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U.S. Air Force Historical Study No. 78

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MORALE IN THE AAF IN WORLD WAR II

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Prepared by the USAF
Historical Division,
Air University
1953

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FOREWORD

This study was written by Mr. Martin R. R. Goldman of the USAF Historical Division, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Like other Historical Division studies, this history is subject to revision, and additional information or suggested corrections will be welcomed.

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

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MORALE

The field of morale is a darkling plain, littered with dead cliches, swept by pronunciamentos, and only fitfully lit up by the electrical play of insight. For more than forty centuries, since human beings first banded together for the purpose of doing formal violence to one another, military specialists have explored the field in an attempt to isolate and master those elusive, volatile elements in whose chemistry lies the key to forces that can fire or wet down the spirits of men at arms. The incomplete success of these efforts is indicated by the fact that there is still no commonly accepted definition of morale, nor is there a definitive list of factors which affect morale; and any discussion of the relative importance of various factors is almost bound to generate, within minutes, hot words, high winds, and little light. There are few men with souls so dead who never to others have volunteered quick dicta on morale in particular and the Army life in general. But while such opinions, grounded as they are in steamy memories of Papua or gritty afterthoughts about Cyrenaica, may glow with the heat of felt experience, they nevertheless do not fill the need for some working definition which will at least serve present purposes. In this chapter,[1] then, morale, that "most abused, most misunderstood"[2] term, will be taken to denote an attitude of mind which when favorable leads to the willing performance of duty under all conditions, good or bad; and which when unfavorable leads to the unwilling performance,

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or poor performance, or non-performance of duty under the same good or bad conditions.*

For assessing the actual morale of the Army Air Forces in World War II, however, such a definition is only a gateway to an obstacle course dotted with such hurdles as time, place, measurement, and evaluation, each of which tends to block soaring generalizations. Any statement about morale in the Caribbean during the roaring activity of the 1942 submarine crisis, for example, would not apply to the final period of the war when the area had sunk back into tropical obscurity and the Sixth Air Force seemed as remote from violent conflict as the Spanish galleon that adorned its shoulder patch. The problem of place is illustrated by the radical contrast between the Eighth Air Force in Britain and the Thirteenth Air Force in the South Pacific Area. The two air forces lived different lives in different geographical areas

* Documentary Research Division of Research Studies Institute, Air University, has drawn up the following definition for the forthcoming Air Force Dictionary:

> morale, n. 1. The state of a person's mental attitude or feeling in respect to what he does or is, as determined by such factors as hope, a spirit of sacrifice, physical comfort, a sense of participating in important action, confidence in his leadership, etc. 2. A composite of such attitudes or feelings as entertained by the individuals of a group or unit.
>
> Morale is said to be high or low, good or bad. Measurement of morale in sense 2 must always be statistical and in terms of individuals, since a group, as such, does not have a mind of its own nor the apparatus for feeling. Thus, to say that "the morale of a unit is high" is to mean that the morale of a majority of, or of all, the individuals in a group is high.

Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, has been a somewhat shaky supreme authority on the meaning of morale. Compare the definition given in the 1961 printing with that of the 1942 printing.

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with different levels of civilization; they fought different wars under different climatic conditions and different combat conditions; and they enjoyed, or suffered with, different priorities and differing degrees of independence, prestige, strength, and fame. These and other distinctions arising in some measure from the accident of place exerted a variable influence on the morale of each organization. Another obstacle to a precise estimate of morale is the problem of measurement. Reams of statistics on venereal disease, for example, cannot be pulled out of context and evaluated apart from such vital matters as the availability of women for intercourse,[3] variations in the incidence of venereal disease among procurable females from area to area and country to country, the frequency of intercourse per man per month, the effectiveness of antivenereal disease revivals, the quantity, quality, and convenience of prophylactic equipment and facilities, and the level of soldierly enthusiasm for the healing powers of penicillin. The incidence of VD was, in fact, conditioned by so many factors that, in spite of tradition, it cannot reliably serve as an index of morale. But perhaps the most formidable obstacle to correctly gauging morale in the Army Air Forces is the evaluation of subjective evidence. There are few leading documents on morale, and these have limited usefulness. Most of the material crops up erratically, appears only in trace amounts, and assays low in quality. With distinguished exceptions, unit historians--whose work is perhaps the chief quantitative source of information on the subject--did their job perfunctorily as an unwelcome added chore for which they had had no preparation. Some over-

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looked morale completely, some gave it only a dull glance, and others handled it with a delicacy appropriate to NCO's and junior officers who write with one eye on the commanding officer through whose hands the record of the organization's achievements must pass before it ascends to a higher headquarters.[4] There is reason to ponder, for instance, the balance and accuracy of reports which declare that "morale has pierced its highest ebb"; reason to wonder if the acid content of other histories can perhaps be traced to an affliction of the spleen; and, in any case, good cause for handling most of the documentary evidence on morale with the care usually reserved for an armed bomb.[5]

The inevitable question remains. Is it possible to move past the hazards, hurdles, and obscurities to a generalization about morale? The answer is a cautious and rather reluctant "yes." The available testimony, which of course can never add up to an arithmetically clean sum, appears to justify the following statement: Morale in the Army Air Forces during the Second World War hovered, on a rough average, between fair and good. It had a wide range, horizontally and vertically. It varied in some degree from man to man, unit to unit, air force to air force; it could soar above "good" to rarified heights, or tumble below "fair" into a black slough; and in all places in all times it reacted with the trembling sensitivity of a compass needle to every change, every shift in conditions. But extremes and fluctuations aside, morale more often than not seems to have clung to a middle or perhaps slightly higher level. When positive and negative morale influences tended toward equilibrium, certain basic constants made for a favorable balance.

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Most airmen never really forgot the fundamental fact that they were on the winning side in a terrible war,[6] and the equally fundamental fact, which no amount of stereotyped grousing could obliterate, that concern for their well-being had generated a remarkable world-spanning welfare effort--civil and military, public and private--whose effects could be felt from the hill stations of India to the most implausible PW locations inside Germany.[7] And, if all other thoughts failed them, airmen could always take comfort from the awareness that they were not in the infantry.[8]

Any generalization about AAF morale, however, in applying to all men and all units, applies to no man and no unit. Behind its broad facade lie many conditioning factors which, functioning without pause, shaped and reshaped, raised up and pulled down morale. An examination of this constant interplay of factors and men throughout the course of the war offers perhaps the clearest path to an understanding of morale in the AAF, and promises not only to add substance to the spare frame of generalization but also to furnish the corrective qualifications that any full-blown statement about the ways of human beings must have. The major stress of this chapter will fall, therefore, on a consideration on morale in the making, or unmaking, first in the United States during the mobilization and training phase of the air man's military career, and then in the theaters of operations during the combat phase, with special emphasis given to the influence of specific factors in specific situations. If the discussion at times takes on a dark hue, that coloration will only reflect the concern of most of the documentary material with the problem side of morale, as well as the tendency of human beings in uniform to speak more of woe than of weal.

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From the earliest days of the war period the AAF grappled energetically if not always successfully with the inevitable morale problems produced by the service's explosive expansion. Regulations, field manuals, directives, memoranda, and other forms of injunction, advice and exhortation provided subordinate commanders, chaplains, and junior officers with impressive prescriptions for safeguarding the morale of the hundreds of thousands of recruits then flooding into AAF basic training and classification centers.[9] Among other things, the military leader was to know his men, take an interest in their concerns, earn their respect and their loyalty, eschew cursing them, promote their comfort and welfare, be patient, considerate, calm, firm and vigorous, keep the men informed, show enthusiasm, never assign pointless tasks, explain the reasons behind orders, preserve good health, make sure that uniforms fit, help solve family financial woes, check on laundry facilities, and bid a furloughed soldier a cheery farewell.[10] In such fashion the AAF provided ready-made paper solutions to all matters even tenuously related to morale. Reality, however, shied away from ideality with characteristic skittishness, and nowhere was this more true than in the hurly-burly of AAF basic training centers.

The obstacles to high recruit morale at AAF basic training centers were varied. Many of the men arrived from reception centers in a condition of bruised bafflement after sustaining the first shock of military life. If they sought peace and a refuge at such typical stations as Basic Training Center No. 7 at Atlantic City or Basic Training Center No. 9

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at Miami Beach, where in 1942 and 1943 violent growth, kaleidoscopic change and frequently clashing gears seemed normal, they could only expect disappointment. Unit commanders or their representatives would greet trainees with inspirational orientation talks whose quality varied according to the interest and talent of the speaker.[11] Whatever good such sermons may have achieved in replacing bewilderment with an understanding of the aims and methods of basic training, and in creating unit spirit and confidence in the training commander, was often dissipated by experiences that followed. In practice, two-way communication between the separate worlds of recruits and training group officers was rare. Budding loyalties withered when officers whirled, revolving-door fashion, into and out of training unit commands every two to three weeks or--in one extreme case--six times in a month, and when the need to furnish cadres for new organizations set off a series of raids on the permanent party ranks of existing basic training groups. Jefferson Barracks alone, for example, turned out forty Technical School Squadrons cadres in 1942.[12] Furthermore, instructor officers were in short supply, many had marginal qualifications, regarded their assignment "to the field" as a punishment for past sins and a bar to future grace, and, whatever their personal feelings may have been, were too sorely beset by multiple duties to pay direct attention to trainees. Permanent party enlisted personnel--especially drill instructors, who as a group were closest to the recruits and played key roles in the basic training program--also failed to measure up to standards in quantity and quality; many of them had been picked helter-skelter, were understandably bemused by the starts,

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stops, and switches in training, suffered from contagiously low morale, or were simply incompetent. As time passed and pressures eased, it became possible to improve the permanent party situation, but this upturn came too late to help those thousands of trainees who, in 1942 and 1943, absorbed from their supervisors little sense of mission or common purpose. Significantly, those unit commanders and instructors who did tackle the work of training with intelligence, consideration, and enthusiasm reaped a harvest of fine results and high morale in direct ratio to their efforts.[13]

Job classification and assignment had perhaps a greater influence on trainee morale than any other step in the process of basic training. If necessary, most recruits would probably have been willing to shrug off various basic training center shortcomings as a price to be paid for the long-run benefits promised by proper classification and assignment. The woes of the drill field were fleeting; but the decisions of classification and assignment sections might, as far as wartime military careers were concerned, endure forever. Contemporary soundings of soldier opinion show that the AAF outstripped the Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces in giving men the jobs they wanted and for which they felt best qualified. There was, nevertheless, widespread discontent on this score.[14] In the case of aviation cadet applicants who had volunteered for induction with the expectation of receiving immediate college training but were instead subjected to psychological and medical tests that barred them from the air crew program, the trouble was rooted in the excessive zeal of AAF recruiters and, fundamentally, in the fang and claw competition between the services for manpower. The low morale



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of these rejected applicants aroused concern in the Eastern Technical Training Command over improper recruiting methods.[15] Another serious morale problem developed when quick shifts in AAF needs jarred and sometimes stalled the carefully crafted machinery of classification and assignment. Theoretically, civilian background, AGCT scores, results of aptitude tests and personal choice determined the classification of a recruit. But time and again the pressure to fill school quotas by hook or crook wiped out the good work of classification sections; thus, to the cheerless tune of "exigencies of war," qualified weather observer candidates set out for Radio School, and qualified draftsman candidates in turn went off to Auto Mechanics School. While such instances of misclassification and malassignment were in a minority, they cropped up too often for comfort and dealt a hard blow to the morale of the victims. Admittedly, the erratic appetite of war forced the AAF to reshuffle requirements frequently. Yet there was a strong feeling that better planning could have prevented much grief. Once the damage was done, repairs were difficult: as late as March 1945 the Eighth Air Force, for example, was still struggling to right the wrongs of malassignment.[16]

The clear, direct influence of leadership, training procedures, classification and assignment on the morale of basic trainees is unquestionable. But the effect of other factors defies easy measurement. Floorless, stoveless tents pitched on marshy ground at Keesler Field, throttling dust at Sheppard Field, rain and muck at Greensboro AAB, and extremes of heat and cold at Jefferson Barracks certainly offered

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little cause for jubilation. But while such conditions could aggravate an already bad morale situation, it seems doubtful that they alone would ordinarily create one. Nothing in the record, furthermore, proves that recruits in an uncongenial setting had a markedly lower morale than those who were in the Babylonian environs of Miami Beach.[17] Army Emergency Relief, the American Red Cross, the United Service Organizations, base legal officers and chaplains, all in their several ways gave aid and comfort to trainees and thereby made a definite, if limited, contribution to morale. Similarly, post facilities for relaxation--service clubs, post exchanges, day rooms, gymnasiums, libraries, and theaters--played a useful role by offering diversion and amusement during leisure hours. Their importance, however, could be and was exaggerated. Secretary of War Stimson, never one to deny the worth of off-duty pleasures, bridled at the idea that "the morale of any army could be measured by the number of its recreation halls and canteens."[18] This view, which Stimson spurned as a delusion, was held far more widely than he liked. There was a tendency to try to dispose of morale by tucking it into a separate compartment of army life, where it could safely be left to the ministrations of "morale agencies." According to Stimson, morale depended finally on the training that a soldier received and on his confidence in his military leaders; but in the eyes of the AAF Training Command, among others, it seemed to hinge rather on the energy of the Special Services officer. Thus at Miami Beach, as one chaplain complained, morale was looked upon as the peculiar province of Special Services, whose efforts boiled down

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to little more than a series of extravaganzas at the Pine Tree Bandshell.[19]

Recreational facilities were especially incapable of undoing the damage done to morale by dislocations such as often occurred at the end of basic training. By that time most recruits, for better or worse, had exhausted the possibilities of basic training centers. If, for example, they had fared well in classification, they could expect to gain little by marking time indefinitely on drill fields or in front of mess hall sinks; and if they had fared badly, a prolonged stay at the scene of disaster promised equally little. For these reasons and perhaps because of native restlessness, there was a general urge to move ahead to the next step in AAF training as quickly as possible. When trainees had high hopes of shipment to schools without protracted delay, their morale reflected that optimism. But when uncoordinated training periods and shifting quotas slowed down or dammed up the flow to schools, morale sank. The longer men stagnated in pools, the more dispirited they became. Pass and other restrictions which had hobbled them as raw recruits continued to harass them in their new role as casuals; and though advanced training programs were concocted to keep them profitably occupied, they still spent much of their time--when they were not on KP, guard and fatigue details--literally as well as figuratively going over ground that was familiar. One battle-eager youngster who went on an alcoholic stampede after six months of frustration at Atlantic City swore that he knew every brick in the road to the drill field and insisted that he had pushed a broom far enough

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to cross the adjoining ocean.[20]

Pools of idle manpower were not peculiar to basic training centers. At one time or another they collected at almost every level of the Zone of Interior training program, and, on occasion, both before and after a particular phase of schooling.[21] And wherever or whenever pools appeared, the predictable consequences were administrative aches and morale pains. The aviation cadet program, to cite a notable case, was cursed with a pool problem, or a complex of pool problems, of oceanic dimensions from the outbreak of war until V-J Day. An ill-fated combination of all out recruitment, inadequate facilities for handling the men recruited, and precipitate ups and downs in aircrew requirements led unerringly to the accumulation of masses of cadet applicants and cadets waiting, variously, to go on active duty, to enter the college training program, to get out of college training and into preflight schools, and to escape from post-preflight holding points into the promised land of flying schools, where, as many cadets later learned, more pools had formed. Each of these pools became, as might have been expected, a slough of despond. Morale may have hit its lowest mark, strangely enough, in the ranks of men who had not even donned uniforms--Air Corps Enlisted Reservists whom the AAF could more readily recruit than absorb. The AAF, pricked by barbs of criticism, argued in self-defense that the fast-changing nature of the war made pools inevitable. Undoubtedly the argument had much force. But there were indications that the pool problem might have been eased and morale stiffened through closer cooperation between Headquarters AAF and the Training Command, as well as through a quicker realization by planners that what they

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regarded as a passing migraine was actually a permanent question which called for a better answer than makeshifts or convulsions of policy.[23]

That morale in the flying and technical training schools of the AAF often fell short of Himalayan heights should have surprised no one. A military academic machine which previously had existed only in miniature, and which in three and one-half years spewed forth 670,014 aircraft maintenance specialists, 128,877 armament specialists, 299,104 radio specialists, 297,318 aerial gunners, 74,400 single-engine pilots, and equally awesome numbers of other specialists,[24] was almost inevitably destined to be troubled by problems arising from hasty construction and human frailty.

