The Air National Guard and the War on Drugs: Non-State Actors before 9/11
On the morning of September 11, 2001, members of the radical Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda hijacked four U.S. airliners with the intention of crashing the fully-loaded passenger jets into high-profile targets. Air National Guard (ANG) fighter planes—Massachusetts ANG F–15s from Otis ANG Base, South Dakota ANG F–16s based at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, and Washington, D.C. ANG F–16s from Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland—scrambled to intercept the hijacked aircraft. Unfortunately, they arrived too late to prevent two of the airliners from destroying New York City’s World Trade Center and a third from severely damaging one section of the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. The fourth plane crashed in a Pennsylvania field when passengers attempted to battle the hijackers.¹

Within hours, 34 ANG fighter units across the nation were ready to fly combat missions. And, in the first 24 hours alone, 15 of those units flew 179 fighter missions to provide combat air patrols (CAP) over major U.S. cities. Air Guard tanker, airlift, and rescue units flew scores of sorties on September 11, as well. Meanwhile on that terrible day, hundreds of other Air Guardsmen including personnel from chaplain services, civil engineers, security forces, and medical units volunteered for duty. In the first five years since September 11, 2001, more than 55,000 ANG citizen-airmen volunteered or were called up to fight terrorism at home and abroad in locations ranging from Afghanistan to Iraq to the Horn of Africa.²

The “9/11” terrorist attacks spotlighted the relationship between U.S. national security and so-called “non-state actors,” like al-Qaeda. On television and radio, in print and online, politicians and pundits argued that military leaders and civilian officials could no longer limit their strategic policies and plans to individual nations and multinational alliances that threatened U.S. interests. Many experts implied and some declared that this new focus on non-state actors represented a major revolution in military and political thinking.³

This viewpoint, however, overlooks the historical record. The U.S. military had confronted non-state actor adversaries long before 9/11. Studying this rich and varied background can provide leaders, planners, and analysts a broader perspective and an invaluable context that may help them better to understand the present and shape the future.

This article briefly explores four instances involving the use of U.S. air power—specifically, the Air National Guard—to engage non-state actors both at home and abroad prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. These case studies, drawn from America’s decades-long war on drugs, include two long-term overseas counter narcotics undertakings, a domestic National Guard Bureau counterdrug program conducted in conjunction with civilian law enforcement agencies, and a series of overseas military engineering and medical civic assistance exercises intended to promote host nation and regional stability.

At first glance, there may seem scant similarity between America’s long-running war on drugs and the more recent “War on Terror” declared by President George W. Bush. Indeed, despite the fact that some terror groups have started to use the illicit drug trade to fund other operations, the authors do not attempt to draw direct comparisons between these two endeavors. Broadly speaking, profit-motivated drug lords are not interchangeable with jihadist al-Qaeda leaders. And most narco-traffickers, the “mules” who transport drugs across international borders, and the local dealers who sell to users on the street, bear little comparison with the terrorists and foot soldiers of anti-western extremist groups. Yet, both the war on terror and the war on drugs are responses to long-term threats to America. Moreover, unlike most military conflicts facing the nation since the American Civil War, the battlegrounds for these two wars are found abroad and at home. They share at least one other feature, as well. As these pre-9/11 case studies from the war on drugs reveal, both conflicts involve the United States and its allies facing off against “non-state actors.” Thus,
Defining the Non-State Actor

For a term that enjoys such widespread use today, defining “non-state actor” proves more difficult than one might expect. Many authors, including those of several U.S. national policy documents, employ the expression without bothering to explain what it means. The same is true of several key Joint Publications (JP) that describe current U.S. military doctrine. For example, JP 2.0 (Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations), JP 3.0 (Joint Operations), and JP 3-26 (Homeland Security) all list non-state actors as serious potential threats to U.S. national security, but none provide a definition. This implies either that the term is so commonplace that no definition is required, or that its meanings are so varied and amorphous that it is actually difficult to define. A quick check online suggests that the latter may be the case. For instance, the first hit on a Google search provided this vastly oversimplified, and thus essentially useless, definition: “Non-state actors, in international relations, are actors on the international level which are not states.” Fortunately, the same site goes on to list what can take considerable effort to piece together from various official—and up-to-date—government sources:

- non-state actors include international paramilitary and terrorist groups; international organized crime and drug trafficking groups; non-governmental organizations (NGOs); multi-national corporations; the international media; and transnational diaspora communities.

Thus, by these and other current definitions, those who produce, transport, or sell illicit drugs clearly count among the legions of modern-day non-state actors.

Background: America’s War on Drugs

By the early 1980s, illicit drug use in the United States had reached epidemic proportions. Drug trafficking, drug abuse, and drug-related crime placed an enormous drain on the national economy; most Americans viewed drugs as a threat to the very fabric of modern society. At the international level, the illicit drug trade jeopardized U.S. foreign relations with governments in Central and South America. Drug cartels and their leaders, the “drug lords,” had grown so wealthy, powerful, and bold that they could threaten legitimate national governments in Latin America. At the same time, terrorist groups with political or ideological agendas—in particular, the Peru-based Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the “Movimiento 19 de Abril” (also known as M-19) in Colombia—exploited the cocaine trade to fund their war against the governments of those countries.

