brigadier General Barton K. Yount, Assistant Chief of the Air Corps, had been enthusiastic about the bill, "and they based their enthusiasm on its military value, emphasizing the fact that establishing and maintaining this pool of young men who have had this primary training, will lift from the shoulders of the War Department and the Navy Department a tremendous burden in time of peace, and a much greater burden in time of war." But neither had made any suggestions for militarizing the measure.11

Despite the arguments of the bill's proponents, however, Representative John K. Vorys of Ohio offered an amendment to provide that no trainee would be accepted without written consent to serve in the armed forces in the event of war. He stated as the reason for the

proposed change his desire to prevent any slackers or conscientious objectors from deriving the benefits of free aviation training without becoming obligated for the logical quid pro quo. Dulwinkle took exception on several counts. He contended that there could be no legal measures which would effectively enforce such an amendment. Further, it was not essentially a military bill but a civil aeronautics measure, with wider significance than the provision of a source for the drawing off of military pilots; it contained important implications for vocational training as well as military. After the interposing of these counterarguments, the Vorys amendment was rejected.12

The question of Negro training was again interjected when Representative Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois proposed the addition of a clause providing that none of the benefits of the program should be denied because of race, creed, or color. Lee insisted that it was needless to drag in the issue since no differentiation was to be found in existing law, but the amendment was passed nonetheless.13

12. Ibid., 4490-91 (April 19, 1939).
13. Ibid., 4487-90 (April 19, 1939). On January 25, 1940, Senator Bridges stated that the provisions for training Negro aviators were being ignored. Senator Elmer Thomas of Oklahoma replied, "we are under no responsibility to administer these laws." Bridges insisted that "the War Department should have its attention called to that matter and that Congress should have some word as to why the administration here in Washington, headed by President Roosevelt, who claims to be so interested in these matters, has ignored the colored people of the country in that particular matter." Ibid., 76 Cong., 3 Sess., 671-72 (Jan. 25, 1940). In April 1940 Representative Louis L. Ludlow of Indiana asked Representative J. Buell Snyder of Pennsylvania "what provision is made for the training of Negroes as air pilots, and, secondly, are Negroes permitted to enlist in the Air Corps of the Army?" Snyder replied that the Army and the CAA had arranged so that "a rather large group of young (contd."

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the other amendment was agreed to. This stipulated that aliens should not be given the privilege of receiving training under the act.\textsuperscript{14} On April 19, 1939, H.R. 5619, as amended, passed the House and was transmitted to the Senate.\textsuperscript{15}

In the interim, a companion bill, S. 2119, had been introduced on April 3, 1939, by Senator Patrick A. McCarran of Nevada.\textsuperscript{15} The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, which held hearings attended by representatives of the Army, Navy, and the CAA. In order to expedite matters, the House hearings on a similar bill, H.R. 5093, which had been introduced earlier, were inserted as testimony, since the discussion on the House bill had covered many points certain to recur. At these earlier hearings, Robert A. Hinkley had told of the War and Navy departments' approval of the plan, and General Yoak had stressed that the greatest value of the program would come from its function in eliminating to a large extent, in the primary phase of instruction, those unfitted for pilot training. By doing

\textsuperscript{13} (cont'd.) Negroes is now being trained at a school on the outskirts of Chicago as pilots and aviation mechanics or engineers. This is taking place right now." Ludlow, however, insisted that justice was not being done and submitted as a supporting document the testimony of a Negro leader, Edgar C. Brown. The gist of Brown's argument was that "All Negro citizens are denied an opportunity to enlist in the United States Army Air Corps as pilots or mechanics." \textit{Ibid.}, 4017-18 (April 4, 1940).

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ibid.}, 4491-92 (April 8, 1939).

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, 4492 (April 19, 1939).

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid.}, 3277 (April 8, 1939).
this, it would enable the Army to speed up its own training procedures, once the candidates had arrived at the Air Corps Training Center.

Admiral Cook, representing the Navy Department, expressed similar views.17

In the Senate hearings, certain points were raised which also came up during the House discussion. Senator James H. Reed of New York objected to the principle of pilot training by the CAA. He wondered why the Army could not take up this work, since the primary object of the legislation was adequate national defense. Hinckley pointed out that the advantages accruing to civil aviation from such a program were equally to be considered, and that it was at the request of the War Department that the CAA was undertaking the program.

General Yoak reinforced this. The Air Corps training program was already severely strained, and with the limited personnel and equipment available, it would be "out of the question" to try to take on anything more.18

The House and Senate companion bills were discharged from the Senate committee on June 7.19 The Senate measure was amended to bring it into conformity with H.R. 5619, with the exception that in Section 6

17. Hearings of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, on H.R. 5023, 76 Cong., 1 Sess., March 20, 1939, reprinted in Hearings of Senate Commerce Committee on S. 2112, 76 Cong., 1 Sess., 46, 43, 44. H.R. 5023 was introduced by Representative Lax on March 15, 1939. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 1 Sess., 7895 (March 15, 1939).
the Senate changed the clause "and such other sums as may be necessary
to carry out such provisions during subsequent fiscal years" to read
"and not to exceed the sum of $7,000,000 during each subsequent fiscal
year." After this amendment, H.R. 5619 was substituted for the Senate
bill and S. 719 was indefinitely postponed. In this slightly altered
form the bill received favorable Senate action.20

The House of Representatives concurred in the Senate amendments,
and when the President signed the measure on June 27, 1939, H.R. 5619
became public law number 153.21 The act authorized the CAA to train
civilian pilots and to prescribe regulations for such training; to
make contracts with educational institutions or individuals to carry
out the training; to lease real property or accept the loan of personal
property necessary to execute the program; and to fix the compensation
of the instructional and other professional personnel employed, without
regard to Civil Service regulations. An executive department or in-
dependent establishment could cooperate with and lend to the CAA
"aircraft and other property or equipment, and land or buildings under
its control and in excess of its own requirements." In the administra-
tion of the program, no discrimination was to be made on account of
race, creed, or color, and at least 5 per cent of the trainees were
to be selected from non-college students. The sum of $5,675,000 was
appropriated to carry out the provisions of the act for fiscal years

20. Ibid., 7219-11 (June 15, 1939).
21. Ibid., 7504-7506 (June 19, 1939), 8882 (July 11, 1939).

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1939 and 1940, and "not to exceed the sum of $7,000,000 for each sub-
sequent fiscal year." The act was to expire on July 1, 1944.22

Any valid interpretation of the worth of the civilian pilot
training program could only come from a thorough study of its execu-
tion, together with an investigation as to how it supplemented or
facilitated the Air Forces training program. Some inferences as to
its value may be drawn, however, from the reaction of those who were
concerned with the continuance of the program or changing its scope.
Just a year after its inauguration, President Roosevelt indicated that
he would ask Congress for money to increase the program in order to
train 50,000 volunteer airplane pilots during the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1940. He expressed the belief that approximately three months
could be lopped off the training period of a military pilot through
the civilian courses.23 On May 26, 1940, President Roosevelt sent a
letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives asking for a
supplementary appropriation of $32,000,000 to train 50,000 pilots in
civilian schools, and the act of June 26, 1940, making supplemental
appropriations for national defense for the fiscal year 1941, made
these funds available.24

There were, however, several adverse criticisms of the CAA
program. A short while after funds had been appropriated for its

22. 53 Stat. 865. See Appendix A for text of the act.
24. Ibid., May 26, 1940.
25. 54 Stat. 599.
expansion, blasts were leveled at it from several directions. Harry F. Guggenheim, chairman of the aviation division of the Republican National Committee, charged that the program was insufficient for the development of trained military pilots and would amount to "mass murder" if the nation should need the services of these CAE-trained pilots. Grover Loening, pioneer aircraft builder, assailed the project as "valueless," claiming that its graduates were of no increased worth to the Army and Navy and were no easier to train as a result of their civilian training. He asserted that they were "fledgling students" who required "many hundreds of hours of flying before they are of any use to either the military services or the airlines," and he charged that the whole scheme was an "aviation boondoggle." Congressional criticism came from Representative Melvin J. Maas of Minnesota, who declared that the program was a waste of money and suggested that its facilities—instructors, planes, and fields—be turned to purely military use.

But defense of the program was not lacking. Colonel George De F. Lerner, general manager of the National Aeronautic Association, urged that the CAE advanced, or secondary, schedule be doubled or tripled. Although he admitted that a graduate of the preliminary course who

27. Ibid., Sept. 1, 1940.
28. Ibid., Jan. 11, 1942.
became a flying cadet had "to start from scratch," at least nationwide interest in aviation had been aroused, and current experiments would indicate whether graduates of the OAI secondary course were sufficiently trained to skip the Army primary course. 29

The strongest testimony to the essential value of the program came in 1941 from Brigadier General Davenport Johnson, Chief of the Training and Operations Division, Office of the Chief of Air Corps. On at least two occasions he put himself on record as being cognizant of definite benefits accruing to the Air Corps expansion from the civilian pilot training program. In a letter of February 7, 1941 to Frank A. Wichenor, chairman of the Special Aviation Committee, Department of Commerce, he stated that a saving of about a million and a half dollars a year to the Air Corps was a reasonable estimate if the civilian program continued as planned. About 80 per cent of the civilian pilot training preliminary course graduates successfully completed the Army's elementary flight training, as against 60 per cent for students who had not had this instruction. In addition, he stressed the value to the Air Corps program of the considerable number of flying instructors trained under the civilian plan who were then sent out to the Army's civil contract flying schools. "The availability of this personnel to the Air Corps Schools," he said, "is unquestionably facilitating and will continue to facilitate expansion of Army Flying Training." 30

29. Ibid., Sept. 9, 1940.
30. AIC 353.3, OAI Training Program.
Several months later, in a statement before the House of Representatives Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, General Johnson again came to the defense of the CAA and its program. He stated "without hesitation" that the Air Corps was being saved considerable expense, for in the absence of the civilian program the Air Corps would have had to establish schools specifically to train these instructors. General Johnson further cited the contribution of the program in filling the urgent demand for trained airline pilots, ferry pilots, and test pilots, thus facilitating the retention of military-trained pilots for the military service. In addition, he asserted the value of the primary civilian pilot training in preparing personnel for further Air Corps training. Apparently there had been a falling off in the elimination rate since his previous statement, as he stated that only 12 per cent of the civilian pilot training graduates were eliminated in Air Corps elementary schools as against 39 per cent for those without such prior training. He believed that the lower elimination rate among the civilian pilot trainees could be attributed to the eliminations in the civilian course and to the fact that it gave the trainee a chance to determine for himself whether he was really suited for a military pilot's career.31

The passage of the Civilian Pilot Training Act accomplished another major objective outlined in the President's message of January 17, 1939. It was designed to create a great reserve supply of pilots trained in "the essential qualifications for civilian flying," who would constitute a source of partially trained personnel in case of a major national emergency. But its significant import for the military services should not obscure its importance as a vital vocational training measure. Considered purely as a civil aeronautics measure, it looms as a landmark in American aviation history. With the coming of war the civil aviation facilities in the United States became an adjunct of the military services. Trained pilots, even those not suited for combat, could still play a real part in the war effort.

Some enthusiasts apparently expected too much of the civilian pilot training program, even though its proponents pointed out from the beginning that it would not train men in the techniques of military or naval piloting. From the first the Air Corps viewed the project as one having value in the primary phase of flying, as one which would probably reduce the number of eliminations in this course because much of the weeding out would have taken place in the civilian training. Thus it would reduce the load and the expense of training and would increase the product. The Air Corps, striving to meet its own objectives under the expansion program, was in no position to undertake the training program itself. Consequently, it was glad for
the job to be done by the CAA, and spokesmen of the air services of
the Army and Navy opposed suggestions which were made that they take
over the project. And when the program was under fire in 1941, an
Air Corps spokesman rallied to its defense. General Johnson's
statements indicate that the program was turning out pilots who were
more often qualified for military flying than were those who had not
had the civilian pilot training. An additional value of the program,
and one which apparently had not been clearly forecast, was stressed
by General Johnson: the training of flying instructors who were of
great utility in the Army's civil contract flying schools.

The civilian pilot training organization probably justified its
entire existence from a military point of view when in early 1942 it
became necessary for the Army Air Forces to request that its facili-
ties be devoted henceforth exclusively to the procurement and training
of men for ultimate service as military pilots or for correlated
nonmilitary activities. Regardless of criticisms that had been
 leveled at the program, there is no doubt that at this time the CAA's
organization and its four years of invaluable experience in the civilian
pilot training program in turn proved extremely valuable to the Air
Forces. Certainly the Army Air Forces were hard pressed to train the
ever increasing numbers of aircrew members and mechanics that were
being demanded by the strategies of total war.
2. Amendment of the Civilian Pilot Training Act to Include Mechanics and Technicians (1942)

First consideration in the legislative authorization for Air Corps expansion was given to the procurement of planes and pilots. These were the obvious fundamentals of an adequate defensive air force, but it was also realized from the beginning that a large-scale program for the training of mechanics and technical specialists was another prerequisite to a satisfactory aerial combat arm. Public Number 18 of 1939 had made provision for the detailing of Regular Army personnel to civilian agencies "to acquire a knowledge of or experience in the specialties incident to aviation," and in 1941 this was amended to permit personnel of other components of the Army of the United States to be detailed for such training. The chief purpose of these enactments, however, had been to utilize civilian flying schools for the primary training of military pilots.

In addition to the authorization provided in 1939 for the training of military aviation specialists, certain individuals interested in the development of civil aviation felt that a reserve supply of civilian airplane and engine mechanics and specialists should be built up. There was a precedent in the Civilian Pilot Training Act which had contemplated the creation of a backlog of partially trained civilian pilots.
On September 19, 1941 Representative Jennings Randolph introduced "a bill to amend the Civilian Pilot Training Act of 1939 so as to provide for the training of civilian aviation mechanics." The proposal was referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. In an extension of remarks in the Appendix of the Record, Randolph quoted an article from *Southern Flight* in support of his bill. This stated:

> We approach you in support of the Civil Pilot Training Act of 1939 amendment bill—the most effective plan yet offered to speed up airplane production and provide adequate maintenance of those planes. We maintain that the facilities of aviation's private schools—for 20 years the chief factor in every type of aviation training—stand wastefully unused while Federal agencies buy duplicate schools and equipment.

> ... Southern Flight's viewpoint is anything but isolated. To those who know the actual facts the logical solution sticks out like a sore thumb.

The article proceeded to quote from an analysis of the problem which had appeared in another aeronautical journal, to the effect that although tens of thousands of additional mechanics were needed for the expansion program, private training facilities were being unused because civilian students were being drained from them by the "vocational training activities of the United States Office of Education." *Southern Flight* stated that sixty-six private aviation

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32. Cong. Reg., 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 7394 (Sept. 19, 1941). The bill simply added "and mechanics" after the two references to "pilots" in the first sentence of Section 2 of the Civilian Pilot Training Act.

schools were training 34,583 students annually, but that total could be increased to 136,387 if they were operating on a three-shift schedule. This would be a major step toward expansion in aircraft production and maintenance. The magazine claimed that the whole problem could be solved by passage of the proposed amendment to the 1939 Civilian Pilot Training Act. 34

Randolph's bill, H.R. 5696, was favorably reported without amendment on January 19, 1942. 35 The committee took the occasion of its report to commend the G.I.A on the success of its civilian pilot training program. Of the proposed mechanical training program, the report said:

The information furnished the committee shows that there is a very substantial reservoir of training facilities widely distributed over the country that can be utilized to further the program proposed by this amendment.