In October 1943 an emissary from Headquarters AAF made a five-day inspection of the cadet armament course at Yale and wrote a glowing report on the excellence of the school, the "really first rate"[25] quality of the teaching, and the enthusiasm of the students. But elsewhere, at schools unblessed by ivied comforts and the ministrations of Mory's conditions were less idyllic. Tent cities of the species that once graced Kelly Field, temporary structures which proved pathetically inadequate in winter at Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and in summer at southern bases where 120° F temperatures were frequent, and general overcrowding at many fields, did not nourish high morale.[26] Nevertheless, though the radio students who trudged through the dead cold of a Wisconsin winter night at 0200 classes at Truax Field might not have appreciated the fact, the basic morale problems of AAF schools--like those of recruit training centers--probably did not spring from physical sources.

Nowhere was this more apparent than among those whose task it was to teach the students--the instructor personnel. Their pains were largely

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of the spirit and the pocketbook. Complaints of injured morale arose during the protracted delay and confusion that accompanied the commissioning of civilian instructors at preflight schools in 1942, and similar protests resulted, once again from the efforts of over-zealous AAF recruiters, who, hard-pressed to outbid the Navy and secondary rivals in another phase of the scramble for manpower,* had oversold civilians on the rank, promotions, and assignments they might expect upon entry into service. The question of promotions appears to have been the chief focus of discontent among instructors. Far from real war and its stimuli, sometimes malassigned and keenly aware of their unfitness for their task, and demoralized on occasion by lackluster leadership (always a major morale factor, but one rarely discussed except in generalities) or by the sheer boredom generated by a standardized teaching system which allowed little room for individual initiative,[27] many instructors often tended to lay especially heavy stress on personal [illegible]

To men in such a mood, promotions offered perhaps the handiest way of measuring the ground gained in private campaigns for prestige, power, and dollars. Motives aside, there was objectively good cause at times for agitation over the promotion situation. The argument that there never would or could be enough promotions to make every man's cup run over did not comfort those officer instructors whose chances for advancement started to fade early in 1943. One legitimate reason for shutting the doors was that too many men had become eligible for promotion at the same time. But this fact was outweighed in the minds of many instructors by the knowledge that officers in administrative

* See above, p.

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and other favored categories were harvesting most of the available laurels. Morale and efficiency fell off when hard-working instructors had to plod along as second lieutenants for a year and a half to two years while their more happily situated peers dashed ahead of them in rank.[28]

Enlisted instructors, for their part, felt no urge to shed tears over the fate of stymied junior officers who, after all, enjoyed the perquisites and immunities that went with a commission. Their own predicament was worse, and their morale that much more affected. Civilian instructors, for example, not only earned higher pay than enlisted men for equal work, but were free from many of the restrictions that hemmed in military personnel. At the Laredo Central School for Flexible Gunnery officer students were taught by privates who received their full measure of KP and like assignments, but no promotions. To the low-rated men on the faculties of other flexible gunnery schools, the dearth of promotions was injury enough; every graduation day, however, seeming insult was added when a new batch of freshly-striped sergeant or staff sergeant gunners rolled off the academic assembly line.[29] Those gunners who went on to armament school at Buckley and Lowry Fields had a catalytic effect on the faculties there, too. Many of them outranked their instructors and believed, furthermore, that after gunnery training they had nothing more to learn about armament. The result was a compound of disciplinary trouble and lowered ⟶

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instructor morale. Some relief came with the adoption of a policy providing that in the future all armorer-gunners would receive armament training before going on to gunnery school and non-commissioned officer status. A more positive balm was the opportunity for instructors to qualify for the cadet armament course, which led to an armament officer's commission. The Training Command also made a number of attempts to raise morale and the quality of teaching by finding ways around table of organization restrictions and other obstacles to higher rank for instructors, but these efforts met with incomplete success. Administrative heads continued to ache over the problem at least until November 1944.[30]

A majority of the students who swarmed into the AAF's school system approached military education with attitudes ranging from willingness to outright enthusiasm.[31] The average airman was inclined at the least to welcome schooling as a forward step along the road to a military career which, if it did not lead to glory, might nevertheless have its satisfactions and postwar uses. Technical training and flying training also offered the immediate attractions of novelty, inherent interest and, for some, excitement. There were, of course, shortcomings in working conditions, living conditions, and other areas of school life, but such departures from perfection were half-expected and wrily accepted by men who had already sloughed off their more utopian illusions during the shakeout process of basic training or cadet classification. More positively, administrative efforts to ease or end some irritants had a therapeutic effect on morale. Student protests, for example, over the damage that had resulted from the piling of purely military training on top of a full program of technical training led by early 1943 to a sharp cutback in military activity at school.

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To cite another case, the gradual elimination of night shifts--long an object of mass reprobation--gave students more sleep and time to recharge their energies, and served as a tonic to their spirits.[32] And the use of such incentives as promotions, competition, and enhanced opportunity based on merit similarly helped to revive flagging morale. So it was that most men went through the school phase of military existence, sometimes cast down by adversity or the repellent drabness of their work,[33] perhaps more often buoyed by a different set of influences. This majority group, like any group, undoubtedly had its morale problems, but they were not usually of the virulent kind.[34] The real trouble lay elsewhere.

The glider pilot program, whose rise and fall bore an unhappy resemblance to the trajectory of a defective multi-stage rocket, produced the most spectacular case of mass low morale in the record of the Training Command. Haste, ignorance of the nature and conduct of both glider training and operations, uncertainty of purpose and lack of clear responsibility were at the root of the troubles that developed when, in 1942, the AAF rushed headlong into this new activity. Because the shortage of manpower had made it difficult to round up enough glider pilot candidates during a period in which the program's goals shot up more than seven-fold, extravagant advertising--with its alluring stress on money, rank and thrills--and lowered physical standards became the order of the day. The result was a glut of humanity that overwhelmed the glider schools. Large pools of waiting men gathered, and morale receded. Then, as the entire program suddenly dived into an earthward spin after the arrival of cutback directives, morale dropped even lower to become "an extremely serious and almost insurmountable . . . problem."[35] Glider training reached its nadir in the spring of 1943 when about three-fourths of the hapless trainees were

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weeded out and sent elsewhere. Of the survivors, many were dropped on physical grounds just before graduation. It was not until that late hour that they underwent physical examinations.[36]

The fevers and chills that shook the glider program were confined, fortunately, to a small segment of the AAF school network. No such isolation occurred, or was possible, in the case of men who had been eliminated from the various aviation cadet programs. A high percentage of these washouts not only suffered from low morale themselves, but also constituted a menace of epidemic proportions to the morale of those with whom they came in contact after their debacle. At Scott Field, disgruntled eliminees who had been shunted into radio school showed no desire to mend their fortunes and behaved dourly enough to provoke a senior officer into denouncing them as sources of contagious rot.[37] Similarly, the great majority of flying school eliminees in the cadet armament course at Lowry Field early in 1942 appear to have earned for themselves nothing more distinguished than the epithet, "defeatist."[38] Administrators were also hard-pressed to cope with the cadets who came to navigation or bombardment schools after banishment from pilot training. Here the curriculum deserved a good measure of the blame for the eliminees' bleak mood, for until 1943 these reluctant navigators or bombardiers were forced to grind through the same preflight course they had already completed during their pilot training days. Morale rose when an overhaul of the flying school system finally put an end to this pointless repetition. There were those who felt, however, that the whole eliminee problem might never have arisen if attempts had been made to quarantine washouts and minister to their morale before they went on to new assignments. Whether or not the training

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Command had the time and personnel for a campaign of mass rehabilitation is questionable. But the success of at least one experiment in careful re-orientation in 1944 suggests that such an investment of effort might have yielded liberal dividends.[39]

The great majority of combat veterans who flowed into the training mill fresh from overseas duty were afflicted, like cadet washouts, with infectiously poor morale. Again, as had been the case with the washouts, responsibility for this condition was mixed. For their part, the authorities charged with the classification and training of returnees generally tackled the job with the best theoretical intentions. Unfortunately, a gap of remarkable breadth separated theory from common practice. Good intentions did not interfere seriously with the workings of the law of military supply and demand. Thus when demand waxed for the use of combat veterans as instructors, returnees suddenly found themselves tagged as pedagogues--whether or not they yearned for the role or had the talent to play it. Returnee pilots, navigators, and bombardiers who voluntarily went to instructors school got along well. But those who looked upon their new career as a grievous form of involuntary servitude soon showed characteristic signs of maladjustment and poor morale. They clashed with permanent party men, failed courses with disturbing frequency, and aroused serious concern over their attitude. Nevertheless, as long as demand for their bodies and abilities held up, returnees were impressed into academic service; and the problems raised by their outlook and performance continued to resist solution.[40]

Virtually every technical or flying school carried on its rolls a number of men whose morale had allegedly been damaged by faulty classification

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or malassignment. True enough, the machinery of classification and assignment did function more than once with the fine discrimination of a bulldozer, but its behavior hardly accounts for all of the claimed injuries. In many instances students seemed to be suffering more from the frustration of personal plans and preferences than from actual mishandling. This was perhaps especially true after the crisis mood of the first eleven months of the war had faded[41] without being replaced, in the case of rootless trainees, by some counter force like organizational pride or the pull of leadership that might have helped men through the process of subordinating individual desires to the demands of military necessity. Reports from technical schools spoke of the problem of dealing with recalcitrant students who either objected to the kind of training they received or wanted no training at all. Their low spirits probably sank further under the a ded weight of a feeling of futility when it became known that in spite of orders from Headquarters AAF newly acquired specialist skills were frequently going to waste in operational units.[42] Flying schools had troubles of their own. Some small-sized pilots, for example, raised an outcry over their assignment to fighters, while others of all dimensions were just as outraged by assignment to bombers. Harassed training authorities tried to hew to a policy of voluntary assignment, but there were times, when an urgent need for men over--especially in the heavy bomber program--forced them to override personal choices. The resultant drop in morale had to be accepted as one of the costs of an emergency situation.[43]

As the many tributary streams of air and ground specialists flowed from their sources in the Training Centers and merged to form units, new morale factors came into play and familiar ones took on

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in a regularly constituted organization, men who had hitherto drifted through individual training like clumps of discrete atoms found themselves in a changed world. For the first time--in most cases--they actually belonged to a unit with a permanence, a meaning, and a clearly defined purpose that Training Command school squadrons (whose numerical designations quickly faded into a half-forgotten blur) had seemed to lack. There might be tumult and confusion during the early weeks of an infant organization's life, but in good time a feeling of identification with the unit began to well up in men--and with that emotion came a lift in spirits. The speed with which esprit de corps developed varied with the rate of personnel turnover, the availability of equipment and facilities for a prompt start on training, and--above all else--the quality of leadership shown by senior officers.[14]

Though it would be hard to claim that physical conditions had no effect on morale at isolated bases like Blythe, in the California desert, where summer heat gave training a glowing resemblance to the Bessemer process,[15] other factors generally exerted a graver influence. The most dramatic of these was a fear of flying in certain aircraft. There was nothing new about the phenomenon. It had cropped up in World War I when the DH-4 won temporary notoriety as the "Flying Coffin." Two decades later, the Spitfire--finest of Britain's fighters--also encountered much whispering suspicion after the occurrence of several crashes marked by wing collapse. In their turn at least a half-dozen American aircraft of World War II became objects of worry and controversy. The P-38 came in for its share of buffeting early in 1942 when a series of accidents involving this novel fighter set off a wave of applications for transfer to bomber units. The excitement died down and the wave of applications ebbed as pilots gradually

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mastered the airplane's quirks. At about the same time the B-26 became the center of a greater furor whose echoes reverberated in General Arnold's office. Almost from the instant of its first delivery to AAF organizations, this medium bomber proved difficult to maintain and--much worse--dangerous for raw air crews to fly. As disaster piled on top of disaster, a mood of panic spread like a pestilence from one B-26 base to the next and helped to add to the accident rate. The situation became so serious that when an opportunity for transfer arose, every eligible pilot in the 320th Bombardment Group (M), with the exception of the commanding officer and his executive, either formally or informally stated a desire to escape from B-26 training to a safer kind of flying activity. It took changes in design, combined with evangelistic lectures and a number of aerial demonstrations to convince crewmen that the B-26 would behave as well as any other airplane if handled properly.[16] The Second Air Force, which concentrated on four-engined bomber crew training, had its share of grief--first and foremost with the B-24, and later with the B-29. At the bottom of the trouble with these aircraft--as with others that came before them or after them--were inadequate maintenance work, combat crew deficiencies, faulty supervision of the training program and the maddening bugs that mar the early record of almost every untried airplane. During 1942 and 1943 the B-24 had the sorry distinction of being the Second Air Force's "problem plane." In 1943 alone, [illegible] Second Air Force combat crewmen went to their deaths in [illegible] B-24 accidents. The air of mystery that enshrouded many of these disasters had a doubly chilling effect on the morale of untouched crews. Four baffling crashes in rapid-fire order at Alamogordo, New Mexico, for example, led Gen. [illegible] B. Forrest to report:

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"The people down there are scared to death of their airplanes and it is very bad."[47] Morale congealed almost as dangerously in the 34th Bombardment Group (H), which lost seven B-24's and forty-three crewmen during a six weeks' stay at Salinas, California.[48] The B-24--like the P-38 and the B-26--ultimately went on to a notable record in combat, but not until many apprentice airmen had contributed heavily in lives and spirit to its trying out.