In response to the growing drug-related problems at home and abroad, President Ronald Reagan, on January 30, 1982, officially declared a “War on Drugs” to combat drug-smuggling operations. What began that year with the South Florida Task Force eventually grew into the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS). Directed by then-Vice President George H.W. Bush, the NNBIS was responsible for coordinating all federal counterdrug efforts. The Department of Defense (DoD) initially resisted becoming involved in counterdrug operations. First, DoD leaders feared that a new mission would diminish military readiness at a time when the Soviet Union remained a significant military threat. Second, there was a longstanding tradition—dating to the early days of the American Republic—of the military resisting any involvement in civil law enforcement matters.

This tradition had been codified into law through the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which expressly prohibited the U.S. military from providing certain types of assistance to civil authorities without first obtaining Presidential approval, and made violations of this law a felony. Over time, this law was interpreted to include members of all active duty, Reserve, and National Guard forces (with the exception of special law enforcement provisions for the U.S. Coast Guard). In 1982, however, Congress made significant changes regarding how the military could support counterdrug operations. Public Law 97-86 amended the Posse Comitatus Act by authorizing indirect involvement by any component of the U.S. military to assist civilian law enforcement agencies. This could include equipment loans, personnel support, training, and the sharing of information. There were still several caveats. This “indirect support” could not be a primary mission; instead it either had to provide equivalent military training for the units involved or else be accomplished in addition to required training missions. Furthermore, the law directed that this indirect support could not degrade unit combat readiness or the DoD’s capacity to fulfill its national defense mission.

These changes to the Posse Comitatus Act cleared the way for increased military involvement in counterdrug operations. By late 1988, the DoD was named the lead agency for detecting and monitoring illegal drug traffic into the United States. Then in September of 1989, President George H.W. Bush unveiled a National Drug Control Strategy that outlined his proposed policies for dealing with the problem. That same month, and in keeping with the President’s intent, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney stated that counterdrug operations were now a part of DoD national security priorities. In short, the U.S. military had joined the war on drugs.

Overseas Counter-Narcotics Missions: Operation “Coronet Nighthawk”

In 1990, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) determined that its counterdrug mission oppositions in the form of non-state actors are actually nothing new to the modern U.S. military.

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required a high-speed, covert method to intercept, identify, and shadow civilian aircraft suspected of transporting narcotics within the transit zone between Latin America, the Caribbean, and the United States. This, in turn, led to the creation of Operation Coronet Nighthawk, which employed ANG fighter aircraft and personnel to support the detection and monitoring mission assigned to U.S. Southern Air Forces (SOUTHAF, also known as the Twelfth Air Force) and other agencies involved with counterdrug efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean. Ultimately, this ANG operation lasted for more than a decade before it was discontinued shortly before the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001.13

Coronet Nighthawk deployed Air Guard fighter units on six-week rotations to provide continuous coverage in the region. Each deployment package included five aircraft and 41 personnel (all of whom volunteered for the mission). In keeping with the standard National Guard two-week annual training requirement, most of these personnel rotated every two weeks, while the unit’s aircraft remained at Howard Air Base (AB) in Panama for the entire six-week duration. When Howard AB closed in April 1999, SOUTHCOM relocated the Coronet Nighthawk mission to Hato International Airport on Curaçao in the Netherlands Antilles. The United States chose this 171-square mile coral island, located less than 50 miles north of Venezuela, as the new base of operations in part because it lay in the path of the most direct route for narcotics traffic from Latin America to Haiti and the Dominican Republic, which were considered key stepping stones for smuggling drugs to the United States. While deployed, the ANG fighter units maintained a 15-minute aircraft alert posture 24 hours per day.14

Requirements for Air Guard fighter units supporting the counterdrug mission centered on the capability to quickly intercept, then shadow and identify an aircraft or boat suspected of carrying illegal drug shipments. The fighters flew only unarmed patrols over international waters, never entering another country’s airspace. In addition, they did not attack, nor attempt to force down, any aircraft suspected of carrying illegal drug shipments. Instead, various agencies used information collected by Air Guard fighters to interdict suspicious aircraft and boats at their destinations and to predict patterns for future counter-smuggling efforts. This information also assisted Latin American and Caribbean nations in finding and destroying drug labs and drug-carrying aircraft on the ground within their borders. Although direct proof that Air Guard fighter patrols denied drug smugglers direct access across the Caribbean from Colombia and Venezuela to Haiti and the Dominican Republic is scarce, these
The 119th Fighter Wing, North Dakota ANG, flew the last Air Guard rotation for Coronet Nighthawk. With a new aerial platform in place, SOUTHCOM officially ended the operation on August 2, 2001. However, Lt. Col. Marvin Whetstone, Counter Drug Program Manager for the National Guard Bureau, observed that there had always been considerable controversy about Coronet Nighthawk because key members of the Twelfth Air Force—which controlled the program—firmly believed that the Air National Guard should not be in the counterdrug business. According to Whetstone, this prevailing attitude led the Twelfth Air Force staff to misrepresent the results of a cost analysis completed regarding the operation. For instance, Coronet Nighthawk showed an annual operating budget of approximately $17 million after it moved to Curacao in 1999. However, Lt. Col. Whetstone noted that this figure was based on a faulty interpretation of the mission’s manning document. The actual cost of the ANG performing the operation was between $10.5 million and $11 million per year. Nevertheless, Twelfth Air Force would not accept the correction.20