The training under this program will not only create a valuable reservoir of men for the mechanical service in our civil and military air services, but it will also provide an economic asset to the nation, as mechanics so trained can readily adapt themselves to many mechanical lines of work requiring skill and precision. . . . 36

When the bill came up for discussion two months later, Representative Bulwinkle explained its purposes. He stated that there

34. Ibid.
were many facilities which could be utilized for training men and women as aircraft technicians and mechanics, and he proposed that H.R. 5695 be amended to provide for the training of technicians as well as mechanics and pilots. His amendment was accepted and the bill passed the House on March 25 without further changes.37

In the Senate H.R. 5695 was referred to the Committee on Commerce on March 26, 1942, and was finally reported out on June 27.38 As reported, an important amendment had been added at the instigation of the War Department. On January 27, 1942, the War Department had given an adverse report on a Senate bill (S. 1919) to amend the Civilian Pilot Training Act to include aviation mechanics. The unfavorable report had been based on the contention that the bill would divert training facilities and equipment from the use of the Army. On February 21, however, a letter from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of Commerce had requested the CAA to undertake the training of aviation technicians as well as pilots, "within the limits of law and availability of appropriations." The aviation technician training should be limited to members of the Air Corps section of the Enlisted Reserve Corps who could meet the Army Air Forces technical schools' entrance requirements. It was contemplated that these reservists would remain on inactive status until the Army Air Forces desired their services.39

38. Ibid., 3109 (March 26, 1942), 5589 (June 27, 1942).
39. Ibid., Director of Legislative Planning to Director of Individual Training, April 17, 1942, in AAG 030 Misc.: Hearing of Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Commerce, , , H.R. 5695, 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 3, 5.
With reference to the February 21 letter of the Secretary of War, on March 17 the Director of the Bureau of the Budget wrote to Representative John W. McCormack reversing the Budget Bureau's previous stand on H.R. 5695 and giving its approval if the training of aviation technicians and mechanics should be limited to inactive enlisted reservists. He stated that this decision had been reached at a conference between representatives of the Army Air Forces, the Office of Education, the CAA, and the Bureau of the Budget. They had agreed to support H.R. 5695 if a proviso were added stipulating that CAA pilot training might include enlisted reservists and that aviation technician training should definitely be limited to enlisted reservists on inactive status.\textsuperscript{40}

In response to a request from the Senate Committee on Commerce for a report on H.R. 5695, the Directorate of Legislative Planning on April 17, 1942, requested the Directorate of Individual Training for its views on the bill.\textsuperscript{41} The reply recommended that the War Department support the bill on the basis that the CAA conduct technician and mechanic training, provided that the only ones trained were Air Corps enlisted reservists subject to call by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces. The further provision was made that such

\textsuperscript{40} AAR 037 C.
\textsuperscript{41} Rm., AFMLP to AFHT, April 17, 1942, in AAR 037 Misc.
training employ only "that equipment now available to and used in conjunction with the program of pilot training." 42

Before this reply was received, however, Lieutenant Colonel G. R. Ferera, Director of Legislative Planning, had prepared a letter to be sent to the chairman of the Senate commerce committee. This stated the additional provisions desired by the War Department restricting the mechanic and technician training on the basis of equipment already available for the pilot training program. The letter explained that the Air Forces were giving complete training for the great majority of the Army's aviation mechanics and technicians, but that preliminary training by the J.A. in these specialties would be helpful to the Air Force program. But the "need of the Army Air Forces for all equipment" obtainable made "it desirable that no other government agency make conflicting demands thereon." 43 At the same time a letter was drawn up for the signature of the Deputy Chief of Staff to be sent to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. This letter stated the War Department's desire that the mechanics' training program be restricted because of the limitation on available equipment, and it was indicated that the Air Forces should have first call on such equipment as was produced. 44

42. Em. No. 2, AFRIC to AFRIC, April 30, 1942, in ibid.
43. Draft letter prepared on April 28, 1942, in AUG 03 P 0.
44. Draft letter, Deputy Chief of Staff to Harold D. Smith, Director, Bureau of the Budget (prepared by Lt. Col. G. R. Ferera, AFRIC, April 27, 1942), in ibid.
The letter from the Secretary of War to the chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce on May 18, 1942, indicated the War Department's reversal of opinion on H.R. 5695, but the second provision contained in the draft letter prepared on April 28 for the Secretary's signature was omitted. In other words, the War Department requested that the House bill be amended to read:

The Civil Aeronautics Authority is authorized, within the limits of available appropriations made by Congress, to train civilian and aviation technicians or to conduct programs for such training, including studies and researches as to the most desirable qualifications for aircraft pilots. Provided, That the training of civilian pilots may include, but the training of aviation technicians shall be limited to, members of the enlisted reserves of the military services in inactive status.45

The War Department views as they were presented to the Senate Committee on Commerce explain the amendment of H.R. 5695 while it was receiving committee consideration. The bill passed the Senate on July 2, 1942, in this form.46 The House disagreed with the Senate on amendment, and the conference committee recommended that the Senate rescind from its position.47 The Senate and the House agreed to the conference report, and on July 24 the President signified his approval of the bill, which became Public Law Number 677.48 By the terms of

45. H.A. 032 0.
47. Ibid., 6176 (July 6, 1942); 6191 (July 7, 1942); 6354 (July 15, 1942).
48. Ibid., 5613 (July 17, 1942); 5662 (July 18, 1942); 6636 (July 20, 1942); 5628 (July 21, 1942); 5867 (July 27, 1942). See Appendix 3 for text of act.
the act the CAA was authorized to train civilian pilots, technicians, and mechanics, "or to conduct programs for such training, including studies and researches as to the most desirable qualifications for aircraft pilots and technicians and mechanics."49

In consequence of the House insistence on its measure without amendment, the final enactment was in a form which had been opposed by the War Department. Therefore, the Department chose to interpret the act in a manner which would secure the sort of training program it desired. A letter prepared in the Directorate of Legislative Planning set forth the interpretation which the Air Forces wished to be placed on the act:

The War Department offers no objection to approval of enrolled enactment H.R. 5695 . . . but desires to make it clear that, under the powers conferred upon the Secretary of War by Executive Order 8974 of December 13, 1941, it proposes to take action to see that the Act be administered to limit the training thereunder of aviation technicians to members of the enlisted reserves of the military services in inactive status . . . .

As enacted, H.R. 5695 does not include the amendment recommended by the War Department. For this reason the War Department takes the position that its administration must be as set forth above. In so far as the Army is concerned, the War Department will utilize the existing facilities of the Civil Aeronautics Administration, where possible, for the elementary training of technicians and mechanics enrolled in the Enlisted Reserve Corps of the Army in order to supplement the training program of the Army Air Forces.50

49. 56 Stat. 961.
50. Draft letter, Secretary of War to Harold D. Smith, Director, Bureau of the Budget (written July 21, 1942), in AAG O32 F.
Under the provisions of Executive Order 8974 the Secretary of Commerce was to be guided in his administration of civil aeronautics statutes by requests of the Secretary of War in accordance with requirements for successful prosecution of the war. In effect, this meant that the congressional enactment for training civilian mechanics and technicians was a legal fiction if the War Department chose to make it so.

More than ten months, therefore, after the introduction of the bill to extend the provisions of the Civilian Pilot Training Act to include mechanics, the measure was finally enacted substantially as it had been first introduced. The only change had been the addition of technicians as well as mechanics to the original provision for the training of pilots. The final enactment was not in accordance with the wishes of the Army Air Forces, but there were means at hand to attain the sort of training program the Air Arm thought should be undertaken by the CAA. By the authority of Executive Order 8974, the War Department was empowered to see to it that its desires were fulfilled.
Chapter III

MILITARY FLYING TRAING LEGISLATION

1. Aviation Cadet Act (1941)

During the twenty-two years prior to 1941 the flying training
of young men by the Army had been conducted in the grade of flying
cadet, a grade created in 1919 under the provisions of the Army
appropriation act for the fiscal year 1920. By the terms of that
act the Secretary of War was directed to set up and maintain at
one or more established flying schools courses of instruction
for aviation students, and it was provided that these students
should be enlisted in the Air Service as flying cadets. The total
number of flying cadets was not to exceed 1,700 at any one time. The
act authorized a basic pay for cadets of $75 a month, which included
extra pay for flying risk, a ration allowance of not to exceed
11 a day, and other allowances equal to those of a private first
class in the Air Service. It further provided that upon completion
of the course, each cadet, if he wished, could be discharged and
commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Officers' Reserve Corps.¹

¹ From 1919 to 1941 there was little change in the law relating

¹. 41 Stat. 106.
to flying cadets, save for increases in the numbers of cadets authorized to be trained. At the beginning of the expansion program of the Air Corps in 1939 the general status of cadets was as follows: (1) Those eligible for appointment included enlisted men of the Regular Army, officers and enlisted men of the National Guard, Reserve officers and members of the enlisted Reserve Corps, and civilians. (2) The educational requirements called for at least half the credits necessary for a degree at a recognized college or university (about two years) or the equivalent. (3) The applicant agreed that after completion of his training as a flying cadet he would serve three years on active duty as a second lieutenant, Air Corps Reserve, if his services were required.

By the fall of 1940, with the national defense and Air Corps expansion programs well under way, with the limitation on the number of flying cadets suspended for the fiscal year 1941, and with the selective service bill on the point of enactment, it was

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2. Public, No. 242, 55 Cong., June 4, 1920, Sec. 138, authorized not to exceed 2,500 flying cadets; Public, No. 445, 69 Cong., July 2, 1926, Sec. 2, authorized the same number; and 2,500 remained the authorized number until Public, No. 703, 76 Cong., 3 Sess., July 2, 1940, Sec. 2 of which authorized the suspension of all existing limitations on the number of flying cadets in the Air Corps for fiscal year 1941.

3. 515-150, July 20, 1938.
becoming obvious that revisions were necessary in order to make the grade of flying cadet more all-inclusive. Air Corps schools were now giving training in activities other than flying, and the term "flying cadet" was no longer strictly correct. In addition, it was desired to give the cadets parity with the cadets of the Navy and Marine Corps in matters of pay, allowances, and status, both while in training and afterwards as commissioned officers.

At the beginning of August 1940 the Personnel Division of the Air Corps pointed out to the Plans Division the situation then existing. This communication stated that unless the Air Corps made its flying cadets' status comparable to that of the Navy's in respect to pay, allowances, and career prospects, the Army would have little chance of meeting its program in terms of numbers of cadets required. It recommended that a bill providing for such equality be prepared without delay and submitted to Congress. On August 17, General Yoht, Chief of Plans, advised Personnel that "Action is already being taken on this matter." On August 20, 1940, the Chief of the Air Corps, in a communication prepared by General Yoht, submitted to The Adjutant General a proposed bill which would give Air Corps flying cadets such parity, and recommended that it be submitted to Congress at once.

5. Ibid., p. 3, Plans to Personnel, Aug. 17, 1940, in ibid.
and that an effort be made to obtain its enactment during the current session. "If such legislation is not obtained," the letter stated, "it will be impossible for the Air Corps to compete with the Navy in obtaining the flying cadet material in the numbers we require."6

Subsequently, on September 19, 1940, two bills (S. 4366 and H.R. 10526) were introduced in Congress to create the grade of "aviation cadet" as a substitute for flying cadets, to authorize certain pay and allowances for the aviation cadets, to give them $10,000 life insurance at government expense while training, and to provide for their status upon commissioning as second lieutenants in the Air Corps Reserve with an agreement to serve for three years on active duty. In addition, the bills authorized the Secretary of War to establish one or more schools for the training and instruction of aviation cadets. They further provided for a bonus to be paid to any Air Corps Reserve officer, except those chosen for commission in the Regular Army, who had been continuously on active duty that had been continuous for one or more years.7

The War Department, in a letter to Senator Shepard, chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, pointed out the

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vital importance of placing Army flying cadets on a parity with naval and Marine Corps cadets and of providing the same allowances for Air Corps Reserve officers on extended active duty as was provided for naval and Marine Corps Reserve officers in the same situation. The letter stated the procurement difficulties facing the Air Corps because of this disparity. Among the discriminatory provisions to the advantage of the Navy and Marine Corps were:

(1) the provision of government life insurance for $10,000 during the period of active duty of aviation cadets; (2) the clothing allowance of $150 provided to this group, either during their period as aviation cadets or upon commissioning; and (3) the payment of a bonus of $500 a year for each year of active duty to naval and Marine Corps Reserve officers upon their release from active duty of one or more continuous years. The necessity of procuring adequate numbers of high type personnel to meet the requirements of the Air Corps expansion program demanded the elimination of these discriminations.8

On the floor of the Senate, Senator John Gurney of South Dakota explained that S. 1255 was designed to make the same provisions for Army aviation cadets as those provided for Navy cadets in S. Res. 1000, passed earlier in the session. The Navy

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bill, however, had authorized naval aviation cadets to remain in
the service and for them to be enrolled on the Navy's regular
promotion list. As there would be too many Army aviation cadets
to include in the regular promotion list, the bill under discussion
would give them a $500 bonus at the end of each year of extended
active duty with the Air Corps. Senatororman B. Austin of
Vermont, who considered the bill 'distinctly a departure from the
past,' stated that it was devised as a 'means for education, to
give the men who take the special training a rank which will
enable them to have prestige in their office of teaching when they
are called upon to teach men who have not had special schooling
and training.'

In the course of the Senate discussion, Senator Joseph
Gurney asked about the possibilities of Vermont
becoming a pilot and was assured by Gurney that it would be
impossible to have any such specific provisions in the bill,
since under its terms all men could have an equal opportunity.10
The bill was passed by the Senate on September 20, 1940,11 and
was referred to the House Committee on Military Affairs on October
23.

10. Ibid., 13871-72 (Sept. 20, 1940).
11. Ibid., 13872 (Sept. 20, 1940).
12. Ibid., 13988 (Oct. 2, 1940).
Senator Edwin G. Johnson of Colorado, in congratulating the Senate upon its passage of the measure, expressed his gratitude at this recognition of the Army's need for well-trained aviators. But he considered "absolutely salient" the regulation he feared would be laid down by the Secretary of War requiring two years of college. He went on to state his intention to introduce, in the next session of Congress, a bill which would provide for the training of mechanic sergeants, along the general lines of this measure. He asserted that the "lack of proficient pilots and skilled mechanics" constituted "the bottle necks and the weaknesses in our defenses."  

No further action was taken on the bill, although the Air Corps had apparently expected the House to pass it. A Plans Division representative conferred with House committee members on the aviation cash bill and reported: "From information received, it appears that the House has reached a gentleman's agreement not to take up any new business until after the election or until about November 13, 1940." The House members, however, were declared to be in favor of the legislation, and one representative expressed his opinion that it would go through after the election.  

13. Ibid., 1745-54 (Oct. 9, 1940).  
Despite the lack of further action on S. 4365 during this session, the Air Corps was evidently doing some thinking on the matter, particularly with reference to the possibility of training enlisted men in grade as pilots and in other aviation specialties.

In connection with this question, the Office of the Chief of Air Corps requested an opinion from the Judge Advocate General as to whether the provisions of S. 4365, if enacted, would permit such training. The Judge Advocate General replied that the bill would not provide for such training unless amended so as specifically to authorize it. The Air Corps Act of July 2, 1926, did not alter the 1919 provision "that all enlisted aviation students must have the grade of flying cadet." Since the 1919 act had defined the term "flying cadet" to mean "aviation student," and since S. 4365 substituted "aviation cadet" for "flying cadet," it followed that the term "aviation cadet" meant "aviation student"; consequently, enlisted men could be given training in grade but would still have to be given the grade of aviation (flying) cadets as under existing law.

At the beginning of the first session of the Seventy-seventh Congress, the Secretary of War transmitted to Congress a draft of another and identical bill to create the grade of aviation cadet.


16. Memo for Chief of Air Corps by J.C., Jan. 8, 1941, in ibid.
in the Air Corps, Regular Army,\textsuperscript{17} and on February 10, 1941, Senator Sheppard introduced the bill, S. 840.\textsuperscript{18} This time the bill received speedy action and no discussion on the part of either house. By June 3, 1941, it had been enacted into law.\textsuperscript{19}

The major provisions of the act—Public Number 97—in its final form were: (1) The grade of aviation cadet was substituted for the grade of flying cadet. (2) The Secretary of War was authorized and directed to 'establish and maintain one or more schools for the training and instruction of aviation cadets.' (3) Aviation cadet personnel were to be drawn from volunteers enlisting in the Air Corps and from qualified enlisted men in the Regular Army who would be appointed by the Secretary of War. All cadets were required to agree that upon completion of the course they would accept commissions as second lieutenants in the Air Corps Reserve and would serve for three years on active duty, upon completion of which they would be promoted to first lieutenant, Air Corps Reserve. (4) Basic pay of $75 a month was provided, which included extra pay for flying risk. In addition,

\textsuperscript{17} Cong. Reg., 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 817 (Feb. 8, 1941).
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 822 (Feb. 10, 1941).
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 4729 (June 5, 1941).
A day subsistence allowance, and full quarters, medical care, hospitalization, clothing, uniforms, and equipment were to be provided at government expense, as well as travel allowances equal to those furnished for officers.

(5) Aviation cadets were to be issued government life insurance for $10,000, the premiums to be paid by the government. Upon commissioning, they were to have the option of continuing such policies at their own expense.

(6) Air Corps Reserve officers not selected for commission in the regular Army who might be released from active duty that had been continuous for one or more years were to be paid a lump sum of $900 for each complete year of active service as such an officer.

2. **Aviation Student Act (1941)**

During the period in which the aviation cadet bill was on its legislative course toward enactment, steps had been initiated to obtain passage of a bill to permit the training of enlisted men in grade as aviation students. As far back as December 1940 the shortage of pilot training applicants who could meet the rigorous educational requirements was becoming apparent. A newspaper dispatch of December 15, 1940, cited the War Department's concern that the Air Corps was short of pilot students and that applicants for training had fallen far below the minimum set.

20. 55 Stat. 236. See Appendix 4 for text of act.
for training new pilots. It was stated that it might be necessary to lower the educational standards in order to accelerate the personnel expansion program to keep step with the pilot objectives.