Overcrowding at airfields, lack of convenient recreational facilities and drastic shortages of housing for dependents[49] were familiar but minor morale factors at this stage of the training program. Though they may have caused individual cases of discontent, most men in operational training units had by this time learned to shrug them off or accept them as the facts of Army life in wartime. But the issue of promotions was something rather new to the alumni of flying schools and technical schools who manned the organizations that were taking shape in the continental air forces. A majority of these men had spent most of their military lives in one form or another of individual training. As casuals they had moved about in a rigidly controlled economy where promotions either came automatically to all trainees in good standing at some point in the schooling process, or were not open to any of them. Now, in the more flexible world of the numbered air forces, officers and enlisted men alike scanned bulletin boards and followed the latest Table of Organization developments with an interest that fed on high hopes of personal gain. The general tendency to promote men to within one step of the maximum rank or grade allowed for their positions served as a spur to morale.[50]

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The question of leaves and furloughs also began to loom larger on the horizon as airmen realized with mingled emotions that their time in the Zone of Interior was running out. For most of them there had been little or no chance to break away from military routine--except on passes--until they reached the end of Training Command schooling. Between that point and their date of departure from the United States, they could normally expect--as a matter of policy--a leave or furlough of up to fifteen days, plus travel time. This final opportunity for a visit home might come before, during, or after OTU or RTU phase training--depending on schedules or unlooked-for lulls in activity brought on by a dearth of airplanes. In the case of unassigned men who had not received unit training, it might not come short of arrival at Overseas Replacement Depots. Early or late, these leaves and furloughs were a boon to morale.[51] But whenever they were unduly delayed, cut down, or written off, a decline of morale followed. Such was the experience of units of the XIIth Air Force Service Command which had abandoned pre-embarkation furloughs in the rush to meet TORCH commitments in 1942; and such was also the experience of the Training Command and the Second Air Force after they had adopted similar emergency measures in the spring and summer of 1944 in order to fill their obligations to the OVERLORD forces in Europe and the B-29 project in the Pacific.[52] At the Greensboro, North Carolina, ORD during this period, the moratorium on furloughs in combination with spit-and-polish discipline helped to send the court martial rate soaring; while out in Kansas a senior general officer unwittingly made a difficult situation worse by declaring during an inspection of the 40th Bombardment Group (VH), that

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the group's combat crews ought to have seven days of leave--a respite which they could not get and did not get because of the urgent need to modify their B-29's and fly them away by a set date. But the crisis soon passed, after provoking a near mutiny at one base, and by November the Second Air Force could report that over ninety-nine per cent of the men processed for transfer overseas by its 21st Wing had had leaves or furloughs at some time during the previous six months.[53]

The approach of overseas movement usually acted as a signal for the appearance of an ailment that came to be known as "gangplankitis." Its symptoms ran the gamut from nervous tremors to AWOL and desertion. It could crop up anywhere--at training fields, staging areas, overseas replacement depots and ports of embarkation--and whether it would occur in mild or intense form was something no one could predict with any certainty. Generally speaking, severe seizures were most likely to develop when organizational ties were weak or--as in the case of individual replacements who belonged to no unit--non-existent; when leaves or furloughs and even passes were barred; and when men had as much as seven weeks of idleness in which to consult their fears of the unknown reaches beyond the piers of San Francisco or the runways of Morrison Field, Florida. But "gangplankitis" normally presented no grave problems. If the prospect of leave-taking aroused some qualms, it also generated a surge of excitement and high spirits that was powerful enough to overcome the drag of other factors.[54]

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During the journey overseas the likelihood of morale difficulties tended to vary inversely with the length of the trip: the longer the voyage, the greater the problems. Those who traveled by air might grumble or damn the amenities and liabilities of such stopover points as Presque Isle, Morrison Field, Goose Bay, Atkinson Field, Natal, Bluie West No. 1 and Kwajalein. But these reactions were more or less fleeting. Movement by air usually offered the virtues of speed--except along the North Atlantic route in winter, which at least provided the compensation of Iceland's Danish pastry--and variety. It mattered little if the food at a base in Trinidad were wretched; within twenty-four hours the complainants might be enjoying a meal in a hotel at Belem, Brazil. Similarly, if the sight of Ascension caused dismay, it did so only for a day.[55] Men in ships were less fortunate. Few wartime voyages resembled the 27th Bombardment Group's journey to the Philippines in November 1941 aboard the _President Coolidge_: the liner was comfortable and uncrowded, the diet--"steaks, squabs, cheeses of all kinds"--astonishing.[56] After Pearl Harbor, those who traveled fastest along the shortest possible routes generally fared best. During a quick run from New York to the Firth of Clyde on the _Queen Mary_, cramped quarters, dismal food and other shortcomings ranked only as passing irritations. But on many longer voyages--especially through equatorial zones--the heat, the overcrowding, the lack of ventilation, the surfeit of [illegible] stew and other tasteless dishes, the stench from [illegible], the shortage of recreational facilities, [illegible] thirty-eight

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consecutive days aboard ship could blend into a somewhat corrosive mixture. Many of the discomforts and deficiencies were unavoidable, but, as anger boiled up over such affronts as gross inequities in food and food service, this fact was often forgotten.[57]

The chances of war brought American airmen into overseas settings that varied radically in nature and effect. Units could consider themselves thrice-blessed if their movement orders took them to stations in a temperate zone where climate was tolerable, disease was no grave menace (save to the careless and incontinent), and living quarters were reminiscent of what they had known in the United States. The worst that could be said of Eighth Air Force housing in Britain during 1942 and 1943 was that it did not equal the standards of permanent Zone of Interior installations. In southeastern Australia, facilities at Tocumwal and Melbourne struck Maj. Gen. George C. Kenney as perhaps even too comfortable to be militarily useful. And in China, during the summer of 1942, Kunming offered to the startled men of the 23d Fighter Group a magnificent locale and accommodations that were as gratifying as they were unexpected.[58]

But East Anglia, New South Wales, and the valleys of Yunnan were not the world. Elsewhere, from Shemya to Biak, from Youks-les-Bains to Espiritu Santo, airmen too often encountered conditions that subjected them to mass trials by fever and chill, dehydration and deluge, dust and slough, monsoon, khamsin, and williwaw. There was nothing temperate about the heat of Darwin and the North Australian bush country, the suffocating, clinging damp of the Papuan jungles, the bleak cold of the Alaskan mainland, the interminable grayness of the Aleutian chain, Bengal's mixture of sun and starch, and the Libyan desert's winter blend of sand

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

storms and inundations. There was nothing reminiscent about the scrap-and-tin-can dugouts that dotted the landscape at forward fields in Algeria, the washed-out tents at Magrun--"a hell hole if there ever was one"[59] in Cyrenaica, unwinterized Eleventh Air Force quarters at Elmendorf, the charnel house atmosphere of Tarawa, Kwajalein, and other devastated atolls in the Central Pacific, and the insect-ridden, snake-ridden, lizard-ridden, unfloored and unscreened pyramidal tents at bases in New Guinea. Nor was there any dearth of menace, or at least misery, in the onslaught of afflictions like malaria, dengue fever, scrub typhus, diarrhea and dysentery ("Karachi Crouch," "Delhi Belly"),[60] schistosomiasis, boils, abscesses, tropical ulcers, fungus infections ("Guinea Crud," "Jungle Rot"),[61] furunculosis, filiriasis, and "fevers of unknown origin."[62]

During the early stages of combat operations, however, morale held up far better than might have been expected, in spite of physical conditions that ranged from poor to appalling. Disease, of course, could and did have a depressing effect. Malaria, for example, helped to drain reserves of strength and will in badly stricken organizations like the 11th Bombardment Group in the New Hebrides and Lower Solomons, and the Fifth Fighter Command in [illegible]. Chronic dysentery had a similar though less extreme effect on personnel of the India-China Wing of the Air Transport Command. Perhaps equally depressing were the glaring contrasts that existed between the living standards of senior officers and their men in India in mid-194[illegible], or between sailors and their poor relations of the army on islands of the South and Central Pacific at any rate.[63] But these cases fall far short of telling the whole story of morale in physical adversity. Given the spur of crisis, the compulsion of responsibility,



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the elemental pull of leadership, the feeling of pride in their unit, the excitement of participation in great undertakings, and the belief that all concerned were sharing the suffering alike, air crewmen and ground crewmen in all theaters not only endured privation but did what they had to do with a drive and a spirit that many of them could never again summon up in later, physically easier, periods after the wear and tear of overseas life had taken its toll. Morale in some Twelfth Air Force units was never higher than during the winter months at Thelepte and other forward bases in North Africa when conditions were at their worst. On the other side of the world, verve, enthusiasm and sense of purpose carried many Eleventh Air Force men through the hectic days and hard times of 1942; but these were largely dissipated by 1943, to be replaced by the "demoralizing and [illegible]"[64] influence of Aleutian [illegible].[65]

The challenge of physical hardship might serve as a short-term stimulus to fresh and eager troops, but there was no power of uplift in ill-[illegible] mutton and tinned [illegible]. "Poor food" ranked as one of the most frequently, most persistently voiced grievances of airmen in theaters of operations. The fact that available edibles usually met nutritional requirements signified nothing to overseas veterans [illegible] turned [illegible] at the sight of the [illegible] contents of a Vienna sausage can. Complaints about diet could cover everything from unpalatable British [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] and dehydrated American vegetables. They could reflect the [illegible] of canned U.S. Army Quartermaster C, [illegible], and B rations in the Pacific, or the absence of [illegible] in China. They could refer to [illegible], or to the [illegible] dishes and [illegible]

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[illegible] did [illegible] foods. [illegible] only that they [illegible] in lieu of [illegible] of [illegible], [illegible], or [illegible]. In any case, sustained and vehement [illegible] over [illegible] trouble: the former [illegible] of the [illegible], the latter [illegible] probability that morale was ebbing.[66]

Food was not a major problem in [illegible] Europe and the Mediterranean. Though difficulties arose, they were usually neither [illegible] nor serious. The quality of cooking often left much to be desired, but airmen generally accepted this shortcoming, however sourly, as another one of the facts of army life—a condition that good cooks, training, and other measures might relieve but never eliminate. British rations, which rarely failed to evoke a bristling reaction, made only a brief, [illegible] appearance at AAF [illegible] in Great Britain and [illegible]. Supplies began to flow in regularly from the Zone of Interior. Thenceforth, aside from some mutterings about [illegible] and the talents of GI chefs, there were few complaints in the ETO over a diet that usually contained a variety of fresh foods. When Ninth Air Force units began their series of shifts and jumps across France in 194[illegible], K rations dominated menus at times. But not many men fretted about this temporarily limited fare during a period of rousing action and movement.[67] In Northwest Africa and the Middle East, where transportation never kept pace with demand, and supply lines had to reach far beyond port and refrigeration facilities, diet became a touchy issue in the months after the [illegible] of TORCH and [illegible] Alamein [illegible]. [illegible] according to the [illegible]

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in 1943, they received it first and most frequently. At less accessible bases up front, where the arrival of a stray planeload of frozen meat was a holiday event, men had to make do with what quickly became a dreary diet of British rations and the usual array of canned American hashes, stews, and luncheon meats. Fortunately, trading talents quickly came into play, and more than one mattress cover ("sleep-sleep")[68] changed hands in return for native chickens, eggs, and tangerines. Haphazard barter had its limitations, however, and the food question showed signs of developing into a disturbing morale problem just at the time that Allied forces leaped over the Mediterranean barrier into Sicily, Italy, and Sardinia. The move into Europe provided logistical salvation, for there soon followed a remarkable improvement in troop menus as fresh meats and dairy products poured into the refrigeration storage facilities of ports like Naples, Bari, and Cagliari, and then flowed out to consuming units with increasing regularity. As butter, steaks, pork chops, and "the long 'Coney Island' hot-dog"[69] made their welcome appearances, morale rose and diet ceased to be an issue of real consequence in the Mediterranean.[70]

Airmen were less fortunate east of Suez. In Asia and out across the Pacific food rarely failed to be an issue of consequence from the beginning of the war until its final stages. Except at rear area installations in India, Australia, and Hawaii, or at forward bases in the Aleutians where by 1944 chicken every Sunday had become a commonplace, dissatisfaction with available fare developed into and remained a chronic complaint of the overwhelming majority of air units. Conditions varied widely from Linglin to Sansapor and Saipan, but at all of these bases a persistently unsatisfying diet damaged morale.[71]

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In isolated China, which logistically speaking lay at the end of the known world, AAF organizations were dependent upon the Chinese War Area Service Corps for the bulk of their food, and its preparation as well. The system aroused more protest than praise. Airmen at CWASC hostels variously complained about the monotony of diet, objected to the dearth of vegetables, described water buffalo meat--which at times made up ninety per cent of the meat issue--as sickening, and reported that unsanitary kitchen conditions had caused numerous cases of dysentery. But in spite of the pressure of repeated assertions that morale had suffered as a result of these conditions, little could be done either to reform the hostel organization or to procure American food. Eggs and rice remained life-sustaining standbys for men who dreamed of C rations. No such yearning existed, however, on the other side of the Hump in Assam, where the lack of refrigeration facilities necessitated a diet of canned GI foods. Here, the problem of coping endlessly with hash and the military version of spam was one that taxed the ingenuity of GI chefs and the morale of the clientele.[72]