Despite the fact that they were flying actual intercept missions, some Air Guard pilots felt that the operation was a waste of time. The F–15 and F–16 fighters used for the mission had immense combat capability, but they were also extremely expensive to operate. For this reason, some Air Force personnel—including many at SOUTHAF/Twelfth Air Force and at least a few within the ANG—believed that these aircraft were not the ideal airframes for conducting counterdrug operations. In response, SOUTHAF/Twelfth Air Force developed a plan to transfer this mission to the Cessna Citation 550, an aerial platform belonging to the U.S. Customs Service. Designed as a corporate executive transport jet, the Citation 550 had a longer un-refueled range than the F–15 or F–16, cost less to operate and maintain, and was equipped with radar better suited to tracking slow, low-flying aircraft like those used to transport illicit drugs.19

The decision to discontinue this Air Guard mission was hardly unanimous. Lt. Col. Marvin Whetstone, Counter Drug Program Manager for the National Guard Bureau, observed that there had always been considerable controversy about Coronet Nighthawk because key members of the Twelfth Air Force—which controlled the program—firmly believed that the Air National Guard should not be in the counterdrug business. According to Whetstone, this prevailing attitude led the Twelfth Air Force staff to misrepresent the results of a cost analysis completed regarding the operation. For instance, Coronet Nighthawk showed an annual operating budget of approximately $17 million after it moved to Curacao in 1999. However, Lt. Col. Whetstone noted that this figure was based on a faulty interpretation of the mission’s manning document. The actual cost of the ANG performing the operation was between $10.5 million and $11 million per year. Nevertheless, Twelfth Air Force would not accept the correction.20

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August 31, 2001. Regarding this final deployment of ANG fighters, Gen. William T. Hobbins, Commander of the Twelfth Air Force, announced: “Termination of F–16 operations at Curaçao do not signal the end of counterdrug air operations there or any intent by USCINCSO [U.S. Commander-in-Chief, SOUTHCOM] to relieve us of executive agent responsibilities for the FOLs [Forward Operating Locations] at Curaçao and Aruba.” Instead, he indicated that in addition to the Cessna Citation 550 flown by U.S. Customs Service pilots, other aircraft—including the U.S. Air Force’s E–3 AWACS and C–130 Senior Scout, as well as the U.S. Navy’s E–2 Hawkeye and “a strong possibility” of the Navy’s P–3/EP–3—would take over “robust counterdrug air operations” from Curaçao.21 This last statement suggests that the Twelfth Air Force did indeed see value in using tactical military aircraft to conduct counterdrug missions. This said, one should note that none of the potential replacements General Hobbins mentioned for the outgoing ANG F–16s were fighter aircraft. Furthermore, of these potential replacements for Air Guard fighters, the C–130 Senior Scout mission could theoretically be flown by either active Air Force or Air Guard units. Thus, it is impossible to discern—at least from his public statements—whether or not General Hobbins truly believed that the Air National Guard should not be in the counterdrug business.

Ground-Based Radar Sites

Although using fighter aircraft to intercept and track suspected drug smugglers represents a non-shooting (but otherwise traditional) version of “projecting air power,” the Air National Guard was involved in counterdrug operations outside the United States prior to Operation Coronet Nighthawk. Early on, SOUTHCOM determined that ground-based radar stations capable of identifying and tracking suspicious aircraft were an essential component of the war on drugs. Starting in 1989, one year before Operation Coronet Nighthawk kicked off, Air Guard units began manning ground-based radar stations in the Caribbean Islands, the Bahamas, and the Dominican Republic to fill gaps in existing SOUTHCOM radar coverage.22

To cover other suspected drug-trafficking air-bridges linking South America to the United States, SOUTHCOM decided to establish additional radar sites to close the gaps in its so-called “electronic fence.” By this time, however, the active Air Force had already reduced its ground-based deployable radar assets to the point that it could not maintain wartime readiness and support this new counterdrug mission. As a result, starting in 1992, the ANG took responsibility for sending radar controllers, technicians, and equipment to operate four sites in Latin America in concert with host-nation forces.23

The four sites—one each in Peru and Ecuador and two in southern Colombia—operated 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Air Guard personnel rotated in on a regular basis to run these sites. At first, these Guardsmen deployed on short 15-day voluntary tours of active duty that fulfilled their two-week annual training requirement, but later these tours were expanded to 90-day and 120-day rotations as the pool of trained and experienced Air Guard manpower dwindled due to budget cuts, retirements, and shortfalls in retention as some radar unit personnel chose to change military career fields or leave the ANG altogether.24 According to Col. John Moseby, Special Assistant to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the ANG was forced to go to great lengths in order to continue accomplishing the mission:

After a while, we virtually had to create an active duty component within the Guard that did nothing but [counterdrug] radar deployments...In effect, we had a full-time force that did nothing but rotate in and out of South America.25

Additional Air Guard radar personnel supported the counterdrug mission in Honduras and augmented the Counter Drug Joint Analysis and Planning Teams (JPATs) at the U.S. embassies in Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela.26

Statistics indicate that ANG-operated ground-based radar units had a measurable impact on illicit drug trafficking. For instance, in 1992, before these stations were in place, the Colombian government identified some 250 suspected drug flights. In contrast, one year later, with the help of ANG radar stations now operating within its borders, Colombia identified 600 such flights. Colombian officials used this information to track down 27 aircraft engaged in smuggling operations and...
destroy them on the ground. This radar data also permitted Colombian authorities to track drug traffickers to their destinations. As a result, in 1993 alone, Colombian police and military forces raided more than 100 airstrips from which drug smugglers operated.27

