Call No.: K239.0512-377

IRIS No.: 01010715, C.1/01010716, C.2

IRIS Tape No.: 01000296 & 010000297

Accessibility: OPEN

Pages/Time: 86pp/1:45

Class: U

Date/Location: 8 February 1967/Washington D.C.

Interviewers: Arthur K. Marmor

Source: Project CORONA HARVEST Collection


(1941-1967) Oral history interview with General Hunter Harris, Commander of the 447th Bombardment Group in World War II (WWII) to Commander of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) during Southeast Asia (SEA) conflict. Discusses authority on role and effectiveness of airpower in WWII, Korean campaign, and Vietnam, both tactical and strategic; justification of daylight precision bombing in WWII; restraints on airpower in Korea and Vietnam; airpower in limited war and coordination of B-52 strikes with other airstrikes. As Deputy commander, Armed Forces Special weapons Project and later as Commander, 509th Bomb Wing, he emphasizes tactical use of nuclear weapons, validity of readiness of nuclear equipped units and usability of nuclear weapons in Korea, swing from too much centralization in military department to too much centralization in Department of Defense and European buildup during the Korean campaign. Discusses disagreement with graduated response theory, US support of French in Indo-China, command relations in Pacific, abilities of Armed Forces of Pacific Allies, command and control of Strategic Air Command, aircraft/missile mix, unified command structure in Pacific and restraints on use of airpower affect Air Force capability of attaining national objectives in Vietnam. Topics also include new tactics to meet enemy air defense, effectiveness of US/South Vietnam command and control coordination, personal view on US Army air mobility and land barrier in South Vietnam concepts, special air warfare, counterinsurgency, defoliations, leaflet drops, politics and finally the economy in SEA.