In the Pacific the combination of long, often attenuated supply lines and grossly inadequate refrigeration facilities--both ashore and afloat--created an almost insurmountable barrier to a satisfactory diet for army forces. Airmen nevertheless tried every conceivable way of getting through, above, or around that barrier. They attempted, with mixed success, to improve the preparation of the Australian and American canned rations and dehydrated vegetables that formed their basic menu. They resorted to cajolery, letters of request through channels, barter with the Navy cus



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of channels, smuggling, thievery, special buying arrangements in Australia and Hawaii, the rigging up of makeshift cool rooms, and the use of everything from C-46's to P-38's for "fat-cat" shipments of extra supplies to forward areas. But these expedients provided only sporadic relief at best. The ultimate solution of the problem lay beyond the control of air units, whose efforts to lay hands on palatable foods and the precious "reefers" in which to store them were either informal or illegal, depending on the observer's viewpoint. Official responsibility for refrigeration rested with the theater engineers, who were hampered both by shortages and the strait jacket of War Department Tables of Equipment. Jurisdiction over the procurement and shipment of rations belonged to the Services of Supply, whose hotly-criticized operations reflected only too faithfully the fact that--for army purposes, at least--there were not enough refrigerated cargo vessels or transport aircraft to go around. The situation remained serious until the winter of 1944-1945. By then GI veterans of an endless succession of jungles and coral outcroppings had had more than enough time to wonder, as they poked at their bully beef or contemplated peanut butter, why neighboring naval forces never seemed to have to do without the refrigerators, the fresh foods, and other material blessings that could make wartime existence in the torrid regions of the Pacific more tolerable.[73]

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A number of factors shaped the morale of AAF ground personnel as they went about their daily rounds. That the most dramatic factor of all--peril to life, limb, and mind from enemy air attack--exerted perhaps the least influence was a matter of the fortunes of war. American mechanics, clerks, and administrators were constitutionally no less vulnerable than their foes to the shattering effects of sustained aerial assault. But generally speaking, only those AAF units in the most advanced areas during the early phases of a campaign ever underwent a pounding. They could be badly hurt. The Japanese fragmentation bombs that rained down upon Port Moresby, the concentrated dose of bombing and strafing inflicted upon Twelfth Air Force men at Thelepte, the beating administered to Fifth Air Force Service Command truck drivers who worked round-the-clock on the Oro Bay -Dobodura supply run, and the punishment meted out to signalmen and other personnel at Wakde and Biak, all strained morale and undermined endurance. Yet these cases were exceptional. Most air organizations either never came within striking distance of Axis aviation or were shielded just as effectively by local allied air superiority and the enemy's gradual descent into a defensive strategy. During the last half of the war enemy raiders intruded so infrequently upon the calm of many bases that one of their rare, ineffectual appearances was more likely to result in an upsurge rather than a sinking of spirits.[74]

A more serious threat than enemy bombs to the stamina and morale of non-combat personnel under certain conditions was over work. In

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New Guinea, the New Hebrides, the Solomons, and the Gilberts, shortages of personnel (especially in the skilled categories) and equipment put a heavy burden on the manpower available. Maintenance men who toiled long hours seven days a week under cruelly difficult conditions could hold up for a time, but not indefinitely. When overwork sank from the exalted status of an all-out emergency effort to the level of routine, unrelieved drudgery, the danger of a drop in strength, productivity, and morale developed.[75] Though the problems posed by exhaustion came to the fore most quickly in dismal settings like Guadalcanal and Tulagi, they were by no means confined to the torrid zone. In China, for example, the commander of the veteran 23d Fighter Group warned Headquarters Fourteenth Air Force in November 1943 that his undermanned, under-equipped organization could not stand the strain of overwork much longer "without a serious decline in efficiency and . . . morale."[76]

As long as the tempo of ground activity normally stayed below the danger line, hard work could serve as a powerful stimulus to unit morale and performance. This was especially true in the case of ground personnel who were able to see a close and direct connection between their labors and the prosecution of the war. In days of crisis, when that relationship stood out with naked clarity, non-combat men reacted magnificently to the challenge of the hour. Maintenance crews of fighter and bomber squadrons at Nome, Adak, and Umnak, during 1942, toiled up to 65 and 70 hours at a stretch in zero weather, snowstorms, and one-hundred-mile-an-hour gales, and emerged from the ordeal in good spirits. They had done something worthwhile, and they knew it. At Causeway, Tunisia, the ground men of the 79th Fighter

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Group uncomplainingly labored sixteen hours a day during a vital period of operations against the Afrika Corps. Line crews and other ground section personnel at Eighth Air Force stations in England earned a glowing tribute for the superb way in which they met the crushing requirement of maximum aircraft availability that went into effect on 2 June 1944 and lasted until two weeks after the Normandy landings.[77] When unit activities went forward at a less hectic pace, the virtues of work were still apparent to observers and toilers alike. A Seventh Air Force bombardment squadron characteristically reported from Guam in 1944 that "everybody is to busy too feel sorry for themselves."[78] Eight months later, the squadron's parent organization--a group whose morale aches were legion--echoed the refrain from Okinawa with the comment that the work load left "little time for contemplation" and thereby helped the days to "pass more swiftly."[79] Non-tactical units voiced similar sentiments. The smoothly-functioning 3d Air Depot Group at Agra, India, for example, found that "more work and less idle time" strengthened morale by seeming to shorten the long months and years of an overseas tour of non-combat duty. Here, too, was an affirmation of faith in the principle that "the faster we finish, the sooner our return to the States."[80]

There were limits, however, to the appeal of work. Ground personnel who, when the need arose, could be counted upon to pour all of their strength into the execution of any militarily useful task, looked with contempt and disgust upon chores that were transparently worthless. Make-work projects led nowhere and achieved nothing more constructive than waste motion. Almost every airman had [illegible] at one time or another an unpleasant taste of such enterprises in the lore of an [illegible]rior; overseas, they were

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even less palatable. This was particularly true in veteran organizations like the Twelfth Air Force Service Command, where the concocting of make-work schemes in 1945 kept men "busy" but wrecked morale.[81] Enlisted men harbored an even more intense animosity to work details that carried the label of special comforts and privileges for officers. The commanding officer of Headquarters Squadron, USSTAF, for example, protested against the morale-breaking practice of detailing his men to construction work on an officers club at a time when there was no day room for enlisted men and a wide gap already existed between officer and EM living standards. An engineering officer at a lower echelon level in the Central Pacific was equally critical of the practice of repeatedly pushing aside work that would improve living conditions for enlisted personnel in order to proceed with the apparently unnecessary rehabilitation of high-ranking officers' quarters. Enlisted ground personnel, particularly in areas where the sounds of combat were faint, had a bottomless capacity for indignation against what they took to be flagrant discrimination. Cases like these were all that was needed to transform latent resentment against officers into steaming wrath.[82]

Despite all efforts to avoid sags in the rate of operations, almost all units inevitably experienced spells of inactivity. Bad weather, shortages of equipment, snarled shipping schedules, unpredictable twists of events, and a number of other factors might be responsible for enforced idleness. Whatever the cause, the effect was likely to be unhealthy. Airmen, whose devotion to sack-time was proverbial, of course welcomed a respite from the grinding demands of a period of stress, but they had no desire to vegetate. Long days or weeks of marking time had little appeal for

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ground person[illegible]el, [illegible] possible progress toward victory [illegible] only [illegible] their current [illegible]. The urge to get on with the [illegible] have [illegible] opportunities for [illegible] the environment [illegible]; [illegible], never-theless, universal. [illegible] concerned on units, morale [illegible]. [illegible], China, [illegible] the 11th Bombardment Squadron [illegible] out of [illegible] by [illegible]. It [illegible] force [illegible] Bombardment Group [illegible] for something to [illegible]. [illegible] Air Force units also suffered from declining morale when there was little for them to do during [illegible] of 19[illegible]. [illegible] such [illegible] and [illegible] in [illegible] effect of home[illegible] spirits.[53] In the [illegible] Air Force Service Command the story was essentially the same, and the conclusion obvious: "A unit must not be allowed to go through a long period of idleness."[54] This dictum might have included individuals as well as organizations: "insufficient occupation" was an [illegible] affliction of [illegible] in the [illegible].[55]

In [illegible] sector [illegible] there [illegible], where the [illegible] of existence [illegible] the inability of many men to [illegible] their [illegible] had anything to do with [illegible] The [illegible] frequently [illegible] of futility. [illegible] could also [illegible] unit. Like the [illegible] Group in Italy, [illegible]

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deal of truth in the slogan, "the nearer the front, the higher the morale."[86] Behind this cliché lay something more than a conviction that time raced at Tacloban, Leyte, and dragged in the Caribbean. Pride, self-respect, and a sensitivity to the opinions of others ("And what did you do in the war?") were also involved. On Morotai, morale flourished in bombardment units whose men "knew they were contributing a goodly share toward the winning of the war."[87] In India, the feeling that they had "participated,"[88] however vicariously, in successful combat missions helped to keep up the spirits of mechanics in a bombardment maintenance squadron. On Tinian and Okinawa, "justifiable pride" in "concrete accomplishment,"[89] and the fact that all personnel--ground as well as combat--could measure the grief visited upon the enemy through their joint efforts, contributed heavily to an outlook of optimism.[90] But in rear areas* frustration often outweighed such compensations as a relatively high standard of living and immunity from sudden death. A special services officer pictured morale as "a tremendous problem"[91] in the Aleutians after the withdrawal of the Japanese had reduced numbers of Eleventh Air Force men to a routine of sitting on their hands in a cold mist. Obsession with "a feeling of unimportance"[92] was perhaps just as strong at air depots in England; this condition led one observer to urge a policy of sending depot personnel on temporary duty to combat units where they could see tangible evidence of the worth of their work. In the Mediterranean, men in AAFSC/MTO units that were still stationed at African bases many months after the tide of war had swept into Europe also found it difficult to believe that their

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* The term was more figurative than real in air forces like the Eighth, where air depots were within cycling distance of the nearest bomber airdromes.

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efforts had any military significance. This mood may well have been most acute in the rear echelons of the Thirteenth Air Force Service Command, whose personnel could draw small comfort from the conviction that they were stagnating in the middle of nowhere ("What was the name of that island again?") as members of a forgotten air force in a secondary theater of operations.[93] There were ways, however, of combatting the negative mood that was so common among service personnel. In the Fifth Air Force Service Command, for example, intelligence officers carried on a steady and at least partly successful campaign of educational therapy that was designed to show how the prosaic labors of non-combat units had made the triumphs of the Fifth Air Force possible. The spur of competition also helped to keep men out of the doldrums, as did the careful exploitation of the individual airman's pride in his resourcefulness and skill.[94]

One fairly certain antidote for rear area depression and restlessness was forward movement. Pulling up stakes might mean confusion or disruption, exhausting effort and physical misery, but these liabilities were overshadowed in the minds of most men by the excitement of a change of scene and the knowledge that every forward stride along the highways to Berlin and Tokyo brought home, paradoxically enough, that much closer. Another encouraging aspect of a move was that it promised to carry men nearer to the combat zone. The experience of the [illegible] Service Group of the Ninth Air Force in the Middle East was typical. When the 98th and 376th Bombardment Groups ceased operations at [illegible] for a more active sector, morale slumped in the [illegible], which had been left behind to contend with dust storms instead of the enemy. For a few weeks, "every day was in the dumps."[95] But as soon as the Group received orders to trek west, morale soared. "We are moving, our prayers had been answered."[96] Half

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way around the world, where a change of station could usually be defined as a shift from a developed jungle site to an undeveloped jungle site, service units of the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces also reacted [illegible] to the arrival of movement orders.[97]

Some of the workday factors that affected the morale of AAF non-combat personnel had a similar, perhaps even more acute influence on combat crewmen. Enemy air raids on forward AAF bases taxed the nerves, energies, and spirits of air and ground men alike: "Washing Machine Charlie" in the Solomons and his Luftwaffe cousins in Tunisia were no respecters of persons. Nevertheless, as hard as it may have been for a bleary-eyed mechanic to drag himself through his daily routine after the tension and loss of sleep caused by shelling and bombing, it was probably still harder for a pilot who had undergone the same tearing stress to face up without respite to the rigors of air combat. True enough, combat fliers had the opportunity--denied their earth-bound comrades--to hit back at the enemy, but there were times when, in their raw-nerved state, they were hardly disposed to snatch at the opportunity. Similarly, though overwork might grind non-combat men down to a condition of deep-seated fatigue, reduced efficiency, and lowered morale, it could actually shatter combat personnel. A steady diet of sixteen-hour days at workstands was harsh fare, but nowhere as harsh as an almost equally steady diet of long overwater missions, flown against odds, without benefit of fighter escort or adequate air-sea rescue facilities. It was no accident that, at a time of critical manpower shortages, the punch-drunk survivors of the early air battles in the Philippines and Java had to be sent home, while many ground crewmen were still considered capable of holding on. Idleness, too, could wield more

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heavily upon com[illegible] [illegible] tour [illegible]. [illegible] personnel may have [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] for constructive [illegible]; [illegible] nothing like the mounting [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] crews were subjected during the [illegible] ordeal of starts, [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] the first [illegible] Air Force [illegible] assault on Berlin and the first XXI Bomber Command strike against Tokyo.[68]

Of those [illegible] factors [illegible] to [illegible], attrition was among the most prominent. [illegible] flier, of course, [illegible] with every expectation [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] he might be jolted when he first encountered them. Battle losses [illegible] not of themselves automatically make for low morale. [illegible] [illegible] than not, [illegible] only [illegible] [illegible] close to the men who had gone down; others experienced only fleeting [illegible] of [illegible]. In terms of unit morale, the important thing about attrition was [illegible] it occurred, but how it occurred. In a [illegible] [illegible], for example, the loss of an obscure [illegible] pilot might have no effect whatever on morale. But if the [illegible] turned out to be the squadron commander--as was the case in the 31[illegible] Fighter Squadron of the [illegible] Air Force--or another key figure, the loss could come as "a terrific blow"[69] to the entire unit. The mental consequences of casualties hinged also upon the rate of operations. In bombardment groups of the [illegible] Air Force, where the count of missions ran into the hundreds, losses were almost an [illegible] part of the daily routine [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] any impairment of morale. A different situation [illegible], however, in the [illegible] Aleutians, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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losses tended to stand out more dramatically than elsewhere: an antishipping sweep that cost one B-25 crew threw "a cloud of gloom"[100] over the 77th Bombardment Squadron.