Periodic difficulties undermined the drug interdiction mission. Monitoring thousands of square miles of airspace proved challenging. So too did maintaining the delicate political balance required to operate within the borders of various Latin American nations. In one instance, a disagreement over what constituted the proper (and legal) use of counterdrug intelligence threatened to bring international cooperation to a sudden end. At issue was the use of U.S. flight tracking data by the Colombian and Peruvian governments to shoot down aircraft merely suspected of transporting illegal drugs. This violated U.S. views regarding due process of law (innocent until proven guilty), and also opened the U.S. government to being held liable for the deaths of those aboard aircraft that might be shot down by mistake. The debate arose when, on November 4, 1993, a Peruvian Shorts Tucano aircraft shot down a suspected drug smuggler near Pucallpa, Peru. Following this incident, the Colombian government announced its intention to pursue a similar policy and shoot down suspicious aircraft, including those identified by the U.S. radar network.28

In response, SOUTHCOM suspended ground-based radar operations in Colombia and Peru on May 1, 1994. Furthermore, SOUTHCOM prohibited personnel from both Latin American nations from riding aboard U.S. surveillance flights launched from Panama and refused to share counterdrug intelligence gathered from these flights. Colombia and Peru countered by banning U.S. surveillance aircraft (Air Force E–3 AWACS and Navy P–3 Orions) from flying over their territories. Colombia also threatened to expel Air Guard ground-based radar units altogether.29

The disagreements hampered sharing counterdrug information—including time-sensitive data needed to intercept suspected smugglers at their destinations—among the three nations and allowed drug cartels to conduct their smuggling operations with little risk of interdiction. These problems were finally resolved in December 1994, when the United States agreed to share counterdrug intelligence information with Colombia and Peru on the condition that these countries would not hold the United States government liable for the outcome if they chose to use that information to shoot down aircraft suspected of carrying illegal drugs.30

Compared to Operation Coronet Nighthawk, the Air Guard’s participation in ground-based radar operations was relatively short-lived. By 1995, it was clear that operating these sites posed significant challenges to the Air Guard in terms of
logistical support, mission essential equipment, and manning. In addition, reductions in Air Force and Air National Guard tactical air control squadrons, the growing demand to support contingency operations in Southwest Asia and Eastern Europe, and the anticipated move of U.S. forces out of Panama in 1999 due to treaty commitments led the Air Force to seek other ways to maintain radar coverage of drug-trafficking routes in South America. Ultimately, the DoD terminated Air Guard ground-based radar operations in 1998 to save money and reduce the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) for Air Guard radar units. To maintain the counterdrug electronic fence, responsibility for operating these sites shifted to contractors, commercial resources, and host-nation personnel.31

Domestic Counterdrug Operations, the ANG, and the RC–26 Surveillance Aircraft

As mentioned earlier in this article, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prohibits the U.S. military from engaging in civil law enforcement activities inside the United States without prior Presidential approval. To be more specific, the Posse Comitatus Act applies only to members of the military who are serving under the terms and conditions set forth by U.S. Code Title 10. Since the active duty military and members of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Reserves always fall under Title 10—which means “Federal money, Federal missions, Federal control”—Posse Comitatus remains in effect for these forces at all times. Members of the National Guard, however, do not always fall under Title 10. As a result, there are certain conditions under which Posse Comitatus does not apply to these personnel.

For instance, when mobilized under State Active Duty (SAD) status, a National Guard soldier or airman falls under the command of the state’s Adjutant General. Because the Adjutant General is appointed by and reports directly to the governor, he or she does not fall under the national civil-military chain-of-command wherein the President serves as Commander-in-Chief. In SAD status, Army and Air Guard personnel receive pay and benefits in accordance with state law. Thus, while on State Active Duty, the soldier or airman has no official federal military status and serves—in the truest sense—as a member of the state militia.

There is a second condition under which Posse Comitatus does not apply: National Guard soldiers or airmen serving under U.S. Code Title 32 orders receive the pay and benefits entitled to military personnel on federal active duty, but they still fall under the non-federal command and control of their state’s Adjutant General. Title 32 applies only within the borders of the United States and its territories, and it only applies to members of the National Guard. Because members of the active duty military and the Reserves always fall under federal control, Title 32 cannot apply to them.32

At first glance, Posse Comitatus, SAD, and Title 32 may seem like just so much legal mumbo-

* These six words—“Federal money, Federal missions, Federal control”—indicate that military personnel serving under Title 10 status are paid by the Federal government, can only conduct missions as directed by the Federal government, and ultimately report to the President of the United States as their Commander-in-Chief. As such, personnel serving in Title 10 status cannot be mobilized or controlled by a state governor in order to conduct state missions, including (but not limited to) riot control or disaster relief.
In our view, acquisition of the UC–26C would not have been approved if DoD's standard requiring a validated threat had been applied. It is also uncertain that procurement of the prototype would have been approved, even with a validated threat, if DoD had first tried to fill the requirement with resources already in the interdiction agencies' inventories—such as comparable aircraft operated by the Customs Service.

In March 1994, the DoD Inspector General's office released a report that echoed the GAO's earlier conclusions and again recommended that the RC–26 program be scrapped. However, following a detailed re-verification of the counterdrug mission by Maj. Gen. Donald W. Shepperd, Director of the Air National Guard, and with the backing of Maj. Gen. Raymond F. Rees, Acting Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the U.S. Air Force finally approved converting the airplanes for their new role.