An illustration of the seriousness of the situation was embodied in the short-lived proposal that the United States Office of Education Institute educational "cramming" courses to be given to high school students in order to prepare them for the examination given to Air Corps flying aspirants. At the beginning of January 1941 Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson contacted the Administrator of the Federal Security Agency with a suggestion for a training program, free of tuition, to establish courses in such subjects as American history, English grammar and composition, general history, geography, arithmetic, higher algebra, geometry, trigonometry, and elementary physics. It was planned that the courses would be of three months' duration, with a capacity for 1,000 students, and that they would be conducted three times a year "on a nation-wide basis to afford the youth of each state an opportunity to benefit from the program."22 The Federal Security Agency Administrator welcomed the project, but

pointed out that lack of funds would require a legislative authorization to set up the courses. 23

The Office of the Chief of Air Corps, howev-r, did not approve of the whole scheme. It advised the Adjutant General of its opinion that "there can be no permanent benefit to the individual or to the service from an expenditure of public money for this sort of training of combat personnel." It set forth an alternative proposal that any existing shortage of properly qualified applicants be remedied by raising the existing educational standards. It further suggested that practical courses in technical and professional subjects would have much more value for combat pilots than a "crude course in general educational subjects." 24 The Adjutant General's Office also considered the proposed educational course illogical and indefinite. 25 On the other hand, the Adjutant General's Office held that the Air Corps proposal to give training in technical and professional subjects was not practicable because it involved no commitment by the present, nor did the government offer the student anything if he passed the courses. The most efficacious widening of the field of applicants would be achieved.

In reply to the views of the Adjutant General's Office, the Air Corps advised that its current plans contemplated training of 25 per cent enlisted pilots, to train "suits in the fiscal year 1941-42." Also, plans were being drawn up "to institute the examination for "Fly in Civilian" appointment with a view to "find it were nearly fit the type of personal required for pilot training and eventual commission." It was believed that training of enlisted pilots on this vision of the "Fly in Civilian" examination would enable the Air Corps to meet its pilot requirements.

On May 15, 1941, the Administrator of the Federal Security Agency was informed that the "Army at all times nothing further to be done at least until the general approval to the whole course of the natural processes." Obviously, the simplicity of the idea had been decided "from the start," with the Air Corpsdueness of its plans for training enlisted pilots, there for any such "crude" course was "ill advised.

For several months to the Air Corps had been preparing and pushing legislation to authorize training of enlisted men as

26. 3rd Ind., Lt. Col. H. A. Gilbert, ADF, to Chief of Air Corps, April 8, 1941, in ibid.
27. 4th Ind., Col. A. N. Brandenberger, ADG, to AD, May 2, 1941, in ibid.
noncommissioned pilots. In a memo from General Arnold on December 27, 1940, Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson said: "I submit that the time has come when we should not require two years of college for the Air Corps. It seems to me that this requirement is hurting a large number of capable and willing young men from being pilots. I should be glad to have your views." General Arnold advised Patterson that he had kept this letter in his mind for some time and that a great deal of study had been done in connection with it. He explained that the revised higher educational standards had been retained temporarily because noncommissioned officers and enlisted pilots were being commissioned upon completion of their course. If a grade of noncommissioned officer and enlisted pilots were created, however, the Air Corps would be enabled to accept candidates with lower educational standards.

He stated that he would "have this letter expeditiously as it not only would be a good thing for the Air Corps but is a necessary step."
In a communication to the Chief of Staff on January 25, 1941, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, presented the results of a study of the problem that had been directed by General Arnold. It was pointed out that the existing law relative to training of aviation students clearly indicated that all students at flying schools were to be trained in the grade of flying cadet. Inasmuch as the Air Corps considered such cadets officer candidates and required the equivalent of two years' college work as a minimum educational requirement for this grade, it was obvious that it would not be possible to train enlisted men lacking such requirements under the provisions of this law. Amended of the aviation cadet bill, S. 4685, passed in the Senate on September 30, 1940, the legislation stated that it was to be reintroduced in the Senate early in the new Congress in an effort to insure its early passage. The bill as it stood, however, would not provide authority for the training of enlisted men in grade unless amended so as specifically to authorize such action. Consequently, it was recommended that the Secretary of War direct the initiation of legislation to this end.

Under Secretary of War Patterson was still concerned about the two-year college requirement when he wrote the Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, Robert A. Lovett, in February 1941:

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31. This statement was based on the opinion given by the Judge Advocate General on Jan. 8, 1941. See n. 16, above.
32. Memo for Chief of Staff by Brig. Gen. H. D. Shedd, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Jan. 25, 1941, in AAC 221-3, Enlisted Pilots.
"If the Air Corps has not already done so, it seems to me that it should, without further delay, abolish the requirement of two years in college for flying cadets. I should be glad to have your views," Lovett reported in his request to Colonel G. P. Stratemeyer by telegraph on February 25 and asked that every effort be made to use enlisted pilot trainees. In transmitting Major George H. Brett's request, Stratemeyer advised that Lovett be made compliant of General Arnold's desire with reference to the cadet legislation prior to enlisting legislation for enlisted pilots.33

Accordingly, on February 26 General Brett sent Lovett a draft of a memorandum to be sent to Patterson. This communication pointed out that the current educational requirement for flying cadets was not two years of college, but two years of college or its equivalent. It was suggested that it would be undesirable to lower the educational qualifications for flying cadets since the cadre was destined for commissioning in the Air Corps Reserve, as well as to make up a pool from which Regular Air Corps officers would be obtained. Patterson was further informed that action had been begun to secure legislative authority for the training

of enlisted pilots with only high school education and that such training was to begin about July 1, 1941, assuming that the legislation would be enacted prior to that time. In a memorandum to Lovett, General Brett stated that the aviation cadet bill, S. 340, was then pending in Congress and that it was not desirable to submit additional legislation which might jeopardize its passage. The bill to permit training of enlisted men in grade would be submitted immediately upon passage of the "extremely important" aviation cadet bill.

At the beginning of April 1941 General Brett communicated to Colonel Robert C. Candaes, Chief of the Intelligence Division, Office of the Chief of Air Corps, the necessity for taking some immediate action.

In conversation with General Arnold yesterday he stated he considered it absolutely essential that the proposed bill for the enrollment of enlisted men to take the flight training course should be given considerable a tention. At present there is a lot of criticism over the fact that we retain a two-years' college requirement for flight training as a pilot. He believed that publicity pertaining to the training of enlisted men as pilots will offset action to reduce the qualifications for pilot training as a Reserve Officer. Please see me concerning this.

On April 5 the Executive of Plans Division was informed that G-1

had been notified that General Arnold wanted the legislation submitted "without delay." He was told that on March 7, 1871, a bill had been forwarded to the Senate of the State for consideration. Subsequent steps would be taken immediately in accordance with General Arnold's desires.\[32\]

Recently in an effort to forestall further criticism,\[33\]
information was given out that plans were about to train enlisted men as pilots. On April 6, 1871, the New York Times reported that the War Department and the Navy were about to begin training 100 men to be used to train new enlisted men to assure an adequate number of pilots for their prospective new fleets of seamen.\[34\]

Some officials believe that only by following the example of several foreign nations, including Britain in making pilots out of enlisted men can the Army achieve its objective of 50,000 ship's pilots.\[35\]

A new policy in training of the Army for air may be put into effect in the summer.\[36\]

April 22, soon after General Crook's victory, a bill was introduced in the Senate by General J. A. Hay (R.I., 4449), but was later tabbed under H.C. 3551 when S. 1371 was passed in lieu.\[37\]
The Committee on Military Affairs reported the bill with an amendment increasing the amount of government life insurance to be issued during the period of flying training from $5,000 to $10,000, the premiums to be paid by the government during the training period and continued by the recipient at his option thereafter. The committee report stated that the War Department considered the measure necessary to create an additional group of pilots—noncommissioned officers lacking the educational qualifications for flying cadet appointment. 39

The bill in its amended form was passed by the Senate on May 15 and four days later was referred to the House Committee on Military Affairs. The House, without amendment or discussion, passed the bill on May 19, and by June 4 it had been signed by the President. 40

The act—Public Number 99—authorized the training in grade of enlisted men of the Regular Army and of other components of the Army of the United States on active duty status. They were to be known as aviation students rather than aviation cadets. The Air Corps planned, under the authority of the act, to train

40. Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 7681 (May 1, 1941), 4116 (May 15, 1941), 4222 (May 19, 1941), 4316-17 (May 21, 1941), 4728 (June 5, 1941). This bill became Public Law Number 99, the Aviation Student Act. For the text of the act see Appendix 5.
"young men who are physically and temperamentally qualified as combat pilots but lack the basic educational level deemed essential to a commissioned officer." At the time of enactment the contemplated requirements for acceptance as an aviation student were that the applicant be unmarried, of good character, and between eighteen and twenty-two years of age; that he be a graduate of an accredited high school, in the upper half of the class, with a minimum of one and one-half mathematics credits; that he meet the Army physical requirements for fliers; and that he pass the Army General Classification Test with a score of 130 or higher (Group I). 41

Shortly after the enactment of the Aviation Student Act, The Adjutant General received a directive relative to the issuance of Army Regulations on the subject of training of enlisted pilots, 42

41 Memo for Assistant Secretary of War for Air by Col. G. T. Stratemeyer (for Chief of Air Corps), June 5, 1941, in ASG G-3, Pilot Training. If the exceptional mental score had been adhered to, as well as the other requirements, only a very limited number of enlisted men could have been qualified. Certainly those few who scored above 130 on the General Classification Test would seldom have lacked the "basic educational level deemed essential to a commissioned officer." The usual qualifying score for officer candidate school was only 110 (the lowest score in Group II).

42 Memo for AG by Lt. Col. C. D. Duncan (for Chief of Air Corps), June 21, 1941, in ibid.
and on August 1, 1941, AR 615-150 was issued. This set forth the
requirements and conditions of appointment for such training and
provided that no enlisted men would be detailed to aviation student
training who had reached his twenty-third birthday. It was
further stimulated the successful completion of the training
the student would receive the rating of pilot and warrant as
staff sergeant pilot, Air Corps, without reenlistment or the grade in
which he arrived in training. These regulations stayed in effect
until after the passage of the Flight Officer Act the following
year, when they were superseded by AR 615-150 dated November 5, 1942.

3. Amendment of Section 2 of Public Number 18 of 1939 (1941): Training
in Grade
Section 2 of the "adequate national defense" act of 1939 had
authorized the detail of Regular Army personnel as students in
technical, professional, or other educational institutions or
industrial plants when the Secretary of War deemed the facilities
of the Army for such instruction insufficient. By the end of 1940
the demands of the expansion program were making it necessary
for the Air Corps to avail itself of all suitable applicants for
flying training. Two sources apparently not yielding all they
right were the groups of reserve officers of branches other than
the Air Corps and National Guard officers. The existing regulations
tended to restrict applications from these individuals. The reg-
ulations required such personnel to take flying training in the

43. The age limit of twenty-seven years was set for aviation cadet
applicants.
grade of flying cadet, and the monetary sacrifice was often an important factor. In addition, upon completion of training they had to accept the rank of second lieutenant in the Air Corps Reserve, regardless of the commission they had previously held.

On December 14, 1938, General Brett, Acting Chief of the Air Corps, set forth these facts in a letter to The Adjutant General. General Brett recommended that the law be amended so as to permit personnel of the Army of the United States (instead of just the Regular Army) to be detailed to these civilian schools. He stated that it was probable that a large number of the 125,000 Reserve officers available would desire flying training and be able to qualify for it. Although the cost of training a Reserve officer in the Air Corps would cost about $1,445.75 more than the cost of training a flying cadet, the total cost of training a pilot was so considerable that the difference should not be a determining factor, particularly in view of the fact that it will be necessary to obtain qualified pilots from a very available source in order to meet the pilot requirements for the existing emergency.44

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-7, concurred in this proposal and recommended to the Senate and House of Representatives:

of the War Department that such an amendment be initiated.\(^{45}\)

The Judge Advocate General drafted a bill to put the proposal
into legislative form and transmitted the draft to the Budget and
Legislative Planning Branch at the beginning of February 1941.\(^{46}\)

In reply to an inquiry from the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Bureau
of the Budget advised that there would be no objection to the sub-
mission of the proposed legislation to Congress.\(^{47}\)

In March and April of 1941 identical bills (H.R. 4443 and S.
1246) were introduced in the House and Senate to amend Section
2 of the act of April 3, 1939, to make its provisions applicable
to personnel of all components of the Army of the United States,
instead of just members of the Regular Army.\(^{48}\)

At the House hearings, Major Ira F. Swift of G-1 clearly set
forth the existing situation which needed some legislative change:

\[\ldots\] At the present time all of our primary flying
instruction is conducted in civilian flying schools.
It is used to be in Army flying schools. We have authority
to send a Regular Army officer to a civilian school
for flying instruction but that authority is limited
to a Regular Army officer. If a National Guard second
lieutenant or reserve second lieutenant wants to trans-
fer to the Air Corps we may not send him to a primary
civilian flying school; he has got to give up his
commission and go to that school as a flying cadet.\(^{49}\)

\(^{45}\) Memo for Chief of Budget and Legislative Planning Branch by
Col. Harry L. Tweedie, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3,
Jan. 25, 1941, in ibid.

\(^{46}\) Memo for Chief of Budget and Legislative Planning Branch by
Col. F. Y. Llewellyn, Feb. 5, 1941, in ibid.

\(^{47}\) J. R. Blanford, Jr., Assistant Director of Bureau of Budget,
to Secretary of War, March 13, 17\(^{th}\), in ibid.

\(^{48}\) Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 5749 (April 21, 1941), 2900
(March 27, 1941).

\(^{49}\) Hearing of House Committee on Military Affairs on H.R. 4443
(transcript), 77 Cong., 1 Sess.
The report of the House Committee on Military Affairs on H.R. 4443 favored its enactment and explained its purposes. The report quoted Major Swift's testimony and quoted from the letter of the Secretary of War, dated March 22, 1941, which designated the existing discrimination as "unjust" and contended that it unquestionably prevents a large number of excellently qualified individuals from applying for pilot's training." The Secretary's letter also stated that quota requirements for pilots would soon necessitate turning "every available source" of potential applicants, 50

The Senate Committee on Military Affairs reported similarly on the Senate bill, and on May 1, 1941, S. 1945 passed the Senate and was referred to the House committee four days later. 51 The House bill passed the House on May 21 and was referred to the Senate committee on the twenty-third. 52 Meanwhile, the Office of the Chief of Air Corps was advised by the Plans Division of that office that the enactment of H.R. 4445 would solve the problem of training reserve officers of branches outside the Air Corps. 53 On June 25, S. 1943 passed the Senate and its own bill was tabled. 54 The President signed it on July 7 and it became Public Law Number 152. 55

51. Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 3613 (May 1, 1941), 3600 (May 5, 1941).
52. Ibid., 4316 (May 1, 1941), 4798 (May 21, 1941).
53. H.R. 1945, C.S. (Cosetti) to Executive, OSAC, June 17, 1941, in TIRI files.
54. Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 5577 (June 25, 1941).
55. Ibid., 5826 (July 7, 1941).
Following the passage of the bill, the question arose as to
whether aviation cadets already in training but holding reserve
commissions would have to continue in the grade of aviation cadet
and be commissioned as second lieutenants in the Air Corps Reserve. 56
A-1 of the Air Staff expressed the opinion that the new law required
the following decisions:

(a) Aviation cadets undergoing pilot training who
at the present time hold reserve commissions will be
discharged as flying cadets and continue their pilot
training in their reserve grade.
(b) Upon completion of pilot training such officers
will be transferred into a grade in which they train to
the Air Corps Reserve. 57

A further question of the application of the law was raised
in a memorandum dated September 26, 1941, in which the intent of
the act regarding the pilot training of officers outside the Air
Corps within the grade of second lieutenant was discussed. 58

Military Personnel Division, Office of the Chief of Air Corps, held
that training in all cases in the grade of second lieutenant
was undesirable on several counts:

(1) Publicity and information had already been disseminated

on the basis that the particular grade of the applicant was
not one of the requirements for eligibility. Any change in
this status would entail the retraction of information already

55. R-E, h.43, for Maj. Gen. G. H. Brett, Chief of Air Corps, to
Maj. Gen. Arnold, Chief, AAF, Aug. 13, 1941, in AAG 032 N.
58. Memo for A-6 by Reserve Section, Military Personnel Division,
OGAC, Sept. 26, 1941, in AAG 3523.9 K, Pilot Training.
widely disseminated and the revocation of definite commitments made to officers above the grade of second lieutenant.

(2) "Such restriction should be contrary to the intent and purpose of the Congress and the War Department in providing for the enlistment of personnel of the Army of the United States for pilot training." Inasmuch as the legislation was passed to permit the enlistment of National Guard and Reserve officers "on the same basis as now authorized for personnel of the Regular Army," a restriction of training to the grade of second lieutenant would be unjustified since no such restriction was in existence for Regular Army personnel taking flying training.