In spite of dissenting opinions,[101] there seems to be little doubt that heavy casualties exerted an intense downward pressure on morale. The gray atmosphere they created in the 17th Bombardment Group in North Africa, and their "depressing effect"[102] on bomber crews in the South Pacific during the spring months of 1944, were typical. When heavy losses occurred in concentrated form, the pressure on morale increased acutely. The shock of calamitous attrition in the Ploesti low-level mission of 1 August 1943, for example, hit the 98th Bombardment Group with "tremendous"[103] force. Disaster at the hands of German fighters during the Vicenza raid of 28 December 1943 reduced the 512th Bombardment Squadron of the Fifteenth Air Force to a condition of stunned bewilderment over the "immensity"[104] of its loss and was a major factor behind the withdrawal of the unit from combat two days later. When the 512th went back on operational status, its worried new crews showed too much of a tendency, for a time, to discover mechanical troubles early in a mission and head for home. In the Pacific, according to General Kenney, the casualties sustained by the Thirteenth Bomber Command in the Balikpapan strikes of 30 September and 3 October 1944 brought the morale of the surviving crews "close to the breaking point."[105] Catastrophes that resulted from non-combat causes were scarcely less demoralizing. The Fifth Air Force was badly shaken by the tragic loss on "Black Sunday"[106]--16 April 1944--of thirty-one fighters which had returned safely from an attack on the [illegible] area only to be sealed off from their home bases by a fatal barrier of cloud and fog. The ATC's India China

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Division also had reason to remember "the black days of January 6-8, 1945,"[107] when a burst of meteorological fury over the Hump destroyed nine transport airplanes.

Prompt replacement of killed, missing, wounded, and worn-out airmen was essential to the preservation or restoration of good combat morale. In the case of units whose attrition rates were moderate, a steady supply of new pilots or crews acted more as a preventive of trouble than anything else. But for squadrons and groups that had been numbed by disaster, an immediate influx of reinforcements had the life-giving quality of a blood transfusion. It counteracted tendencies toward disintegration, helped to bring the organization out of a condition of shock, and started the healing process. Though new faces often were a painful reminder of [illegible], their appearance [illegible] as a reassuring sign of renewal and continuity, and [illegible] the sickening sensation [illegible] by the sight of empty crew quarters and blocks of [illegible] at [illegible]. But whether losses were severe or relatively light, morale suffered [illegible] when the replacement flow failed to keep pace with needs. [illegible] in [illegible] of 1942-1943 [illegible] pilots or [illegible] crews [illegible] little inclination to realize [illegible] equivalent, [illegible] when [illegible] did not come soon, [illegible] of [illegible] for all. [illegible] fortunately [illegible] the [illegible] spirit.[108]

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

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When convinced that the mission was worth the cost, air [illegible] could [illegible] up to the hazards and losses of combat [illegible] remarkable steadfastness. A belief [illegible] that kind [illegible] the [illegible] crews who participated in [illegible] with an electrical [illegible] the raid and later speeded their recovery from its [illegible]. The same assurance helped to sustain Eighth Air Force morale during the daylight air battles over Germany in the summer of 194[illegible], and [illegible] Air Force morale during the [illegible] strikes [illegible] in the spring of 19[illegible].[109] In the Alaskan Department, however, the frequently voiced feeling "that the risks and casualties encountered had been very high for the results gained against the enemy"[110] was [illegible] on morale; cloud banks in the Aleutians [illegible] terrain. [illegible] -25 and B-24 airmen of the Seventh Air Force extracted just as little satisfaction from their discouraging task of flying an endless series of neutralizing sorties against [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], and other bypassed [illegible] on the vast surface of the Central Pacific.[111] While [illegible] mood of many fliers in the two miniature Pacific air forces [illegible] the unavoidable result of the role they had to play, in North Africa it appears to have been caused by weak coordination between [illegible] intelligence agencies and frontline units. Pilots who [illegible] understanding of what they had done and why they had done it "[illegible] missions [illegible] waste of time, material and life."[112]

Success or failure in combat had perhaps [illegible] compelling an influence on the ebb and flow of morale as any other single factor. Combat personnel [illegible] through such [illegible] for [illegible] to the [illegible] behavior [illegible]

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[illegible] ... [illegible] ... [illegible] ... [illegible], [illegible] ... [illegible] decisive. [illegible] the [illegible] ... rate [illegible] of 1943 against [illegible] ... bomber crew morale [illegible] ... [illegible] not only from [illegible] ... [illegible] also from the [illegible] belief--[illegible]--[illegible] had succeeded in [illegible] ... [illegible].[113] [illegible] ... [illegible] ... [illegible] Pacific [illegible], [illegible] ... [illegible] ... [illegible] they had [illegible] anything or not; [illegible], they were often inclined [illegible] ... "Lack of confidence in results" [illegible] heard in [illegible] with "rock-bottom morale"[114] in an Eleventh Air Force B-24 squadron in 1943. Accordingly, good results had a tonic effect, whether the objective was a [illegible] plant in [illegible], a formation of Me-109's in the [illegible], or a Japanese concentration at [illegible]; while poor [illegible] had the opposite effect, whether the [illegible] units involved were [illegible] targets in [illegible], [illegible] in the [illegible] of northwestern Europe, or major targets in the Mediterranean.[115] [illegible] enough, the 41st Bombardment Group's chart illustrating the number of enemy aircraft shot down [illegible] ... "Morale [illegible]."[116] In India, the repeated failure of [illegible] Air Force bombers to [illegible] completely a single bridge in [illegible] during 1943--[illegible] ... 1 January 1944, of the [illegible] ... [illegible] of [illegible] ... [illegible] ... [illegible], in [illegible], on

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the occasion of their one hundredth successful bridge-busting attack.[117] In the Mediterranean, the same kind of contrast in moods could be seen in the 17th Bombardment Group, which, much to the "disgust" of its fliers, was pulled out of action in October 1943 because of bombing inefficiency, went through re-training, and in a matter of a few months was able to boast about its record of "almost unbelievable"[118] bombing accuracy.

Fighter pilots who were troubled by misgivings about the worth of escort work had only to head for the nearest bomber field to learn that their big brothers looked upon them as knights-errant whose very presence sent spirits up, and losses down. The veteran of the Eighth Air Force's 305th Bombardment Group who described Spitfires and P-47's as looking "pretty sweet"[119] when they shepherded limping B-17's safely home understood the feelings of bomber men. To combat crews few sights were lovelier than the prancing of friendly fighters around bomber formations during the quiet stretches of a mission, or more breathtaking than their sudden appearance--deus ex machina-fashion--at an instant of ultimate extremity. Bomber crewmen who had ever stared straight at an oncoming FW-190 for long seconds before catching a glimpse of a P-51 on its tail would not seen forget the emotions of that moment. There may have been some uncertainty concerning the extent to which full fighter protection could cut bomber attrition (predictions ran as high as seventy-five percent), but all parties agreed that the cut would be substantial and the benefit to morale immense. Unfortunately, unanimous agreement on the merits of escort fighters and the crying need for them did not solve the painful problems of range extension, production, and allocation; and until those problems were solved, virtually all bomber forces had to make do with only part-time fighter cover or no cover at all. P-38's and P-51's did not reach the North

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

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Air Force, for example, before the latter part of 1943. In the Central Pacific, Seventh Air Force bombers rarely received any assistance before the last weeks of the war. The Fifth Air Force, after a hard beginning, fared better than the Seventh, but its supply of P-38's was limited by priorities favoring the ETO and MTO. And it was not until the fall of 1944 that Liberator crews of the Thirteenth Air Force was finally relieved of "that particular kind of loneliness they feel when the only fighters they see are enemy fighters."[120] In Europe and the Mediterranean, escort presented no great difficulties during the early phase of operations, when American bombers generally concentrated on peripheral targets where the opposition was spotty. The cover furnished by fighters of limited range in this period of shallow penetrations saved a number of B-17 crews and, according to General Spaatz, gave a healthy life to morale. But in 1943, when deep thrusts into savagely defended [illegible] carried heavy bombers [illegible] friendly fighters [illegible], a crisis [illegible] of serious [illegible] [illegible] not [illegible] until enough [illegible] [illegible] forces. The Eighth [illegible] P-38's [illegible] [illegible] 1944, [illegible] fifteenth [illegible] months later. Air [illegible] out of [illegible] [illegible] to illustrate the [illegible] But even after the crisis had [illegible] [illegible] in fighter [illegible] [illegible] in [illegible] of [illegible] in July 1944, [illegible] Air Force [illegible] or [illegible].[121] [illegible]

[illegible] in [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] physical [illegible] [illegible] had never [illegible] before. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] harsh, and [illegible] warfare. But they [illegible] [illegible] American quality of [illegible], [illegible], and [illegible]

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to the ordeal of battle. Wherever airmen flew--whether it was through the thin, flak-smudged atmosphere four miles above Vienna, the forbidding emptiness of the Pacific and the Bay of Bengal, or the "nightmare of searchlights, tracers, rockets, and . . . smoke"[132] over Tokyo--they entered that new dimension of strain. All efforts to mitigate the tensions, fears, and dangers that were part of air operations, and to give airmen every possible assistance should they come to grief, contributed in some degree to the making or maintenance of good morale. The protection that newly-developed body armor, for example, gave to bomber crews of the Eighth Air Force in December 1942 yielded benefits that were mental as well as material and led to wholesale adoption of the life-saving equipment. There was no hiding place in a B-17 and any gadget or garb that lessened a crewman's feeling of naked vulnerability to all missiles was bound to have a comforting effect. Similarly, something as minor as the improvisation of an extra safety belt that would keep gunners from being sucked out of a pressurized B-29 if a blister gave way, also heartened crewmen.[133] On a larger scale and in an entirely different sphere, such brilliantly successful undertakings as Operation [illegible]--the mass aerial evacuation of more than 1,100 eleven hundred American PW's from Rumania to Italy in 1944--improved the morale of thousands of AAF fliers by offering them abundant proof that if they were shot down and survived they would not be forgotten. Air-sea rescue operations were regarded as even greater boon to morale. Navy life-guard submarines in the Yellow Sea apparently never saved any XX Bomber Command personnel, but the B-29 crews "just felt better knowing they were there."[134] Elsewhere many hundreds of fighter pilots and bomber crew-men received form direct air-sea rescue activities of an astonishing array of

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Australian coast [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] crash boats, [illegible], [illegible], L-5's, [illegible], [illegible] L-17 [illegible], [illegible]. The air-sea rescue [illegible] at first, [illegible] series of spectacular rescues before it [illegible] run its course. A [illegible] ended up in [illegible] or [illegible] never failed to [illegible].[125] By 1945, the [illegible] over [illegible] American airmen [illegible] narrower than [illegible] in 1943 when Maj. Gen. [illegible]: "[illegible] have failed to [illegible]."[126]

The recognition [illegible] for their feats [illegible] diverse. It might take the form of [illegible] of [illegible] for the [illegible] air forces, three precious bottles of Scotch [illegible], General [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] citation, or the "little bits of [illegible] ribbon"[127] [illegible] symbolized the Air Medal, DFC, Silver Star or other general decoration. Whatever the form, recognition was sweet and morale thrived on it. ([illegible] inaccurate publicity was acceptable, [illegible] it sounded [illegible].) But [illegible] accolades [illegible] or [illegible] all. The men of the smaller air forces [illegible] in which they carried out their hard [illegible]. [illegible] references to the [illegible] "[illegible]

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

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'big league' Air Forces"[128] betrayed the Seventh Air Force's sensitivity over its neglected state. B-24 men of the Thirteenth Air Force--weary of toiling in the shadow of the Fifth Air Force--were equally touchy and complained bitterly that their missions had been slighted or ignored. Combat awards and decorations served as a valuable complement to, or--if need be--substitute for, the kind of morale-building headlines that the XIII Bomber Command craved. But the good that awards and decorations could do depended to some extent upon the speed with which they were recommended, processed, and formally presented. The universal stress on the need for quick action bespoke a conviction that delay robbed decorations of part of their worth. Minor morale crises developed in units of the Twelfth and Seventh Air Forces when approval of recommendations for the Air Medal took as long as six months to be approved. It was only natural for men who knew [illegible] were poor insurance risks to want to receive their honors while they were still hale and alive. The beneficial effects of awards and decorations could also be lessened when combat men thought--rightly or wrongly--that they were being discriminated against. In the AAF, for example, fighter pilots claimed that their bomber brethren had harvested a disproportionately large [illegible] of the available honors; junior officers and NCO's often took a [illegible] view of the [illegible] pressure upon senior officers; and when standards governing decorations were tightened, fliers [illegible] the [illegible] of the old standards protested angrily that they were being cheated. [illegible] variations in standards from air force to air force [illegible] as much irritation. [illegible] differences, of course, [illegible] adaptation to varying combat conditions. There was a feeling, [illegible], that the excessive largesse of some air forces [illegible] the [illegible]

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Air Medal. Fifteenth Air Force men pointedly suggested that it might be a good idea to stamp their conservatively-awarded DFC's with the number 15 in order to distinguish them from Eighth Air Force DFC's. But the Fifteenth, too, was not above suspicion of inflationary activity. Between August 1944 and 29 December 1944, one of the heavy bombardment groups distributed a total of 15,544 Air Medals and oak leaf clusters.[129]

The recognition that ground personnel received for their services fell far short of that accorded to fliers. This was natural, normal, and traditional. It was just as natural, normal, and traditional for large numbers of non-combat men--especially in service units--to resent their status of inferiority and to feel that they deserved far more than they got in the way of praise and glory. Even those [illegible] organizations which [illegible] [illegible] of DFC's/ [illegible] [illegible] ground personnel. [illegible] Ground [illegible]," [illegible][130] [illegible]

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respect. The institution of the Bronze Star Medal in 1944 gave promise of filling the gap between the Legion of Merit and the Good Conduct Medal. The new decoration was at first hailed as "a means of rewarding the ground crews for the wonderful work they have been doing,"[131] but it apparently did not come into wide enough use to have maximum effect.[132] In service units, battle participation credits probably became a hotter issue than decorations. Service personnel in all operational theaters protested bitterly and at length over War Department and theater policies (which, they said, were based upon a surface-level conception of the nature and extent of combat zones and campaigns) that deprived them of some, if not all, of the battle stars which had been awarded to ground men of [illegible] [illegible] for doing the same kind of work that they were doing, at the same time, and--often--in the same place. [illegible] an [illegible] of [illegible] became something much more intense in 1945 when service personnel learned, to their dismay, that one battle star was worth five discharge points. AAF commanders, [illegible] to remedy such inequities, attempted to secure a redress of service unit grievances but made little headway. The battle star issue remained a sore point up to the end of the war.[133]

Decorations, like battle stars, had a two-fold value. At one stroke, they appeased the airman's appetite for recognition and aided his [illegible] for income. Whether AAF personnel cherished the decorations and prestige more than the added pay is hard to say. Most of them were content to leave analysis of their motivations to others and to concentrate instead on the pursuit of whatever [illegible] were available. [illegible]

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[illegible] ... [117] [illegible] ...