Modifications included installing a removable sensor pod, thermal imaging system, cameras, data recorders, special radars, and other electronic information-gathering equipment. Each RC–26 cost $3 million to modify and about $900,000 per year to operate—about one-third the cost of conducting the
same mission using a C–130 military transport plane. The DoD paid this cost as part of the National Guard Bureau’s counterdrug program.40

A typical RC–26 crew included a pilot and copilot, plus one or more mission system operators to control the reconnaissance camera and forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) pod. Since the aircrews had no law enforcement authority and every RC–26 mission supported a specific request from a civilian agency, at least one civilian law enforcement officer flew with each sortie. From the program’s inception, each Air Guard unit equipped with an RC–26 has maintained two or three trained aircrews to provide maximum short-notice availability.

Because these missions are flown in support of larger operations, it is difficult to quantify the results of the RC–26 program in traditional counterdrug terms like “pounds of drugs seized” or “millions of dollars worth of drugs taken off the street.” However, since its inception, RC–26 crews have flown thousands of hours in support of law enforcement agencies. Missions include photographing marijuana fields, cocaine processing centers, and drug-smuggling routes. These aircraft have also transported evidence and key witnesses to trial and hearings and provided airborne command and control for drug stakeouts and raids. Based on their historic high rate of use by supported civilian agencies, this program (which continues to this day) appears to be a success.

Promoting Host-Nation and Regional Stability: the “New Horizons” Exercises

The fourth case study regarding pre-9/11 ANG activities directed against non-state actors focuses on a series of humanitarian and civic assistance exercises conducted annually in the Caribbean and Latin America. Known collectively as Nuevos Horizontes or “New Horizons,” the first exercise by this name kicked off in Panama in January 1996. However, New Horizons actually represented the unbroken continuation of an earlier series of similar exercises that started in 1984, including “Blazing Trails,” Caminos de la Paz or “Roads of Peace,” and Fuertes Caminos or “Strong Roads.”41

The New Horizons exercise program—which, like the RC–26 program continues to the present—involves deploying units from the Army and Air National Guard as well as Active and Reserve Army, Air Force, Navy, and USMC units to conduct civil engineering and medical civic action missions. The following mission statement from one such exercise clearly shows the intended outcome:

Purpose: Provides training for U.S. units and allied nation participants in Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Operations resulting in a by-product of construction and medical projects for the host nation.

Description: A Joint exercise for training Medical, Engineer, Civil Affairs, MP, and Logistics units in
Honduras. The exercise also provides deployment training and training in an austere, tropical environment. Major focus is on road & bridge repair and construction.42

From the start, several New Horizons exercises took place every year, each in a different country and each involving different U.S. military units. A typical exercise lasted for several months, with Guard and Reserve forces rotating in and out of the host nation to complete their two-week annual training requirement while a small cadre of active duty or Guardsmen/Reservists served as the exercise command and support staff for the duration. Most New Horizons exercises also involved host nation military forces and government agencies working side-by-side with their U.S. counterparts in order to provide training to all involved and put a "local face" on these operations.

The phrase “projecting air power” typically conjures images of putting “iron in the air” (launching aircraft sorties) and dropping bombs on target. For some, this alone makes the connection between projecting air power and exercises like New Horizons seem obscure. Although Operation Coronet Night-hawk and domestic ANG counterdrug operations did not entail dropping bombs or shooting bullets, they at least involved using aircraft against non-state actor opponents. The connection between operating ground-based radar sites and air power is also fairly obvious. But what about humanitarian and civic assistance missions like New Horizons that use no airplanes (except for transportation) and deliberately avoid any mention of counternarcotics operations or America’s war on drugs?

Prior to September 2001, DoD counterdrug efforts fell under the umbrella of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).43 The term MOOTW (which was officially retired in September 2001, although the programs it described continued under different names) encompassed numerous military missions that fall somewhere short of a full-scale shooting war. In addition to DoD Counterdrug Operations, examples include: Humanitarian Assistance (HA); Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency (sometimes abbreviated as COIN); Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO); and Peacekeeping or Peace Enforcement Operations. United States military doctrine further defined DoD counterdrug operations under MOOTW to include detecting aerial and maritime shipments of illegal drugs entering the United States, as well as using the National Guard to support drug interdiction and enforcement agencies within the continental United States. Nothing in this definition directly linked the term “counterdrug” with operations or exercises like New Horizons.44

However, a closer look reveals that a connection—and a strong one—does exist. By definition, the Nation Assistance aspect of MOOTW involves:

…civil or military assistance (other than HA) rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crisis or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation. Nation assistance operations support an HN [Host Nation] by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability [emphasis from original source].45

This assistance can include any or all of the following: Security Assistance programs (such as grants, loans, or sales of defense-related equipment and training); Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA); and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions. By doctrine, HCA programs—under which the New Horizons exercises clearly fell—“must fulfill military training requirements [for the U.S. military] that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace.”46 On the other hand, FID traditionally “focused on help-
ing another nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow the government." However, U.S. doctrine also recognized that "FID programs may address other threats to an HN's internal stability, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism."47