(3) The proposed restriction "would preclude many desirable applicants from taking flying training, to the detriment of both the individual and the Army Air Forces."

(4) "The placing of some members of a flying class on active duty in a grade higher than second lieutenant would not cause "substantial disturbance.""

Still another problem of interpretation of the enactment was set forth in a question from Military Personnel Division as to which aviation cadet courses, other than the pilot course, would

Dr. E. B. Tod. (Memo for AG by Reserve Section, 17, Sept. 16, 1941), Major J. E. Ives, Assistant Chief, AG, to AG, Oct. 14, 1941, in cited.
be open to Reserve and National Guard officers training in grade.

Among the courses in question were those in bombardment, navigation, meteorology, engineering, armament, communications, and photography. The question was answered by Training and Operations Division, which advised that all of the training mentioned was available to these officers. It stated, however, that "Applicants for training in the following courses: Engineers, Armament, Communications and Photographic, should be limited to those officers who have special qualifications, either educational or experience, which... would make their training in grade especially desirable." 60

4. United States Military Academy Cadet Flight Training Act (1942)

While the Aviation Cadet Act of 1941 had provided for the pay, insurance, and allowances of personnel undergoing flight training at the various schools of the Air Corps, no provision had been made with reference to the cadets at the United States Military Academy in the event that flight training and aviation instruction should be given to them. Consequently, at the beginning of 1942, when plans were announced to institute such training at the Academy about the first of June, the need for such legislation was realized. 61 This realization was voiced in a request by the Acting Chief of Air Corps for the initiation of legislation to provide

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60. 26R, No. 24, to MFD, Oct. 9, 1941, in AG 357.9 P. Training, miscellaneous.

61. On February 8, 1942, the New York Times carried a statement, authorized by General George C. Marshall, that elementary, basic, and advanced flying training were to be given at Stewart Field to all physically qualified West Point cadets who desired flying training.
government life insurance equal in amount to that given to aviation cadets for those students at the Military Academy who would be required to participate in regular and frequent aerial flights. The proposed legislation authorized $10,000 in life insurance, premiums to be paid by the government during the period of training and continued at the option and expense of the recipient thereafter.  

About two months later the Directorate of Legislative Planning submitted to the War Department Chief of Staff a draft of a bill which included not only provision for life insurance, but also authorization for the cadets to receive the same basic pay as provided for aviation cadets, including extra pay for flying risk. In addition, they were to be issued necessary aviation clothing and equipment. Moreover, during the course of such training, when not quartered at the Military Academy, they were to receive the same allowances for travel, subsistence, and quarters as the aviation cadets were receiving. With reference to the insurance benefits, the proposed legislation specified that upon completion of cadet training, the insurance was required to be continued, but at the expense of the insured, until such time as he was relieved from duty involving participation in regular and frequent aerial

flights.63

It was explained that plans were being made to institute courses in flight training and aviation instruction at the Military Academy on or about June 1, 1942, the training to be conducted at Stewart Field in the vicinity of the Academy. During furlough periods and for certain phases of the course, the cadets would be trained at fields in other parts of the United States. It was further pointed out that the cost to the government would not be large since not more than three hundred cadets would undergo flight training in any one class. The Director of Legislative Planning noted that the proposed bill had the concurrence of the Adjutant General and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, and that the Superintendent and the Finance Officer of the Military Academy had themselves requested inclusion of the provisions for pay and allowances in the legislation. It was recommended that the draft of legislation be approved for submission to Congress.64

Late in March the Deputy Chief of Staff submitted the draft bill to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Upon his being advised that it was in accord with the program of the President, it was then sent to the chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

64. Ibid.
With a letter from the Secretary of War explaining the purposes of the bill, 65

In order to refute any contention that might be raised to the bill on the grounds of undue expense, on April 2 the Director of Legislative Planning wrote to the "Superintendent of the Academy," asked about the cost of housing, mess, trips, and training the cadets. 66 The Superintendent replied that the cost of educating a cadet at the Academy was estimated at $1,500 a year, including board, clothing, pay, textbooks, personal supplies, medical and dental service, and the like. He claimed that the cost of actual operation of air training for cadets . . . cannot be estimated at this time." He did not believe, however, that the additional training in aviation would make the total cost more than that involved in training in aviation alone. With the broad training supplied at the Academy applicable to all areas of the service, the Superintendent considered that the cadet's given aviation instruction would be a welding element insuring the necessary teamwork between ground and air forces. 67

67. Superintendent, U. S. Military Academy, to AF IP, April 10, 1946, in ibid.
The bill (S. 345) was introduced in the Senate on April 13, 1943, by Senator Reynolds, and was reported out of committee on April 27 without amendment. 68 Similarly, the Secretary of the Navy Training Command was urging the passage of the bill as quickly as possible since the military academy cadets were scheduled to report at civil elementary schools on June 3, and their travel orders had to be issued prior to May 7. Inasmuch as authorization for funds for their travel was contained in this legislation, the urgency was real. 69 The Directorate of Legislative Planning advised that steps had already been taken to speed action on the bill but that the War Department could actually do no more than urge early and favorable consideration. 70

The Senate passed the bill without discussion or amendment on May 7, 71 and on May 12 it was referred to the House Committee on Military Affairs, from which it was reported on May 26 with an amendment. 72 The amendment proposed to strike out the provision

68 Daily Comp. Sec., 77 Cong., 2 Sess., 786 (April 17, 1943).
69 Col. W. B. Keene, Chief of Staff, Flying Training Command, to CG, NAV, April 21, 1942, in AAG 072-0.
70 Col. G. F. Larrabee to APFR, April 27, 1942, in Ibid.
71 Daily Comp. Sec., 77 Cong., 2 Sess., 415 (May 7, 1942).
72 Ibid., 427A (May 12, 1942), 4890 (May 26, 1942).
granting base pay equal to that of aviation cadets, which included extra pay for flying risk. The committee report explained its amendment by citing the testimony of Major General F. B. Wilby, the Superintendent of the Academy, to the effect that increasing the pay of certain cadets without at the same time increasing the pay of all the others would be destructive of morale at the institution. 73 General Wilby had testified at the Senate hearings that the pay of West Point cadets was wholly inadequate to meet their expenses and that each class graduated with an average debt per capita of $500 to $700. The salaries of the cadets had been fixed in 1919, but their expenses had multiplied many times since then. He urged that Congress increase the pay of all West Point cadets, and he stated that he had so recommended. 74 The committee, however, "did not consider the reasons advanced for the increase of pay of all cadets sufficient to warrant such action by the Congress." 75 Without discussion on the floor, the amendment was agreed to, and the bill passed the House in its amended form on May 28, 1942. 76

In Army Air Forces Headquarters, meanwhile, much concern was being expressed as to whether the bill would be passed by the

73. H. dapt. No. 2171, 77 Cong., 2 sess.
74. Hearing of Senate Committee of Military Affairs on S. 2445 (typescript), 77 Cong., 2 Sess., 4-8.
time training was scheduled to begin. Headquarters of the Flying Training Command reminded the Chief of the Air Staff of the consequences if it were not. It would mean that the cadets would have to bear all their expenses on route to the schools (save for third-class train accommodations) and pay out of their own funds the difference between the subsistence cost at the schools (1 $ a day) and their academy ration of eighty cents a day. In addition, they would bear the entire expense for quarters, and since their total salary was $55 a month, the inequity of the situation was patent.77

In reply, Army Air Forces headquarters reported to the Flying Training Command on the status of the bill and asserted that one of the reasons for the delay in enactment was the "action of the superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy in attempting to use the bill as a vehicle for increasing the pay of the entire cadet corps." The Command was assured that leaders of the House would be pressed to act on the bill, but there could be no guarantee that it would be passed before May 28, 1942.78

The Senate, aware of the fact that the cadets were expected to leave for training camps the following day, on May 28, immediately passed the House amendment to the bill, and on June 1 the bill was signed into law and presented to the President.79

77. Brig. Gen. H. F. Krause, Chief of Staff, ARMY TO Chief of Air Staff, May 22, 1942, in AAG C32 C.
77. 1st Ind. 10th Gen. M. F. Harmon, Chief of Air Staff, to CG, AFFTC, May 22, 1942, in AAG C32 C.
Because of the "determined opposition" of the House military affairs committee to increased pay for 'test point' cadets and because quick sanction was necessary, the Army Department concurred in the amended measure. On June 5, 1942, the President signed the act, which became Public Law Number 571.

6. **Chief Office (1942)**

In the beginning of 1942, the need for officers from the Army Air Corps became so great that the Cadet program had to be expanded in order to meet the need and maintain efficiency. The Army Training Act of 1942 provided that aviation cadets on successful completion of the necessary course of instruction to be commissioned as 2nd Lieutenants, Air Corps, were authorized, while the act to authorize the creation of a new classification of officer aviation students on to the Army's subsequent utilization was enacted.

In May 1942, the second agreement for aviation cadet applicants went into effect. Educational requirements for entrance were relaxed, and the only necessity was a certain score on the Qualifying Examination. The act, as well as removal of due differences between the two groups, turned out the essential distinctions between aviation cadets and aviation students and new enlisted men into equality of treatment.

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80. *Letter of Transmittal to Director, Bureau of the Budget, May 30, 1942, in AD 513-80*; see appendix 7 for text of act.

especially in the matter of rating or commissioning upon graduation. It was also found that many of the enlisted men training as aviation students were fully qualified to assume a commissioned status, or at least a status higher than an enlisted grade. In addition, the lowered requirements for aviation cadets meant that a large number of this group could not measure up to the desired personality and leader standards for commissioned officers. Thus, steps had to be taken to avoid either the commissioning of men unsuitable for the officer's responsibilities or the retention in an enlisted grade of men who were qualified to assume more responsibility than their status permitted.

Because of this situation, on January 16, 1943, in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff from the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-1, 82 legislation was proposed which would eliminate the category of aviation student, designate all aviation cadets for personnel in flying training, and provide, upon completion of the course, that such personnel be appointed either second lieutenants or "flight officers" in the Army of the United States. The decision would depend upon "an evaluation of the individual's capacity for service as a commissioned officer."

It was explained that the status of a flight officer, in general, would be that of a warrant officer (junior grade), to rank above

82. AAG 037 0.
all other warrant officers, but his base pay would be only $1.00
a month. The proposed bill further provided that promotions from
the grade of flight officer to that of second lieutenant could be
made when deemed advisable. The only personnel taking this training
who would be retained in an enlisted status would be those cadets
who were eliminated, and they would be assigned to duties other
than flying in an enlisted grade for the duration of the war and
six months thereafter. The bill also would suspend the provisions
of Section 3 of the Aviation Cadet Act pertaining to the commission-
ing of aviation cadet graduates as second lieutenants in the Air
Corps Reserve. The new legislation would assign or commission all
graduates either as flight officers or as second lieutenants in the
Army of the United States, and the appointment as an officer in
the Air Corps Reserve after the war would no longer be mandatory
but would be a matter to be determined under regulations to be
prescribed by the Secretary of War. In addition, for the duration
of the war and six months thereafter, enlisted men who had taken
training as aviation students and received warrants as staff
sergeant pilots could receive temporary appointments by the
Secretary of War as flight officers in the Army of the United States.

The proposed bill also included several miscellaneous provisions
concerning uniform allowance for flight officers and $10,000
insurance for aviation cadets, with premiums to be paid by the
government during the period of training, and compulsory insurance thereafter, with premiums to be paid by the insured, until he was permanently relieved from duty involving participation in regular and frequent aerial flights.

Prior to submission to the Chief of Staff, the draft of proposed legislation was referred to the Judge Advocate General for consent or concurrence, with a recommendation that it be approved for submission to Congress. In a memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, on January 18, 1942, the Judge Advocate General concurred in the legal aspects of the action recommended, but suggested several changes in the wording of the proposal, in order to clarify provisions pertaining to date of rank and longevity pay for flight officers and to deduction of insurance premiums from the pay of flight officers or second lieutenants. It was specified that flight officers would be entitled to longevity pay as provided for warrant officers in Section 1 of the act of August 21, 1941. By memorandum to General Arnold on February 7, 1942, Colonel W. Trubee Davison, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-1, recommended that the attached bill be approved as the best solution of the

Ibid.
56 Stat. 651.
problem. Colonel Davison also stated that although the proposed procedure did not fit exactly into the policy which the Navy proposes to follow, it does not appear to be in conflict. In a report prepared for General Arnold by two of his special assistants, Lieutenant Colonels Charles P. Cabell and Lauria Horstman, the pros and cons of the proposed legislation were discussed. Among the reasons given in defense of commissioning all graduates were:

1. It would increase combat efficiency because the officer status enhances initiative and morale by the higher standards inherent in that commissioned status.
2. Every pilot is either actually a leader or commander or may be required to assume that position. The assumption of such duty involves responsibility and authority normally associated with the commissioned status.
3. The incentive offered by the officer status would increase the quality and quantity of the product.
4. The standards of candidates would be consistent with those of officers procured from other sources. All flying cadets undergo an arduous and exacting course of instruction during which necessary selection by selection and other factors may be accomplished.
5. Administration would be simplified immensely by placing all candidates in a single category.
6. It would insure a constant and uniform flow of officers in appropriate experience brackets to fill.

85. JAG 032 0.
86. In his memorandum, Admiral J. F. Towers stated: "It does not appear to me that the proposed plan of creating a warrant officer category of aviators will fit in with the Navy scheme of things. We could use a limited number of them in our shore-based activities but not aboard ships because of the lack of arrangements to accommodate them. For the present we propose to continue the policy now being followed by both the Army and the Navy of enrolling cadets and commissioning them if they qualify. . . ." Emo for Col. F. Trubee Davison by Admiral J. F. Towers, Bureau of Aeronautics, Feb. 8, 1942, in ibid.
position vacancies resulting from attrition and would prevent the development of discrepancies between authority and responsibility. . . .
7. It would give equal rank, authority and privileges to all pilots charged with similar duties and responsibilities. 87

On the other hand, certain disadvantages of the proposed system were also pointed out: (1) the minimum age and formal educational standards for aviation cadets were below those accepted for officers for the Army as a whole; (2) the mechanical requirements for piloting an airplane did not necessarily call for the qualifications or status of an officer; (3) some graduates might prefer not to be on commissioned status; and (4) in the existing emergency situation, where the need for pilots was of greater consideration than the need for officers, "lack of officer qualifications should not result in the elimination of able pilots."
The conclusion was reached, however, that inasmuch as the primary purpose of training was to produce the largest number of most effective combat pilots, "Commissioning aviation cadets immediately upon graduation will contribute more toward the accomplishment of this purpose than will the suggested alternative." It was therefore recommended that the proposed legislation be dropped and the existing commissioning policy be continued, with a proviso that any graduates not desiring to serve on a commissioned basis be appointed to a noncommissioned grade. 88

88. Ibid.
Despite this unfavorable report, the Director of Legislative Planning was directed by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, to prepare a draft bill for submission to the Chief of Staff for approval. This was done and was transmitted to the Chief of Staff on April 1, 1942, with a recommendation that the draft be approved and submitted to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. In this revised draft, provision was made for the pay and allowances of the flight officer to be equal to those of an officer of junior grade. In addition, the provision that the flight officer outrank all other current officers was dropped. These suggestions were made by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Gen. and were concurred in by the Director of Legislative Planning.

Accordingly, on April 22, 1942, a draft of the legislation was submitted to the Bureau of the Budget with a request for advice as to whether it could be in accordance with the President's program. Upon notification that it could be, the draft bill was transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, accompanied

50. Ibid.
51. Idem.
52. Ibid. Gen. Joseph T. McNamara, Deputy Chief of Staff, to Director, Bureau of the Budget, April 23, 1942, in ibid.
by a letter from the Secretary of War explaining its purpose. The Secretary pointed out that the exigencies of the time called for a lowering of the entrance requirements for training of pilots. The President's program calling for the training of thousands of pilots has necessitated that former minimum educational qualifications for pilot candidates be reduced. It is planned to provide rank and grade for pilots suitable to their ability and capacity for leadership.