[illegible] ... officer, "Colonel, [illegible] ... other men in [illegible].[116]

At about the same time, the Eleventh Air Force faced a [illegible] different difficulty. [illegible] All Eleventh Air Force [illegible] to the Aleutian [illegible], and from the [illegible] ...

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of course, was wasted time and motion until the War Department provided a remedy in September 1942 by granting to the Eleventh authority over its own promotions. The India-China Wing of ATC suffered from the same kind of headache during the period when it had to route promotion recommendations through Headquarters ATC in Washington. But even after Maj. Gen. Harold L. George, Commanding General of ATC, had voluntarily abandoned his authority to the theater in an effort to hasten action, conditions did not improve. The India-China Wing had simply jumped from the frying pan of red tape into the world-wide fire of T/O restrictions.[137]

That a hue and cry inevitably arose in all theaters over the baneful effect of T/O restrictions was not surprising. Tables of Organization were by their very nature finite; the ambitions which they checked were not. Feelings on the subject faithfully reflected locale. In July 1943, Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, while still Chief of the Air Staff in Washington, took a calm view of what he described as budgetary and War Department policy restraints on promotions. Writing to Maj. Gen. Ira C. Eaker in England, he noted that the promotion question was under study and that action would duly follow.[138] Two months later, after General Stratemeyer had assumed command of the India-Burma Sector, China-Burma-India, his tone and outlook changed radically. In a letter to his successor on 4 September, he capped a plea for extra grades and ratings with the exhortation, "For God's sake, give us some help." "All I am trying to do," he added, "is build up morale and the least that can be done back there is to support me when I . . . only want to spend a few more of Uncle Sam's dollars."[139] The predicament in which General

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Stratemeyer found himself was already quite familiar to AAF commanders overseas. There were either not enough promotions to go around under existing T/O's, especially in units that operated at above-normal strengths; or, in the case of provisional organizations, there was no T/O at all. Efforts to secure wholesale reforms usually foundered on the rocks of War Department resistance. Air force commanders had better luck at winning piecemeal concessions, which, if they did not cure morale ills, at least eased them. The Tenth Air Force, for example, gained permission early in 1943 to promote fifty second lieutenants in spite of T/O barriers; the Twelfth Air Force twice succeeded in getting extra allotments of grades; and in the Southwest Pacific, the Fifth Air Force received some special dispensations. During 1943 and 1944 the War Department made further concessions on a general basis by liberalizing promotion requirements for second lieutenants and privates. The largest promotion problem of all, however, not only defied solution but--during the last year of the war--steadily worsened. The War Department's policy of furnishing replacements in grade [illegible] for thousands of overseas veterans and thereby dealt a damaging blow to morale. Officers and enlisted men who had worked hard and waited long for the opportunity to fill T/O vacancies that called for higher grades and ratings watched bitterly as replacements [illegible] of inferior rank straight into those coveted [illegible]. The chorus of protest against "high ranking replacements"--the [illegible]--was loud and sustained. The War Department nevertheless held to its policy rather than accept the alternatives of arbitrary promotion of the only personnel available for overseas shipment, or the abandonment of T/O standards. Not until the [illegible] of 1945, [illegible] the mass exodus from overseas theaters had gotten under way, [illegible].[1/0]

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During leisure hours, when there was time to take off the blinders of routine and look away from a world circumscribed by pistons, flak, and third carbons, the thoughts of thousands of airmen turned first and foremost toward home. Therein lay the importance of mail to morale. Letters (with the usual snapshots enclosed), personal parcels, and periodicals not only linked men overseas with the people and places they had left behind, but served also as tangible symbols of that idealized, promised land of America for which airmen longed with an aching desire that at times bordered on the obsessive. Mail from home was not, however, an unmixed blessing. Letters bearing news of feminine faithlessness and other calamities like family illness and death hit the men who received them hard. But the anger, concern, and grief that came of such bad tidings were essentially private and touched only isolated individuals.[141] The general run of mail, on the other hand, had an altogether healthy influence on morale. Letters and parcels contributed notably to the high spirits that prevailed when activities were going smoothly, and provided a measure of cheer in situations that were otherwise quite cheerless. Airmen asked one thing above all of the Army Postal Service--a steady flow of mail. Given that, they were volubly grateful. It was not unusual for a unit to single out reliable mail service as "the biggest morale booster,"[142] especially if that service happened to coincide with the Christmas season. But as soon as mail deliveries slowed down or stopped, reports of a sag in morale followed with automatic regularity. The sag was likely to become more pronounced if, after a five months' delay, holiday packages

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finally arrived with their contents scrambled into a wierd hash.[143]

Complaints of poor mail service cropped up most frequently in 1942 and the first half of 1943. In this early period, cargo space on air transports was at a premium and had to be fought for--not always with success; shipments of second class matter bound for such end-of-the-line points as India and China had to run a gantlet of thieves en route--again not always with success; and, on a number of occasions, the postal system was simply inadequate to meet the mounting demands that were made upon it. Probably the most serious complaint came in November 1942 from a representative of Headquarters AAF who, after returning from a tour of the Eleventh Air Force, charged the Army with neglect of overseas mail delivery. In time, however, service improved immensely, though up to the end of the war there were still sporadic lags and delays--particularly when units were in the throes of movement, when ships with mail aboard were diverted from their original destinations because of operational necessity, and when communications with outlying areas broke down. But these lapses could not obscure the fact that over the long pull the Army Postal Service performed a task of unprecedented difficulty and complexity with a skill, ingenuity and reliability that benefitted morale greatly.[144]

However pleasurable mail may have been, it alone could scarcely exorcise the twin specters of boredom and brooding which threatened the morale of airmen during off-duty hours. Few men had either the desire or mental energy to devote all of their spare time to the ritual of reading and re-reading letters and writing replies. Other diversions were needed.

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

The least complicated of these, in material terms, were GI bull sessions and games of chance. The former, which required only people and a willingness to range back and forth over the eternal subjects of women, war, home, food, and the merits and demerits of various makes of American automobiles, won a high place--though often by default--on the list of leisure time activities. The latter, hardly more complicated, called only for the same people plus a deck of cards or a pair of dice, and thousands of airmen everywhere found some escape in long sessions of bridge, poker, pinochle, and crap games.[145]

But virtually all other recreational pursuits, even one so essentially simple and private as reading, reflected in varying degree the influence of the factors of time, place, and logistics. In the European and Mediterranean theaters, which benefitted from relatively short lines of communications and abundant local resources, recreation presented no serious problems except during the North African phase of operations, when forward units lacked either the facilities or the equipment for most leisure-time activities, and later during periods of movement on the continent of Europe, when some organizations temporarily spurted beyond the effective reach of the American Red Cross, Army Special Services, and other agencies.[146] Generally, however, airmen in the two theaters had ample opportunity for off-duty diversion. Many availed themselves of the hospitality of their allies and co-belligerents; and all, according to their tastes, found some form of pleasure in the cities and towns of Britain, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, and North Africa, where cultural and historical monuments could be seen at almost every step, where entertainment was to be had in innumerable opera houses, bistros, and music halls, where beer, wine, brandy, and gin

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answered the need for relaxation and stupefaction, and where the company of women of differing social stations could be enjoyed for differing social purposes.[147]

The program of officially-sponsored recreational activities got off to a fast if uneven start in both theaters and before long expanded to quantitively awesome dimensions. Special Services offered movie showings (easily the most consistently popular form of diversion in all theaters, and the one credited with doing the most good for morale), supplied athletic gear and equipment, ran hobby shops, distributed scarce radios, phonographs, and P.A. systems, sponsored USO show tours of AAF bases, organized dozens of all-soldier shows like "Skirts," which played 212 times in Britain before 260,000 spectators--including Queen Mother Mary, became involved in radio broadcasting in Italy, produced a rodeo at Foggia, superintended a "Tea Bowl" football game in England and a "Spaghetti Bowl" game in Italy, had a hand in track and field meets, organized ~~fifty~~ 150 dance orchestras in the Fifteenth Air Force and over 500 basketball teams in the Eighth Air Force, initiated a series of symphonic concerts and operatic performances in Naples, and fostered an interest in art in Britain.[148] Information and Education Sections* were scarcely less active at their somewhat more staid tasks of setting up and conducting off-duty schools, supplying and running unit libraries, establishing newspapers, distributing news maps, copies of Stars and Stripes, Yank, and other publications, arranging for courses at Oxford, Cambridge, and other institutions, and both encouraging and facilitating enrollments in USAFI and university extension courses.[149] Working alongside Special Services and I and E,

* I and E had operated as a part of Special Services until the latter part of 1944.

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the American Red Cross also made a major contribution to the program of leisure-time relaxation. Its activities included the management of hundreds of off-base service clubs ranging from modest centers in provincial towns to huge and elaborate establishments in cities like London and Naples, Aero Clubs (complete with American hostesses) at airfields, wandering clubmobiles, rest homes, beach clubhouses, and outdoor pavilions. Its offerings were equally diverse, running the gamut from the inevitable doughnuts and coffee to books, radios, phonographs, musical instruments, ping-pong tables, sports events, educational tours, sightseeing tours, dances, forums, and sleeping facilities. There seems to have been general agreement that, despite occasional lapses and shortcomings, Special Services, I and E, and the Red Cross, aided and abetted by indefatigable chaplains and the USO, not only provided airmen with a goodly measure of amusement, diversion, and edification, but also helped substantially to keep AWOL, courts-martial, and VD rates down.[150]

In Asia and the Pacific, most airmen quickly learned not to expect too much in the way of recreational opportunities or facilities. Only units in rear areas or at fields in China could enjoy the benefits of being based at or near centers of civilization. The rest, for at least the greater part of the war, had to adjust themselves to an existence almost devoid of women, normally potable beverages, and other amenities that were commonplace elsewhere. Informal and organized off-duty activities alike suffered from crippling handicaps imposed by shortages of equipment and transportation, low priorities and the length of lines of communication. Reports from the CBI and the several Pacific theaters

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

during the first two years of the war were filled with complaints about enervating monotony and the dearth of movie equipment, "live" entertainment, athletic gear, books, periodicals, newspapers, club buildings and the like. There was no choice, however, but to make shift with what was available or could be bought, borrowed, bartered, or stolen.[151] Men therefore sat in the rain watching movies and waited patiently when projectors broke. They hailed Joe E. Brown with delight during his pioneering tour of the Southwest Pacific and welcomed the USO troupes that preceded and followed him--especially those with girls in the cast. They depended on the helpful Japanese for radio entertainment until Army stations were established in 1944. And they played softball, volleyball, and basketball when and where they could.[152]

Special Services, I and E, the Red Cross, and other agencies all had to grapple with the problem of carrying out their regular tasks under irregular conditions. They did surprisingly well and earned widespread praise for their contributions to the maintenance of good morale.[153] Special Services distributed its meager allotment of supplies and hunted for more, promoted the usual sports events and shows, tried to keep the flow of films moving, and established and ran not only day rooms and clubs but also a gold mining camp and a ski lodge.[154] I and E sections gave out news, published newspapers, set up war rooms, organized quizzes, and played a leading role in the founding of off-duty schools like Fox Hole Military Academy, Angaur Prep, Suritachi College, and Fifth Air Force University.[155] The Red Cross, though it came under criticism at times in the Southwest Pacific and CBI, generally functioned as well as circumstances permitted. It staffed rest camps in Australia, operated from tents in the Central

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Pacific, had charge of full-scale establishments in the Philippines, mass-produced doughnuts in the Admiralties, specialized in hot coffee on Tarawa, and won legendary fame for the hamburgers served at its canteen in Gaya, India.[156]

The need to supplement the ordinary off-duty recreational activities with periodic intra-theater leaves for both combat and non-flying personnel was recognized in all operational air forces. Commanders and flight surgeons alike accepted the proposition that short spells of relief from the drab and wearing routine of overseas military life were essential to the maintenance of efficiency, health, and good morale. In Europe and the Mediterranean, where rest facilities and transportation were generally available, the leave program got under way early and went forward without serious interruption. Airmen en masse swarmed through Britain on holiday trips, thronged into Paris to sample its delights, and enjoyed the attractions of such superb rest centers as Cannes and Capri.[157] In the CBI conditions were less satisfactory. Nevertheless, personnel in India managed to relax at hill station rest camps like Darjeeling and Shillong during the hot season, and in Calcutta, Lucknow, and other cities when cool weather came on; while airmen in China made use of the limited facilities at Camp Schiel, Tsuyung, and Kunming.[158]

In the Pacific, vast distances, frequent shortages of accommodations in rear areas, and a chronic lack of transportation conspired to make the leave program as much a source of raging frustration as a builder of morale. No amount of pleading, warning, and cajoling could conjure up enough aircraft to carry all of the men who needed rest to havens in Australia, New Zealand, and the Hawaiin Islands. Combat personnel understandably had first call

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on aircraft space when and if it was available. Ground men could only wait in disgust until their names climbed to the top of long leave lists. The Fifth Air Force tried to hew to a policy of giving non-combat men a week in Australia for every six months endured in New Guinea. Few, however, received their leaves on time. Most waited at least ten months, some as long as eighteen.[159] V Air Force Service Command Negro troops, whose poor morale reflected such familiar phenomena as low status and discriminatory treatment, had even greater cause for disgust. According to an intelligence report, "the lack of a rest area and rest leaves for colored personnel" had a serious and inflammatory effect on Negro units.[160] The leave situation in the Pacific deteriorated, if anything, as the war entered its last year. FEAF's movement to the northwest made it increasingly difficult to fly men to Australia and resulted in the gradual elimination of leaves to that area.[161] In the Central Pacific, air units were similarly moving beyond the reach of their rest areas. The situation led Maj. Gen. Curtis LeMay to propose, as a temporary substitute for trips to Hawaii, that two luxury liners be brought to the Marianas and used as floating rest camps for his B-29 crewmen. Lack of shipping, however, blocked the realization of the idea.[162]

For the overwhelming majority of airmen, overseas leaves were only temporary medicine--essential, but no cure whatsoever for a fierce, growing desire to get back home. The longing for rotation implied no lack of patriotism. It was instead simply the elemental reaction of ordinary human beings to the exactions of war and prolonged separation from the people, places, and things they valued most.[163] Under these circumstances, the twists and turns, ups and downs, of rotation policy

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were bound to have a major effect on morale.[164] Rotation policy was conditioned above all by three factors: the availability of replacements, the intensity of operations, and estimates of the ability of men to stand up to various kinds of strain. These factors explain why combat men were ultimately rotated in large numbers and ground men were not, and why within the combat crew relief program there were marked fluctuations in the rotation rate.