Unlike traditional insurgencies, members of drug cartels generally do not seek to take direct control of any particular nation's government, at least not for nationalistic or ideological reasons. Most would be happy to leave the task of day-to-day governance to others—so long as those "others" do not interfere with the drug cartel members' ability to cultivate, process, and transport illicit drugs for profit and to live without fear of arrest, prosecution, or extradition. To achieve these goals, however, drug cartels have engaged in several tactics that closely resemble those used by traditional insurgents: equipping and fielding paramilitary organizations that may actually be more powerful than a nation's own security forces; targeting political and social leaders, including judges, journalists, and members of the church who oppose the cartels; co-opting or coercing the local populace; and otherwise undermining the legitimacy of the existing government so that it cannot effectively combat the illicit drug trade.48

Although Humanitarian and Civic Assistance and Foreign Intelligence Defense are not synonymous, they do share the same overall goal: "to promote long-term regional security." And although the HCA operations, unlike FID, do not directly target illicit drug trafficking, the "long-term regional security" that they promote helps create an environment in which the legitimate government can more effectively address the illegal drug trade, hence the implicit connection between New Horizons and America's war on drugs.

The indirect nature of this connection makes it difficult to measure the results of New Horizons in the war on drugs, especially since exercise planners deliberately avoided suggesting any connections between the two programs. Therefore, for the purpose of examining ways in which the ANG has engaged non-state actors prior to 9/11, it is far more useful to describe the number, type, and scope of missions performed and to consider these results in the larger context of promoting long-term regional stability.

According to one source, more than 35 New Horizons exercises took place in some 20 countries between 1996 and 2001.52 Table 1 (right) provides a summary of the New Horizons exercises scheduled for one year, including the U.S. forces involved and the major focus for each exercise.

As the right-hand column in Table 1 suggests, the Army was a key player in most New Horizons deployments. This comes as no surprise, given the requirement for heavy construction and combat engineer personnel and equipment to drill wells for potable water, clear and improve roads, build or repair bridges, and construct the clinics, schools, and other buildings urgently needed by inhabitants of the poor, mostly-rural regions where these operations took place. However, it is easy to forget—especially if one comes from a "green" (Army-centric) background instead of a "blue" (Air Force) or "purple" (joint) background, or if one thinks of air power primarily as putting iron in the air and bombs on target—that the ANG also possesses considerable civil engineering capability. For instance, RED HORSE squadrons (Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers) are self-sufficient, fully-deployable units designed to repair or build runways, air bases, and support facilities in an austere environment. Prime BEEF (Base Engineer Emergency Forces) are smaller deployable units that provide direct support to deployed forces and emergency recovery from natural disasters. In addition, like its Army counterpart, the Air Guard can field considerable medical assets to provide varying levels of treatment in the field.50

A closer look at Table 1 reveals that the Air National Guard played a key role in at least one of the exercises scheduled for Fiscal Year 1999: New Horizons—Honduras, which ran from February to September of that year. According to a planning document dated November 30, 1998, of the approximately 2,600 U.S. service members scheduled to go to Honduras for New Horizons 1999, only 80 would stay for the duration, while the rest would rotate through in 2-week increments. As a result, planners estimated that 350 to 450 U.S. troops would be in Honduras at one time for New Horizons.51 Air Guardsmen provided part of the "duration staff." The ANG also provided much of the civil engineering and medical capability for the exercise on a rotational basis, including three Prime BEEF units, four well-drilling detachments, and three Medical Readiness Training Events (MEDRETE).52

Most New Horizons exercises scheduled for 1999 were expanded to provide relief in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch. The storm, which made landfall in late October 1998, was the most devastating hurricane to hit Central America in two hundred years.53 In Honduras, the New Horizons program focused on the Lempira region, widely considered to be the poorest and most neglected part of the country. A report prepared prior to the deployment noted that "The extreme poverty, shortage of food and potable water, and lack of sanitation, especially outside the cities, have a very negative effect on health."54 The report went on to describe local conditions in painful detail:

...nearly all rural homes have dirt floors, many have plank and mud walls, and there are almost no means of keeping warm and dry. Only half the villages have (relatively) potable water. Most rural Lempirans lack functional latrines, and only 2 percent of the villages have sewage systems. Garbage collection services are almost nil, and only a minority of the population bothers to burn trash....55

The same report indicated that even before the hurricane struck, the region’s infrastructure was in dire straits. For instance, only four percent of the
territory—which spanned 1,680 square miles and had roughly 224,000 inhabitants—had electricity. There was only one hospital to serve the entire region. Roads were scarce, bridges nonexistent or in poor repair.56 Thus, Lempira was a prime candidate for a New Horizons exercise: plenty of real-world training for U.S. military civil engineer and medical personnel in an extremely austere environment, and a local population that could clearly benefit from this endeavor.

This single example illustrates both the mission-specific intent as well as the broader strategic implications behind the New Horizons program. Although these exercises have never directly supported—or even alluded to—either U.S. or host-nation counterdrug operations, they do reinforce the democratic host-nation institutions that must take the lead in counterdrug efforts within their borders. Actively involving host-nation civil and military personnel in the New Horizons projects helps build public support for the legitimate government in previously underserved regions—historically the prime bases of operation for those involved in the illicit drug trade. Thus, obscure as this case study’s connections might at first seem, it too represents a case of projecting air power against non-state actors as part of the U.S. war on drugs.