In connection with the compulsory post-enlistment insurance, the Secretary's letter explained that about 20 per cent of the recruits of the Army Air Force training centers failed to continue their government life insurance. This was an "unhealthy situation" which needed correcting, and he did not consider the financial load too great for them to continue their insurance at their own expense. He called attention to the fact that if the bill were passed with this insurance provision included, S. 2130, introduced at the request of the Air Department and passed by the Senate on January 22, 1942, would require no further action by Congress, since its provisions were identical with these. With reference to the financial obligations which would be imposed upon the government by the passage of the flight officer bill, the Secretary stated that the additional cost would be approximately...
$5,500,000 in the fiscal year 1943, resulting in necessary revisions in the enlisted pilot training program to provide for training of enlisted personnel as aviation cadets and their ultimate appointment as flight officers instead of staff sergeant pilots. 95

The bill was finally introduced in the Senate as S. 2553 on May 25, 1942, and was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. 96 Testifying before the committee were Colonels F. Truhee Davison and L. S. Smith and Lieutenant Colonels G. R. Perera and John C. Flanagan, all of the Air Forces. Colonel Smith had been asked by Major General M. F. Harmon to represent General Arnold at the hearing since General Harmon could not attend as planned. Colonel Smith was instructed to explain to the committee that the bill was "designed to accomplish a need that has been appreciated by General Arnold for some time" and that the flight officer proposal was "a matter of particular concern to General Arnold and one in which he has taken a vigorous and personal interest because of his conviction that it will materially contribute to the fighting effectiveness of the Army Air Forces." In short, Colonel Smith must assure the committee that the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces regarded the measure "as of the utmost importance." 97

95. ibid.
96. H.R. 7129, a companion bill, was introduced in the House on the same day by Representative Bay, but was later tabled, and S. 2553 passed in lieu. Daily Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 2 Sess., 4690 (May 25, 1942), 6121-22 (July 2, 1942).
Some interesting testimony was brought out at the hearings.

Lieutenant Colonel Pereira, Director of Legislative Planning for the Army Air Forces, stressed the fact that the bill was an emergency measure only and that for purposes of peacetime or during a period of "commencing emergency" the Aviation Cadet Act would be entirely satisfactory. The outbreak of the war, however, had caused an enormous increase in demand for personnel which necessitated an expansion whereby the air forces are obliged to dip down into the pool of available material and to call upon individuals who, physically and mentally, are able to perform certain functions in connection with flight but who are not, through lack of experience or educational qualifications or other qualifications, entirely qualified to be commissioned officers and leaders of men.

He further stated that an alternative to this proposed legislation would be to continue to train individuals either as aviation cadets or as enlisted men who would become enlisted pilots. It was felt from analysis, however, that "the difference in caliber of the individuals was not sufficient to justify that distinction being made at the outset in training."99

Colonel DeVinne told the committee of the necessity for a feeling of comradeship among the members of a squadron. He believed that comradely personal relationships would be fostered by creation of the flight officer grade and elimination of the

98. Hearing of Senate Committee on Military Affairs on S. 2553, 77 Cong., 2 Sess., S.
99. Ibid., 5, 6.
staff sergeant pilot status. Although flight officers would not
have command responsibilities, creation of the new grade would
enable flight and commissioned officers "to go mix with each
other that they will have that teamwork feeling."100 He too
stressed the point that men who can serve admirably as pilots
cannot always carry out the responsibilities of commissioned
officers. "General Arnold feels very strongly," he said, "that
we should not prevent those men from being pilots, which we are
doing at the present time."101

Senator Chan Gurney raised the objection that any man who could
actually pilot a plane of any type in combat was at least entitled
to a commission in the Army of the United States. Colonel Davison
replied that the men who had the proper qualifications for a commission
would still be made second lieutenants; in addition, the bill
would give the opportunity to become pilots to many more men who
under existing law would not be eligible for anything higher than an
enlisted rating. He stated that the proposed legislation had
"been studied by every division in the Air Corps" and by the War
Department General Staff. To his knowledge, this study had proceeded
for at least three months.102

100. Ibid., 10.
101. Ibid., 11.
102. Ibid., 14.
The different qualifications for commissioned and flight officers were explained to the committee by Lieutenant Colonel William B. Shands, Chief of the Psychological Division, Office of the Air Surgeon. The officer, he stated, had to make decisions requiring "careful reasoning, logical judgment, and comprehension." But the Air Force wanted to take flight officers of adequate ability of "performing satisfactorily the general elements of flying duties" but who lacked the qualifications which would enable them to grow into commanding officers. 103

Colonel Bixby, Director of Individual Training, provided a final interpretation of the bill for the committee. He argued that men who had a powerful urge to fly and the ability to do it should not be excluded because of lack of educational qualifications. They can make themselves suitable for selection to officer grades as they progress along the ladder. 104

On June 1, 1943, the bill was reported from committee without amendment and passed the Senate on June 15. 105 Without discussion or debate. 105 On June 16 it was referred to the House Committee on Military Affairs and passed the House without amendment on July 4, in lieu of H.R. 7107, an identical bill. 106 On July 8 the President signed the bill and it became Public Law Number 698. 107

103. Ibid., 17-20.
104. Ibid., 20.
105. Daily Comp. Rec., 77 Cong., 2 Sess., 4957 (June 1, 1943), 5796 (June 15, 1943).
106. Ibid., 5455 (June 15, 1943), 6172 (July 2, 1943), 6190, 6241, 6243 (July 7, 1943).
107. See Appendix 8 for text of act.
Almost immediately upon the enactment of the Flight Officer Act, a few questions arose in connection with it. One of these was the status of those qualified applicants who had been enlisted as privates in either the Army of the United States or the Air Corps enlisting reserve and who were currently on furlough or inactive status awaiting appointment as aviation cadets and assignment to training. This situation was brought to the attention of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-1 by the Chief of the Military Personnel Division in an R&F dated July 24, 1942, in which the latter suggested the necessity of taking steps to correct the situation. The communication invited attention to the fact that Section 2 of the act, suspending commission in the Air Corps Reserve upon graduation, would preclude such commission to those applicants in the category stated above. "To apply the provisions of the bill to all those persons, enlisted and civilian, qualified prior to July 28th (some as long as March or April), who have not yet been appointed Aviation Cadets, would be to violate their enlistment contract and in effect make the bill retroactive."

The Chief of Military Personnel also stated that certain corrective steps had to be taken because of the delay in notifying recruiting and examining authorities of the passage of the law.

108, A&G 032 R.
and its effect on those enlisted on and after the date of message. Undoubtedly some individuals did enlist after July 15 without knowledge of the existing fact that their enlistment or qualification was subject to the terms of that law. It was suggested that all enlistments from July 15 on could be considered subject to the new act, as radio instructions were sent out by the Adjutant General on July 11 notifying examining and enlistment authorities of the provisions of the act and that July 15 as the definite date on and after which all persons qualified or enlisted for Air Corps appointments would be subject to its provisions. In the case of the previously mentioned category of enlistees, however, the division suggested proper handling of the situation either through amendment of the act or in the Secretary of War's regulations for its administration. In the second case, regulations should prescribe that civilians and enlisted men who qualified for aviation cadet appointment prior to July 15 be granted commissions as second lieutenants upon graduation, and that they be appointed immediately in the Air Corps Reserve. In addition, it was recommended that those persons qualified or enlisted for aviation cadet ground duty before July 15 receive commissions in the same manner as set forth above, and that those aviation cadets (ground duty) who had qualified for appointment subsequent to July 15 be commissioned.
Upon graduation from ground duty training, as second lieutenants in the Army of the United States, and not as flight officers. 109

On July 27 the Executive of A-1 advised Military Personnel that its recommendations were approved, 110 and they were embodied in CE 515-160 of November 5, 1942. Another Army regulation provided that personnel who had completed aviation cadet or aviation student training and had "served in time of war as a commissioned officer or flight officer in the Army of the United States, may be appointed an officer in the Air Corps to serve upon recommendation of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces. 111 It will be noted that although Military Personnel had recommended commissioning in the Air Corps Reserve of personnel who had been qualified or enlisted prior to July 15 but not assigned to a school, the provision was finally promulgated stated only that such commissions might be issued to those who had served as commissioned or flight officers in time of war. It did not make specific reference to the particular category of individuals in question. Another question that arose in connection with the Flight Officer Act was whether enlisted men appointed as aviation students and given "flight pilot" training were eligible for temporary appointment as flight officers. 112 The Air Judge Advocate held that such personnel were eligible for the

109. Ibid.
111. AE 515-60, Nov. 5, 1942, para. 6.
112. EM, Brig. Gen. L. S. Smith, AFRT, to Air Judge Advocate, Nov. 27, 1942, in AG 072.1, Congress.
appointment. 113

6. SUMMARY

The five enactments treated in this chapter together represent an extremely significant body of legislation authorizing changes in the military flying training program. Considered chronologically, as here, they reveal the increasing difficulties in meeting pilot procurement and training objectives under the ever-increasing pressure of the expansion program. The same trend, of course, is readily discernible in other fields than legislation. For example, the aviation cadet qualifying examination was continuously undergoing revision in this same period in an effort to recruit all possible suitable applicants for flying training. 114

The principal reason for the initiation and passage of the Aviation Cadet Act was to provide parity for flying cadets of the Army with those of the Navy and Marine Corps. Because of discriminatory provisions operating to the disadvantage of the Army Air Corps and because of the urgency of securing an adequate number of high-caliber personnel to meet expansion objectives, the Air Corps was faced with a difficult procurement objective. The enactment eliminated the disparity which had existed.

113. 345, No. 2, Col. E. H. Sanderson, Air Judge Advocate, to AAFIT, Nov. 30, 1942, in 1943. By Change 1 (dated Jan. 3, 1943) to AR 510-50, warrant officers, enlisted men, or civilians, recommended by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces and qualified to perform the duties of an aircrew member, were also eligible for appointment as flight officers in the Army of the United States.

114. See Initial Selection of Candidates for Pilot, Bombardier, and Navigator Training.

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Concurrently with legislative consideration of the aviation ordnance measure, the Air Corps was considering plans for flying training of enlisted men in grades. Among the pilot requirements lay the basic of the proposal. There were in the Army large numbers of enlisted men eager and physically qualified to become pilots, but lacking the high educational qualifications still being adhered to. This was a difficult problem in that the Air Corps did not desire to lower standards for commissioning. But necessity and need furnished, or created, for training pilots who would be noncommissioned officers, and it was determined that this procedure should be adopted by the United States Army Air Corps. Like the aviation ordnance bill was still pending, however, it was not desired to introduce another measure which might confuse the general problem and possibly jeopardize passage of both bills.

The Congress delayed so long in its action—making a "gentlemen's agreement" to defer the pending bill until after the November 1940 election—that the Air Corps eventually felt forced to submit its aviation student bill before passage of the aviation ordnance measure. An additional factor seems to have been public criticism of the high qualifications required for flight and training. Also under Secretary of War bitter or actual criticisms were taken to lower the existing educational requirements. Anticipated difficulties were not encountered, once the aviation student bill was submitted.
Congress quickly acted and on June 1, 1941, the President signed the
act, the day after he had given his approval to the long-delayed
creation of the air force.

While the aviation cadet and student pilot acts were being considered,
other legislation was introduced to extend the training and
service opportunities for civilians receiving aviation training
under the provisions of Public Number 18 of 1937. This enactment
had provided for the detail in civilian institutions for training
in aviation specialties of only regular army personnel. In its
quest for additional sources of potential aviators, the Air Corps
discovered that many, as a part of their usual service and
service requirements of branches other than the Air Corps, desired to
become pilots but were not eligible to serve in their capacities
and take their courses as flying cadre. A number of the I937
act's authors then detailed to civilian schools for flying
training, an interpretation of the law which they could
execute training to the extent which they held in the Reserve or
national guard and within that condition was an extension of the
course.

A fourth section was the military academy code and training
act, as necessary for the institution of pilot training at
West Point. The approved bill as approved by Congress
was the Superintendent of the Academy opposed increasing the
pay only of cadets taking flying training. He contended, with some justification, it seems, that the whole cadet corps was grossly underpaid and that an increase in pay for a single group of cadets would bring dissatisfaction. Some Air Force members viewed his action as approaching obstructionism in its attempt "to use the bill as a vehicle for increasing the pay of the entire cadet corps."

The Flight Officer Act is a significant and controversial piece of legislation. The anomalous, neither-fish-nor-fowl status of warrant officers was reproduced among flying personnel. Apparently, desire for its passage was dictated by the lowering of requirements for acceptance as aviation cadets, elimination of the essential distinctions between aviation cadets and aviation students, and dissatisfaction with the staff sergeant pilot status resulting from the Aviation Student Act. Efficient combat pilots had to be procured and trained. Although standards for commissioning were undoubtedly being lowered in actual practice, the Air Force still contended that a pilot who was commissioned must have the educational background and the mental ability to make him at least a potential candidate for a commanding officer. But a staff sergeant rating was not a particularly enticing prospect for most enlisted men who wanted to become pilots. It would seem that it was General Arnold's personal sponsorship of the flight officer
proposal which provided most of the status for its initiation and purpose.

In any attempt to evaluate the flight officer legislation, it must be borne in mind that it was enacted in a period of emergency when the need was primarily for qualified combat pilots and only secondarily for officers of the proper cultural and social background and personality. In a more normal period the advisability of such legislation might be questioned, and it might be argued that a more sensible procedure would be simply to stiffen up the initial requirements so as to eliminate from the very beginning those candidates who did not measure up culturally as well as mentally and physically. Such a step in time of war, however, would undoubtedly have slowed up and set back the whole personnel procurement and training program and, consequently, was out of the question.
Chapter IV

PROPOSED LEGISLATION

The three preceding chapters have dealt with legislative proposals which were enacted into law. In addition to these, numerous other bills were introduced in Congress in the years 1939 through 1943 which would have had some bearing on the Army Air Forces training program if they had received the sanction of Congress and the President. Some of these were primarily civilian in their import, although in all cases the proponents related the aims of the bills to the national defense of war effort. The War Department, however, opposed all such proposals on the grounds that they were secondary to the defense measures being undertaken, that the military air arm was the proper agency to carry on training in military aeronautics, and that enactment of the bills might cause a drain of material or personnel vitally needed by the Army's air arm. The most significant of these rejected proposals were those for the creation of a civil air reserve, for a program of civilian glider pilot training, for the establishment of a Division of Aviation Education, and for the creation of national aviation academies.

1. Proposals for Establishing a Civil Air Reserve

During the congressional discussion of the Army expansion bill in 1939, proposals were also put forth for creating a pool of pilot
personnel from among civilians already engaged in flying or undergoing flight training. On March 16, 1939, Representative Lea of California introduced H.R. 5093, a bill "to provide for training of civil aircraft pilots" which was referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.¹ Four days later Senator McCarran introduced an identical bill, S. 1857, in the Senate.² The Air Corps, apparently, did not have any objection to either of these bills if they were amended in such a way as to prevent the possibility of the CAA being authorized to borrow Army personnel or land and buildings in use by the Army. General Yount, during the hearings on H.R. 5093, suggested such an amendment. The Navy's representative concurred in General Yount's suggestion, and the CAA did not object to such an amendment.³ Ultimately, however, neither of the bills progressed beyond the committee stage.

The following month another bill, H.R. 5644, "to aid in the national defense by developing a civilian air reserve in the United States with basic military training, by providing for a pilot training program, and authorizing an appropriation therefor," was introduced by Representative Van Zandt.⁴ The purpose of the bill was to

¹ Cong. Rec., 75 Cong., 1 Sess., 2899 (March 16, 1939).
² Ibid., 2915 (March 20, 1939).
³ Memo for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, by General Arnold (prepared by H.P. [Lt. Col. Hume Peabody]), April 4, 1939, in AAG 032 L.
⁴ Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 1 Sess., 4422 (April 18, 1939).
increase the sources from which trained air pilots could be drawn in
the event of an emergency, and to this end it proposed to create "a
Civilian Air Reserve, the members of which shall be selected and
appointed by the Secretary of War." This reserve group, however,
was not to constitute a part of the Army of the United States. The
Secretary was to be further authorized to prescribe the rules and
regulations for the training of such personnel "in basic military
subjects and in navigation, meteorology, engine and aircraft mechanics,
radio, ordnance, and allied military or aeronautical subjects." The
Civilian Air Reserve was to consist of holders of the CAA's airman
certificates who had a minimum of twenty-five hours solo flying time
and other qualifications to be prescribed by the Secretary of War.
Persons accepting this training would be liable for military service
in any branch of the government that the President might direct in
the event of war or other national emergency. They would receive their
training at military training centers for periods of one week or more
annually, where housing and subsistence would be furnished at govern-
ment expense. At least ten hours of flying training in government
aircraft would be provided. An additional clause stipulated that the
government would take out $5,000 life insurance for each participant.5

As might have been expected, the Air Corps opposed the measure
on the grounds that it was unnecessary in the light of programs then

5. H.R. 5544 (in the House of Representatives, April 18, 1939),
76 Cong., 1 sess.
in effect or about to be set up. In fact, provision for this additional source of partially trained pilots would interfere to some extent with the progress of the expansion program, as Army men would have to assist in the training program and its administration. It was believed that the Air Corps Training Center and the civilian flying schools which would be utilized would be able to keep pace with the existing aeronautical manufacturing establishment. Finally, "The organization of another group of reserve personnel separate and distinct from the existing Reserves and National Guard adds unnecessarily to the administrative problems of the war Department pertaining to civilian components."