The early realization that after a certain number of missions or combat hours--varying according to the nature, intensity, and locale of operations--a hypothetical average flier would decline in efficiency and, if not relieved in time, "burn out" led to the development of a decentralized system of aircrew rotation.[165] Battle weary veterans were to be transferred to the Zone of Interior, where, it was felt, they could best recover from their experiences before going on to another combat tour or other activities. The aircrew rotation system never functioned, however, in a vacuum. Senior air force commanders were expected to carry out their missions--General Arnold was emphatic on that point[166]--in spite of the fact that the flow of replacements up to the last year of the war rarely if ever seemed adequate to cover attrition, allow for relief, and still leave enough men to meet mounting operational commitments. An impossible situation soon arose. Combat men eventually went home, but some air forces had to hold back rotation, and others--like the Eighth--were forced to scrap the rotation programs they had established. Headquarters AAF was deluged by a torrent of anguished pleas for more replacements, reports of impending or actual combat crew exhaustion, and warnings that the involuntary policy of slow rotation or no rotation that had been forced on the overseas air forces

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was doing grave damage to flier morale. Headquarters AAF, for its part, replied with assurances that replacements were being trained and rushed to the theaters as fast as was humanly possible and expressed the hope that by some future date--1944 was usually given--a peak supply of replacements combined with a drop in attrition would make possible the establishment or restoration of a consistent and steady process of rotation. The long-awaited day of personnel plenty did finally come in the summer of 1944, and thereafter combat crew rotation was at most a minor issue.[167]

Ground personnel began the war with few illusions about rotation. The lack of manpower reserves made normal replacement of non-combat men a virtual impossibility.[168] Nothing could change that harsh fact. Nevertheless, as time passed, commanders and flight surgeons in the Pacific and CBI pointed out with increasing urgency the dibilitating effect of climate and working and living conditions on the energy and morale of the men in their charge. They also insisted again and again that it was absolutely essential to give those men some goal to aim for, some hope of escape "short of the indefinite end of the war or collapse."[169] An already bad morale situation became perhaps worse whenever hopes for an effectual program of relief were periodically raised, then dashed. A scheme calling for the rotation of five per cent of AAF ground personnel per month was abandoned in March 1943 before it ever got under way and constituted "the most crushing blow to morale experienced during the period."[170] A War Department plan for rotation at the token rate of one-half of one per cent per month actually went into effect in 1943 but in the long run probably cost more misunderstanding and bitterness than good. No sooner was the program launched than eligibility standards were raised. Later changes created

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further restrictions. But even then, with all but the most grizzled veterans eliminated from eligibility, the program still ran far behind schedule. Coming on the heels of the aborted rotation plan was a project for granting thirty days (late forty-five) of temporary duty in the Zone of Interior to qualified personnel who agreed to return to the theater for another year. The TDY program appears to have functioned with some success, but it came too late and affected too few men to repair the damage done to morale by confusion, delay, and half-extended, half-retracted promises.[171]

Though leadership received far less attention than rotation as a morale factor, it nevertheless exerted a strong influence, perhaps stronger than that of any other single factor. There was widespread agreement that unit morale acted as "a complete barometer and gauge of the fighting spirit, capacity for leadership, and general all-around ability of the . . . commander."[172] What constituted effective leadership varied according to the circumstances and the personality of the officer in command. But certain fundamental traits appear to have been essential. These included vigor, aggressiveness, fairness, firmness without arbitrary harshness, a lively interest in the welfare of all personnel, and, perhaps most important of all, the ability to inspire confidence by demonstrating both a grasp of the work at hand and a capacity for doing it.[173] That many officers, especially those with the least experience, lacked one or more of these qualities is beyond question and not too surprising. Each shortcoming was usually reflected in lessened efficiency and lowered morale, whether the unit involved was large or small. Despite a number

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of somewhat strident complaints about poor leadership, the AAF--a very human organization working in an imperfect world--appears to have done a creditable job in the selection of its leaders. The record of senior officers, like that of their juniors, was mixed. Conspicuous failures occurred, but they stood out as exceptions. Senior commanders by and large knew their work and did it, understood their responsibilities and fulfilled them, placed a high valuation on the well-being of their men and fought for it. They led, they took care of their own. In so doing, they contributed richly to the maintenance of good morale from the beginning of the war to the end.[174]

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1. For other definitions, see Hist. 8th AF Special Staff Section, Jan. 1944-July 1945, Chap. 6, n. 4; Gen. Sir William Slim, "Morale," [illegible] (Nov. 1948), 73-7?; Hist. 15th AF Medical Section, Nov. 1943-June 1944, n. 20; "What Is Morale?" What the Soldier Thinks, I (Dec. 1943), 1-7. For an able discussion, see Col. [illegible] C. Smith, "What Is Morale?" Air University Quarterly Review, [illegible] (Winter 1951-1952), [illegible]-59.

2. [illegible] Instruction Course No. 403, Phase 4, "Military Management" (Montgomery, Ala., 1949), p. 47.

3. See, for example, Hist. 15th AF, Nov. 1944, p. [illegible].

4. In some cases historians found it difficult to get material from officers and enlisted men who were afraid to put criticism on paper. See, for example, Hist. [illegible], Greensboro, N.C., 1 July-30 Sept. 1944, I, vi-vii.

5. For an example of conflict between [illegible] regarding the state of morale, see 100th [illegible] Historical Report for Dec. 1944, and [illegible] Dec. 1944; see also [illegible] in AAG 0 [illegible], [illegible]-July 194[illegible], and [illegible] reports in AAG 0 522.07, 1943-1944.

6. See, for example, Hist. [illegible] Gp., July 1944, n. 14.

7. Hist. [illegible] 6, Aug. 194[illegible]; Hist. [illegible] Service [illegible], [illegible] Gp., Sept. 1944; [illegible], [illegible] Groups A History (New York, 19[illegible]), p. [illegible]; [illegible] (New York, 19[illegible]), p. 163.

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[illegible]

9. [illegible] 730.11.

10. FM 1-5, 16 July 1941; [illegible] 1-10, 16 June 1942; [illegible] 15 [illegible] 1939, in AG 337.7.

11. Hist. AAF [illegible], 1.

12. [illegible] 1941-1 [illegible] 1943, I, 161.

13. [illegible]

14. [illegible]

15. [illegible]

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16. AAFHS-49, pp. 395-96; Monograph on Basic Training, p. 83; Hist. AAFTC, II, 324-25; VII, 1300-1; memo for Gen. Arnold from Col. H. W. Sholmire, 14 Oct. 1943, in Morale and Welfare Folder, AGO 330.11A; Hist. AAF Training Center No. 1, 1 Mar.-1 July 1944, p. 144; Hist. Jefferson Barracks, 1 Jan. 1943-7July 1943, I, 70, 72, 74-75; Hq. 8th AF Narrative History, Mar. 1945.
17. Monograph on Basic Training, pp. 36, 140, 146, 153-54; AAFHS-49, p. 398.
18. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1948), pp. 379-80.
19. Monograph on Basic Training, pp. 156-57, 159-60; Hist., Hq. 2d AF, Activation to Dec. 6, 1941, pp. 300-305; Hist. AAFTC, I, 162; AAFHS-49, p. 400.
20. AAFHS-49, pp. 85-86, 396-97; Hist. AAFTC, VII, 1322; Hist. BTC #7, 29 June 1942-15 Aug. 1943, II, Sec. XI S, 5, note 6; Hist. Jefferson Barracks, 1 Jan.-7 July 1943, p. 369.
21. See, for example, Air Historical Study, No. 15, Procurement of Aircrew Trainees, 101-15, p. 77; memo, Lt. G. B. Ryan to Col. DuBose, 8 Dec. 1942, in AGO 319.1 'C'; Hist. AAFTC, III, 428; V, 1045; VIII, 1681.
22. The same thing had occurred in World War I. See H. H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), p. 61.
23. Air Historical Study No. 21, Aviation Cadet Ground Duty Program: Policy, Procurement, and Assignment, pp. 54-55; AAFHS-15, p. 76-77; Hist. AAFTC, II, 300-301, 400; III, 428-44. A more lurid but less typical illustration of the tie between pools and poor morale was the glider pilot program.

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Notes

23. Cont'd
See Air Historical Study, No. 1, The Glider Pilot Training Program, 1941-1943; and Hist. AAFTC, VI.

24. Hist. AAFTC, III, 607, 620; IV, 845; V, 942, 985; VII, 1406; VIII, 1514.

25. Air Historical Study, No. 8, Bombsight Maintenance Training in the AAF, p. 64.

26. Hist. AAFTC, I, 25, 70-71; II, 353; IV, 806-7.

27. Occasional visits by instructors to tactical units, where they could watch the alumni of technical schools at work, not only provided an escape from tedium and lifted morale, but raised the quality of instruction as well. See Hist. AAFTC, VII, 1376.

28. Air Historical Study, No. 48, Preflight Training in the AAF, 1939-1944, pp. 31, 35-36, 41, and Tab 10, pp. 3-4, 6-7; Hist. AAFTC, II, 207, 272; III, 476; IV, 479.

29. Hist. AAFTC, V, 1082; VII, 1377; Air Historical Study, No. 31, Flexible Gunnery Training in the AAF, p. 22.

30. Air Historical Study No. 60, Individual Training in Aircraft Armament by the AAF, 1939-1945, p. 98; AAFHS-31, p. 22; Hist. AAFTC, II, 273; IV, 792; V, 1013-14; VII, 1377-79.

31. Preflight students who had been classified as pilots were in the "eager" category. See AAFHS-48, p. 48.

32. Hist. AAFTC, VII, 1362-63; Air Historical Study, No. 20, Individual Training in Aircraft Maintenance in the AAF, p. 150.

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33. As far as many reluctant trainees were concerned, armament training and clerical training fitted into the drab category. See AAFHS-60, pp. 94-96; and Hist. AAFTC, VIII, 1631-32.

34. A typically non-virulent morale problem was that created by delays in giving cadets back pay and re-imbursement for travel. See Monograph on Classification Centers (Aircrew), 1 Jan. 1939-31 Dec. 1944, p. 110.

35. AAFHS-1, p. 57; R&R, AFRAS to AFRIT, 3 Oct. 1942.

36. AAFHS-1, pp. 9, 12, 15, 18, 29, 39, 45, 49, 61; Hist. AAFTC, VI, 1113, 1115, 1117.

37. Hist. Scott Field, 7 July 1943-1 Mar. 1944, IV, 942.

38. AAFHS-60, p. 76.

39. AAFHS-48, pp. 48-49; Hist. AAFTC, III, 482-83; AAFHS-60, p. 97.

40. Hist. AAFTC, II, 239, 311-13; IV, 788; V, 972; Hist. AAF Personnel Distribution Command, V, 163-64.

41. Hist. AAFTC, III, 570.

42. Hist. AAFTC, VIII, 1328, 1358; R&R, AFDAS to AFAAP, 13 July 1942; Air Historical Study No. 26, Individual Training In Aircraft Maintenance in the AAF, 1943, pp. 151, 159; Survey of Soldier Opinion, USAFIME, 4-18 May 1943, Part II, p. 4.

43. Hist. AAFTC, III, 583; IV, 712; Air Historical Study, No. 18, Pilot Transition to Combat Aircraft, pp. 75, 160-61.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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6 Oct. 1942; Hist. 13th AF, Jan.-Mar. 1945, Sec. VI; Apr.-June, 1945, Sec. VI; Hist. 51st Ftr. Gp., 1 Jan. 1942-25 Mar. 1943, p. 25; Hist. ICW ATC, June-Dec. 1943, p. 387; Hist. ICD ATC, 1944, III, 742; memo, Brig. Gen. Ernest Moore to Maj. Gen. Junius W. Jones, 26 June 1945; Form 34's, 76th Ftr. Sq., 29 Aug.-4 Sept. 1943, 12-18 Sept. 1943; Form 34, 375th Bomb. Sq., 14-20 Nov. 1943; Form 34, Hq. 23d Ftr. Gp., 14-20 Nov. 1943; Memo, Brig. Gen. E. Moore to Maj. Gen. Junius W. Jones, 26 June 1945; Hist. 38th Bomb. Gp., July 1945, p. 55; Administrative Narrative, 5th AF, p. 6.

152. Hist. ICW ATC, June-Dec. 1943, pp. 389-91; Hist. V FC, chap. 1, Nov. 1942-June 1943, p. 135; Org. Hist., VII BC, Apr. 1945, p. 422; Hist. 28th Bomb. Gp., Oct. 1944, p. 4; Prelim. Org. Hist. VII BC, 1 May 1931-31 July 1944, p. 68; Hist. 28th Bomb. Gp., May 1944, p. 7; Hist. 400th Bomb. Gp., Aug. 1945, I, 36; Hist. V FC, chap. 1, Nov. 1942-June 1943, pp. 135-36; Hist. 5th AF, Mar.-Apr. 1944, p. 44.

153. Morale Factors in SWPA, pp. 29-31, 35-44; Hist. 7th Bomb. Gp., July 1945; Hist. ICD ATC, 1944, III, 743; AAFRH-13, p. 111.

154. Org. Hist. VII BC, Feb. 1945, p. 354; Hist. 13th AF, Jan.-Mar. 1945, Sec. VI; Hist. Personnel Services Sec., 11th AF, 1 July 1941-1 May 1945, pp. 4-6, 9-10.

155. Hq. XX BC Special Service Historical Report, Nov. 1944, p. 1; Org. Hist. VII BC, Jan. 1945, p. 284; Mar. 1945, p. 391; Hist. 313th Bomb. Wing, June 1945, I, 10; Hist. 5th AF, 15 June 1944-2 Sept. 1945, I, chap. 1, 63; Morale Factors in SWPA, Annex 31; Hist. 13th AF, Apr.-June 1945, Sec. VI; Historical Report from Information-Education Officer, VII FC, 5 July 1945.