**Conclusion and Lessons Learned**

According to George Santayana—one of the great philosophers and cultural critics of the early 20th century—“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”57 Note that
Santayana did not say: “Historical case studies provide cookie-cutter solutions for present or future problems.” As promised, the authors have not drawn direct comparisons between the history of the war on drugs and the present-day war on terror. But what, then, can we learn about confronting non-state actors from the pre-9/11 war on drugs that might help in today’s (and tomorrow’s) war on terror?

Perhaps the most obvious lesson is that just because the terminology changes over time, in many cases the underlying concepts, issues, and problems remain essentially the same. While this should go without saying, too often it seems that the leaders and policy makers casting about for lessons-learned from history overlook a past event simply because the labels used “back then” do not match the terms and buzzwords in current use. When President Reagan declared a “War on Drugs” in 1982, he defined the enemy as “narco-traffickers” and “drug dealers,” not “non-state actors.” Not until the mid-1990s did the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff start referring to “non-state actors” in the National Military Strategy. However, when one looks at the modern definition of non-state actor, it is immediately clear that the narco-traffickers and drug dealers against whom President Reagan declared war were, even then, acting in the same ways (and presenting the same basic challenges) as some of today’s non-state actors.

There are more specific lessons to be learned from the case studies described above, as well. These are not tactics or techniques for engaging an adversary on the battlefield, but rather “big picture” takeaways that can help leaders to make full and proper use of all available assets.

For example, despite the questionable cost-benefit return of using fighter aircraft in the war on drugs, Operation Coronet Nighthawk serves as a reminder that volunteers from National Guard and Reserve operational units can be deployed on a rotational basis in order to conduct real-world mission training and, at the same time, protect America’s borders. And as shown during Coronet Nighthawk, it is possible to accomplish this without increasing OPTEMPO beyond the normal training requirements.

The ANG’s experience with ground-based radar sites reinforces one part of the lesson described above, although it also carries with it a cautionary tale of continued long-term operations placing unreasonable strain on a predominately part-time force. But the ground-based radar case study highlights another potential lesson: the ANG (and other Guard and Reserve forces) may have personnel and equipment that the active components do not. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the ANG was able to provide ground-based radar units and the people to run them, assets that had been largely phased out of the active Air Force. It is entirely possible that Guard and Reserve units today can offer capabilities simply not found within their active duty counterparts.

Reviewing the New Horizons HCA exercise program provides a useful reminder of a different sort. It is no great secret that “nation building” is a fundamental part of counterinsurgency operations. Although the United States and its allies in Latin America did not necessarily label the drug cartels in the region as “insurgents,” many of the basic principals of counterinsurgency still applied to combating these non-state actors. As New Horizons proved (and continues to prove, since this series of annual exercise is ongoing), it is possible to field the considerable noncombat assets of National Guard and Reserve forces to combat poverty and thus bolster basic democratic institutions in host nations. Furthermore, this can be accomplished by rotating these forces through the exercise as part of their normal annual training, providing real-world training and accomplishing real-world results without increasing the OPTEMPO for the units and personnel involved. This is not to argue for deploying Guardsmen and Reservists into active combat zones like Afghanistan or Iraq for their two-week annual training stints in order to conduct HCA operations. However, there are other parts of the world where extreme poverty currently helps to fuel anti-Western sentiments, thus creating a potential recruiting ground for radical Islamic terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda. Places like these are possible candidates for a New Horizons-style effort in support of the war on terror.

The final potential takeaway from this study comes from the use of ANG assets—specifically the RC–26 surveillance aircraft—to help civilian law enforcement agencies combat drug trafficking within the continental United States. As described above, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 precludes the use of active military units in a law enforcement capacity against the civilian populace of the United States. This same prohibition extends to members of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Reserves, as all of these forces fall under federal control at all times. The National Guard, however, enjoys a unique dual status. When deployed overseas either for training or for real-world contingency operations, National Guard airmen and soldiers fall under Title 10 status: in other words, they become federal forces for the duration. However, when training or operating at home within the United States, they fall under Title 32 status or State Active Duty (SAD): under these conditions, they are not legally considered federal troops and are thus not subject to the strict limitations imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act. This dual status explains how the Air National Guard was able to legally obtain and operate the RC–26 aircraft to support local, state, and federal law enforcement operations. The Guard has already created full-time regional teams to support civil authorities in the event of a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) or other type of attack by terrorists. Depending on current and future threats, it may be desirable to consider creating similar programs, including those that rely more heavily on part-time citizen soldiers and airmen, to support America’s ongoing war on terror.
Four case studies produced, four lessons learned. First, terms change far faster than the threats; remember this when searching history for “lessons learned.” Second, as Operation Coronet Nighthawk and the New Horizons exercises in particular show, involuntary mobilizations for extended periods are not the only way that National Guard troops and airmen can contribute to real-world DoD national security missions without adversely affecting wartime mission readiness. However, as a corollary (or perhaps counterpoint) to this lesson, the ANG experience with ground-based radars in South and Central America serves as a reminder that it is indeed possible to over-commit limited personnel and resources, thus creating an unsustainable OPTEMPO. Third, Title 32 status provides decision makers with a degree of flexibility in using the National Guard to support domestic antiterrorism efforts. And last, but certainly not least, the Guard and Reserves can potentially provide capabilities that the active duty military lacks.

These, in the authors’ opinions at least, represent the type of “lessons learned” that we should seek from studying history. It seems highly unlikely that any case study from any era will provide “the grand solution” to the myriad challenges facing the United States in the ongoing war on terror. But by continuing to look to history, and by recognizing that the “lessons learned” are often complex and can simultaneously provide examples of programs that worked and reveal potential pitfalls (often in the same programs that “worked”), we can indeed help to shape the future by knowing the past.