During the remainder of 1939 and through the winter, the development of the Air Corps expansion program seems to have occupied congressional interest to the point that the legislators wished to see its progress before introducing any further bills to supplement existing sources of pilot personnel. By the spring of 1940, however, the war in Europe had started, and after a weird winter of "sitzkrieg" on the western front, there were increasing signs of imminent activity on the part of the Nazi war machine. It was natural, therefore, that people's minds turned once again to defense and means of strengthening it.

On April 17, 1940, Senator D. worth Clark of Idaho introduced S. 3723, "a bill to supplement existing laws with respect to the training of civilian aircraft pilots," which was referred to the Committee on Commerce. This bill was identical to one introduced a month later in the House by Representative Randolph, H.R. 9786. The measures provided for the issuance of "aviation-training certificates" to holders of student-pilot or private-pilot ratings. After completion of a course of aviation training, the certificates would be redeemed by payment of $50 to the holders. The purpose of the bills was to encourage and expedite the training of civilian pilots from whom candidates for appointment in the Air Corps might be drawn as the need arose. Although neither of the bills got beyond committee, both were indications of the general tenor of the period, when the urgency of developing a strong air arm was becoming increasingly apparent.

A similar indication is embodied in a news item in the New York Times of May 20, 1940, which reported a program presented by the "Civilian Air Corps," an organization composed of a group of Chicago airmen who proposed that the government provide military flight training for experienced civilian fliers. They suggested that since events in Europe had proved that the United States needed every pilot it could get.

8. Ibid., 5726 (May 15, 1940).
could obtain, the nation should avail itself of its approximately fourteen thousand licensed pilots who were not members of any military unit. With some training by Army pilots these experienced civilian fliers could be fitted "for rapid transition from civilian to army flying in case of an emergency." Such training would enable cutting down the time lag in that transition "to weeks instead of years." Arthur J. LaFonte, Jr., spokesman of the group, asked that the Army supervise such a training program and allocate advanced models of training planes and the money necessary to pay instructors.

Another variation of the same theme was set forth in a bill, S. 4183, introduced by Senator James M. Mead of New York on June 19, 1940. This proposed to establish an "Air Line Pilots' Reserve." The bill provided that every such pilot

... shall be commissioned as a reserve officer in a separate aviation unit, to be known as the Air Line Pilots' Reserve. Each such pilot shall take a course of training in such unit for one month during each calendar year. Each such pilot, while taking such course of training, shall receive training pay from the United States, at a rate equal to his average monthly pay for the twelve months immediately preceding the month during which he begins such course, together with traveling expenses and subsistence, or allowances in lieu thereof, subject to limitations corresponding to

those provided by law in case of officers of the United States Army, insofar as they are not inapplicable.\textsuperscript{11}

The bill further provided for periodic advances in grade, but would not require any pilot already commissioned in the Army or Navy reserves to join this new group. The Air Line Pilots' Reserve would be a reserve component of the Army, but its members would be subject to active service only when ordered into it in time of war. The training of this reserve would correspond to the tactical training given by the Air Corps, would "emphasize bombardment tactics," and would "be carried on in a separate unit, with tactical equipment corresponding to that used by the Army Air Corps."\textsuperscript{12} The bill was referred to the Committee on Commerce and died there.

In the ensuing months air lines experienced an increasingly serious shortage of pilots as a result of calls to reserve duty. Therefore, renewed attention was given to Mead's bill. When Mead had first introduced his proposal in 1935, the air lines had opposed it. When he introduced it the third time in early 1941, however, it was believed that the commercial carriers were more in favor of it. They could no longer recruit replacements from the Army and Navy, and the measure furnished an alternative to the prospect of losing their pilots altogether. Many air lines, however, were still cool to the idea and apparently preferred an exchange arrangement whereby Army

\textsuperscript{11} S. 4155 (in the Senate, June 19, 1940), 76 Cong., 3 Sess.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
and Navy pilots would rotate in and out of the air lines, along with regular transport pilots, giving all an equal amount of training. Another objection to the proposal, voiced by Army authorities, was the fear that the difference in pay between the Regular Army and Navy personnel and the air line reservists—who by the terms of the bill would be paid on the basis of their previous twelve months' earnings—might engender dissension and bad feeling. The bill, S. 766, which was introduced on February 6, 1941, again expired in committee.

On April 29, 1941, Jennings Randolph introduced another bill, H.R. 4670, "to establish a civilian air reserve, to be organized and trained by the War and Navy Departments, and for other purposes." Under the proposed legislation, the War and Navy departments would organize and train civilian pilots, mechanics, ground crew members, and others who owned their own aircraft and ground equipment. War gear, such as boat racks and machine guns, would be provided and installed on private planes. The bill proposed to subsidize the personnel of this civilian air reserve for their service in war exercises, but no figure was set to limit the amount of this subsidy. The War Department designated the bill as "uneconomical" and "unsound" as well as unnecessary. Air Corps schools were the proper places to provide such training. Further, the value of using civilian reserve pilots.

15. Ibid., 3739-40 (April 29, 1940).
in war exercises was considered "extremely doubtful and their value in time of actual war even more so." It would be sheer suicide to attempt combat in current private aircraft. In short, the bill did not seem to have any national defense value, and the large appropriations which it would make necessary could be better spent for other purposes. 15

on several similar bills introduced in Congress during the same period, 17 the War Department made similar comments.

The War Department is now engaged in preparations to defend this country against one or more of the greatest professional armies ever developed. To succeed, our military and naval forces, including our air force, must possess technical excellence found in professional organizations. While it may be possible later on, when our basic training has been completed, to divert some of our time and energy to civilian organizations such as is proposed in this bill, now is not the time to divert them.

The Army does not have the instructors and other necessary individuals to carry on the training of civilians provided for in this bill, nor should it be called upon to provide the administrative personnel and equipment needed for the same purpose. The powers and duties enumerated in the bill are rather loosely defined. The provisions relating to the installation of bomb racks, machine guns and such material in private airplanes appear to be impractical... 18

Thus, all these proposals to establish a formal civilian air reserve caze to naught, in view of the Army's stand that the best means of establishing a strong air defense was to conserve all

16. Secretary of War to A. J. Bay, Aug. 10, 1941, in AG 037 N.
18. Secretary of War to A. J. Bay, Aug. 8, 1941, in AG 580 (6-14-41).
facilities and personnel for the chief use of the Air Corps and its civil contract schools in the flying training program of the air arm. From the standpoint of administration, such a civilian reserve organization would have been unwieldy. The tactical training which the measures contemplated would have been so meager as to be valueless. And the proposal to arm private aircraft in an effort to convert them into warplanes displayed a discouraging unawareness of advances in tactical and material factors.

2. Proposel Legislation for Glider Pilot Training

The first congressional proposals for the use of gliders in the emergency defense program were made in January 1941, just a few months before the Germans made their most spectacular use of the glider in the conquest of Crete. As early as 1939, however, recommendations had been made for a glider pilot training program. In February of that year it was reported that the Soaring Society of America was seeking government aid for the training of glider pilots, and that its president, Richard C. du Pont, was to confer with members
of Congress on the possibilities.\textsuperscript{19} In July 1940 a New York Times editorial urged the adoption of glider training as a basis for military pilot training. At least, the writer claimed, such training could play "an important supplementary role in primary instruction," particularly in the meteorological knowledge it would impart.\textsuperscript{20}

Glider experts were asserting the same thing. Levin E. Barringer, in a newspaper interview, introduced the further argument that preliminary glider training would save the government money and would lead to a lower accident rate in power-pilot training. He contended that "Gliding has a definite place in training fliers."\textsuperscript{21}

On January 10, 1941, Senator Patrick A. McCarran of Nevada introduced a bill, S. 790, "to establish a Civilian Glider Pilot Training Division in the Civil Aeronautics Administration, and for other purposes."\textsuperscript{22} Shortly thereafter, Representative John M. Costello of California introduced H.R. 2661, a bill to provide for

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{19} New York Times, Feb. 12, 1939. The project included a formal request to the technical development section of the CAA for the purchase of several gliders and for the subsidization by the CAA of the training of 100 glider pilots. A recommendation was also to be made to Army officials to buy gliders for use in the training school at Randolph Field, Texas. \textit{Ibid.} In December 1939 Bernard M. Baruch submitted to Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson a report on "The Air Power of the Totalitarian Aggressors and Its Significance for the United States," written by "a man who knows something about the subject." Baruch thought that something ought to be done to get the country more air-minded, and he asked that the report be passed on to the Chief of Staff and the "Chief of the Air Service" for their comments and suggestions. This report cited the methods employed by the Axis powers in building up their air forces, with particular stress being laid on the German gliding activities. \textit{Memo for Chief of Staff by Louis Johnson, Assistant Secretary of War, Dec. 13, 1939, in} \textit{AAG 390-394-331.4 C (War Plans, National Defense, etc.)).}
  \item \textsuperscript{20} New York Times, July 7, 1940.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} \textit{Ibid.}, Aug. 4, 1940.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Cong. Rec., 77 Cong. 1 Sess. 90 (Jan. 10, 1941).
\end{itemize}
the training of civil glider pilots. Costello proposed that the
CIA, as part of its civilian pilot training program, include the
study of gliders, and he stressed the value of trained glider
pilots in any program of special defense and offense. He contrasted
the neglect of glider training in the United States with the
attention given this phase of aviation in Germany, and he claimed
that Germany's glider training program had resulted in more than
a quarter of a million trained glider pilots, from whom the nucleus
of the Luftwaffe was selected. In further support of his bill,
Costello introduced an article by William L. White, who described
the very likely part that German glider troops might play in
any attempt at invading England.

Despite the fact that Costello's bill was buried in the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, another bill—
"to establish a civilian glider pilot training division in the
Civil Aeronautics Administration"—was soon introduced by
Representative Hamilton Fish. Fish's bill met the same fate as
Costello's, but meanwhile the question had been taken up to a
certain extent by publications and individuals who were stressing

23. Ibid., 303 (Jan. 24, 1941).
25. Ibid., Appendix, 542-43 (Feb. 17, 1941); cf., Daily Gong. Reg.,
77 Cong., 2 Sess., Appendix, 144-45 (April 9, 1942).
the military advantages of a glider pilot training program. In the interim, the War Department had been considering the first bill, S. 300, and had apparently come to the conclusion that such training might be of considerable value if given as civilian training, but opposed it as a part of the Air Corps training program. Its value for the training of military pilots would not be "commensurate with the cost involved." But encouragement of glider clubs and civilian glider training would be of "considerable potential value to national defense." Therefore, it was "recommended that the War Department report favorably on subsection . . . which relate to the establishment of Civilian Glider Clubs and the fostering of Civilian Glider Pilot Training." 27

Public opinion was being expressed in communications sent by various individuals to Major General George H. Brett, Acting Chief of the Air Corps, urging the War Department to support the bill as a means of bringing low-cost preliminary pilot training to thousands of young men who could not otherwise obtain it. 28

An editorial in the New York Times on February 16, 1941, analyzed the pros and cons of the question and urged positive congressional action. It said that "experts in both the Army and Navy maintain that the motorless craft provide a safe and speedy medium in

which to give the student flyer a feeling of confidence in the
air, a knowledge of basic control mechanisms, and an invaluable
groundwork in first-hand knowledge of air currents, thermals
and the like." These would be excellent foundations for powered
flight training. It was said, too, that gliders "could be provided
readily and without drain on the resources of metals and power-
plant facilities urgently needed for the construction of airplanes."

The reports from the "aer, "navy, and commerce departments,
however, ultimately opposed passage of S. 220 because of the fear
that such training might draw off and divert materials needed
for the procurement of toners for the flying training program.

Senator Carter, the sponsor of the bill, was apparently irked
by these arguments, and a confidential report to the Secretary
of the General Staff from the Budget and Legislative Planning
Branch noted part of his speech on the floor of the Senate on
May 26, 1941:

Apparently Secretary Stimson does not know what is going
on in the War Department, because during the period
the War Department had this bill under consideration,
that is, from January 30 to April 15, the United States
Army Air Corps was very much concerned about troop-
carrying gliders and how they should be built. . . .
I feel certain that if Secretary Stimson had consulted
the Air Corps before making his recommendation to
the Chairman of the Commerce Committee, the recommen-
dation would have been different.

27. Memo for Secretary, General Staff, by Col. A. T. Brown, Chief,
Budget and Legislative Planning Branch, May 27, 1941, in A&A
ASPP, 1 A, Gliders.
Despite the War Department's official recommendation against the passage of this bill, it is evident that the Air Corps was giving the problem serious consideration and that Secretary Stimson knew it. In a confidential memorandum to General Brett on February 25, 1941, General Arnold had directed that a study be made of the possibilities of troop- and cargo-carrying gliders.\(^{30}\)

In response to this directive, a memorandum prepared for the Chief of Staff, dated by 28, 1941, with reference to the training of glider pilots stated that the opinion of the Secretary of War on P-380 had been shared by the Chief of the Air Corps. The latter official considered that glider training would be of doubtful value for crew training. The Navy had found this true. Secretary Stimson's failure to mention troop-carrying gliders in his report on P-380 could be explained by the fact that the Air Corps project was confidential in nature. The memorandum also stated that gliders were being procured for experimental purposes and that crew pilots had been ordered to glider schools for instruction.\(^{31}\)

Meanwhile, the battle for Crete had taken place, and the part played by German glider-borne troops in its conquest had received front-page notice as well as editorial comment. On May 29, 1941,

\(^{30}\) Memo for General Brett by General Arnold, Feb. 25, 1941, in ibid.
\(^{31}\) Unsigned memo for Chief of Staff, May 28, 1941, in ibid.
The New York Times carried a dispatch to the effect that the House Committee on Naval Affairs had ordered an investigation into the possibilities of using gliders as combat aircraft, and a sub-committee had been instructed to begin a preliminary inquiry.

In a letter to President Roosevelt on June 5, 1941, Edward Stanton, vice president of Detroit, a pioneer in the glider field and founder of the National Glider Association, advocated the teaching of gliding to all pilots as preliminary instruction which would greatly improve their flying ability. He pointed out that the invasion of Crete had demonstrated the usefulness of gliders in the actual field of battle for the transport of armies. "Our Army and Navy seem to overlook this valuable arm to our service. I have always been deeply interested in the subject and I feel it is worthwhile bringing it personally to your attention." 32

Edward's letter was referred to the War Department for reply, and in a letter from Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, on June 16, 1941, the Air Corps' feeling about 3, 000 and similar hills were set forth:

"Where the Air Corps has given encouragement and aid to civil aeronautics in time of peace, the country is now in the midst of an all-out defense program. If we are to create adequate air power, military demands for power and aircraft and competent crews for such aircraft should be a recent. Civil concerns should not be permitted to impair or diffuse the military effort. From reports the German civilian gliding program has not continued at its previous level.

32. AAG 052 Legislation-General.
after that country went to war in September 1939.

... It is believed that to improve another civil aeronautical venture such as is proposed in S. 288 would serve to encourage the business-as-usual attitude which has been detrimental to the national defense program.33

The letter stated that the Air Corps felt that the training of power pilots was of more importance than the training of glider pilots, and that glider pilots would have to take a long course of training before being able to use military gliders, whereas military pilots could easily be taught to operate towed gliders after they had received their usual basic training. The theory that Germany had built up a vast reserve of military pilots as a result of her extensive gliding activities was put forward. The Air Corps program of glider pilot training was explained in general terms, and the opinion was expressed that "there exists in the Air Corps, adequate development, procurement, and training organizations to satisfy its likely glider needs."34

The congressional sponsors of glider training went right on introducing legislation to that end. McCarran, despite the failure of his previous bill, on July 15, 1941, introduced another bill, S. 1749, "to promote the national defense and preparedness through the creation of a vast reservoir of potential assets."35

33. R. A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, to Edward S. Stettinius, Jr., June 15, 1941, in ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
airplane pilots and mechanics, and for other purposes. In this bill he proposed the establishment of a glider division within the National Youth Administration for the purpose of promoting the art of glider soaring in the United States.35

The War Department was asked for its opinion of the measure, and in a letter to Senator Albert E. Thomas, chairman of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, the Secretary of War expressed the Department's disapproval. It is interesting to note, however, that this time the objections were based on slightly different grounds, namely, that the value of glider training as a preliminary to pilot training was not considered essential enough to warrant the expense and use of materials involved. The use of gliders for strictly military purposes is of definite interest, but it is believed that training of personnel for such military use should be undertaken by the Army Air Forces, and this is being done.36 A year later, when a revised draft of the bill was again under consideration before the committee, the War Department reiterated its objections on the same grounds.37

The wide public interest in the German use of glider-borne troops in the Crete campaign and the congressional criticism

35. Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 sess., 6024 (July 15, 1941).
of the War Department for its "present lack of interest in the glider as a military weapon" called for. He replied as to what was being done. This came in a radio address by General Arnold at 11:15, New York, on July 17, 1940, entitled "Speaking for the Army." General Arnold acknowledged that the introduction of gliders had changed the whole scheme of combat, and he stated that the Army had been preparing for their prospective use for more than six months. First attention had been devoted to over-driven planes, but the Army Air Forces had not ignored the glider.38

Even with the dissemination of information on the Army Air Forces glider program, there were still some demands for a civilian glider pilot training bill. In a radio address on March 29, 1940, Representative Fred Bradley of Michigan urged the establishment of a Civil glider training program for young people, to sustain their initial interest in aviation and to prepare them to go on to later pilot training in over-driven aircraft. He felt that the Army and Navy should actively support such a project in order to build up a backlog of potential pilots. He cited opinions of well-known Army and Navy pilots to the effect that glider training would show up deficiencies and eliminate

38. Quoted in Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 4474-75 (Oct. 6, 1941).
unsuitable pilot material and that such training was “an essential to the art of flying.”