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156. AAFRH-16, pp. 168-89; ltr., Whitehead to Mr. Kyles Christianson, 17 Jan. 1944; ltrs., Whitehead to Kenney, 24 and 28 July 1944; The Tenth Air Force Chaplaincy, p. 8; Admin. Hist. 5th AF, p. 3; Hist. 3d Air Depot Gp., Aug. 1943, p. 6; Jan. 1944; Hist. 13th AF ARC; Prelim. Org. Hist. VII BC, 1 May 1931-31 July 1944, p. 42; Hist. 7th Bomb. Gp., Feb. 1945; Hist. ICW ATC, June-Dec. 1943, p. 387.

157. Hist. 8th AF, Vol. II, 17 Aug. 1942-1 May 1943, 439-41; Historical Data, Hq. IX TAC, June 1944, p. 9; Hist. XIX TAC, 1 July 1944-28 Feb. 1945, pp. 190-92; The 9th AF and Its Principal Commands in ETO, Vol. II, Part 1, 67-68; Hist. Hq. & Hq. Det. 1586th QM Gp. (Avn.), Mar. 1945; ibid., Apr. 1945; ibid., May 1945; Nelson Report, pp. 3, 9; 12th AF Admin. Hist. Part II, II, Annex 3; ibid., Annex 26; ibid., VI, Annex 26; Med. Hist. 33d Ftr. Gp., p. 41; AAF Operation of Rest Camps in MTO, 19 Dec. 1942-31 Oct. 1945; Hist. 439th Bomb. Sq., Dec. 1943; War Diary, 84th Bomb. Sq., 23 Feb. and 9 Aug. 1944; Hist. 5th Bomb. Wing, July 1945; Hist. AAFSC/MTO, 8 May-30 Nov. 1945, pp. 18-19.

158. Hist. 51st Ftr. Gp., 1 Jan. 1942-25 Mar. 1943, pp. 10, 12; ltr., Brig. Gen. C. V. Haynes to Bissell, 31 May 1943; Hist. 80th Ftr. Gp., June 1944; ibid., July 1944; Hist. 377th Sv. Sq., Nov. 1944; Hist. 51st Sv. Gp., Jan. 1945; Hist. ICD ATC, 1944, III, 762; Med. Hist. ICW and ICD ATC, 1942-45, pp. 38-44; Hist. 770th Bomb. Sq., July 1944, p. 2; Hist. 1st Bomb. Maint. Sq., 19-30 June 1944; Hist. XX BC, Aug. 1944, pp. 8-9; Historical Data, 769th Bomb. Sq. and 10th Bomb. Maint. Sq., Sept. 1944, p. 2; Hist. 524th Material Sq., Dec. 1944; Hist. Med. Sec. XX BC, Nov. 1944; Hist. XX BC,

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159. Morale Factors in SWPA, pp. 16-17; ibid., Annex 17; Hist. V FC, chap. 1, Nov. 1942-June 1943, p. 134; AAFRH-16, pp. 192-93; Hist. 43d Bomb. Gp., Feb. 1944, p. A; Hist. 5th AF, Part III, 1 Feb.-15 June 1944, p. 44 of Mar.-Apr. section; ibid., Appendix II, Vol. V, documents 562, 563; General Kenney Reports, p. 416; ltr., Kenney to Whitehead, 1 Aug. 1944; ltr., Millard Harmon to Arnold, 2 Nov. 1942; ltr., Twining to Arnold, 27 Apr. 1943; Lt. Col. Frederick J. Freese, Jr., MC, Status Report on Medical Department Officers in Thirteenth Air Force and in Other AAF Units in SPA, as of 9 Apr. 1943; Hist. 13th AF, Apr.-June 1944, pp. 72-74; ibid., July-Sept. 1944, pp. 21-22; ibid., Oct.-Dec. 1944, Sec. V, p. 27; AAF Evaluation Board, POA, Report No. 1, p. 55; Hist. VII FC, Sept. 1944, p. 6.

160. Extract from Monthly Intelligence Summary No. 1, Hq. V AFSC, 20 June-20 July 1944.

161. Hist. 5th AF, 15 June 1944-2 Sept. 1945, I, chap. 1, 85; Hist. V FC, chap. 4, July-Dec. 1944, Annex I, Incl. 34; Hist. V AFSC, Dec. 1944, p. 14; ltr., CG 5th AF to CG FEAF, sub.: Rest Area for Combat Crew Personnel, 11 June 1945.

162. Hist. 500th Bomb. Gp., Feb. 1945, p. 11; Hist. 73d Bomb. Wing, Feb.-Mar. 1945, pp. 34, 69, 72; ibid., Apr. 1945, pp. 37, 40; ibid., June 1945, p. 29; ibid., July 1945, p. 24; Hist. 313th Bomb. Wing, Apr. 1945, Part I, p. 34; ltr., Col. K. H. Gibson, CO 6th Bomb. Gp., to CG 313th Bomb. Wing, sub.: Rotation Rest and Recreation Plan, 26 Apr. 1945; ltr.

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162. Cont'd
Barney Giles to Eaker, 12 June 1945; ltr., Eaker to Barney Giles, 4 July 1945.

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163. Survey of Soldier Opinion in New Guinea, 29 Oct. 1943, Part II, p. 29; Hist. 308th Bomb. Gp., Jan. 1945, p. i; Hist. 40th Bomb. Gp., May 1945, p. 14; War Diary, 717th Bomb. Sq., 12 Mar. 1944; AAF Evaluation Board, POA, Report No. 2, pp. 29-30; ltr., Eaker to Arnold, 14 Aug. 1944.

164. Morale Factors in SWPA, pp. 12-15; Hist. V FC, chap. 3, Jan.-June 1944, p. 121; Hist. 5th AF, 15 June 1944-2 Sept. 1945, I, chap. 1, p. 83; Monthly Intelligence Summary No. 7, Hq. V AFSC, 20 Dec. 1944-20 Jan. 1945; Hist. 13th AF, Jan.-Mar. 1945, Sec. V, p. 22; Hist. of Air War in POA, Text, IV, chap. XXXI, 18; Org. Hist. VII BC, Apr. 1945, p. 421; Incl. 12 Personnel and Administration, in memo, Maj. Gen. J. W. Jones, The Air Inspector, to CG AAFPOA, sub.: Inspection VII Fighter Command, 29 June 1945; Hist. 404th Bomb. Sq., Sept. 1944, p. 11; AAF-CBI Evaluation Board, Report No. 1, 15 Sept. 1944, para. 63; Hist. 12th AF Med. Sec., Aug. 1942-June 1944.

165. Hist. 9th AF, Vol. I, 28 Jan.-17 Aug. 1942, 201; Ibid., Vol. II, 17 Aug. 1942-1 May 1943, 436; Hist. 12th AF Med. Sec., Aug. 1942-June 1944, p. 74; Hist. 12th AF A-1 Sec. through end of 1943, pp. 5-6, 8; ltr., Eaker to Stratemeyer, 2 Jan. 1943; ltr., Maj. Gen. James H. Doolittle to Maj. Gen. Davenport Johnson, 8 Jan. 1943; ltr., Millard Harmon to Arnold, 16 Dec. 1942; Hist. A-1 Sec., Hq. 11th AF, 16 Mar. 1942-31 May 1944, pp. 18-19; CM-OUT-10624, OPD to CG USAFIME AMSME Cairo 4539, 26 Apr. 1943; WD Circular 127, 29 May 1943; Nelson Report, pp. 7-8; ltr., Barney Giles to Stratemeyer, [illegible] Oct. 1943.

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

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166. Ltr., Arnold to Brig. Gen. Ralph H. Wooten, 16 Feb. 1944. Similar letters were sent to other overseas air force commanders.

167. Morale Factors in SWPA, pp. 13-14; Happy Warriors Folder; Col. Charles G. Williamson, First Partial Report of Alaskan Inspection, 12 Nov. 1942; Memo, CG USAFISPA for Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Hanley, Jr., 8 Dec. 1942; ltr., Millard Harmon to Arnold, 16 Dec. 1942; ltr., Eaker to Stratemeyer, 2 Jan. 1943; ltr., Doolittle to Johnson, 8 Jan. 1943; AAFHS-35, pp. 167-69, 175-77; Lt. Col. Frederick J. Freese, Jr., MC, Status Report on Medical Department Officers in Thirteenth Air Force and in Other AAF Units in SPA, as of 9 Apr. 1943; ltr., Spaatz to Arnold, 14 July 1943; ltr., Barney Giles to Spaatz, 24 Aug. 1943; ltr., Kenney to Arnold, 28 July 1943; ltr., Arnold to Kenney, 31 Aug. 1943; ltr., Arnold to Eaker, 2 Jan. 1943; ltr., Johnson to Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, 15 Jan. 1943; ltr., Stratemeyer to Whitehead, 29 Jan. 1943; ltr., Stratemeyer to Millard Harmon, 11 Feb. 1943; ltr., Barney Giles to Maj. Gen. Howard C. Davidson, 11 May 1943; ltr., Arnold to Doolittle, 11 Feb. 1944; 8th AF Memo 35-1, 4 Mar. 1944; ltr., Doolittle to Arnold, sub.: Policy on Relief of Combat Crews, 4 Mar. 1944; ltr., Maj. Gen. James M. Bevans to Kenney, 25 Apr. 1944; ltr., Barney Giles to Eaker, 19 June 1944; ltr., Barney Giles to Spaatz, 19 June 1944; Narrative Hist. Hq. 8th AF, Mar. 1944, p. 4; ibid., July 1944, pp. 1-2, 93-94.

168. CM-OUT-2083, SPXPE-A to CG USAF AMSME Cairo, 3724, 5 Mar. 1943; ltr., Arnold to Kenney, 31 Aug. 1943; ltr., Bevans to Twining, 12 Jan. 1944; ltr., Barney Giles to Eaker, 19 June 1944.

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169. Morale Factors in SWPA, p. 12. See also ltr., Brig. Gen. Paul B. Wurtsmith to Dep. Comdr. 5th AF, sub.: Replacement Personnel, 19 June 1943; ltr., Kenney to Arnold, 23 July 1943; ltr., Wurtsmith to Dep. Comdr. 5th AF, sub.: Medical Officer's Report, 9 Nov. 1943; ltr., Doolittle to CG AAF, Att.: Bevans, sub.: Personnel, 19 Nov. 1943.

170. Hist. V FC, chap. 1, Nov. 1942-June 1943, pp. 134-35.

171. Hist. 12th AF A-1 Sec., through end of 1943, p. 12; ibid., 2d quarter 1944; ibid., 4th quarter, 1944; ibid., 1st quarter 1945; ltr., Hq. 5th AF to All 5th AF Unit Commanders, sub.: Temporary Duty to United States, 6 Apr. 1945; File 124; Morale Factors in SWPA, pp. 6, 14-15; ibid., Annex I, pp. 5-6; ibid., Annex 11-A; Hist. 5th AF, 15 June 1944-2 Sept. 1945, I, chap. I, p. 83; Extract from Monthly Intelligence Summary No. 1, Hq. V AFSC, 20 June-20 July 1944; Extract from Monthly Intelligence Summary No. 2, Hq. V AFSC, 21 July-20 Aug. 1944; Monthly Intelligence Summary No. 7, Hq. V AFSC, 20 Dec. 1944-20 Jan. 1945; ibid., No. 11, 20 Apr.-20 May 1945; Hist. 13th AF, Jan.-Mar. 1945, p. 22; ibid., Apr.-June 1945, p. 21; Hist. 11th Bomb. Gp., Aug. 1944, p. 5; ibid., Sept. 1944, p. 5; ibid., Oct. 1944, p. 6; ibid., Dec. 1944, pp. 5-6, 8; ibid., Feb. 1945, pp. 5-6; Hist. 26th Bomb. Sq., July 1945, p. 15; Hist. of Air War in POA, Text, IV, chap. XXXI, p. 18; Incl. 1, Personnel and Administration, in memo, Maj. Gen. J. W. Jones, The Air Inspector, to CG AAFPOA, sub.: Inspection VII Fighter Command, 29 June 1945; War Diary, 84th Bomb. Sq., 29 Jan. 1944; War Diary, Hq. & Hq. Sq. 306th Sv. Gp., 13 Mar., 20 Apr. 1944; War Diary, 1666th Ord. S & M Co., Avn., 26 Apr., 24 Oct. 1944; Hist. 31st Ftr. Gp., Oct. 1944, pp. 5-6; War Diary, 1068th Sig. Co., Sv. Gp., 19 Nov. 1944; War Diary, 1062d Sig. Co., Sv. Gp., 18 Nov. 1944.

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172. Quote from Eaker in memo for CGs 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 6th, and 7th Air Forces from Arnold, 22 Apr. 1943. See also ltr., Eaker to Stratemeyer, 2 Jan. 1943; memo for Chief, Research Br., Div. of Morale Services, from Maj. Douglas Waples, sub.: Information Obtained from Returnees at AFRS #1, 22 Nov. 1943; Report on Survey of Aircrew Personnel in the 8th, 9th, 12th and 15th Air Forces, p. 61; Morale Factors in SWPA, p. 6.

173. Ltr., Brig. Gen. Frederick L. Anderson to Stratemeyer, 21 July 1943; Interview with Col. M. A. Preston, 3 July 1945; Report on Survey of Aircrew Personnel in the 8th, 9th, 12th and 15th Air Forces, pp. 62, 64-65; Nelson Report, p. 7; Morale Factors in SWPA, p. 6.

174. For examples of successful leadership and its morale consequences, see memo for CGs 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 6th, and 7th Air Forces from Arnold, 22 Apr. 1943; Air Reference History, No. 9, The Fourteenth Air Force to 1 October 1943, p. 9; General Kenney Reports, pp. 64, 382-83; Hist. 404th Bomb. Sq., 14-15 Jan. 1941 to 1 Jan. 1944, p. 42; Hist. 79th TC Sq., Mar. 1945, p. 6. For examples of poor leadership and its morale consequences, see Hist. of FEAF, I, 23-24; Interview with Capt. Edward M. Woddrop, 12 Apr. 1944; Interview with 1st Lt. Kenneth H. Oppenheimer, 11 Apr. 1944; Interview with 1st Lt. George C. Riggins, 12 Apr. 1944; Interview with Col. Millard L. Haskin, 15 June 1945; ATCU No. 5, Reports E-29, E-32; Hist. of ICD ATC, 1944, I, 272-76; Hist. 332d Sv. Gp., 2 Mar. 1942-Aug. 1943, pp. 2-3. For many examples of the concern of AAF commanders for the morale and welfare of their men, see Operations Letters, Vols. I and II, in Air Historical Archives, passim.

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