NOTES


4. As early as the mid-1970s, some political scientists were using the term “non-state actor.” See for instance Richard W. Mansbach, Yale H. Ferguson, and Donald E. Lampert, The Web of World Politics: Nonstate Actors in the Global System (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1976). However, it took more than two decades for the term to become commonplace in the National Military Strategy (NMS) policy document that is periodically prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For instance, the 1995 NMS made no mention of “non-state actors.” Instead, the term du jour was “transnational threats.” See Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy (Feb. 1995), www.au.af.mil/au/awlwecgate/nms/nms_feb95.htm (accessed Aug. 15, 2007). The 1997 NMS represents the first case that this article’s authors have found in which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs referred to “non-state actors” or “non-state actors” in this key national policy document. See Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy (1997), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awlwecgate/nms/index.htm (accessed Aug. 15, 2007).


9. President Reagan established the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBSS) in March of 1983 to coordinate the actions of all federal agencies involved in any aspect of interdicting the flow of illegal drugs across the border into the United States. The NNBSS was headed by then Vice President George Bush. Its Executive Board included members from the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Transportation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and White House Drug Abuse Policy Office. Francis M. Mullen, Jr., Acting Administrator of the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), also served on the board. According to an official DEA history: “The role of NNBIS was to complement, but not to replace, the duties of the regional Drug Enforcement Task Forces operated by the Department of Justice.” A chronology published by the U.S. Coast Guard provides more detail on what this actually entailed: “The new system provided a coordinated national and international interagency network for prioritizing interdiction targets, identifying resources, recommending the most effective action, and coordinating joint special actions.” This source also notes: “Coast Guard anti-narcotic operations were reinforced when needed by military forces” but provides no further details. As part of the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the White House established the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), which took over (and expanded) the duties formerly performed by the NNBIS. The Director of the ONDCP, ubiquitously known as the “Drug Czar,” is a cabinet-level position. See Drug Enforcement Administration: A Tradition of Excellence, 1973-2003 (Washington, D.C.: DEA, n.d.), 50, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/history/history_part1.pdf (accessed May 8, 2008); Policy Changes/Major Events & Their Influence on the Missions & Capabilities of the U.S. Coast Guard and Its Predecessor Services, http://www.uscg.mil/history/Policy_Changes.html (accessed May 8, 2008); and “About ONDCP” Office of National Drug Control Policy, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/about/index.html (accessed May 8, 2008).


13. Coronet Nighthawk supported the SOUTHCOM Commander’s requirements using the following command relationships: the Joint Interagency Task Force—East (JIATF-E) exercised Tactical Control (TACON); U.S. Southern Air Forces (SOUTHAF/Twelfth Air Force) had operational control (OPCON). The National Guard Bureau (NGB) Counterdrug Office provided program management for Coronet Nighthawk. While deployed to support Coronet Nighthawk, Air Guard aircraft and personnel were designated as the 12th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron. Twelfth Air Force History: 2001 (Headquarters, Twelfth Air Force, c. 2002), pp. 88-90, on file as SD V-50 for Gross, ANG History: 2001-2004 (“on file as SD… “ indicates that a source is a “Supporting Document” for the specified Air National Guard periodic history and is on file at Maxwell AFB with that periodic history); and Master Sergeant Bob Haskell, National Guard Bureau, “Air Guard Finishes Up Last ‘Nighthawk’ Mission,” On Guard, Summer 2001, pp. 12-13, on file as SD V-44 for Gross, ANG History: 2001-2004.


16. See note 13 (above) for more information on JIATF-E.


25. Mosbey interview, p. 84.


“Colombia Bans American Anti-Drug Flights.”
36. Ibid.
38. Briefing from U.S. GAO, National Security and International Affairs Division to Chair, Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Subject: “Procurement and Modification of Aircraft and Other Equipment Used for Drug Detection and Monitoring” (Jul. 30, 1994).
40. This report indicated that it cost $1.69 million to operate a C–130 for 500 flight hours, whereas a C–26 could operate the same number of hours for $551,000. The $900,000 annual operating cost cited in the main text of this article appears to reflect a usage rate higher than 500 hours; logically, the cost of operating a C–130 transport for more than 500 hours would be proportionally higher, as well.
43. One of the changes announced in the September 10, 2001 revision to Joint Publication 3-0 was the decision by the Department of Defense to stop using the term and acronym “Military Operations Other Than War” (MOOTW). See “Summary of Changes: Revision of Joint Publication 3-0, dated 10 September 2001,” in Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations, p. iii.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., Chapter III, Para. 2i, p. III-10.
49. Ornsbee, WHO’s Scroll. These countries include: Antigua and Barbuda; the Bahamas; Belize; Bolivia; the Commonwealth of Dominica; the Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; Grenada; Guatemala; Haiti; Honduras; Jamaica; Nicaragua; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; St. Kitts and Nevis; St. Lucia; and Trinidad/Tobago.
58. Poverty and anti-Western sentiment alone do not cause terrorism, but they are widely recognized as contributing factors in creating an environment where fundamentalist terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda can flourish.
59. The failed state of Afghanistan in the 1980s or; more recently, countries in the war-torn region of the Horn of Africa, are prime examples, Kalic, Combating a Modern Hydra, pp. 58-59.