Although legislation to provide for a glider training program by the AAI was never enacted into law, the events of the war, the expression of public opinion in several countries, and professional interest in glider training, all combined to make the Army Air Forces fully conscious of the military possibilities of gliders. On May 28, 1942, the War Department, in connection with its first public recruiting of civilians for the service, announced that the Army Air Forces would train large numbers of glider pilots under an expansion program to be started June 1. Candidates were to receive preliminary training at eighteen AAI schools, with nine additional schools to be utilized for elementary and advanced training. In an editorial on July 5, 1942, the New York Times cautiously commented upon the belated commencement of the program:

At last there is substantial evidence that the glider training course for the Air Corps is under way... one after the Nazis demonstrated at Crete how effectively gliders can be used in an attack, an extraordinary amount of inertia apparently had to be overcome before the objections for a suitable supply of this military means...

The Air Corps reaction to the various bills to encourage civilian slider training was one of disapproval. Viewing the slider as a potential military weapon, the Air Arm began experimentation and training before the German demonstration of the use of sliders in the invasion of Crete. But it was unwilling to let material needed for the production of power-driven aircraft be diverted to slider production for civilian training only on the grounds of possible worth of slider training as a preliminary to power piloting. As a military reason the development of a slider school and the necessary training to that end should be an Army project.41

3. Proposals to Establish a Division of Aviation Education

Remotely related to the training program of the Army Air Forces but primarily civil in import was the proposal to establish a Division of Aviation Education in the United States Office of Education. The proposal merits some attention, however, because its advocates held that the promotion of interest in aviation through instruction and practical participation in aeronautical

41. For a detailed study of slider training activities carried on by the Army Air Forces, see The Slider Pilot Training Program, 1941-1943, prepared by the Training Section, Administrative History Branch, 1944.
activities in secondary schools was related to the national
defense program.

At the annual convention of the National Aeronautic Association
in St. Louis in January 1936, concern was expressed at the American
failure to match Germany's air training for youth. Expansion of
the military and civilian aviation program was urged, and a
two-point program for aviation education was submitted by
William L. Knapp, secretary of the association. He proposed:
(1) "establishment of courses in aviation in high schools"; (2)
"development of train instructors for these schools"; (3)
"establishment of a balance, well-rounded program which would
take boys and girls... at the age of 10 - 15 instruct them in
aviation up to the age of 19, when they would be eligible for the
more advanced government courses." The resolution finally adopted
by the convention urged the "introduction of some form of aviation
education or activity in every junior high school and college in
the United States, and the establishment of a section of aviation
in the Federal Office of Education."42

In December 1939 the attention of the war Department was
called to the specific progress of the totalitarian countries

involving the military training of youth groups, with particular emphasis upon aviation, and it was urged that the United States adopt some modification of the same plan in order to make American youth air-minded. Such a program, it was pointed out, would greatly enhance the future of civil aviation as well as provide a pool of potential military pilots. The immediate reorganization of the air arm of the United States on a mass basis was urged, with the building up of a country-wide organization to mobilize American youth for air sport. The part of the government should be to arrange for speedy training of several thousand flying teachers. Specifically, Congress should be requested to appropriate $100,000,000 to further air sport in the interest of national defense. All Americans between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two should participate in a three-month flying course to be given free by the national government, in turn obligating themselves to serve in the air forces in the event of national emergency.

The results of such a program, it was stated, would be the development of a tremendous enthusiasm for air sport on the part of American youth; the provision of a vast pool of energies and talents to which the Army and Navy could turn in the moment of danger; confidence of American youth in the air as great as that on the highways; and acceleration of air traffic with consequent stimulation of the aircraft industry.43

Prior to 1940 the Office of Education in the Federal Security Agency had for some time been engaged in the promotion of aviation education through its Vocational Education Division, which
administered relations with public schools throughout the country.

With the increasingly active general interest in aviation, however, it was felt that the creation of a special division within the Office of Education specifically to handle this work might be desirable. On May 21, 1940, Senator McCarran introduced S. 4511 to establish such a division. Its general purpose should be to conduct research and make studies and investigations with
respect to means and methods of organizing and carrying on education in aviation in the United States. This should be
accomplished through cooperation with public educational institutions in providing plans and materials for instruction in aerodynamics, the theory of flight, the airplane and its engines, meteorology, law relating, and other related subjects in aviation. The
appropriate legislation was based on the contention that "general dissemination of aeronautical educational information" was of questionable value.

44. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 3 sess., 5756 (May 21, 1940).
45. Ibid., 76 Cong., 3 sess., 5756 (May 31, 1940).
In response to a request from Representative William L.
Larrabee, chairman of the House Committee on Education, asking for
his views on a similar bill, H.R. 7074, General Arnold stated
that he felt an expression of his views would be inappropriate.
Such a division—relationship to the Air Corps would be limited
to representation on the Advisory Committee which would be set
under the terms of the bill. He did point out, however, that
the criticism of the bill "shows the effect of its
enactment to be of secondary consideration in the national defense,
and that the Bureau of the budget reports that it is not in accordance
with the policy of the President." Neither of the bills yet
beyond committee.

In May 1942 Representative Randolph introduced H.R. 7089,
with similar purposes and provisions. He cited the
training being given in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, high schools
as a good example of what could be accomplished by an intensive
program of aviation education. Termination of training on the
secondary level would provide a great class of ready-made can-
didates for military flying and would lay "the groundwork for

47. General Arnold to W. L. Larrabee, July 25, 1942, in ARB 002 F.
world leadership in a vast multi-nation industry which gives every prospect of dominating our commerce, economics, and world-wide politics. Again, on September 3, 1942, in a radio address on the National Radio Forum, Wendell urged the creation of a Division of Aviation Education to facilitate remedying the desperate shortage of both pilots and mechanics.

This bill, like its predecessors, got no further than committee, but its fate greatly did not discourage proponents of similar legislation. As late as January 7, 1943, at the beginning of the Seventy-eighth Congress, Senator McCarran once again tried to obtain passage of a bill, S. 25, with similar wording. This time the bill did not receive the outright disapproval of the War Department, but doubt was expressed as to whether its purpose could be carried out without interfering with the immediate demands of the training program of the Army Air Forces. It was stated that additional instruction materials and instructor personnel are essential to the successful prosecution of the Air Forces training program. Training courses conducted by the aircraft industry for Army Air Forces personnel are an integral part of the training program for mechanics and technicians. It is important that no equipment or personnel be diverted from this primary effort and that the instruction facilities of the aircraft industry be utilized entirely to training military and civilian aircraft technicians.

51. Ibid., 78 Cong., 1 Sess., 33 (Jan. 7, 1943).
52. Draft letter, Secretary of War to Senator J. Thomas (prepared by Maj. A. M. Hanson, Jan. 21, 1943), in AAG 0371 Congress
Inasmuch as one of the functions proposed to be carried out by such a Division of Aviation Education would be "the encouragement of active cooperation between educational institutions and the aviation industry to foster course, in aviation education, the expression of such doubt is understandable. The War Department, however, did stress its desire "to contribute in every way possible to the improvement of aviation education subject to the reservations" contained in the letter of comment.\(^{53}\) Once again the bill died in committee.

4. **Proposals to Establish an Aviation Academy**

With the increased burden of training more and more men for the Army Air Forces, from time to time legislative proposals were made to help alleviate the problem by the creation of "aviation academies," schools for the Air Forces similar to the Military Academy at West Point and the Naval Academy at Annapolis. The proponents of such legislation felt that the only real answer to the training problem lay in the creation of such schools which would take students from the very beginning and carry them right through the entire training at one school.

As early as 1917 a bill was introduced into the House of Representatives which had, among other provisions, a section

\(^{53}\) Ibid.
authorizing the establishment of one or more air academies for
the training of cadets in the science of military and naval aerospace
making such academies equal with the military
Academy and the Naval Academy in that graduates would become
regular officers in the military and naval air arms. 54

At the beginning of 1930 Representative John C. Houston
of Kansas introduced H.R. 4751, to provide for the establishment
of a United States Aeronautical Academy in Sedgwick County,
Kansas. 55 Although the proposed academy was to instruct officers
and cadets in aerospace science in preparation for service
with the Army Air Corps, the Secretary of War might also accept
qualified naval officers and cadets detailed to the Academy
by the President. The courses of instruction were to be supplementary,
or similar, or both, to the courses offered at the
United States Military Academy. 56 The War Department comment on
the bill was succinct. The Plans Section advised the Chief of the
Air Corps that the bill should be opposed by the War Department
because there is no need for another Air Corps Training Center. 57

Meanwhile another type of aviation school had been proposed.

On March 8, 1930, Senator Lister Hill of Alabama had introduced

54. H.R. 7825 (in the House of Representatives, July 28, 1930),
66 Cong.
56. H.R. 4751 (in the House of Representatives, March 3, 1930),
76 Cong., 1 Sess.
57. S. P. [Lt. Col. J. E. Eakid], Plans Section, OCAC, to Chief
of Air Corps, March 14, 1939, in APO files.
In 1939, a bill to authorize "the establishment and operation of a military aircraft engine-repair center to determine production costs of military aircraft, and for other purposes." Among these "other purposes" was the creation of a military aeronautical school in the vicinity of the proposed engine-repair center. The school would train military pilots and aviation mechanics under supervision of the War Department. Requirements for pilots trained at the school should be at least as high as those necessary for a commercial pilot's certificate, while mechanics' courses should be a prerequisite for flight training.

War Department opposition to this phase of the bill was based on the fact that the proposed program contemplated supplementing the existing facilities for Air Corps training and that the proposed school would not be established in time to be of any value. Early the extension was far anyway, nor is it likely that it would be used after completion of the extension program.

The bill never went beyond the Committee on Military Affairs. Two years later, in 1941, a similar bill was introduced, the content of which was identical to the bill introduced by Senator Bill. In

58. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 1 sess., 79-10 (March 6, 1939).
59. S. 1729 (in the Senate, March 8, 1939), 76 Cong., 1 sess.
60. Draft letter, Secretary of the War to Senator Morris Sheppard (prepared by F. H. S. Shadrack, March 24, 1939), in AAG 032 L.
recommending unfavorable consideration, the Secretary of War presented the same objections offered to the earlier measure, 62

Later in 1941 a House bill, H.R. 5746, was introduced "to provide for the establishment and operation of an aviation academy for training of persons for service as commissioned officers in the aviation branches of the military and naval forces," and a few days later an identical bill, S. 164, was introduced in the Senate. 63 In commenting unfavorably on the latter bill, the War Department pointed out that while the bill provided that such an academy would train students to fit them for service with both the military and naval forces, in the rank of commissioned officers, actually the training of naval and military aviators necessarily differs. It was believed unlikely that one course of training could be adapted to fit both categories without entailing a good deal of wasted time on the students' part. "The proposed bill does not provide for any numerical limitation between student naval aviators and student military aviators nor does it stipulate to what extent the proposed academy would devote its teaching to primarily naval aviation or primarily military aviation matters." It was further pointed out that the number of graduates from such an academy would fall far short of the needs of the Army and Navy for aviation officers, and it

62. Secretary of War to Senator E. R. Reynolds, April 17, 1941, in MGC 033 N.
was concluded that the existing plan of training Army aviators at Air Corps training centers was adequate with no need for duplicating the program by creating an additional aviation academy. 64

Halfway through 1942, when the United States had been at war for about six months and the need for aircrew personnel was becoming more urgent every day, Senator Tom Stewart of Tennessee introduced S. 2507 to establish both a Military Aviation Academy and a Naval Aviation Academy. Senator Stewart argued that these were needed to speed up the training of cadets. He considered that combat training in the academies would be especially valuable. 65 The Secretary of War, however, felt that a military air academy was not needed under the Air Force training program and would tax facilities and personnel badly needed for the program already in operation. Also, the institution of aviation training at that point should solve the special problem. However, Post-war requirements and experience gained from methods now in use will dictate the advisability of establishing separate aviation academies.

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64 Secretary of War to Senator J. C. Reynolds (prepared by Lt. Col. C. E. Lederer), Dec. 28, 1941, in APR, O32.
65 Daily Cns., 77 Cong., 2 sess., 5505 (June 18, 1942).
academy for training additional personnel for the regular Army Air Corps. In 1943 Senator Stewart introduced a bill which was identical to his measure of the preceding year. The Air Department's position was based on the same arguments as those set forth previously.

As late as December 1943 the idea of an aviation academy was still being given congressional consideration in some quarters. On Dec. 3, 1943, a bill to create a department of air defense, provided among other things for the creation of a United States aviation academy to train personnel who would be commissioned as officers.

56. Secretary of War to Senator R. S. Kerr, April 7, 1943, in AG 353 (6-24-43). Although Stewart's bill died in committee, one of his home-state newspapers, the Nevada Commercial Appeal, took vigorous issue with this routine treatment and urged emergency consideration of the measure. It suggested that air academies, instead of being scattered as Army and Navy assistance acts, should be established in their own right as air academies, similar in status to the Institutions at West Point and Annapolis. "In our judgment the immediate years will bring aviation to supremacy with the Army and Navy as auxiliaries. We believe recent losses and recent battles have borne this out... Yet here we are still struggling to build a two-ocean navy and squadrons billions of dollars on it—dollars that should be going into an air fleet." Quoted in Daily News, Sec., 77 Cong., 2 sess., Appendix, 2918 (June 25, 1943).

57. Ibid., 76 Cong., 1 sess., 1318 (Feb. 22, 1943).

in the United States air force. Such an academy could be administered and a similar to that in the Naval Academy. The bill received unreported from the Committee on Appropriations in Executive Departments to which it had been referred.\(^\text{69}\)

In connection with proposals to establish aviation academies, it is interesting to note the introduction, in May 1940, of two bills to authorize appropriations to establish a national airport and aviation school at Indianapolis for training airmen to become aviators in the Army and Navy. Representative Ludlow introduced the House bill (H.R. 4072) and Senator Fatio the Senate bill (S. 4078).\(^\text{70}\) Both bills provided that upon completion of the prescribed courses the students would be eligible for admission into the "Regular Aviation Corps."\(^\text{71}\) The actual wording of the bills, both of which were introduced by request, was such that their exact import could not be ascertained. The Senate bill, upon being reported from committee, was indefinitely postponed,\(^\text{72}\) and the House bill was never discharged from committee. The Illinois Division recommended that the Air Corps not comment on the proposal until the War Department specifically requested it.\(^\text{73}\)

\(^{69}\) Daily Cons. Rec., 78 Cong., 1 Sess., 277 (Sept. 17, 1943).
\(^{70}\) Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 3 Sess., 5468 (May 2, 1940), 7255 (May 31, 1940).
\(^{71}\) id., 7072 (in the House, May 31, 1940), 76 Cong., 3 Sess.
\(^{72}\) Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 3 Sess., 8655-64 (June 27, 1940).
\(^{73}\) H.R. Canvin Moore, Illinois Division, CDAC, to Chief, Illinois Division, May 8, 1940, in Air 03.\(^{\text{74}}\)
It may be expected that certain of the measures treated in this chapter will continue to be introduced, both during the war and after. For example, proposals to establish aviation academies are often linked with bills calling for a separate air force or a single department of national defense. Also, after the war, in line with the tremendous aviation expansion anticipated, a far-reaching system of aviation education to instill air-mindedness in American youth may be adopted. But during the period of national defense preparation and after war came such proposals as those discussed here constituted a possible strain on the facilities and personnel of the Air Force training program. Therefore, they were opposed by the Air Force and by a majority of the legislators.

74. See "Digest of Legislative Proposals for a Department of Aviation and/or Department of National Defense," prepared in Legislative History Section, Administrative History Branch, AHI.
Chapter V

CONCLUSION

The period 1939-1943 inaugurated a revolution destined before it ran out to overturn many comfortably accepted ways of life. Those most immediately apparent, of course, are in the arts and sciences of war-making, particularly in the employment of aviation not only as a support and support for the traditional arms, but also as a powerful striking force in its own right. The role of air power, it is true, had been forecast, and its potential led inspired fear in the minds of British and French statesmen at the time of the Munich crisis, but without a clearer demonstration than had then been furnished, its terrific impact in actual conflict had been only dimly realized. It is to the credit, then, of the President, the American Congress, and the Air Department that the legislative process was able to furnish a sufficiently flexible basis of authorization to permit the construction of an aerial combat arm second to none. Perhaps it is not to their credit that so little, relatively speaking, had been done in advance. The increasing influence of an ever-increasing defense psychology furnishes the explanation.
The basic planning for Air Corps expansion was first reflected in the legislative realm in the President's message to Congress on January 13, 1939. His program embodied the Air Corps decision to utilize civilian agencies to facilitate Air Corps pilot training as well as to authorize training of Army personnel in other aviation specialties. In addition, the President called for a civilian pilot training program to create a reservoir of partially trained pilots from which the armed services could draw in time of crisis. Within less than six months these fundamental authorizations for the expansion program were enacted into law.

Although first consideration was given to pilot training, with expansion of Air Corps facilities mainly depended upon to meet requirements for aviation mechanics and technicians, under the provisions of Public Law Number 18 of 1939, Army personnel could be given technical training by civilian agencies. Also, in 1940 the Civilian Pilot Training Act was amended to provide for the training by the CAA of civilian aviation mechanics and technicians. The Air Corps tried to get the bill amended so that only enlisted reservists would be trained under its provisions. Congress did not make the requested changes, but through Executive Order 8976, the Air Department had the power to control the program.

The constant pressure of the expansion program necessitated
securing ever greater numbers of candidates for military flying training. This inevitably meant relaxing some of the ideal standards, but the aim was to retain as many of them as possible.

Several legislative steps were taken to broaden the procurement base to include all possible applicants. The aviation cadet program was designed to accelerate the rate of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps flying cadets so that the Army's procurement program could not continue working under a disadvantage. The aviation student bill sought to open the way for flying training of large numbers of enlisted men who could not meet the high standards for commissioning. "Then are, mental, and educational requirements for aviation cadets were relaxed in the continuous effort to meet procurement goals, the flight officer bill affected a commitment on the commissioning policy.

The military Air Force was consistently unwilling to permit the diversion of urgently needed material, manufacturing facilities, training agencies, and personnel to civilian training programs which were considered of doubtful value to the Army's expansion program. This was the attitude expressed in the case of the bill to create a reserve of civilian mechanics. Also, in the role for civilian pilot training, the Air Corps was perfectly willing to acknowledge the possible military value of
the slider; but as it has not been established that slider utilization has any value or a preliminary to power-plant training, the Air Corps held that the slider project should be military rather than civilian consideration. The same basis has reversed the Air Arm's attitude toward creation of a civil air arm and the establishment of a "Division of Aviation Education to sponsor nationwide cost-efron educational education on the secondary school level. The Air Corps consent on one of the civilian slider-pilot training bills is worth reemphasizing. It was strongly expressed that neither assistant cuisine on civil aviation bills only incidentally related to the war effort.

In the air arm's view that encouragement and aid to civil communities in time of war, the country is not in the spirit of an "all-out defense program. If we are to create adequate air power, military demands for trained aircraft and trained air crews must exist. Civil concerns should not be permitted to inhibit military efforts. It is believed the to encourage another civil aviation venture such as is proposed in Sec. 209 would serve to encourage the business-as-usual attitude which has been so detrimental to the national defense program.

In the legislative process for the more was considered in this study, relationships between the air arm and the war department General Staff were apparently amicable. Although minor changes might be made during General Staff consideration.

1. J. J. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, to General S. Parmelee, June 16, 1941, in the OS: Legislation-General.
of draft measures proposed in the air arm, or bills referred by the war Department to the Air Corps for comment, the Air Corps attitude was invariably opposed as the War Department opinion.

Although the President's message of January 12, 1937, received widespread newspaper comment, most of the other proposals treated here received no significant editorial notice in the press, with the exception of the New York Times. Proposals for glider training, however, were mentioned in many papers, because of the spectacular German use of the glider as military weapon. A sampling of editorial columns of outstanding newspapers in 11 sections of the United States reveals a scarcity of comment on other bills, apparently reflecting lack of interest in such inertive measures as those for military glider training.

In 1937 the various codes contributing to the enactment of Air Corps legislation were working in a vacuum. They had, of course, some record of experience and some basic colleges to guide them, but the character and scope of the demands which would be made upon them were so utterly beyond their immediate comprehension that their lack of authoritative current information and their failure to make definite preliminary plans to meet the extension of war planning caused indecision, duplication of effort, and waste of valuable time on matters.
shortcomings, especially in the early period, are understandable. After war began in Europe, the legislative body rapidly became better informed on the nature of the general problem. Both Congress and War Department officials usually put first things first. Visionary ideas were to be treated with less serious deliberation and practical problems with more dispatch, though not always with the necessary forethought to prevent the need for later patchwork. Generally the legislation passed was of sufficient flexibility to allow the requisite administrative modifications. This last factor is especially important. It is obvious that, although Congress and the War Department did not always see eye to eye, the legislators usually held the confidence of the military men in high enough regard to accept their suggestions on technical matters and to permit them a relatively free hand in the execution of basic national defense policies. Preserving the perspectives of investigation, criticism, and speaking its mind on grand strategy, Congress realized that the using agency, the War Department, was best able to develop types, tactics, and techniques.
United States Congress. 73rd Congress, 2nd Session. 3rd Series. November 7, 1933.


The following were the chief bills and resolutions on the calendar of the 73rd Congress.

WATER RESOURCES

Reports

HAWAI'I

RESOLUTION

UNITED STATES. 1933 EDITION.

UNITED STATES STATUTES AT LARGE.

The following were the principal bills and resolutions introduced during the first session of the 73rd Congress, which were referred to committee, but were not reported. Occasionally, other issues were raised on the floor of Congress or otherwise discussed, but did not arise in the committee reports.
Central Files

The Army Air Forces Central Files contain the essential or negligible materials of value for this study. The files are printed and are filed in alphabetical order. The files contain routine personnel and equipment data, as well as official orders, reports, and other documents. In addition to the routine files, there are special files, such as the files for aircraft, for all types of locations.

Current (Present General):

The General Central Files were used for details not found in the Army Air Forces Central Files. They contain information similar to those described above.
AIA Historical Division

Miscellaneous Files and Correspondence.

The principal file material housed in the Historical Division, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, of use for this study is to be found in the Archives Section, especially useful were the files of the Plans Division, Office of the Chief of the Air Corps. Although much of this material is duplicated in the Army Air Forces Central Files, none of it was not found in any other depository.

Special Studies:


This detailed study, prepared by the Training Section, Administrative History Branch, Historical Division, treats generally some of the legislative proposals for a glider pilot training program, although its chief emphasis is upon the actual conduct of the training.

"Digest of Legislative Proposals for a Department of Aviation and/or "Department of National Defense." Typed study in files of Administrative History Branch.

This digest, prepared by the Legislative History Section, Administrative History Branch, Historical Division, in the winter of 1943-1944, is a detailed list and analysis of congressional bills to create a separate air force or a Department of National Defense.

Initial Selection of Candidates for Pilot, Bombardier, and Navigator Training. Army Air Forces Historical Studies: No. 2 November 1943.

This study, prepared by the Personnel Section, Administrative History Branch, Historical Division, traces the development of selection and classification procedures from 1917 to the summer of 1943, with particular attention given to the Aviation Cadet Qualifying Examination.
Newspapers


The above newspapers were sampled for expression of opinion on the major bills treated in the study. The New York Times
was useful both for editorial opinion and factual information.
Section of Public Law 70-68, April 3, 1943, Pertaining to Training
(43 Stat. 559)

SEC. 2. The facilities of the Army for instruction and training in aviation are hereby made available to the Secretary of War to be used for the education and training of technical, professional, or other educational institutions, or as applicable, except for the cost of tuition at such educational institutions, and the cost of maintenance of personnel, the Federal government shall be responsible for all personnel as required or necessary for training purposes. The tuition for the personnel of such educational institutions shall be paid out of funds which may be used for such purposes for the procurement branches.

SEC. 3. The Secretary of War, in his discretion and under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, is authorized to enroll any student at the Air Corps Training Center, for the pursuit of such course of instruction as may be prescribed thereon, in civil aviation, upon their own applications, so may be selected from the instructional staffs of the aviators flying schools which have been accredited by the War Department for the education, experience, and training of personnel of the military establishment: Provided, That except for the furnishing of such supplies, material, or equipment as may be necessary for training purposes, the tuition of such students shall be without cost to the United States: Provided further, That in case of injury to or sickness of such students, hospital or medical treatment may be given in Government hospitals, but shall be without charge to the United States other than for services of medical or dental personnel and the use of hospital equipment, not including medical or dental supplies: Provided further, That the United States shall be under no obligation in respect to removal or evacuation, transportation, or other facilities to the extent of any such student who dies of disease or injury while under such training, or to any such student in the event of personal injury sustained by him.

SEC. 4. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized, in his discretion and under such rules and regulations, and limits there to be prescribed by him, to use accredited aviation schools, the cost of which school shall be fixed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority for the training of any employee at such schools, at which personnel of the military establishment are required to take courses of training in aviation and its requirements, to enter into contracts with the Air Corps, on behalf and behalf of the Government, such contracts to be entered into under relevant Article of the law or Articles of agreement, or other aircraft, aircraft parts, or civil aviation equipment for the purpose of the Air Corps, or such letters, or any other contracts to be entered into or maintained for instruction, training, and maintenance purposes.
CIVILIAN AID TRAINING ACT OF 1933
(53 Stat. 455)

To it enacted . . . That this Act may be cited as the "Civilian Aid Training Act of 1933."

§ 1. The Civil Aeronautics Authority is authorized, with the limits of available appropriations made by the Congress, to train civilian pilots or to conduct programs for such training, including studies and researches as to the most desirable qualifications for aircraft pilots. Such training or programs shall be conducted pursuant to such resolutions as such Authority may from time to time make, including regulations regarding students participating therein to maintain special or insurance, and to any such voluntary or other fees for training or programs instituted by such Authority shall be based on cost of met, race, creed, or color. Such training or programs shall be carried out either through the use of the facilities and personal of the Authority or by contracts with educational institutions, or other persons (as defined in section 1 (26) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1933).§ 2. At least 90 per cent of the students selected for training under this Authority shall be selected from applicants other than civilian students.

§ 3. The Authority is authorized to lease or accept loans of such real property, and to purchase, lease, exclude, or erect leases of such personal property, as it may be necessary or desirable for carrying out the provisions of this Act.

§ 4. For the purpose of carrying out its functions under this Act, the Authority is authorized to exercise all powers conferred upon it by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, and to appoint and fix the compensation of experienced instructors, pilots, and other professional personnel and experts in technical or research work in the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, or as otherwise applicable to the employment and compensation of officers and employees of the United States, and which are section 2709 of the Revised Statutes shall apply to contracts with educational institutions and other persons for the use of aircraft or other facilities or for the performance of services authorized by section 21 of this Act.

§ 5. Any executive department or independent establishment is hereby authorized to cooperate with the Authority in carrying out the purposes of this Act, and for such sum as may be or in aid of the Authority, by contract or otherwise, and as may be appropriated by the Authority, to educational institutions or to persons cooperating with the Authority in the conduct of any such training or programs, civilian officials, experts, or employees, aircraft and other property or equipment, on lands or buildings under its control and in excess of its own requirements.
3. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated the sum of $5,000,000 for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act during the fiscal years 1949 and 1950 and not to exceed the sum of $7,000,000 during each subsequent fiscal year. This Act shall enter into force on July 1, 1949, and all costs of, labor, or other obligations incurred prior to such date shall be paid from funds appropriated for this Act.

(Amended June 27, 1950)
Amendment of Civilian Pilot Training Act of 1972 (96 Stat. 161)

To it enacted . . . that the first sentence of section 4 of the Civilian Pilot Training Act of 1972 is amended to read as follows:

'The Civil Aeronautical Authority is authorized, within the limits of available appropriations made by the Congress, to train civilian pilots with special training to profitably or to conduct research for such training, including studies and research, to train flight instructors for such training, and to conduct research for aircraft flight training, which are not available.
Eviction Statute Act (5US Stats. 117)

It should be noted that the act is not directly related to the

landlord's right to evict a tenant. The act is concerned with the

procedure for assessing and collecting a civil claim for damages

caused by the tenant, such as for rent or repairs.

Under the act, the landlord must file a complaint with the

county court, and the tenant must be served with a copy of the

complaint. The court will then schedule a hearing to determine

whether the landlord is entitled to the damages claimed.

In the event that the court finds in favor of the landlord,

the landlord may then proceed to evict the tenant by filing a

petition with the court, and the tenant will be notified of the

hearing. The court will then hear evidence from both parties

and make a decision. The tenant may appeal the decision to

the superior court if they disagree with the ruling.

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hearing. The court will then hear evidence from both parties

and make a decision. The tenant may appeal the decision to

the superior court if they disagree with the ruling.
3. Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the act of June 16, 1900 (34 Stat. 376), as amended by the act of June 1, 1916 (39 Stat. 252), are hereby revised to read as follows:

3. The proviso of the first paragraph of the act of 1900, as amended by the act of 1916, that the amount of the interest on the portions of the proceeds of the []

(Amended June 1, 1916)
Aviation Student Life Insurance Act (47 Stat. 561)

It is hereby authorized and directed, upon such conditions as the Secretary of the Army of the United States in active Federal service for training and instruction in aviation students, in their respective grades, in such schools and schools as shall direct, provided that said conditions are so detailed as to provide for the following courses of instruction which shall be carried out, to participate therein and frequently in aerial flight shall be issued Government life insurance in the amount of $10,000 under the Federal Service Life Insurance Act of 1920 (Public, 46 Stat. 60, title 7, sect 1), except that the minimum shall be paid by the Government during the period such students are undergoing training and instruction, and upon completion of training and instruction in aviation students who shall have the option of continuing such policies at their own expense and provided further, that policies hereunder shall be considered as insuring or otherwise reflecting existing statutory insurances for the amount of training and instruction in aviation students or aviation safety. (Approved June 3, 1941.)
... that section 1 of the Act of April 3, 1919
(C. & O. 535), is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Section 1. That the facilities of the Army for instruction and
training in military and technical subjects in the Department of War to be
instituted "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, in
accordance with the provisions contained in section 18 of the Act of
April 3, 1919 (C. & O. 535), shall be used for the training of
students of any technical, professional, or
professional instruction, or for students, the Army, or
in the case of any industrial, labor or other plan, shall be
made to include such training to be in accordance with an
expenditure of not less than the period of military training in which the training
of which the normal instruction provided, to ensure the training shall be
instituted by the United States in accordance with the normal distance of
the personnel in the United States for the cost of tuition at such
institutions, at the cost of travel to and from any necessary
materials, shall be given at the discretion of the War Department or the
Securities and Exchange Commission, to ensure the training at such
institutions at the cost of travel to and from the military training in which the training
shall be provided.

(Signed July 3, 1919)"
United States Military Academy Cadet Flight Training Act (56 Stat. 7)

2. It is enacted ... that during such time as cadets or the United States Military Academy are engaged in flight training involving aerial transportation in a plane or a similar aircraft they shall be insured to the extent of all costs of any medical or surgical treatment and medical expenses for such treatment, during the course of such training, that are custom of the military academy they shall receive the same allowances for travel, subsistence, and quarters as are now or may hereafter be provided for Army cadet students and during the course of such training they shall be entitled to the same insurance benefits as are provided by the Act of March 3, 1921 (Public Law 68, Seventy-second Congress), for enlisted men of the Army detailed as aviation students, provided that, with the concurrence of the Secretary of the Army, certification of any cadet student, and until completion of training, they may be detailed as aviation students, but the training shall be deducted from the term of the individual concerned and until the Secretary of War is directed to the 'Supervisor of the final tutoring and selection training' the medical or surgical treatment and medical expenses for such treatment shall be provided by the Army. The medical and surgical treatment and medical expenses for such treatment shall be provided by the Army.
LIEUTENANT OFFICER (CT 3, 3-11)

A. In order to

...
subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Army of the United States, shall be entitled to the allowance of $120 per month for uniform.

5. Sec. 7. The Secretary of the Army, or any officer of the Army, may, at any time, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of War, with the approval of the President, appoint officers to the Army of the United States, to be commissioned as such officers, and to hold the same office as any other officer of the Army of the United States, and to be entitled to all the privileges and benefits of such officer.

6. Sec. 8. Any person who has completed the required course of instruction and instruction in the Army of the United States, under regulations thereon the Secretary of War may prescribe, shall be entitled to receive a commission as an officer in the Army of the United States.

7. Sec. 9. Any person appointed as an officer of the Army of the United States, shall be entitled to the allowance of $120 per month for uniform.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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Subject: Legislation Relating to the AAF Training Program, 1932 to 1943
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Subject: Legislation Relating to the AAF Training Program, 1939 to 1943

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Subject: Legislation Relating to the AAF Training Program, 1939 to 1945
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